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 Abstract 
Everyday Fascism in Contemporary Japan 
Etsko Kasai 
 
This dissertation uses the concept of fascism in order to examine the socio-culture of 
contemporary Japan. Defined in terms of its commodity structure, fascism turns out to be a 
relevant concept to Japan not only prior to and during the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945) but also 
from the postwar days to date. Against various forms of culturalism that claim that the country is 
essentially totalitarian and its culture is innately violent, I will argue that the country has shared 
fascist conditions with those other countries and regions that operate in the mode of mechanical 
reproduction. While the overall mode of mass-reproduction has been further articulated by 
different moments, such as late capitalism or post-modernism, the cultural and political condition 
of reducing singular lives and events into standardized forms has continued in these countries 
and regions roughly since the 1920s. My view will expand the horizon of studies of fascism, 
which has hitherto been limited to Europe between the two World Wars. At the same time, the 
view of fascism’s generality should not be blind to local inflections and historical specificities. In 
this dissertation, I will examine such trans-war Japanese institutions as the ideologies of 
emperorship, formation of the petty bourgeois class, and corporatist organizations of gender and 
locality. My dissertation will ethnographically investigate the way in which these institutions 
have interacted with the country’s modern capitalist everyday to result in fascist violence. The 
specific sites in which my ethnographies take place are the contemporary Tokyo and Yokohama 
suburbs (Chapters 1 and 3) and the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo (Chapters 2 and 4), among 
others. These ethnographies will elucidate how the categories of class, gender, and generation 
 crisscross everyday pleasures and anxieties of commodification. Lastly and not least importantly, 
another historically specific element of postwar Japanese fascism is memories and traces of its 
prewar violence exercised on other Asians and Pacific Islanders. The problem of ill mourning 
seems to critically ground the postwar Japanese formation of fascist potentialities. The last 
chapter will discuss contemporary Japanese efforts for mourning and the accompanying issue of 
ethics.
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Prologue 
 
Suggestively perhaps, the date and location are vague. It was some time during my early 
graduate years, somewhere in the so-called “graduate ghetto,” that is, roughly between Whitney 
Avenue and State Street in downtown New Haven. Over potluck dishes and international beers, a 
small number of us were wound down in the couch, remotely hearing silly laughter from the 
kitchen. “Doug” was as loaded as any one of us, which made him oddly quiet and melancholic. I 
am not sure how we ended up in talking about it, but when I noticed, he was describing some 
details of a set of action figures comprised of American and German soldiers from the Second 
World War. 
 “And here were commanders pointing their fingers at their lieutenants; and there were 
soldiers with rifles, bazookas, and machineguns. Some were the snipers on their stomach; others 
were about to throw their grenades,” he spread out the imaginary map.   
 According to him, the Germans had been painted black and the Americans had been 
green⎯fifty pieces each. The little Doug would line them up neatly so that they would look 
realistic in their positions, under artificial trees and on paper grass. He would look at them 
tirelessly, everyday. He had never even played with them, according to him⎯“the point was 
their order, I guess.” The line and order, starting from the commanders and ending in infantries, 
however, had not lasted forever, as he might have wished. One day, one of his classmates had 
come to play with the figures. The order had been scrambled; one of the German commanders 
had even gone missing⎯as it would turn out, forever. “John Doe!” the grown-up Doug in the 
New Haven party quietly shouted the name of the classmate from long ago and shook his head. 
  v 
The talk was becoming pointless and everyone started to go to the kitchen to get the freshly 
baked cookies.  
It is obvious that Doug’s story is one of those insignificant, party talks that people might 
make late at night to sound intimate, to repel sleepiness. As for me, I am not sure why I even 
remember the story. Even now, I occasionally think of the otherwise complete set of Doug’s 
soldiers, ninety-nine in all, whose lost perfection apparently still haunts him. I imagine the 
miniature soldiers’ plastic bodies, their eternal poses in Doug’s parents’ dark basement, 
somewhere in the middle of the Midwestern surrealism, in its tornado-pregnant tranquility. 
Perhaps now it is me who is haunted, if not by the soldiers, then by the perceived bizarreness of a 
child who is obsessed with the organization of, rather than the interaction with, action figures. 
But who can actually tell that I am not obsessed with the soldiers, the pleasure and fear of their 
meticulous organization per se?  
This dissertation, entitled “Everyday Fascism in Contemporary Japan,” was written in the 




Introduction: Fascism as a Mass Phenomenon 
  
 This dissertation recasts contemporary Japan using the theoretical concept of fascism and 
the analytical category of class. Conventionally, studies of fascism have marginalized Japan as 
their subject, calling the pre-World War Two Japanese polity “authoritarianism,” for instance.1 
Conventional studies have also been cautious about considering as their subjects any movements 
or discourses that are observed after the 1920-40s.2 In this dissertation, I adopt the position that 
fascism is a general phenomenon beyond the European continent and the period of the two 
World Wars. 
The argument as to the generality of fascism has grown out of the insight that fascism is a 
phenomenon of modernity and capitalism.3 Commodity logic, on which modern capitalism is 
based, abstracts, “equalizes,” and totalizes singular things and humans as values, while marking 
each value as different from others.4 The argument is that fascism radically accentuates these 
                                                                  
1 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); 
pp.328-354. 
2 One of the most articulate denials of the generality of fascism comes from the historian Gilbert Allardyce in 
his “What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept,” American Historical Review, 84 (1979): 367-
388. Payne (Ibid.) similarly limits the phenomenon of fascism to the geography of Western Europe and the time 
period of the1920-40s, when he considers South African Ossewabrandwag, for instance. According to him, it is 
merely “protofascism.” Latin American fascism such as the Chilean National Socialist Movement is likewise fas-
cism that is “copied” and “quickly failed.” Walter Laqueur, in his Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996), uses a broader net than these two do, with which he tries to grasp such diversified re-
gimes and movements as Soviet communism, Islamic fundamentalism, or European neofascism in terms of fascism, 
yet confusingly, without a theoretically rigorous definition of fascism. 
3 See Jun Tosaka, Nihon ideology-ron: Gendai Nihon ni okeru Nihon-shugi, Fascism, Jiyū-shugi,Shisō no 
Hihan (Tokyo: Hakuyō-sha, 1938(1935)); Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. and with an intro by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zone (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1968(1936)), pp. 217-251; Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” in New York Review of 
Books, February 6, 1975; Ernst Bloch, Heritage of Our Times, trans. by Neville and Stephen Plaice (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1990); Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in 
Interwar Japan (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000) and “Constitutive Ambiguities: The Per-
sistence of Modernism and Fascism in Japan’s Modern History,” in Alan Tansman ed., Ibid.; Marilyn Ivy, “For-
ward: Fascism Yet?” (in Tansman, Ibid). 
4 See Karl Marx, “The Commodity” in his Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1. intro. Ernest 
Mandel, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp.125-177. See also Ferdinand de Saussure’s similar 
discussion on linguistic value in his Course in General Linguistics, ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in 
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workings of commodification by violently erasing the singularity of each individual and system-
atically integrating the thusly-rendered individuals as mutually identical yet differently function-
al units of society. The fascist totality of the radically commoditized humans potentially looks 
attractive and forceful to these individuals, to the extent that they are always already the modern 
capitalist subjects. In order to produce commoditized goods and services, these individuals have 
to be forgetful about their own creative agency, while fascinated with their products’ commodi-
tized appearances. When a neatly packaged commodity aligned with others in the identical 
shapes and a range of colors is so strangely alluring that the commodity appears even to com-
mand a certain emotional and psychological dominance over one’s monotonous, reified life, one 
is already prepared to find an aesthetic satisfaction and irresistible force in fascism. Lined-up 
soldiers, “mass” events, the “equal” and equalized subjects⎯the picture that fascism provides is 
at once that of the commodity’s overwhelming beauty and that of humans’ reified self-
expression. Objectively and subjectively, fascism is thus deeply rooted in modern capitalism. 
This dissertation is a survey of this connection in the case of pre- and post-WWII Japan. My pur-
pose is not to particularize Japan as specifically fascist, but to generalize fascism out of the spe-
cific history of Japan.  
The theory of general fascism necessitates a new theory of modern capitalism. If the vio-
lence of fascism’s rendition and integration so closely maps onto the power of capitalism’s ab-
straction and formalization, is it not because the capitalist abstraction and formalization are po-
tentially totalitarian and/or otherwise violent? Does not modern capitalism necessarily invite the 
problem of fascism due to capitalism’s own potentialities for violence? How can and should one 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, trans., with an intro. and notes by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book, 1966). According to Thomas Keenan, “equality (gleihheit)” is originally Marx’s word⎯see Keenan, “The 
Point Is to (Ex)Change It: Reading Capital, Rhetorically,” in Emily Apter and William Pietz eds., Fetishism as Cul-
tural Discourse (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.152-185; p.165. 
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re-consider the capitalist logic and mechanism in the face of their fascist appropriation? Max 
Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno address these questions, using the concepts of “mythology” 
and the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment that they see as logically and socially related to com-
modity logic. Their conclusion is that “[j]ust as the myths already realize enlightenment, so en-
lightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology.”5 The wrath of the 
gods as vengeance on the villains, repetitious ordeals that the heroes and heroines have to go 
through, and these heroic figures’ eventual returns to their homelands⎯these mythemes, accord-
ing to Horkheimer and Adorno, already show the modern principles of retribution, repetition, and 
identity. But in addition to these modern principles that are inherent in mythic violence, the 
scholars are here talking about the mythic violence of modernity, which contradictorily persists 
at the center of the otherwise rational logic of the Enlightenment.6 To these scholars, Enlighten-
ment logic is initially that of the quantification of the world. As is exemplified by mathematics, 
Enlightenment reason then tries to use the unity of the thusly-abstracted world, i.e. the unity as 
consisting of numbers only, in order to build a system, a scheme. Horkheimer and Adorno sug-
gest that nature fundamentally resides in or eventually returns to this system of rationality in 
three ways. First, nature can be found as the uncontrollability of the system’s totality. The system 
does not completely subjugate itself to human knowledge, to the degree that the system comes to 
acquire its own life, automaticity (the return of “animism”).7 Second, also in the process of quan-
tification, the violence of nature manifests itself as reason’s inability to consider each individual 
being ethically in its preciousness and uniqueness. The system’s inhumane automaticity has 
something to do with this fundamental unethicality of reason. Third, related to all of these points, 
                                                                  
5  See their Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1998(1944)); pp.11-2. 
6  See also Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” ed. and with an intro. by Peter Demetz, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 
1978(1921)), pp.277-300; Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in ed. and with 
an introduction by Gil Anidjar, Acts of Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), pp.230-298. 
7  Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid., p.28.  
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there is a certain requisite inertia in the rational mind, in the sense that modern individuals join 
the Enlightenment projects driven by what Horkheimer and Adorno call impulse. Initially, they 
say, the impulse is that to survive in the middle of natural environments and later, the impulse is 
that to maintain the totality that has started to automatically subjugate humans. The violence of 
impulse is a requisite for the system to sustain itself, since without it, enlightened humans would 
rationally understand that the systematic quantification oppresses both humans and nature and 
would eventually try to escape the loop of subjugation. Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that fas-
cism should be considered the fleurs du mal of the Enlightenment, which absorb the Enlighten-
ment’s fundamental violence and express its full potential. Absurd formality without meaning, its 
subjects’ blind conformity to the meaningless forms, and the formalist totalization of the blindly 
self-subjectivized beings⎯these characteristics of fascism are merely the logical extensions of 
the Enlightenment’s instrumentality, according to these scholars.8  
Note here that to argue that there is something violent about modernity is obviously not 
to argue that every regime in modern times deserves the name of fascism. What this dissertation 
argues is the inverse⎯fascism is modern and capitalist. This argument does not require one to 
re-categorize other types of modern capitalist regimes and movements as fascist; one is rather 
required to reexamine modernity and capitalism in terms of their potentialities to grow such poi-
sonous flowers as fascism. Any violence of other regimes and movements in modern times could 
and should be studied as sharing the same potentialities of modern capitalist violence with fas-
                                                                  
8  It is known that these insights were collectively developed in the intellectual interactions between 
Horkheimer and Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, and other Frankfurt School thinkers. Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s thesis of the dialectic between the Enlightenment and myth, then, is found already in the following 
works, though in prototypical forms⎯Benjamin, “The Work of…,” Ibid.; Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar 
Essays. trans., ed., and with an intro. by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995). For 
the analyses of the actual process through which these thinkers interacted, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of 
Negative Dialectics: Theodore W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: Free Press, 
1977); Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social 
Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996(1973)).  
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cism; but again, this does not mean that these regimes and movements are fascist. The questions 
that this dissertation asks are, “What nurtures these violent potentialities of modernity and capi-
talism, which are common among modern capitalist societies, to realize these potentialities into 
the actual violence of fascism in particular societies? What catalysts cause fascism in one mod-
ern capitalist society at a certain historical juncture and not in another? How historically specifi-
cally do certain actors succeed in sublimating the fascist desires for and anxieties about commod-
itized equivalence into the democratic ideas and institutions of humanitarian equality?” In order 
to answer these questions, this dissertation explores the concrete agents of a fascist manifestation 
in the case of trans-war Japan.  
Their conditions’ generality notwithstanding, fascist movements are classed. One of the 
biggest contradictions of modern capitalism, class tends to cause peculiar patterns in fascist 
movements’ constituencies. Even though the whole society generally understands the logic and 
charm of fascism more or less intuitively, certain class groups in the same society usually sup-
port the fascist movements more vehemently than others. The key here is the radicalized law of 
equivalence, as fascists practice it, which appeals particularly to those class groups that are un-
derprivileged in the modern capitalist system.9 In this dissertation, I will examine the way in 
                                                                  
9 Many studies of fascism’s constituency in interwar Europe have pointed out the similarly classed structure 
of fascism. Stanley Payne, for instance, finds that voters for Nazis were either the petty bourgeoisie in small towns 
or farmers, while the non-organized proletariat (the young lumpen proletariat, farm laborers, etc.) followed suit in 
later years (esp. as members of the SA). He reports that the members of Italian Fascismo, prior to Mussolini’s com-
promise in October 1922 with elites, were similarly farmers and the petty bourgeoisie (Mussolini is known to have 
demobilized the petty bourgeoisie upon his alliance with elites). See his Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Mad-
ison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), pp.58-61. For similar studies, see Renzo de Felice, Interpretations 
of Fascism, trans. Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), p.316; Rein-
hard Kühnl, “Pre-Conditions for the Rise and Victory of Fascism in Germany,” in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hag-
tvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust eds. Who Were the Fascists” Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, 
Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), pp.118-130; and Nico Passchier, “The Electoral Geography of the Nazi Land-
slide,” in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust eds., Ibid., pp.283-300. About Hungarian fascists' appeal to petty bour-
geoisie plus lumpen proletariat, see Miklόs Lackό, “The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: The Arrow Cross”; and 
György Ránki, “The Fascist Vote in Budapest in 1939,” both in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust eds., Ibid., pp.395-
400 and 401-416 respectively. In Norway and Spain, fascism started as middle- to upper-class movements and then 
extended to include petty bourgeoisie—see Stein Ugelvik Larsen, “The Social Foundations of Norwegian Fascism 
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which everyday fascism in contemporary Japan is generated by the distressed bourgeoisie and 
petty bourgeoisie, who carry embodied wishes for equality. Like many other places in the globe, 
Japan today is not hesitant about pushing its economy to the neo-liberal extreme, polarizing the 
population that was once called “all middle-class” (ichi-oku sōchūryū).10 Although every group 
in the neoliberal class spectrum is equally supplied by the desires for and fears of the ultimate 
equivalence that fascism promises through its violence, the “proletarianized” bourgeoisie and the 
further deprived petty bourgeoisie are so conditioned that they are more inclined to the fascist 
promise of equalization than “dot-com millionaires” and other nouveau riche might be. This dis-
sertation will locate the moments of fascist generation in everyday Japan, as the country is going 
through a tectonic shift in its class dynamic. Fetishistically fascinated and melancholically for-
getful, the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Japan today are the unconscious agents of the 
prolonged moments of fascism there.  
            A troubling expression of the society’s class-structure, fascism in everyday Japan has a 
history. About a century ago when the country experienced a similar level of socio-economic 
turmoil to the current one due to a series of the post-First World War recessions, dispossessed 
farmers, in addition to small retailers, clerks, carpenters, plumbers, teachers, monks, small land-
lords, and others of a petty bourgeois background started numerous movements for grass-roots 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1933-1945: An Analysis of Membership Data,” in Larsen, Hagtvet, and Myklebust eds., Ibid., pp.595-620; and 
Payne, Ibid. (1995), pp.252-267. 
10 According to Yasusuke Murakami, the term circulated as “common sense” (jōshiki) among the Japanese 
during the 1950-80s period, after the Prime Minister’s Office’s annual Survey of National Life in this period had 
found out that about 90% (initially about 70%) of those surveyed responded that they thought they would belong to 
the middle-class. See his Shin Chūkan Taishū no Jidai (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1984); p.167. For criticism of the 
ideology, see Marilyn Ivy, “Formations of Mass Culture in Postwar Japan,” in Andrew Gordon ed., Postwar Japan 
as History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp.239-258 and William W. Kelly, “Finding a Place in 
Metropolitan Japan: Ideologies, Institutions, and Everyday Life,” in Gordon, Ibid., pp.189-216. Many empirical 
studies also prove the myth to be erroneous—for example, see Joe Moore ed., Other Japan: Conflict, Compromise, 
and Resistance Since 1945 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997) and John Lie, Multiethnic Japan (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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economic cooperation, local modernization, and neighborly supports of a moral nature.11 It was 
the historical epoch in which the economy was being monopolized worldwide, the state’s and 
industries’ response to the globalized recessions that culminated in the Great Depression of 
1929-1939. Independent businesses, artisanship, and agriculture were declining everywhere.12 It 
is perhaps the “delayed” nature of their modes of production behind the world trend of mechani-
cal reproduction that made the petty bourgeoisie and farmers particularly susceptible to the 
anachronistic surface of fascist ideologies⎯the ideology of “communities,” for example. The 
alleged “alternative” to the class-divided society that impoverished these actors, the supposedly 
moral communities were said to guarantee the members’ mutual equality. But at the same time, 
the point of this ideological morality, which was supposed to assure the extra-capitalist equality 
in these communities, rather confirmed the totality of capitalism. As Kant says, morality in mod-
ern times cannot be but the principle of subjectivization; and in that sense morality is intimately 
connected to commodification.13 The farmers and petty bourgeoisie were surely delayed materi-
ally yet not completely outside capitalism.14 
 Most prominently, the moral equality that the farming and petty bourgeois Japanese 
dreamt about then culminated in the ideology of the “emperor’s infants” (tennō no sekishi), 
                                                                  
11 See Theodore C. Bester, Neighborhood Tokyo (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International, 1989) and 
Shōichi Amemiya, “Kisei Seiryoku no Jiko-Kakushin to Gleichschaltung: Sōryoku-sen Taisei to Chūkan-sō,” in 
Yasushi Yamanouchi, Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita eds., Sōryoku-sen to Gendai-ka (Tokyo: Kashiwa 
Shobō, 1995), pp.239-266. 
12 Horkheimer and Adorno (Ibid.) record the petty bourgeois decline in Germany. See especially the chapter, 
“Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,” pp.81-119. 
13  See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Third Edition. ed., trans., intro. by Lewis White Beck 
(New York: Macmillan, 1993(1956)). 
14  As Horkheimer and Adorno (Ibid.) say, “[e]very spiritual resistance it [the Enlightenment] encounters 
serves merely to increase its strength... Whatever myths the resistance may appeal to, by virtue of the very fact that 
they become arguments in the process of opposition, they acknowledge the principle of dissolvent rationality for 
which they reproach the Enlightenment. Enlightenment is totalitarian” (p.6). See Ernst Bloch (Ibid.) for his detailed 
analysis of the non-contemporaneous contemporaneity of German farmers in Weimar to Nazi days. A. James Gregor, 
citing Giovanni Ansaldo, similarly argues that Italian fascism “resonated with the interests of the ‘Italian petty bour-
geoisie obsessed with modernity.’” See his “Fascism and Modernization: Some Addenda,” World Politics, Vol. 26, 
No. 3 (April 1974), 370-384; 376-7; the emphasis is Gregor’s. 
  
8 
whereby all the Japanese were alleged to be morally and aesthetically equal before the then polit-
ico-cultural sovereign, the “emperor” (tennō). Despite its reference to archaic myths and “tradi-
tions,” the ideology’s technique of abstracting variously classed individuals into the same form 
of the subject (infants or sekishi) and imagination of total exchangeability among the thus-
abstracted subjects would be possible only after the advent of modern capitalism and its logic of 
the commodity. The technologies of mechanical reproduction, which had been used in the Japa-
nese economy since the 1920s, further facilitated these techniques and imaginations adopted by 
the emperor’s infant ideology. With the help of these technologies, such as the cinema, the pho-
tograph, and the phonograph, the farmers and petty bourgeoisie enjoyed the images in which 
they appeared to be identical with each other as the emperor’s infants. These images were meta-
phorically referring to and literally created by the infinitely repeatable forms of the mechanically 
reprinted photos, films, records, and so on.15 The farmers’ and petty bourgeois fascism in Japan 
thus presented the picture of completely commodified equivalence among its subjects. While co-
opting these actors’ ideology of equality, the state also promoted corporatism, which was a pro-
posal of differentiation. 
            Corporatism throughout the world was conceived about the turn of the last century as an 
elite solution to modern capitalist anomie, especially commodification of humans (reification) 
                                                                  
15 Thinkers like Walter Benjamin (Ibid.) underscore the age-specificity of fascism within the overall regime 
of modern capitalism. Especially the mode of mechanical reproduction, where modernity and capitalism have at-
tained their most advanced state, is the mode in which fascism was born and thrives, according to Benjamin. Fas-
cism intends to promote the logic and technologies of mass-reproduction in its project to aesthetically and physically 
eliminate singularities and differences, particularly the class disparities that are the inevitable consequences of mod-
ern capitalism. One of the most prominent examples that show the relation between fascism and the mode of me-
chanical reproduction will be Leni Riefenstahl’s 1935 film Triumph of the Will (Bloomington, Il: Synapse Films, 
2001), in which the powerful impression of cadence and organization that was cinematographically produced pushes 
itself through to the end of the film, literally triumphing over any possible chaos and fluidity of more than 700,000 
classed and otherwise diversified people, who gathered for the Nazi Party’s Nuremberg Convention (see Sontag, 
Ibid., for useful comments). About whether Japan in the 1920s was ruled by the mode of mechanical reproduction, 
Harry Harootunian (Ibid., 1995) affirmatively describes contemporary Japanese scholars’ anxiety about this mode 
and about the resultant disappearance of aura from the society. 
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and the resultant formation of the “masses.” The concept of corporatism can be compared to the 
ideology of equality, which aimed at mobilizing people as masses, that is, as reified producers 
and consumers of mechanically reproduced products. Although the emperor’s infant ideology, 
for example, did aspire to check the inherently uncontrollable dispersal of the masses, it aspired 
to do so by merely magnetizing them to the center (e.g. the emperor).16 Corporatism was differ-
ent in its attempt to block the infinite exchangeability and dissemination of the masses by com-
partmentalizing them into a multiple number of supposedly organic groups other than class. Cor-
poratists sought organic solidarity not only within each of these groups but among the groups so 
that each of them was a function of their collectivity, which was then regarded as an organism in 
itself.17 Mussolini’s Italy was conceived as an organic, national whole, which was consisted of a 
bundle (fascis or fasces) of vocational groups.18 In Japan, the organic whole was imagined to be 
the fantastic body of the emperor, which was ideologized as coinciding with the territory and 
polity of the Japanese nation-state (kokutai).19 In 1940, the body of the nation-state was institu-
tionalized as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai), coordinating and 
controlling its subordinate corporate groups, each of which was assembled according to the 
                                                                  
16 The masses’ affinity with political totalitarianism is of course derived from their aesthetically totalitarian 
nature. Where there is not even a hint of diversity in their members' significance, identities, and other contents, the 
form that they adopt (“styles,” “trends,” etc.) comes to totalize them, readying them for fascist and other politically 
totalitarian manipulations. See Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.; esp. the chapter “The Culture Industry: Enlighten-
ment as Mass Deception,” pp.120-167). 
17 According to Stanley Payne, the most concise definition of corporatism can be found in Philippe Schmitter, 
who states “Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which constituent units are orga-
nized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitve, hierarchically ordered and functionally differ-
entiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational mo-
nopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls....” (in Payne, Ibid., 1980, 
pp.24-5; parenthesis original). 
18 Thus Mussolini invented the appellation, Fascismo, for his movement. According to Alan Cassels, “Alt-
hough the Duce was highly successful between the wars in cornering the market in corporative philosophy, this as-
pect of Fascist Italian activity is often overlooked,” perhaps “due in part to the belated formulation of corporative 
doctrine, several years after Mussolini took office,” that is, after he compromised with the elites. See his “Janus: The 
Two Faces of Fascism” in The Canadian Historical Association ed., Historical Papers, Vol.4, No.1, 1969, 166-184; 
p.171. 
19 In other words, the emperor had the two bodies that Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz discusses in his King’s 
Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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members’ gender, age, status, ethnicity, etc.20 Similar to the emperor’s infant ideology, the struc-
tural functional view of the organic nation-state was predicated on commodity logic, as its over-
emphasized spatiality (body, function, categories, etc., versus their histories) might attest to. Dif-
ferentiation, after all, is an important working of commodity logic, for exchanges never occur 
among self-same products.21 Yet, as different commodities are the same in their being the con-
gealment of people’s “labor-power” (and in that sense taking the same value-form), different 
corporate groups were the same as parts of the whole. In order to be the parts, the groups and the 
members of the groups had to forsake other, more idiosyncratic aspects of themselves that did 
not fit the whole.22 
            Materially, therefore, the ideologies of the emperor’s body (corporatism) and the emper-
or’s infants (fascism proper) shared the same commodity logic, whereas in their appearances, 
they were the opposite forces of differentiation and equalization. The ideological opposition was 
socially played out between the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.23 While the petty bourgeoi-
                                                                  
20  About Japanese corporatism that was enforced more vigorously in borderlands than in other spaces, see 
Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, Maryland: Row-
man and Littlefield, 2003) and Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the 
North Korean Revolution in Manchuria (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005). 
21  See Marx, Ibid., p.132. 
22 According to one of the most influential ideologues of corporatism in Japan then, Tetsurō Watsuji, each 
unit of the nation-state should be a moral individual sans “selfishness” (wagamama). The corporatist individual is 
then comparable to the structuralist, in addition to capitalist, value, in its lack of real singularity and in its acquisition 
of the new, abstracted difference that takes on significance only in its comparison with others, as Naoki Sakai’s 
post-structuralist reading of Watsuji suggests. See Sakai, “Return to the West/Return to the East: Watsuji Testsurō’s 
Anthropology and Discussions of Authenticity,” in his Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nation-
alism (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp.72-116. The concept of value is of course 
the theoretical strength and weakness of structuralism, as the concept necessarily starts with the conceptualization of 
totality—see critique of Saussure by David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin 
of Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001); especially pp.49-89. Similarly, value in the Saussurean or even 
Foucaultian version of structuralism cannot consider those temporal factors that the parts of the whole have to con-
tain⎯transformations, decays, growth, or amnesia could and do easily de-constitute things and individuals as the 
structural values. See Rosalind Morris, In the Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Northern Thailand 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000); pp.46-7. Sakai’s criticism of Watsuji also takes into account 
temporality. 
23 My class-analysis of 1920-40s Japan builds on those preceding social scientific studies in Japan, which 
identify the petty bourgeoisie as the agents of the Japanese violence then. For instance, Shōji Yamada pursues mas-
sacres of Korean residents in the wake of the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1923 as one of the manifestations of the 
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sie’s and farmers’ desperate situations made them exercise what Deleuze and Guattari call “war-
machine” force to radically commoditize (“equalize”) the classed everyday, the bourgeoisie was 
inclined toward differentiation and categorization, to the degree that they would like to maintain 
their difference, albeit in other disguises than class.24 In the end, the ideological strife between 
the class groups was solved as the petty bourgeois war-machine took over the state and drove it 
into the “all-out” war. Two million Japanese and twenty million other Asians were killed accord-
ing to the ideology of the emperor’s infants, thus eternalizing their equivalence in their deaths.25 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Japanese petty bourgeois violence. Among his numerous works, see e.g. Kantō Dai-Shinsai Chōsen-jin Gyakusatsu 
Mondai Kankei Shiryō (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 2004). At the same time, I depart from these studies for their more 
or less prominently suggested nationalism, originally introduced by their muse and master, Masao Maruyama. Ac-
cording to him, the petty bourgeois belligerence exhibited in neighborhoods and battlefields during the war was 
merely a new instance of the ethno-culturally specific, prelinguistic violence of Japan. See his “Nihon no Shisō,” in 
Nihon no Shisō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), pp.1-66. 
 Another point of my criticism of those preceding studies is their negligence to analyze the bourgeois in-
volvement in fascism. It is due to such negligence that corporatism in Japan has been studied in terms of the state 
enforcement and people's subjection. Corporatism, in these studies, looks to be the almost natural corollary of the 
teleologically conceived advancement of the modern bureaucratic state. See, for instance, Peter Duus and Daniel 
Okimoto, “Fascism and the History of Prewar Japan: the Failure of a Concept,” in The Journal of Asian Stud-
ies,Vol.39, No.1 (November 1979): 65-76 and Yasushi Yamanouchi, “Hōhō-teki Joron: Sōryoku-sen to System 
Tōgō,” in Yamanouchi, Victor Koschmann, and Ryūichi Narita eds., Ibid., pp.9-53. By introducing the corporatist 
agents of bourgeois and elite ideologues and mass media into my study, I intend to provide a new, historical ap-
proach that juxtaposes the two ideologies of the emperor's infants and emperor’s body (corporatism) in the same 
historical plane of their mutual competition. 
24 In their A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translation and foreword by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari similarly observe that “fas-
cism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before 
beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State” (p.214; emphasis original). These molecular foci are 
replete with suicidal, “war-machine” force, according to their imagination, which struggles to “tak[e] over the State” 
to build its own fascist regime (or the regime taken over by a war machine is called fascist) (p.230). “Total wars” 
that fascist countries tended to embark on in the 1940s could be reconsidered from this perspective—“so-called total 
war seems less a State undertaking than an undertaking of a war machine that appropriates the State and channels 
into it a flow of absolute war whose only possible outcome is the suicide of the State itself” (231). To Deleuze and 
Guattari, the war machine represents what they call the “nomadic,” a kind of trans-historical figure, with which to 
imagine the fascistic that transgresses particular, historical regimes. 
25 Naoki Sakai (Ibid.) similarly says about Tetsurō Watsuji’s philosophy, “And if the putative systematicity of 
totality as the human being is always threatened by sociality, the return to the authentic self would require a much 
more violent decisiveness toward an ecstatic leap into communality,” the result of which being “unnatural, violent 
death” (p.98). In Watsuji’s corporatism, the basic unit of the totality, a moral individual, has to be always already 
systematically related to others. Realization of this inherent system and its totality is ideologized to be a “return.” 
Insofar as the authenticity of the return is guaranteed by one's determination to purge sociality and other historical 
factors of life, Watsuji’s “human being” (ningen) or moral individual must be dead. Watsuji thus shows the commu-
nity of death could be the corollary of corporatism as well. However, with the minimal condition of such a commu-
nity being one's reduction (“return” in Watsuji’s terminology) to the unit of totality (structuralists’ “value”), the hi-
erarchical tendencies of Watsuji, which are integral in his philosophy (as in his concepts of aidagara and kaiwa), are 
merely frills, though important ones in analyzing fascism in terms of class. 
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 Thus my dissertation sees the prominently oppressive ideologies, movements, and re-
gimes of 1920-40s Japan as fascist and examines the way in which the ideological, institutional, 
and psychological legacies of this previous instance are inherited and advanced in the country 
today. In contrast to this position, there are other camps of scholars who diagnose that pre-WWII 
Japan was not fascist. Three major theoretical trends are responsible for this diagnosis: modern-
ism, certain Marxism, and culturalism, roughly corresponding to similar schools in European 
studies of fascism. Modernists and Stalinists view fascism as the problem of the advanced socie-
ty after fully-fledged modernization and/or monopoly economy. According to their respectively 
developmentalist ideas of history, Japan after the First World War was still agrarian with the 
“feudalistic” remnant of the “emperor system” (tennō-sei). It is true that there was some bour-
geois formation observable, they say, yet it was formed “from above” (ue kara), that is, by the 
state, and not by the spontaneous force of a matured history. Therefore, the representative of 
modernism, Masao Maruyama, concluded that the political and military violence that Japan then 
exercised was that of “ultra-statism” (chō kokka-shugi) and not people’s fascism;26 while histori-
cal materialists in Japan, Kōza-ha maintain that the violent agent should be attributed to what 
they call “imperial absolutism” (tennō-sei zattai-shugi) and not the people.27 These ideas seem to 
                                                                  
26 Masao Maruyama, “Chō-Kokka-shugi no Ronri to Shinri,” in his Gendai Seiji no Shisō to Kōdō (Tokyo: 
Mirai-sha, 1965(1964)), pp.11-28. I translate “chō kokka-shugi” into ultra-statism rather than Ivan Morris’ known 
translation, ultra-nationalism, due to Maruyama’s grounding in Carl Schmitt. In the short article that was originally 
published in a popular leftist magazine, Sekai, Maruyama focused on the state and its ideology, instead of people 
and their practice. See Morris’ translation in his “Theory and psychology of ultra-nationalism” in his ed. Thought 
and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, Expanded Edition (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), pp.1-24. 
27 Another group of Japanese Marxists, Rōnō-ha (“Labor and Agriculture Faction”), though, have insisted that 
the 1920-40s regimes and movements in Japan deserved the name of fascism, for, according to them, bourgeois 
domination had already been established in the country then. At the same time, similar to Kōza-ha, Rōnō-ha empha-
sizes the existence of the emperor and admits this existence as the specifically Japanese factor in Japanese fascism. 
In the 1950s, these two groups of Marxists eventually reconciled with each other and jointly presented the thesis of 
“fascism of the emperor system” (tennō-sei fascism). See Gavan McCormack, “Nineteen-Thirties Japan: Fascism?,” 
in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 14. no.2 (April-June 1982): 20-32 and Sebastian Conrad, The Quest for the 
Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century, trans. by Alan Nothnagle (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles , London: University of California Press, 2010(1999)), p.99. 
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be caused partly by their respective views of the emperor and nation as prior to the advent of 
modern capitalism and not as its effects. Despite modern capitalism, according to these theories, 
the emperor and people as his national-cultural subjects remained outside the economic sphere of 
the society, which made the post-1920s Japanese polity and politico-military oppression cultural-
ly unique.28 
            The Kōza-ha Marxists’ and modernists’ anti-materialist position is repeated in the third 
trend of the “Japan as non-fascist” theorem, which is developed by Japanese and American an-
thropologists and culturalists. Ruth Benedict, the de facto founder of this line of argument, would 
                                                                  
28 Modernists and historical materialists elsewhere repeat similarly culturalist analysis of fascism, causing 
Felice (Ibid.) to call them “classics” of fascism studies. For instance, according to a modernization theorist, A. K. F. 
Organski, fascism is the phenomenon that is observable in a modernizing country as a reactionary fortification of 
traditional sectors and leaders. Similar to Maruyama, Organski merely assumes that the “non-modern” remains in  
and “resists” modernization. See his “Fascism and Modernization,” in S. J. Woolf ed. The Nature of Fascism (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968); the quotes are from p.33. A notorious perversion of the classical culturalist 
theories can be seen in Friedrich Meinecke, who renounces fascism as an exception in the otherwise steady, moral-
cultural progress of German national history—the exception that should be attributed to the importation of the 
French Revolutionary influences, according to him. Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollec-
tions (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963(1946)). 
                The theory of fascism as an exception is similarly advocated from non-culturalist positions. Benedetto 
Croce, for instance, famously said that fascism should be placed between historical “parentheses” (see Felice Ibid.; 
p.14). Juan Linz similarly argues that fascism as a political “latecomer” had to fill the ideological and constituent 
“niche” in the late 20th century political scenes in Europe—see his  “Political Space and Fascism as a Latecomer,” in 
Stein Uselvik Larsen ed, Ibid., pp.153-189. To Dominick LaCapra, fascism is a return of religiosity (i.e. the modern 
sacred, sublime, or “elation”), which he thinks as being repressed and/or otherwise superseded in the process of 
modernization. See LaCapra, Representing the HolocaustL History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994) and History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). In Saul Friedlander's 
similar idea, fascism represents another instance of modern repression, i.e. that of death—see his Reflections of Na-
zism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death, trans. by Thomas Weyr (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993(1983)). 
Giorgio Agamben also tries to think about fascist concentration camps in light of the concepts of zoé (bare life), ho-
mo sacer, state of exception, etc., in his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998(1995)). Slightly differently, Erich Fromm and Wil-
helm Reich associate fascism with “deviant” personality types, such as sado-masochism and authoritarianism, which 
could and should be corrected for the subject's full maturity. See Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: H. Holt, 
1994(1941)) and Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 3rd ed., rev. and enl., ed. by Mary Higgins and Chester M. 
Raphael (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1930).  
The classic theories and theories of repression are similar, with their similarity being seen from my per-
spective that tries to locate fascism in what is not bracketed and/or repressed, viz. in the overt space and time of our 
modern capitalist everyday. From this perspective, the nature of fascism is banality, represented by and presenting 
itself in such everyday realms as mass-culture, consumption, and the language of mass-media (vs. unspeakable ex-
periences of violence or equally unspeakable realm of folk and culture). For banality of fascism, see Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1977(1964)) and Claude 
Lanzmann, Shoah (Hollywood, CA: New Yorker Video, 2003). 
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say that Japanese belligerence exhibited in the Pacific War could not be understood otherwise 
than in terms of their “unconditional and unrestricted loyalty to the Emperor of Japan.”29 Their 
loyalty should be placed in the context of on (moral obligations), chū (loyalty), and other time-
resistant, moral cultural concepts, Benedict says.30 Similarly, culturalists have blamed Japan’s 
“vertically” rigid social structure, popular dependence on (maternal) authorities, and “situational” 
morality for having caused Japanese aggression in the war. As with Benedict, they abstain from 
using the term, “fascism.”31 
 Alongside the mysterious effects of commodification that the emperor went through prior 
to the end of the war, the postwar East Asian geopolitics under the Cold War should be consid-
ered here in order to explain the prominence of the culturalized idea of the emperor in the three 
versions of “Japan-as-non-fascist” theories.32 Culturalization of the emperor as the “symbol” of 
the postwar “state and of the unity of the people” was required to construct the new sovereign of 
                                                                  
29  Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Cleveland and New York: 
Meridian Books, 1967(1946)); p.33.  
30 Benedict, Ibid.; p.126. 
31 See Chie Nakane, Tate Shakai no Ningen Kankei: Tan’itsu Shakai no Riron (Tokyo: Kōdan-sha, 1967); 
Takeo Doi, “Amae” no Kōzō (Tokyo: Kōbun-dō, 1972); Robert J. Smith, Japanese Society: Tradition, Self, and the 
Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
32 Prior to 1945, paternal and maternal images of the royal couples were sold and consumed in the forms of 
film, stamps, postcards, or coins, as Takashi Fujitani studies in his Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in 
Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). See also Hiroshi Kawahara in his “‘Chichi-naru 
Tennō’ wa Ika ni Tsukurareru-ka” in Asahi Journal ed. Shōwa no shūen: 1988.9-1989.2: Tennō to Nihon-jin (Tokyo: 
Asahi Shinbun-sha, 1989), pp.259-267. Besides household consumption, photographed images of emperors and em-
presses (called “real images or go-shin’ei”) were displayed in communal spaces for public ceremonies. Perhaps it is 
these commodities’ power of uncanny repetitiousness rather than redundant enforcement by the state that made these 
commodities work to generate the culturalized images of the emperor. Since the consumers, i.e. masses, were com-
modities themselves, the commoditized emperor was more believable and easier to identify themselves with than 
any enforced ideologies of him might have been. About photography’s phantasmagorical power, see Walter Benja-
min, “Little History of Photography,” in Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith eds., Selected Writ-
ings, Vol. 2: 1927-1934, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.507-530; Eduardo Cadava, “Words of Light: Theses on the Photography of 
History” in Patrice Petro ed. Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video (Theories of Contemporary Culture) 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp.221-244; Tom Gunning, “Phantom Images and Modern Manifes-
tations: Spirit Photography, Magic Theater, Trick Films, and Photography’s Uncanny” in Petro ed. Ibid., pp.42-71; 
Vincente L. Rafael, “The Undead: Notes on Photography in the Philippines, 1898-1920s,” in his White Love: And 
Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp.76-102. 
  
15 
Japan, the capitalist democratic nation.33 According to Cold War logic, this nation had to be nei-
ther communist nor otherwise radical, but mildly distracted by mass-culturalized nationalism 
centered around the “tradition” of the emperor.34 Japan-as-non-fascist theories have (perhaps un-
intentionally) contributed to the Cold War efforts to invest the utmost amount of national re-
sources in the capitalist reconstruction of Japan, while these resources could have been used to 
recompense other Asian and Pacific losses caused by Japan.35 
            This dissertation studies contemporary Japanese history in the theoretical framework of 
fascism.36 This framework is employed not due to any cultural attributes of the country, but due 
to the historical efforts of people, who under the continuous mode of mechanical reproduction 
have variously tried to imagine and realize the problematic idea of equivalence. Although since 
about the 1980s the country has been discussed under the rubric of “postmodernism” or “late 
capitalism,” the new trend can be thought of as an intensification (and not replacement) of the 
core feature of the mechanical reproductive mode of production, i.e. the massification of people 
and goods as the pastiche of the “origin.”37 I will examine the ways in which the continuous, and 
                                                                  
33  The quote is from Article 1, the 1947 Constitution of Japan.  
34 The Cold War association of the culturalized nation with capitalism will be clearer in the backdrop of what 
is excluded from the nation; those resident Koreans who were regarded as communists. 
35 After almost sixty years, Norma Field investigated the repercussions of this capitalist decision not to ethi-
cally and politically resolve these losses. See her “War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After,” in Posi-
tions 5:1 (Spring 1997): 1-49. 
36 The dissertation fieldwork was conducted between 2007 and 2008, in addition to numerous months-long 
pre-dissertation works. 
37 Due to the digital technology that has featured the post-1980s everyday throughout the globe, “the very 
memory of use-value is effaced,” according to the observation by Frederic Jameson in his “Postmodernism, or the 
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review, no.146 (September/October 1984), 53-92; p.66. However, the 
three characteristics of postmodernism that he lists (“a new depthlessness,” “a...weakening of historicity,” and 
“a...new...emotional ground tone” (p.58)) have been initiated about one hundred years ago already by the camera. 
Although I agree that the digital broadened the possibility of new aesthetics (“crispness”) and innovative usage (the 
“multimedia” enjoyment of a certain software), it seems to me to merely mark one period within the overall mode of 
mechanical reproduction—perhaps a period of maturity and saturation. Peter Lunenfeld is helpful in understanding 
the digital⎯see his “Introduction: Screen Grabs: The Digital Dialectic and New Media Theory” in his ed. Digital 
Dialectic: New Essays on New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp.xiv-xxi. About postmodernism, see 
also Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994). Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian eds., Postmodernism and Japan (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1989) explores the question whether postmodernism has replaced modernism in the Japanese case, in which 
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recently deepened, mode of mass-reproduction has generated the dreams of radically commodi-
fied equality among people and how these dreams have been carried along class-lines. 
 In my first and second chapters, I will ethnographically show such class-based inher-
itance of fascism among contemporary Japan’s forgotten class group, the petty bourgeoisie. In 
the history of the majority of the Japanese, the first decades after the end of the Asia-Pacific War 
in 1945 were the time when they struggled to fulfill the anti-communist requirements of Cold 
War politics and fully concentrated on capitalist production and consumption.38 In the almost 
frenzied spell of the so-called “high growth period” (kōdo seichō ki) (1955-1973), they attained 
an average annual GDP growth rate of about 9%, in which the above-mentioned myth that the 
one million Japanese were all middle class was created. The similar level of economization of 
the society characterized West Germany over the roughly same period, allowing observers to 
suspect that the whole population there might suffer from the melancholia of lost fascism. Mel-
ancholia is ill mourning, in which a loss cannot be recognized as a loss and persistent love and 
hate of the lost object are perpetually acted out as bipolarity between mellowness and aggres-
siveness toward the self and others.39 The petty bourgeois subjects that I analyze in these chap-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the argument that postmodernism is totally new is intimately connected with the Japanese nationalist desires to 
overcome modernism and modernity (hence postmodernism is nationally possessed in this type of argument).  
38 Although the Second World War in Asia started with the 1931 Manchurian “Incident” and developed as 
Japan was further invading and resisted by other Asian countries, it has been conventionally recognized to be the 
war between Japan and the Allied Forces, especially the United States, as is shown in its popular and academic no-
menclature, the Pacific War. Against this grain, this dissertation joins the critical trend that emphasizes the war’s 
Asian origin and agency to call it either the Asia-Pacific War or the Fifteen-Year War. In the conventional view the 
war lasted for four years starting with Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941. For more discussions, see Junichiro 
Kisaka, “Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō no Koshō to Seikaku,” in Ryūkoku Hōgaku 25. no.4 (1993): 386-434. 
39 According to Freud, those who are narcissistically attached to a libidinal object could develop melancholia, 
for narcissism does not recognize the object as other than the self but incorporates it into the self. Incorporation of 
the object is the key to understanding those manic behaviors that the patient could take, occasionally leading to sui-
cide—mania and suicide could be the subject's revenge on the object's taking over his/her psyche. See Sigmund 
Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in Philip Rieff ed. General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology 
(New York: Touchstone, 1997(1963)), pp.164-179. About applicability of the theory to West Germany, see Alexan-
der and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of Collective Behavior, trans. by Beverley R. 
Placzek (New York: Grove Press, 1975) and Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in 
Postwar Germany (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). Marlene A. Briggs similarly examines the 
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ters have refused to fully substitute economized mania for their libidinal attachment to the lost 
ideal, i.e. the emperor-centered equality, as fascism promised. It is their increasingly minority 
class-status that has made them ideologically adamant, while their adamancy has lowered their 
class-status in the environment in which co-opted amnesia means economic success. 
 By tracing the interactions between the grotesque remainder of fascist ideologies among 
the petty bourgeoisie and their class condition over the span of sixty six years since 1945, these 
chapters will also introduce the reader to a certain postwar Japanese history. This history will be 
written around the figure of what I call the “death spaces,” the fascist enclaves of petty bourgeoi-
sie that have formed the larger, capitalist democratic society as other than these enclaves.40 The 
death spaces are metaphorical yet concrete, historical places such as suburbs, where some petty 
bourgeois members reside (Chapter 1), or the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo, which was offi-
cially constructed in 1869 to “soothe the souls” (irei-suru) of fallen national soldiers (Chapter 2). 
My ethnographic portrayal of those petty bourgeois actors who inhabit these death-spaces will 
elucidate the emperor’s infant-type of ideology and aesthetics, as they have been resuscitated and 
developed in and around these spaces. The first chapter, entitled “The Emperor’s Infants Now,” 
will focus on the postwar inflections of the ideology and the second, “Theories of Delay: The 
Petty Bourgeois Formation of Postwar Fascism,” will thematize the issue of class.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
British case after WWI, where she says “the equivalence between peace and wealth” was the state-advocated formu-
la to avoid mourning. See her “D. H. Lawrence, Collective Mourning, and Cultural Reconstruction after World War 
I,” in Patricia Rae ed., Modernism and Mourning (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2007), pp.198-212; the 
quote is from p.205. 
40 According to Jacques Derrida, the western metaphysical concept of logos could possibly develop only with 
the supplementary theoretical space for writing. This space for writing exists within the concept of logos, even 
though writing is supposed to externally demarcate and define logos as its “opposite,” i.e. as the living voice. See his 
Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997(1967)); see esp. pp.65-73. The term “space of death” is also Michael Taussig’s, where he similarly ana-
lyzes the way in which the terrorized spaces of exception (under the state of emergency, in the (post)colonial con-
texts, etc.) are a necessary irrationality enabling domination by the modern bureaucratic state. See “Culture of Terror, 




            Chapter Three, entitled “Incorporating the Everyday; Or, the Corporatist Representation of 
War Machines,” will shift our attention to the bourgeoisie. This chapter will focus on the neigh-
borhood association (chōnai-kai or chō-kai), the formerly war-machine expression of the farmers’ 
and petty bourgeois desires for moral equality, which was then co-opted by the 1920s state as the 
foundation of its corporatism. Even since the end of the war, this association has kept working as 
the switchboard between the social exclusion and inclusion of fascist desires. After 1945, 
through the neighborhood associations, those everyday fascist moments that are expressed in 
people’s anxieties, frustrations, and desires to be mechanical copies with each other, are trans-
formed into a more moderate, democratically acceptable discourse of neighborly self-sacrifice, 
team play, and the moral sameness of local towns throughout the nation. Neighborhood associa-
tions in turn have been politically represented by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (since the 
1990s also by the Democratic Party), creating and created by the LDP’s (and DP’s) policies to 
corporatistically organize the Japanese locality. I will examine this layer of political representa-
tion (the individual desires, the neighborhood association, and the LDP/DP) as one of the main 
culprits that have prolonged the institutionalized life of corporatism in postwar Japan. A neigh-
borhood association in a Yokohama suburb will set the stage for my ethnographic examination in 
this chapter. Large landlords and a banker’s family will be depicted to have fought each other 
over ideological definitions of the town, role of the association, and the terms of the different 
levels of political representation. In the backdrop of neoliberal disruption of the neighborhood, 
these bourgeois members’ legal strife will turn out to be a joint project to corporatistically organ-
ize the new demands for fascist equivalence. 
 My fourth chapter, “Internet Fascism and Resurgence of the Grassroots,” will focus on 
the media of fascism. When fascism, both corporatist and war-machine types, is based on the 
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logic and structure of the commodity, the question of mediation is inevitable.41 Commodity logic 
guarantees exchangeability between different goods and humans, but not their moral connectivity. 
How could the “atomized” and then massified subjects of fascism be related with each other? Is 
the idea of the fascist community actually an oxymoron? To imagine generality is one way to 
solve these problems; in the supposedly general figure of the emperor, il duce, or führer, masses 
could imagine themselves represented and totalized into a community. Another way is to intro-
duce organic language of the body, life, or blood-tie, with which to narrate the boundary and or-
ganization of the community. These imaginations and rhetoric have been facilitating and facili-
tated by the historical development of mass-media. The prewar Japanese imagination of the 
death-community was intimately connected with the development of newspapers and cinema; 
postwar corporatism in the country, up until the 1980s, has been maintained by the boundary- 
and hierarchy- creating technologies of radio and TV. 
 Chapter 4 will explore how the TV imagination of corporatist Japan is being challenged 
by the renewed idea of the “grassroots” (sōmō).42 Enabled by the dialectic between the new tech-
nologies of the Internet and cell phones, the new grassroots aspires after equality among ordinary 
people with their common sense and sentiments. The Internet technologies of “participation” 
(sanka) and “simultaneity” (dōji-sei) are ideologically adopted by the participants, who have 
been variously distressed by the prolonging recession that started with the burst of the so-called 
bubble economy in 1990. The imagination of orders and hierarchies has declined alongside the 
demise of TV, radio, and other old media, of which the neighborhood associations had taken ad-
vantage. The result is a renewed possibility of fascism, the possibility that the emperor’s infant 
                                                                  
41 See Benjamin, “The Work of...,” Ibid. 
42 Departing from the conventional kusa no ne (literally meaning grass-roots), the conservative mood of re-
cessionary Japan has selected sōmō, more Chinese (kanbun), and thus “traditional”-sounding term. Sōmō’s violently 
populist usage is traced back to a late Edo revolutionary nativist, Shōin Yoshida. 
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ideology is socio-culturally underscored with a new appearance of urgency. Located back in the 
Yasukuni Shrine, this chapter will ethnographically examine how the shrine lends its prewar fas-
cist legacies to those Internet fascists and neonationalist youths, who gather together there to 
stage their mass-events and connect with the rest of the country, real-time. The shrine as a new 
fascist stage attests to the degree to which today’s wave of fascism is not only materially deter-
mined by neoliberalism, but also historically determined by melancholia, viz. postwar Japanese’s 
amnesia of their past violence, which the shrine embodies as a synecdoche.  
 The last chapter, “Disruptions: Other Voices and Mournful Responses,” will cut the mel-
ancholic loop of repetition by introducing the glimmer of other futures, which refuse to point to 
the “future” as fascism has projected. The participants in this chapter, those Japanese veterans, 
who form the “Liaison among Repatriates from China” (Chūgoku Kikan-sha Renraku Kai), were 
the typical subjects of fascism during the Fifteen-Year War. Born as peasants and farmers, the 
Liaison veterans provide us with the view of the field where the commodity’s ideologizing pow-
er was concentrated on this class-group as well as the class of the petty bourgeoisie. With that 
power, the veterans excessively exercised the violence of literal “equalization” throughout their 
long military careers during the war, so that they were detained in the People’s Republic of Chi-
na as war criminals until 1956. By focusing on the language that they use in their public witness-
ing of their horrible war-crimes, this chapter will explore the possible way out of the contempo-
rary Japanese melancholic replication of fascism. Psychoanalytically, mourning is a strictly se-
miotic process in which the patient gradually has to renounce his/her embodied attachment to the 
lost object by cognitively and intellectually recognizing the object as other than the self.43 This is 
an ethical process, when ethics can be minimally conceptualized to be the act of acknowledging 
                                                                  
43 Freud, Ibid. 
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and sustaining the distance between the self and the object.44 Based on my participant-
observation research of the repatriates’ testimonies, this chapter will attempt to listen with the 
repatriates to the inaudible voices of other Asian victims. Their fleeting existence, which the liv-
ing can merely sense through the testimonies, will ethically re-frame other chapters in terms of 
the discussions of ordinary Japanese accountability for the war and fascism. 
Chapter 5 also considers the question, “how can the postwar Japanese moralize the ethi-
cal possibilities exhibited by these veterans?” Morality, as this dissertation uses as the concept, is 
“law” in the Kantian sense.45 The second part of this chapter is meant to examine the way in 
which progressive Japanese have endeavored to make their ethical thoughts habitual and their 
civil activism enduring. Concretely, this part of the chapter will analyze my ethnographic data 
and interviews of the Kanagawa Prefectural Association of Peace Families (Kanagawa Ken Hei-
wa Izoku Kai). The several core members of the association are those bereaved families who de-
clare that their fallen families were “invaders” (shinryaku-sha) of other Asian and Pacific coun-
tries. These families have struggled to carry out their fundamentally ethical declaration as civil 
movements for other victims; they have also endeavored to expand these movements further into 
anti-war activism in general. I will investigate these families’ moral exchanges with other vic-
tims and activists by introducing the category of generation. I will show how the families’ civil 
networks have been generationally woven along a slender yet durable warp, i.e. relayed gestures 
of mourning from the actual perpetrators to their immediate families, from these families to fol-
lowing generations. The generational tapestry woven by the remorseful veterans and peace fami-
lies constitutes another death space in the melancholically economy-oriented society⎯the death 
                                                                  
44 See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969); and Jacques Derrida’s commentary in his “Violence 
and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” Writing and Difference, trans., with an intro. 
and additional notes by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.79-153.    
45  See Kant, Ibid. 
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space in which the politics of remembrance has been practiced against the social grain, the re-
membrance of another past for another future, beyond national history for fascist utopia.  
Crisscrossed by class lines and holding on to the prewar heritage, contemporary fascism 
in Japan is therefore the structure and symptom that have profoundly conditioned the country’s 
everyday. Everyday lives in their turn have been generative of new desires for and fears of fas-
cism, which constantly and dynamically interact with the discourses and institutions of the unre-
solved past. It is how fascism relentlessly returns in old and new disguises to trouble classed eve-




            Writing is a process that unfolds in time in such a way that the subject matter of contempo-
rary research is always open-ended, constantly adding related information derived from those 
new events, which might or might not dynamically overturn the nature of the researcher’s 
thoughts on the subject matter.46 The Tōhoku (Fukushima) Earthquake in March 11th, 2011, is 
potentially such a thought-overturning, historical event, while further confirming the way in 
which I think about the structure and dynamic of Japanese society. On that historic day, the 
earthquake of magnitude 9 and subsequent tsunamis of 133 feet at the highest hit the Pacific 
coasts of the Tōhoku region, northeastern Japan. According to an official report published in 
March 2013, the calamity killed 15,882 in total, leaving 6,142 injured and 2,668 missing.47 What 
is more, a tsunami-stricken nuclear power plant in the shore of Ōkuma, Fukushima Prefecture, 
                                                                  
46 About the temporal nature of the relation between fieldwork and writing, see Johannes Fabian, Time and 
the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
47  Keisatsu-chō Kinkyū Saigai Keibi Honbu, “Heisei 23-nen (2011-nen) Tōhoku Chihō Taiheiyō Oki Jishin 
no Higai Jōkyō to Keisatsu Sochi,” http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf 
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has ever since kept emitting serious levels of radioactive materials that are comparable with 
those which were observed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear explosion in 1986. For sev-
eral months after the earthquake, many “hot spots” of radioactive materials persisted in Tokyo 
and its vicinities, which are approximately 180 miles away from Fukushima. Unusual levels of 
caesium, a highly toxic fission product of uranium and plutonium, were found even in Seoul, 
South Korea as well as off the Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia. Due to these nuclear problems and 
also due to delayed reconstruction, over 315,000 are still unable to return to their homes.48 Even 
as of June 2013, many Japanese throughout the Archipelago still wear masks to go out. On the 
Yahoo Japan homepage, the column, “Great Eastern Japan Earthquake: Help Reconstructions,” 
lingers, collecting volunteer applications, advertising for stigmatized products of the agricultural 
Tōhoku, and distributing the daily forecast of nuclear levels throughout the country. “The whole 
of Japan was contaminated—even the air that I breathe right at my home must be polluted with 
caesium,” a middle-aged female friend of mine in Tokyo laments in her e-mail, in deep disap-
pointment and frustration with the state’s mismanaging the crisis and misinforming citizens, in 
addition to the dull regret that the country has declined in many ways since its “bubbly” euphoria 
in the 80s. 
            A Nobel-laureate novelist and peace activist, Kenzaburō Ōe, describes the crisis as another 
“Hiroshima.” After Hiroshima City experienced an atomic bomb in August 1945, the Japanese 
citizens were convinced to forever renounce the country’s right to war, Ōe says. Similarly, ac-
cording to him, the current crisis is summoning a new law that should express the Japanese de-
termination to be eternally free of nuclear generators and the accompanying possibility for nu-
clear armament.49 While the shocks of the crisis are thus being sublimated into Ōe-types of activ-
                                                                  




ism for peace, the state and business have tried to take advantage of the shocks to fortify the sta-
tus quo more than ever. Immediately after the disaster, they declared that nuclear generators 
throughout the archipelago were safe and should be operated as usual, while continuing their talk 
with Turkey to export a nuclear generator.50 Even though many anti-tsunami bulwarks along Ja-
pan’s coastline failed in the earthquake, the same types of bulwarks were budgeted as if nothing 
had happened. The majority of ordinary Japanese unwittingly cooperate with the state/industries 
by trying to forget and repress the shocks. They seem wishfully to hold onto the false yet com-
forting information that is dispensed from the government-controlled media and enjoy the ever-
more fantastic-looking details of mass-culturalized everyday lives. Critical thinking about the 
events and their aftermath are refrained from, while too much thoughtless enjoyment of lives is 
equally avoided, all under the term of fukinshin, or “indiscretion.”51 People thus seem to prefer to 
opt out the political chance to take a radically peaceful turn for the sake of fantastic reorganiza-
tion of the society into a dissident-free community united with pressures of a gloss of mourning. 
The fantasies of a united community that are currently circulating in the society are the same 
kind as those which this dissertation argues have been presented again and again since the 1920s, 
every time class disparities and other crises of social disintegration seem to be imminent.52 
            Yet at the same time, with the scale of the disaster, the Japanese mournfulness this time 
might look to be containing the solemnness and truthfulness that could potentially penetrate and 
uncover even the aesthetic appearance of the fantastically united society. Coincidentally, the 
                                                                  
50 “Energy Kyōryoku Bei Futsu to Itchi: Turkey, Genpatsu Yushutsu ni ‘Mae Muki’: Edano Kei San Shō,” 
Asahi Sinbun (10/19/2011) 
51 A documentary filmmaker, Tatsuya Mori, states in a film screening event of his “311” in 10/21/2011 at 
Yale University that indiscretion is the term that independent journalism since the earthquake faces as silent pres-
sures and inhibition from society. 
52 One of the most recent instances of the fantasies of unity was presented around the death of Emperor 
Shōwa in 1989—see Naoki Sakai (Ibid.); Asahi Journal ed., Ibid.; Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1991); Akira Kurihara, Mitsunobu Sugiyama, and Shun’ya Yoshimi eds., Kiroku: 
Tennō no Shi (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1992). 
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world-wide trend for people’s movements that started with the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011 
seems to have unprecedentedly energized Japanese civil causes and activism, including anti-
nuclear actions. The events are still unfolding as I write this passage, ever urging me to reconsid-
er my ideas of contemporary Japan, the society that I am going to describe as saturated with fas-
cist desires and anxieties. If reality proves that the reconsideration is of absolute necessity, then 
the dissertation will serve as a guide to the social structure and cultural organization of pre-3/11 
Japan, from which the Japanese might or might not be making their departing steps.
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Chapter 1: The Emperor’s Infants Now 
 
 
The number of the war-dead [the fallen imperial Japanese soldiers] is 2.4 
million. Imagine their corpses lined up, forty inches apart from each other. This 
column would span 1,500 miles, running through the Japanese Archipelago 
from the northernmost tip of Sōya Cape on Hokkaidō Island to Naha City in 
Okinawa. Envision a row of these bodies stretched over mountains, valleys, 
cities, towns, villages, rivers, and oceans. This many young lives were taken by 
the warring state of Japan.1 
 
 
 The statement above elucidates the way in which the prewar (-1945) fascist ideology, 
tennō no sekishi or the emperor’s infants, remains and evolves in Japan today. The ideology 
referred to equivalence among subjectified Japanese under the emperor. Ordinary Japanese then 
fantasized that death, the great leveler, would eternalize their subjectified equivalence with each 
other. Regardless of their class statuses, they thought, they would be mutually equalized 
members of the death community for the emperor.2 The death community was not just a 
                                                                  
1  Kakunosuke Akiyama, “Senbotsu-sha-ra no Arisama” (unpublished handbill, 2003); p.1. 
2  According to Jean-Luc Nancy, one of the main endeavors of fascism—erasure of singularities—could be 
figuratively considered as the building bloc of the community of death. In his word, 
Death is not only the example of this [a fascist community], it is its truth. In death, at 
least if one considers in it what brings about immanence (decomposition leading back to 
nature—‘everything returns to the ground and becomes part of the cycle’—or else the 
paradisal versions of the same ‘cycle’) and if one forgets what makes it always irreduci-
bly singular, there is no longer any community or communication: there is only the con-
tinuous identity of atoms. 
 This is why political or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute 
immanence have as their truth the truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains 
no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it. 
In his Inoperative Community, ed. by Peter Connor, trans. by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and 
Simona Sawhney, forward by Christopher Fynsk (Minneapolis and Oxford; University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 
p.12; parentheses and emphasis original. 
3  The National Liaison for Correct Memorialization of the War-Dead, “Senshi-sha, Mikan Itai no Atsukai, 
Nichi Bei no Chigai” (unpublished handbill, 2005), p.5. 
4  Kakunosuke Akiyama, “DNA de Senshi-sha no Mimoto Kakunin wo” in Asahi Shinbun, 5/20/1999. 
5  In the following, those quotes from Akiyama that are not accompanied by references are taken from my 
phone and personal interviews of him conducted in 2008. 
6  Akiyama. Ibid., p.2. 
7  Akiyama, “DNA...,” Ibid. and “Chidorigafuchi Boen: Ikotsu no Atsukai Ihō de Zankoku” in Asahi Shinbun, 
2/9/2003. 
8  I owe my understanding of the phenomenon of mass to Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 
ed. and with an intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968(1939)), pp.155-200. See helpful comments by Samuel Weber, “Mass Mediauras, or: Art, 
Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin” in Alan Cholodenski ed., Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Me-
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metaphor; it was literalized by the half-willing, half-enforced bodies of the farmers and petty 
bourgeoisie, which comprised the majority of the Japanese population at that time. In fact, it was 
only after these actors’ practices that the ideas of the death community and the emperor became 
sacred. Left behind by these practices are the physical traces and psychological complications of 
suicides and murders. As a result, a version of postwar fascism in Japan takes the form of the 
imaginative and literal organization of these traces into a belt-conveyer “row” (rui rui to 
tsuranatta) of stylized imperial soldiers. In this mass-reproduced form of the commodity, as is 
imagined in the epigraph above, these soldiers’ equivalence is underscored, thus theoretically 
inheriting and morally advancing the ideology of the emperor’s infants, the practitioners would 
say.   
 Their fascism is unconscious, reflecting its complicity with such postwar concepts as the 
nation and democracy. On the surface level, the postwar inheritors of the emperor’s infant 
ideology say they are pursuing the principle of national or democratic equality among the dead. 
This chapter is an ethnographic survey of the seeming contradiction within the postwar fascist 
practitioners’ ideology. Moving back and forth between the spoken and unspoken levels of the 
ideology, between national democratic and fascist points of discourse, my ethnography will try 
to find the key to understanding these practitioners’ ideologies in their petty bourgeois lives—in 
their resentment of postwar inequality, riotous wishes for radical democracy, and repressed 
memories of and as the emperor’s infants, as these seem to be born through their everyday 
experiences. In the dark corners of the otherwise forgetfully affluent Japanese society, fascist 
practitioners are conditioned to remember and inherit the emperor’s infants’ ideology. 
Kakunosuke Akiyama, the unintentionally fascist writer of the epigraph above, will explain how.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
In his Inoperative Community, ed. by Peter Connor, trans. by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and 
Simona Sawhney, forward by Christopher Fynsk (Minneapolis and Oxford; University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 




The Row of the Infants’ Corpses 
 Akiyama is the vice-president and secretary of the National Liaison for Correct 
Memorialization of the War-Dead (Senbotsu-sha Tsuitō o Tadasu Zenkoku Renraku-kai). We 
meet in his small apartment in a Tokyo suburb, where I interview him. Handing me a double-
sided, four-page handbill, from which his earlier quote is taken, he says the active members of 
the Liaison are only a few. According to him, the Liaison has lobbied for the “correct” treatment 
of the remains of Japanese soldiers who were deployed in the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945). As 
of September 2003, he says, about 1.16 million bodies still remain unrecovered throughout the 
former battlefields of Asia and the Pacific. His own brother is one of them, presumably having 
fallen in Okinawa in May 1945 at the age of 22. Akiyama and the Liaison maintain that it is the 
Japanese state’s responsibility to recover, repatriate, and humanely (re)inter these bodies. 
 Akiyama’s declared purpose to correct the mourning state of Japan seems to be based on 
his belief in the relationship between the state as the moral sovereign and the people as its 
subjects. As he argues, the state and people should be bound together by means of people’s 
“sacrifice” (gisei) of themselves to the state and the state’s care of them. Given the history in 
which their sacrifices were made as soldiers’ lives and deaths in the war, he says that now “It is 
the state’s responsibility to recover the remains of the war-dead.”3 The state’s recovery of the 
sacrificed bodies of these soldiers will be then returned by future generations of Japanese people 
as their further self-sacrifices for the state, thus potentially forging an enduring relationship 
between the state and people. Yet in contemporary Japan, “By treating the dead who died for the 
state in this way [without properly recovering their remains], the state is losing its own future.”4 
                                                                  
3  The National Liaison for Correct Memorialization of the War-Dead, “Senshi-sha, Mikan Itai no Atsukai, 
Nichi Bei no Chigai” (unpublished handbill, 2005), p.5. 
4  Kakunosuke Akiyama, “DNA de Senshi-sha no Mimoto Kakunin wo” in Asahi Shinbun, 5/20/1999. 
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When no economic principles but the moral emotions of “pride” (hokori) and “shame” (chijoku) 
sustain this relationship, according to Akiyama, the current state’s “inhumane” (hijindōtekina) 
treatment of the war-dead only negatively binds the state to its people, insofar as people feel 
shameful about the state.5 As he puts it, 
 
 
Is there any other example of a state this inhumanely treating the vast number 
of the war-dead who sacrificed their lives for its sake? In the past or present, 
Orient or Occident, none, I suppose. This [the current Japanese state’s 
inhumane treatment of them] is a national shame.6 
 
 
Thus he and his fellows established the Liaison as a “national” (kokumin no) agency to correct 
the quality of this moral exchange with the state. 
 Akiyama suggests that one of the symptoms of the failed relationship between the current 
state and its people is what he calls the state’s “mass-treatment” (tasū issho no atsukai) of people. 
Akiyama’s earlier plea to “imagine” the “row of these [fallen Japanese soldiers’] bodies” (rui rui 
to tsuranatta shikabane) would be thought of as instantiating what he means by mass-treatment. 
In that scenario, the mass in mass-treatment might look to express just the massivity of the total 
number of the soldiers in the imagined row, its endless length, the sheer number of the soldiers in 
it, its totality as a row. In the graphic analog of this imagination, a figure included in the same 
handbill (Figure 1), though, this mass turns out to consist of not just a countless number of 
soldiers but the soldiers who look mutually identical.  
                                                                  
5  In the following, those quotes from Akiyama that are not accompanied by references are taken from my 
phone and personal interviews of him conducted in 2008. 





Akiyama aptly uses computer graphics to express this identicality⎯or does the technology create 
the idea of identicality? Here, the soldiers are stylized and in that stylized figure, they make a 
long row similar to Andy Warhol’s Campbell Soup can repetition. With the same size and shape, 
maintaining the same interval of distance, “2.4 million” war-dead are here rendered anonymous, 
and in their anonymity, they form an industrial collectivity of death. In the anonymous 
collectivity, even Akiyama’s older brother, whom he remembers was to inherit their family farm 
in Katori County, Chiba Prefecture, loses his individuality. The brother’s body in the collectivity 
is totally formalized, painted black, spreading his stylistically masculine legs shoulder length 
apart, just like everybody else. 
 This is not just an image, Akiyama further explains—the soldiers’ bodies are actually left 
under the elements like things, then recovered and incinerated en masse “until they are formless” 
(genkei o todomenaku-naru made) and “without identities” (mimoto fushō).7 Because the state 
does not identify the bodies, counterfeit bodies infiltrate the system; he laments the “dogs’ or 
cats’ bones that the natives [of former battlefields] carry and try to sell [to Japanese recovery 
                                                                  




missions] for exorbitant prices.” To condemn this situation, the Liaison has lobbied for a DNA 
analysis of each set of remains and individualized burial of the identified bodies. Their ideal, 
then, is the state’s recognition of each soldier and perhaps appropriate reward for his 
individuated contributions to the state, which is apparently his burial as an individual. 
“Individuation” (kobetsuka) of the soldiers, in the Liaison’s understanding, is the result of what 
they call “humanity” (jindō) and “sincerity” (makoto) of the state. Put another way, humanity 
and sincerity would not bear the soldiers’ mass-treatment. 
 Without denoting it, Akiyama and the Liaison’s critique of the state’s mass-treatment 
seems to replicate the moralistic discourses about the “mass,” the discourses that were presented 
mostly at the turn of the last century as a reaction to the then-emerging economic mode of 
mechanical reproduction. Totally adapted to the mass-reproductive technologies of camera, 
cinema, mimeograph, etc., workers and consumers then showed a new level of their reification 
(“thingification”). Through production and consumption of mechanically reproduced products, 
people in the same market had become identical with each other, operating in the same everyday 
rhythm, donning the same apparel, and made of the same internal substance. The result was the 
“massification” of people, and the accompanying issues of their limitless exchangeability and 
dissemination across different boundaries, such as gender, status, or nation. The discourses of 
masses tended to be moralist, reflecting the contemporaries’ dismays at the unintentionally 
radical nature of the socio-culturally indiscriminate mass power. Social disintegration was 
deplored; the mass psychology was studied in terms of the “anomie,” i.e. the distance that such a 
psychology was supposed to have come to take from the previously caring, respectful, sincere, or 
otherwise authentic minds.8  
                                                                  
8  I owe my understanding of the phenomenon of mass to Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 
ed. and with an intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: 
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Akiyama’s critique of the mass-treated soldiers is relevant even to the contemporary 
moment, insofar as the masses still keep appearing throughout the world, indicating that our lives 
are situated in the same mode of mechanical reproduction. It is true that in a society like post-
1980s Japan, the mass society is supposed to have ended to be replaced by a multitude of 
differently articulated positions or a totality as a relation of over-determined moments.9 Yet the 
supposedly different articulations made by popular cultural “tribes” (toraibu) or consumer “tiers” 
(kaisō) in contemporary Japan cannot and should not be discussed separately from the post-
1980s economic mode of “small batch production” (tashu shōryō seisan).10 The small batch 
production is enabled by the concentration versus diversification of the access to the production 
means. Behind the façade of the diversified tempos and lifestyles among different workers and 
consumers, the diversity of manufacturers has been increasingly denied. The multiplication of 
consumers’ positions is illusory, since these positions eventually converge with each other to 
express the monopolizing corporation’s interests in each industry. The dominant corporations 
have never stopped mass-producing certain goods and services; they have merely reduced the 
size of each batch of production. It is probably the other way⎯the monopolist monopolizes the 
industry so that it can enjoy the mode of mechanical reproduction, the hitherto most efficient 
(and capital-intensive) mode of production. If small batches of production were shared among 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Schocken Books, 1968(1939)), pp.155-200. See helpful comments by Samuel Weber, “Mass Mediauras, or: Art, 
Aura and Media in the Work of Walter Benjamin” in Alan Cholodenski ed., Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Me-
dia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.76-107. Bernt Hagvet is more comprehensive than they in his 
placing mass theories in the vast history of thoughts that start with Plato—see his “The Theory of Mass Society and 
the Collapse of the Weimar Republic: A Re-Examination” in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter 
Myklebust eds., Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso: Universitesfor-
lget, 1980), pp.66-117. Anomie is a Durkheimean term⎯see his Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. by John A. 
Spaulding and George Simpson: ed. with an intro. by George Simpson (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 
9  See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics, trans. by Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985).   
10  See Toshiya Ueno and Yoshitaka Mōri, Jissen Cultural Studies (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2002) for 
ethnographical studies of those whom they call “subcultural,” i.e. pop-cultural, tribes from the perspective of the 
Birmingham School. Kaisō is the term popularized by Atsushi Miura, the former chief editor of Across, a 
department store chain Parco’s promotional magazine, in his Karyū Shakai: Aratana Kaisō Shūdan no Shutsugen 
(Tokyo: Kōbun Sha, 2005). 
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multiple manufacturers, big and small, global and local, then the tiered and tribalized subjects of 
neoliberalism might be truly spared from exhibiting the same sensibility of mechanical 
reproduction⎯fascination with empty formalism and obsession with identity. But this is not the 
case, as is seen with Akiyama⎯if he was not determined by the mass-reproductive mode, then 
how come he would look to have an intuitive grasp of the points of the anti-mass critique? In his 
imagination, the row of the mutually identical soldiers is stretched over the Japanese Archipelago 
and possibly beyond, just as the fin de siècle European critics imagined of the commoditized 
masses and massified commodities. In Akiyama’s implication, the mode of mechanical 
reproduction is not just a metaphor; the state has actually mass-treated the dead, so that they lose 
individualized identities—beneath their appearances of generic bones, they could even be cats or 
dogs. Perhaps Akiyama’s difference from other thinkers of the mass is his substantiation of the 
state as the supposed agent of massification.11 
 The idea of the mass that seems to implicitly reside in Akiyama’s activism, however, may 
not be the object of his criticism only. That suspicion might arise in the reader as soon as s/he 
encounters another, similarly illustrated figure of the massified soldiers (Figure 2) and yet 
                                                                  
11  Although admitting their violence, derived from the production line of mechanical reproduction, the 
“masses” to Benjamin have other possibilities than their co-optation by fascism. The masses’ machine-induced 
tactility and favoritism of tactile media (e.g. cinema) seem to Benjamin to be presenting a chance to form a new line 
of “habit.” See his “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. and with an intro by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zone (New York: Schocken Books, 
1968(1936)), pp. 217-251; see esp. p.240. In the meantime, as Hagtvet (Ibid.) summarizes, to many conservative 
thinkers from Jakob Burckhardt to Friedrich Nietzsche, the masses are excessive due to their overemphasis of 
equality. If these thinkers are anxious about the masses’ seeming embodiment of the idea of democracy, Elias 
Canetti, Crowds and Power, trans. by Carol Stewart (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984(1960)), stands out 
in the genealogy of conservative critiques of the masses with his keen sense of the mechanically reproduced nature 
of the post-1920s masses. Whether one sees a habit-forming momentum or democratic possibility, modern criticism 
of the mass starts from the (conscious or unconscious) recognition that the society’s massification is the 
phenomenon of people’s reification and ultimately of commodity logic. 
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another (Figure 3), while Akiyama discursively repeats the same imaginative vision of the 





In a mesmerizing uncertainty, the reader/interviewer might be distracted from these images’ 
declared meaning of immorality to notice the form with which the meaning is supposed to be 
delivered. The form that might come to the fore in this way is that of mass reproduction, whose 
cold mechanicity makes a shocking contrast to the existential matters of life and death, of 
cadavers, of war that Akiyama would like to discuss. The copied redundancy with which he 
                                                                  
12  Figure 2 is taken from the National Liaison for Correct Memorialization of the War-Dead, “Senshi-sha, …,” 
Ibid.; p.1. Figure 3 is from Akiyama, “Senbotsu-sha-ra no...,” Ibid.; p.2. 
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repeats his imagery might eventually erase any meaning whatsoever, so that in the end, only the 
singularity of the form might remain. The differences between the human and skeletal shapes, 
between their sizes, and between the figure of the human body and that of the monies budgeted 
for the recovery project (Figures 4 and 5), etc. might look to be more important than what they 





One might sense a certain level of jouissance in designing, drawing, and printing these figures. 
The mechanical beauty that one might or might not perceive from the figures is of course that 
which might accompany the Campbell Soup cans, for instance. Distraction of one’s attention 
from the meaning and its re-focus on the surface of the presentation would perhaps be the last 
things that a moralist like Akiyama might wish, but the almost excessive emphasis on formality 
                                                                  
13  Figures 4 and 5 are from the Liaison, “Senshi-sha, …,” Ibid.; p.4 and 5. 
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is his own, whereby his moral anxiety of masses seems to be traversed by an odd fascination 
with and joy in their mass-form.    
 Akiyama thus seems to be split between his explicit criticism of the massification of the 
soldiers and implicit fascination with the form according to which they are metaphorically and 
actually massified. This split is expressed in his contradictory usage of the mass-form (as in 
computer graphics), probably unconsciously, in his conscious critique of the same form. This 
split between the critique and attraction, consciousness and unconsciousness, makes a fine 
instance of commodity fetishism, Marx would say. In modern capitalism, individuals are never 
fully autonomous, according to Marx. They are always already split between rational knowledge 
of the world and the intractable belief that denies such knowledge⎯the belief in the commodity 
as the fetish, to be more specific. While these individuals clearly understand that they are the 
subjects of commodity-production and –exchange, they cannot help but fantasize that it is 
actually the commodities that are the subjects. The commodities in this fantasy approximate 
fetishes as in Hegel’s imaginative “African” religions, mingling, relating, and socializing with 
each other, outside human agency.14 Ultimately, this fantasy expresses the fact that commodities 
are truly exchangeable with each other in and of themselves as the same products of abstracted 
human labor. This expression is theoretically erroneous yet materially enabling. According to 
Marx, the primitive-looking speculation of the commodity’s agency is necessary for “man” to 
“[tear] himself loose from the umbilical cord of his natural species-connection with other men, or 
                                                                  
14  Already in Hegel, the split exists between people’s self-consciousness as the producers of fetishes⎯thus 
they could and do “capriciously” create and destroy the fetish⎯on the one hand, and their belief in the 
“indeterminate, unknown power” that these fetishes are supposed to command, on the other hand. “The Negroes [sic] 
have an endless multitude of ˜divine images,˜” Hegel says, “which they make into their gods or their ‘fetishes’ (a 
corrupted Portuguese term). The nearest stone or butterfly, a grasshopper, a beetle, and the like⎯these are their 
Lares⎯indeterminate, unknown powers that they have made themselves; ˜and if something does not work out or 
some unhappiness befalls them, then they throw this fetish away and get themselves another. ˜” In Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, One-Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827, ed. by Peter C. Hodgson, trans. by R. F. Brown, 
P. C. Hodgson and J. M. Stewart with the assistance of H. S. Harris (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); 
pp.234-5; parentheses and small tildes original. 
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on direct relations of dominance and servitude” as in corvée.15 Without wrongly yet 
pragmatically speculating that his/her product has the agency to autonomously connect with 
other products, that is, without being enchanted by the supposed agency of his/her product, the 
actor in modern capitalism is not motivated to produce such advanced things as commodities. In 
the sense that it produces the material effects of production, exchange, and consumption, 
commodity fetishism is real⎯the modern capitalist actors are really subjected to the commodity 
and its supposed power as and of the fetish.16  
The magical charm of the massified soldiers that might motivate Akiyama to produce his 
discourse and activism can be assumed to have been enhanced to its utmost level in the mode of 
mechanical reproduction. Such a mode potentially renders every bit of a thing’s original history 
and unique usages into a formality that can be standardized, copied, and disseminated in the 
market. Most valuable when they are “trendy,” the mechanically reproduced products’ use-value 
closely approximates their exchangeability⎯being trendy⎯itself. The mode of mechanical re-
production thus brings the products of human labor to its ultimately social point, i.e. existence as 
exchangeability.17 What actors like Akiyama are showing is the obverse side of this advanced 
stage of modern capitalism, that the super-commodities of mechanically reproduced products are 
supported by and supporting people’s hyper-fetishism of such commodities. When these com-
modities’ mutual exchangeability is readily visible on their surfaces, in their thoroughly stand-
ardized texture, it is very easy for the subject to forget that it is actually human agency that pro-
duces and exchanges the commodities. Commodities are not automatically exchangeable among 
themselves; they become mutually exchangeable because humans expend on every one of them 
                                                                  
15  See Marx, “The Commodity,” in his Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1. intro. Ernest Mandel, 
trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp.125-177; p.173. 
16  See Marx, Ibid.; especially the section, “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” pp.163-77. 
17  The definition of the commodity is that it is produced with its exchange in mind⎯only highly evolved 
levels of labor division will necessitate such a form of production. See Marx, Ibid.; p.166. 
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the same abstract labor-power and also because humans bring these products to the market with 
the desires for other commodities with other use-values than their own products. Yet due to their 
copied and proliferated appearance of identicality, the mechanically reproduced products more 
readily look to be immediately and naturally exchangeable without human labor, without human 
agency, than ever before. “[R]elapse into mythology,” the German critic Siegfried Kracauer calls 
the hyper fetish-power of the mechanically reproduced products.18 The Campbell Soup cans or 
the “Tiller Girls” that Kracauer observed in the 1920s Broadway and other North American stag-
es surely showed “the rationality of the mass pattern, [yet] such patterns simultaneously [gave] 
rise to the natural in its impenetrability.”19 Impenetrable here is the truth of the human creativity 
behind these products. On the one hand, this impenetrability makes these products the truthless 
ornaments that are to adorn, rather than to illuminate, the mass-lives; on the other hand, the same 
impenetrability makes these products also the uncanny enigma that implies the existence of re-
pressed truth on the other hand. And it is into such an enigmatic ornamentality that the fallen 
Japanese soldiers have been rendered in Akiyama’s imagination and, according to Akiyama, in 
the Japanese state practices. Such ornamentality makes him morally resentful, Akiyama sug-
gests; yet to me, he also seems to be inexplicably attracted.  
When one introduces the category of unconsciousness⎯attraction and desires, belief 
versus knowledge⎯one is re-examining the idea of the subject. When one recognizes 
commodity fetishism as indispensable for production, one cannot help but notice the subjected 
nature of the modern capitalist subject. Similarly in Marx’s definition, freedom in modern 
capitalism means being “free of,” i.e. having no other way than being the producer in the system. 
“A free individual,” in his words, means that 
                                                                  
18  See Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans., ed., and with an intro. by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995); p.84. 




he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other 
hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all 
the objects needed for the realization [Verwirklichung] of his labour-power.20 
 
Being “rid of” everything but his labor power, Marx’s individual is the model for total 
abstraction, the capitalist value itself, which is completely substitutable and thus potentially 
infinitely mobile—he is absolutely “free.” This state of being in an interstice between quotation 
marks, that is, “free” (yet unfree), is the quality of modern individuals, which is none other than 
the state of subjectification to commodity logic. 
Akiyama’s presentation of the individuated individual as individually identified soldiers 
might now look to be his effort to overcome this (un)freedom of the modern capitalist subject. In 
his argument, individuation by the sacrifier state is supposed to save the soldiers from their mas-
sification. Massness is the ultimate state of subjectivization due to people’s hyper-
exchangeability (hyper-freedom) and their heightened fetishism regarding their own hyper-
freedom. The mass to Akiyama apparently represents immorality⎯it goes against human life 
and death and their individuality. The problem with this position is that individuality and com-
modity character are not mutually exclusive. Rather, individuals whom Akiyama imagines to be 
moral and dignified cannot be but commoditized and unfree, no matter how individuated they are. 
For, their individuation is that of and as soldiers, while those parts of them that are irrelevant to 
their existence as the soldiers—for instance, the personal history of Akiyama’s brother being the 
heir of their family farm in Chiba—are simply disregarded. This is a process that is parallel to 
commoditization, in which an object’s various use-values have to be abstracted into its generic 
exchange-value.21 Akiyama remarks, 
                                                                  
20  Marx, “The Sale and Purchase of Labour-Power,” Ibid., pp.270-280; the quote is from pp.272-3; square 
brackets original. 
21  Marx, “The Commodity,” Ibid.; pp.125-177. 
  
40 
 “I imagine the solders had worldly passions (bonnō); also, they must have been thinking 
about their kids a lot. But, I think they must have died, saying, ‘We die right here so that 
following generations wouldn’t have this kind of thing [war] any more.’” 
 The soldiers died and die anyway, in spite of their heterogeneous passions and kids, for 
the sake of the “following generations.” According to Akiyama’s above-mentioned sense of 
moral national history as the people’s enduring relation with the state, the following generations 
in turn exist only in and as their deaths that they are assumed to dedicate to the state in the future. 
In Akiyama’s sense, the future generations are imagined to be an always-already assembled 
collectivity of the state’s soldiers, despite the past generations’ wish that their descendants would 
not have war any more. Formally analyzed, the soldiers in Akiyama’s sense are necessarily 
commodified, from the past to the future. A soldier’s individuality in a formal analysis is 
comparable to the individuality of the commodity, which is not to say an oxymoron. As different 
commodities differ in their purposes, functions, etc. yet identically conform to the commodity 
form, each soldier is different in the degree and/or kind of contributions that he can make to the 
idea of the state. Yet fundamentally, he is the same with his fellow soldiers as a soldier. Despite 
their differences such as where they are deployed or what useful fighting skills they have, the 
soldiers are mutually exchangeable at any time, just like commodities. Ultimately, the soldiers 
are the exchange-value itself in their deaths, as Akiyama intuitively sees in his figures—these 
figures demonstrate the soldiers’ commodity-character, ironically (to Akiyama) as the state’s 
quintessentially moral subjects. 
 Akiyama with his will to morally correct the commodity form of the fallen soldiers, 
therefore, seems to fail. The failure might be attributable to his idealization of moral 
subjectification as that which is supposed to transcend subjectifying commodification. In modern 
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capitalism, the concept of the subject presupposes commodification. From the individual 
perspective, one has to already have been “freed” under commodity logic in order to be 
interpellated as the subject of modern ideologies. A designated subject of, say, the state, has to 
have already had the visceral feel for such radical ideas as the general form of the subject (with 
different use-value) and/or the subjects’ complete substitutability, which the state requires people 
to understand. Before the state’s propaganda, most likely people have already practiced these 
ideas in their lives. Here, I am not saying that the “base” (economy) determines the 
“superstructure” (ideologies). Far from that, the commodity logic is the ur-ideology, which 
determines both sub-ideologies, such as the ideas and discourses on the state-, colonial, 
patriarchal, ethnic, and other dominations on the one hand, and the economic relations on the 
other. Political, social or cultural discourses on the nation-state, gender, or “race,” could be 
thought of as confirming, maintaining, and reproducing commodity logic as an ideology.22 
Commodification is temporally and spatially prior to the process of subjectification, since 
commodification is total. According to Thomas Keenan, it is a “radical (‘total’) abstraction that 
massively and systematically effaces the differentiation of every use value, every thing.”23 A 
similar sense of totality of commodification (or rather modernization) is expressed by Heidegger, 
who says one “enters” the modern world of appearance in its entirety⎯one is always in it, 
already prepared and equipped for it, as its subject.24 The relations of the state-people, men-
                                                                  
22  See Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. by Chris Turner (London, NY: Verso, 1995). 
23  See Keenan, “The Point Is to (Ex)change It: Reading Capital, Rhetorically,” in Emily Apter and William 
Pietz eds., Fetishism as Cultural Discourse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.152-185; the quote is from 
p.165; parentheses original. 
24  See Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. and with an intro. by William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), pp.115-154. 
According to him, what he calls the “world picture,” which “does not mean a picture of the world but the world con-
ceived and grasped as picture,” is a “system” of the represented objects set before the subject “in its entirety” (p.129). 
The systematic totality of the world picture envelopes the subject, contradicting the fact that the subject represents 
the objects and thus produces the world picture⎯“Wherever this [representation] happens, man ‘gets into the picture’ 
in precedence over whatever is. But in that man puts himself into the picture in this way, he puts himself into the 
scene, i.e., into the open sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented” (p.132). Temporally, the sub-
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women, etc. after capitalism are therefore necessarily generated and affected by commodity 
logic; the opposite is not true. 
 The state-subjectification is thus understandable only within the overall context of 
commodification, only as the latter’s special case, to the contrary of what Akiyama seems to 
hope. Yet he himself seems to half-notice that he is merely hoping. That is probably the reason 
that he keeps representing soldiers as machines—not just commoditized corpses to be 
mechanically recovered, but killing machines without the ethical ability to transcend the state 
orders. This latter representation is disclosed during our discussion of the soldiers’ accountability 
for their war crimes. 
 “Who’s accountable for the war and the Japanese atrocities in it? It’s obvious,” says 
Akiyama in his apartment. “Of course, it’s the military complex (gunbatsu) [implicitly, the 
complex of the Japanese state, military, and military industry]. Hideki Tōjō [the prime minister, 
1941-44, and a major general of the army] was its top and convicted as a class-A war criminal 
[in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946-8]. The emperor [Hirohito]? He’s 
also accountable—the war was fought under his name. The ordinary soldiers? Hmm,” he slows 
down. “I don’t think they’re accountable. They’re kind of victims themselves, you know. They 
were drafted. They were told to kill ‘chinks’ (chan-koro). They did it against their will. They 
were forced to absolutely obey the superior’s orders (zettai fukujū).” 
 According to his decision, the soldiers did not have their own will; then they are not 
accountable for what they did. In the overall postwar Japanese context in which ordinary 
Japanese, soldiers and civilians alike, are regarded as the victims of the war, the soldiers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
ject’s relation to the general and public system of the world picture is that “man will and ought to be the subject that 
in his modern essence he already is”⎯“man is essentially already subject” (p.133; emphasis original). Unlike Marx, 
Heidegger never refers to commodity logic to understand the totality of representation. Heidegger secures the mo-




subjection to the logic of machine is thus affirmed.25 Akiyama’s admission of the soldiers’ 
machine character is despite his moral position that tries to see individuality of the soldiers under 
the humanitarian state. The contradiction looks necessary, not only due to the moral national 
requirement that the soldiers be deprived of their own will in order to count as the victims. In 
addition to this historical reason, the soldiers are necessarily commodified machines and 
individuated humans simultaneously, also to demonstrate and fortify the general compatibility 
between commodity logic that mechanizes them and the logic of the state-subject that humanizes 
them. It was as cold-blooded, mutually identical war-machines that the sacrifier state recognized 
the soldiers as its subjects. The soldiers as the agential, self-sacrificial contributors to the concept 
of the Subjective state are always already commodities in their mutually identical yet differently 
functional state of subjection. Commodification and subjectification are one and the same thing 
here, although the latter is always the former’s secondary instance. 
 At this point, I would like to go back to the image of the infants’ row once more. In many 
ways, it should be now seen as an illustration of Akiyama’s ideals. From the historical 
perspective, the image seems to indicate Akiyama’s idea of the Japanese soldiers as the totally 
managed, thus innocent, victims of the military complex. Although they killed countless Chinese 
civilians, the Japanese soldiers as the state commodities-subjects should not be accountable for 
their crimes, according to Akiyama; his figures perfectly fit his nationalist argument. From the 
structural perspective as well, the soldiers’ commodified status in these figures, has turned out to 
be Akiyama’s ideal of moral subjectification, for subjectification shares its form, process, and 
logic with commodification. The figures in this structural view are the visualized morality of the 
                                                                  
25  Even though Hannah Arendt similarly points out the “banality of evil” (the evil in this case is Nazi’s Adolf 
Eichmann), of course this does not mean that she attempts to forgive what the evil did in and for the Holocaust as 
banal fulfillments of mechanical orders. See her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1977(1964)). 
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state-subject in their illustrating the literally selfless, that is, standardized will to the nation-state. 
The third instance is aesthetic; both the historical and structural instances here seem to show the 
prominence of forms and formality over meaning and ethics. To Akiyama, the idea of aligning 
the atomized national soldiers in a row seems to matter more than its historical and ethical 
implications. Of course, I surmise that he believes in the meaning of the nation or its morality. 
However, it seems that there is something excessive and automatic about his emphasis on the 
form, particularly when he does not consider the ethical implication of the soldiers’ killing other 
Asians and Pacific Islanders. After a while, it might feel as if his figures or the mass-form that is 
expressed in the figures were his ideals and the actual, dead soldiers were their examples. 
 These three dimensions (historical, structural, and aesthetic) in Akiyama’s idealization of 
the soldiers’ commodification seem to confirm the location of commodity logic in the subject’s 
unconsciousness. Recall Marx says that the producers of the commodity are born into the 
habituated system of commodification, in which its logic is articulated always belatedly, after the 
producers’ unconscious production and exchange of commodities as the system’s subjects. The 
above-discussed totality of commodity logic owes much to the logic’s unconscious working⎯if 
one has to go through conscious, enforced processes to be the commodity-producer, then one 
could possibly escape the capitalist system by consciously denying such processes. But the 
conscious explanation that heterogeneous commodities are unexchangeable without the subject’s 
imagination would not halt the unconscious habit to keep imagining.26 Therefore, in his criticism 
of the soldiers’ mass-treatment, Akiyama seems to unconsciously know the existence of 
commodity logic, although he does not name it as such. What he does not know is also that 
commodity logic insidiously conditions and organizes his criticism and also his proposal of the 
                                                                  




alternative, the soldiers’ moral subjectification. Overall, he does not seem to be conscious that he 
deploys and underscores commodity logic in the course of his argument. Thus, when it comes to 
the matter of the war-crimes, he could jump at such a logic very consciously, without knowing 
that such an act undermines his earlier diatribe against the soldiers’ mass-treatment. 
 Akiyama’s concept of the subject either of the sacrifier state or of the victimized nation 
hence seems to be secretly inhabited by the ghostly existence of commodity logic. When 
everyone else in modern capitalism is similarly haunted by such a ghost, Akiyama might stand 
out for his almost violent, self-alienating type of over-exaggeration of his state of being 
subjectified—his repetitious illustration of the formalized corpses, for instance. As I have 
discussed, in this act, he seems to have lost his meaning, taken over by the attraction of the 
mechanical form or by the act of repetition itself beyond or despite meaning. Perhaps, here lies 
one point to define fascism with—séance or the grotesque and in-itself unconscious articulation 
of the unconscious nature with which a modern capitalist person is subjectified.27 
 For another defining point of fascism, the next section of the chapter will focus on 
Akiyamas anachronism, with which he defines pseudo-metaphysically morality and accordingly 
hypostatizes the concept of the Subjective state. Fascism is probably characterized not only by 
obsession with and advancement of capitalist formality (leaving one’s body and mind completely 
to forms’ automaticity would be the ultimately advanced state of capitalism), but also by 
                                                                  
27  Séance is the image that I will explore once more in this chapter, as I discuss a postwar Japanese writer, 
Yukio Mishima. The inspiration is also from Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning and the New International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, with an intro by Bernd Magnus and Stephen 
Cullenberg (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), in which he argues that Marx is concerned with the 
ghostliness of the exchange-value. Marx’s famous table-commodity that “stands on its head, and evolves out of its 
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will” (Marx, “The 
Fetishism,” Ibid.; pp.163-4), then seems to Derrida to be a table during a “spiritualist séance” (p.189). According to 
Derrida, the séance that he argues Marx theoretically holds here represents the act of exorcising the ghost of the 
exchange-value⎯only the use-value is “very human” and ontologically real to Marx, Derrida claims (p.188). But 
séance is not held exclusively for the purpose of exorcising the ghost; it could be held to bring the ghost to human 
senses for communication, analysis, and understanding. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Ghostwriting,” diacritics 
25.2: 65-84 for criticism of this particular instance of Derrida on Marx. Unlike Marxian séance for understanding the 
ghost, fascist séance, as I so metaphorize, appropriates and abuses the mysterious power of the conjured ghost.  
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anachronistic attachment to fetishized meaning that is supposed to be able to check the 
automaticity of the forms (e.g. the Subjective state, il duce, etc.). Fascism should probably be 
studied as a movement between these contradictory moments—between futurism and nostalgia, 
and between formalism and romanticism—a process whereby the fascist libido oscillates back 
and forth between the two. Keeping these points in mind, I am now considering Akiyama’s idea 
of the Subjective state in terms of the theoretical concept of reincorporation. Re-incorporation, 
since his Subjective state cannot be thought of outside modern capitalism and its formalist 
definition of the state, after all. 
 
The Recovering State, Recovering the State 
 “Terusawa,” where Kakunosuke Akiyama lives with his wife, is off the urban, 23 Ward 
district of central Tokyo. Still in Tokyo Metropolis, but Terusawa belongs to suburban Musashi-
no City. Further toward Tokyo peripheries, districts are called counties and villages. The novelist 
Osamu Dazai suggested in his immediate postwar works that this western Tokyo city of Mu-
sashino during the war was fantasized as a pastoral haven by the residents of Tokyo’s 23 Wards, 
many of whom actually relocated here in order to avoid the notorious U.S. air-raids on Tokyo.28 
In Shōhei Ōoka’s 1950 novel “The Lady of Musashino,” though, the city that had really survived 
the air-raids was a battlefield, stripped into a naked, geological structure through the eye of a re-
patriated foot-soldier (fukuin hei), 24-year-old Tsutomu—the sedimentation and erosion of the 
ancient “geological era” and the “primitive” forests of oak and zelkova, in which Tsutomu could 
not help but try to find how to survive imaginative attacks from the enemy. Urbane houses of the 
relocaters (sokaisha), a military airport and factories were the material traces of the war; so were 
repatriated soldiers and the “pan pan” (Japanese prostitutes for American occupational soldiers 
                                                                  
28  See his anthology, Ōtō (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihon Sha, 1948), for instance. 
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and others), who, together with their customers, “swarmed about the railroad stations,” according 
to Ōoka.29 Another writer, Masao Takahashi witnesses that it was about the 1970s when the last 
bit of nature in Musashino started to vanish from its landscape, due to the ongoing real estate de-
velopment, whose origin can be traced to the turn of the last century.30 
 The city that flies in front of the fascinated outsider’s eyes in a train is still spacious and 
green, balmy in the hot June sunshine. Today, though, Musashino’s spaciousness is that of com-
fortableness. While not as pretentious as Den’en Chōfu and other towns in exceptional Setagaya 
Ward, Musashino seems to embody the middle-class normativity of the “nuclear” family, dogs, 
and a two-storied house with a couple of camellia trees or azalea bushes in a small garden. The 
desolately “remote horizon” that one of Dazai’s characters “absentmindedly saw, standing in the 
engawa balcony, smoking,” is now the temporary limit of the vision of such normative houses, 
which are seen from a distance as stone-fenced squares, repeating and proliferating themselves.31 
Musashino outside the window is now literally flying, as the train speeds up in this flattened land. 
As we are further away in this Chūō Line westward from the 23 Wards, the distance between the 
                                                                  
29  Ōoka, “Musashino Fujin” in Ōoka Shōhei Zenshū 3 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), pp.145-306; the 
quotes are from p.146, 179, and 164 respectively. Ōoka describes the former soldier, Tsutomu’s “melancholic” eyes 
as those of “criminals,” who would “do what they don’t want to do, driven by their dark instincts” (p.268). Tsuto-
mu’s instincts are suggested to have been nurtured in Burma, to which he was dispatched. Tsutomu is never tamed 
in the novel, although its overall moral is triumph of morality (abandonment of attempted adultery between Tsutomu 
and Michiko; Michiko in Japanese means the way of morality). The novelist thus reflects on the Freudian theme of 
how the war’s violence is contained, without being resolved, by postwar orders of marriage, property relation, and 
pragmatic morality (See Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” in his Standard Edition: Complete Psy-
chological Works, Vol. XIV (1914-16) (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), pp.273-302). Here, perhaps Ōoka’s masculin-
ity merely performs; that is, Ōoka might just want to see the supposedly female’s realms of household, consumption, 
and moral pragmatism to have survived the war intact and will conquer and normalize the belligerent instincts of 
soldiers. Despite the desired dichotomy between instincts and culture, men and women, Ōoka makes Michiko com-
mit suicide in order to protect the moral ideal of monogamy. This means that in the writer’s unconscious insight, the 
fascistic (roughly equaled with the expulsion of emotions and individuality for the sake of the ideal) governs and 
remains in the cultural and feminine as well. Fascism and, ultimately, the issue of the commodity are the non-
thematized themes that Ōoka only unconsciously pursues⎯from this perspective, males and females, battlefields 
and households, are not so decisively dichotomized as the novel’s overt structure shows.   
30  Masao Takahashi, “Ren’ai to Minpō” in Geppō 2 (a pamphlet inserted in Ōoka Shōhei Zenshū 3, Ibid.), 
November 1994, 7-8. 
31  See Dazai’s “O-San” in the above anthology, pp.1-28; the quote is from p.8. 
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stations becomes greater, so the train is at its full speed—suicides are rampant in this line. Te-
rusawa, Akiyama’s town, is about fifteen minutes by bus from X Station. 
 The bus that is bound for Terusawa echoes with multilingual chats and youthful giggles, 
reflecting the presence of a college nearby. The “bubbly” excess of the 1980s liquidity flowed 
into land, naturally rare in such a small country as Japan, pushing the property prices in the 23 
Wards to their highest ever and many college campuses in the Wards out to the surrounding 
cities. The college in Terusawa was apparently one of them. The colleges’ survival strategies 
nowadays include that of introducing students from abroad. As Akiyama will later tell me, he 
would often see Chinese students working in neighborhood convenience stores, probably to fill 
the still wide currency gap between the yuan and yen (to the yen’s advantage as of June 2008). 
 This is my first visit to any “project” housing in Japan or elsewhere, which is apparently 
built near the campus, off other residential, middle-class parts of Musashino City, away in the 
bused distance. Akiyama’s has an almost Soviet beauty characteristic of pragmatic buildings, 1, 
2, 3, 4, …., in neatly lined blocks, A, B, C, D, …. His apartment, “C-4-5f,” has newly painted 
partitions in the entrance to protect his privacy, just like any other units in the complex. 
 Smilingly receiving my excuse that I have arrived ten minutes earlier than 4:30, Akiyama 
is a lean, tall, handsome man, with his thick, gray hair combed all to the back. A light blue, fresh 
“Ralph Lauren” polo shirt, ironed chino pants, and his workshop where I am supposed to 
interview him is already chilled with the A/C—everything is ready and perfect. According to 
him, he uses this sliver of room next to the small entrance hall to manufacture “electronic 
devices,” which, together with the pension, helps him pay the bills. He says his wife has been a 
homemaker ever since she quit a secretarial job after their marriage. 
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 “I’m following her suit finally this year; I’m planning to retire,” says the seventy three 
years old. In the back of the dim room, whose one small window is thickly curtained to prevent 
the scorching afternoon sun from the west, I see small industrial machines and a broad, tilted 
table for designing. Every inch of the four walls is filled with files, books, and periodicals, in the 
interstices of which are cleverly dovetailed a small fax machine and a copier. Later, during the 
three-hour interview, he would frequently look up the filed documents, which are so 
systematically stored that he does not have to waste even a single moment in looking for a 
wanted reference. I have seen similar levels of orderliness among similarly modest 
Manhattanites—the common issue of limited spaces aside, perhaps the sense of lacking control 
of one’s life might spark the urge to totally control one’s belongings, either documents, spices, or 
one’s own body. 
 “Why do you focus on the remains?” sipping the iced coffee that his wife kindly made for 
us, I start our conversation. We have already talked over the phone a couple of times, so I know 
his answer—because, he is bereaved. However, this is not the answer that I seek, since not every 
bereaved Japanese engages in his types of activism—the majority of them have decided to live 
with the idea that their beloved’s remains are missing, trying to forget about the lack in their 
busy everyday lives, over the long time-span of sixty three years. In this afternoon, in our first 
meeting in person, Akiyama is a little more elaborate than usual about his difference. 
 “See, I’m 73 now. When I was 61 [in 1995], we had the 50th anniversary of the end of the 
war. That was the year when I went to Okinawa [where his brother is said to have fallen] for the 
first time.” 
 Thus he starts his narrative in his low, a bit nasal voice, which connotes his quiet 
determination. He could be funny in genuinely warm, sociable ways. But when it comes to his 
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activism, subdued anger and accumulated frustration seem to simmer beneath his incessant 
speeches. As it will turn out, it is the anger and frustration concerning the bureaucracy of the 
Japanese state, which he says lacks any humanitarian consideration of the bereaved at all. Yet, on 
the surface, he keeps his cool, trying to be as pragmatic and rational as possible, just like the 
bureaucracy itself. 
 It is in such a restrained manner that he continues that prior to his trip to Okinawa, his 
mother passed away. According to him, she was never politically active. Immediately after the 
war, when her local Chiba prefectural government handed her a wooden box with a pebble inside 
in the place of her fallen son’s bones, she murmured, “how condescending” (baka ni shite-iru)—
that was her first and last political act concerning her son. Pebbles for bones had become 
customary in the losing war where the Japanese army could no longer recover and repatriate its 
soldiers’ bodies.32 The pebble that the Akiyamas received was supposed to have been sent from 
the battlefield where the elder brother Akiyama had fallen; but in retrospect, Akiyama says to me 
with a sarcastic smile, it might have been picked in Tamagawa River in Tokyo or some other 
random place (“Tama-gawa atari no ja nai-ka ne”). 
 In the official note that came with the box, which Akiyama has read so many times that 
he remembers verbatim, there was no mention of either the battlefield or platoon in or for which 
                                                                  
32  According to Katsuichi Honda and Setsuo Naganuma, Tennō no Guntai (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1991), 
earlier in China, the fallen Japanese soldiers were “incinerated, received by their buddies with salutes, and 
religiously memorialized [in the battlefield]. On the wooden box [in which their bones were actually placed] was 
written the dead’s rank, which was usually posthumously raised by one or two, depending on if the dead made an 
honorary action in the battle” (p.122). “Over a few times a year, [those boxes of bones] were repatriated [and sent] 
to the troops where the dead were drafted... There then, [the dead] received salutes again, before [the boxes were] 
handed to their families” (p.127). But, as the Japanese were gradually losing the Fifteen-Year War, they no longer 
had time or means to either recover or repatriate their remains, especially in the Pacific front. Emiko Namihira finds 
that the soldiers then cut off and incinerated either the left hands or fingers of their fallen buddies, so that they 
brought them home with them. These synecdoches of the dead are mostly missing, since their carriers themselves 
tended to fall later. The pebble that the Akiyamas received was then the substitute for the substitute (body parts 
versus the whole body). See Namihira, “Heishi no ‘Itai’ to Heishi no ‘Irei’,” in Katsuhiro Arai and Toshiya Ichinose 
eds., Irei to Haka: Kyōdō Kenkyū Kin-gendai no Heishi no Jitsuzō II (Kokuritsu Rekishi Minzoku Hakubutsu-kan 
Kenkyū Hōkoku, Vol.102 (March 2003)), pp.493-513; esp. p.502. 
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his brother fought. In an effort to take back the displaced body of his brother, in 1995, he visited 
the Social Welfare Bureau of the Health and Welfare Ministry that was in charge of bereaved 
families. 
 “Wait⎯but why did you wait until 1995?” I interrupt. 
 “Oh, because, I semi-retired from my job then. Before that, I’d been busy providing for 
my three kids.” 
 I would imagine that his mother’s death might also have something to do with the timing. 
At the same time, many like-minded activists have confessed to me similar lapses for more or 
less the same economic reasons. Throughout the past sixty three years since the end of the war, 
these and other Japanese must have indeed been very busy catching up with the re-assigned 
standard of the middle-class, in which some failed and others succeeded. The collective frenzy 
for economic recovery was of course the substitute for the prewar Japanese libidinal investment 
in their empire over the rest of Asia and the Pacific.33 What is more, the postwar society’s 
economic focus was politically implanted, so that people earn money instead of acting 
politically.34 The purely economic life that Akiyama suggests he has led is typical among 
ordinary Japanese, though he, together with other activists, is extraordinary in his keeping his 
                                                                  
33  A similar process of transference of libido from the political to economic was observed in post-Nazi West 
Germany, according to Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich. See their The Inability to Mourn: Principles of 
Collective Behavior, trans. by Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove Press, 1975). Eric L. Santner also discusses 
the phenomenon in his Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). 
34  According to a historian, Masanori Nakamura, in an attempt to bring a closure to what Nakamura calls the 
“political decade” of the 1950s, in which many strikes and other violent political movements were fought, Ikeda 
Hayato, the then candidate for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (later the prime minister of Japan, 
1960-4), said that his goal was “to brighten up people's minds that had got dark during the Ampo movement [one of 
the biggest political movements in the 50s] with the ‘double the income plan’” that he had been proposing. See 
Nakamura, Sengo-Shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005); p.84. Prime Minister Ikeda’s plan to replace the political 
with the economic apparently worked; many historians point out de-politicization of the Japanese lives after the 
1960s. See Andrew Gordon, for instance, who reports the previously emphasized “class war (kaikyū tōsō)”’s shift to 
the politically opportunistic “civil movements (shimin undō),” in his “55-nen Taisei to Shakai Undō” in Rekishi-
gaku Kenkyū-kai Nihon-shi Kenkyū-kai ed., Nihon-shi Kōza, Vol.10; Sengo Nihon Hen (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppan Kai, 2005), pp.253-289. 
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political posture toward and personal memories of the war through the otherwise automatically 
passing postwar days. 
 When Akiyama thus visited the Social Welfare Bureau in Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda Ward 
in Tokyo, belatedly in 1995, they first said the brother had fallen in Palau, a Pacific island. 
Palau?—Akiyama was puzzled but went home. Talking to them once more later, he found out 
that the Bureau was not that certain about what it had said and willing to refer him to his native 
Chiba prefectural government. As the prefecture actually knew the platoon and other information 
(when did it gain the info? Why had not it let the Akiyamas know?), he called the Social Welfare 
Bureau again to obtain the numbers of his brother’s buddies; he wanted to know exactly how the 
brother fell. Since the Bureau belongs to the central government, it should and indeed did have 
all the lists of soldiers from any prefecture of Japan. And so on, the story goes on through the 
maze of bureaucratic turf and the confusions originating in wartime, to lead him to his first trip to 
the actual Okinawan bunker where the brother’s fellow veterans say that the brother had been 
killed. 
 The brother’s remains were not, and have not been, recovered, then and as of today 
(2008), for, after the war, the local Okinawans built a graveyard on top of the collapsed bunker. 
Akiyama was told that the policy of the Japanese state was that it would not recover the soldiers’ 
remains if their recovery was complicated by the burial site’s property status—the recovery 
project was not adequately budgeted for necessary compensations. Here again, Akiyama feels his 
wish to receive his brother’s remains has been hampered by bureaucracy. 
 “How those oyakusho (government agencies) work... I’m really mad,” says he, with 
oyakusho being a colloquial expression to sarcastically indicate bureaucracy as a self-sufficient 
machine for the sake of its own formalism. According to his idea, since the brother was drafted 
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by and fought for the state, the state has the “moral responsibility” (dōgiteki sekinin) to probe 
under the now-graveyard in Okinawa at any cost (of course with due respect for the dead in the 
graveyard). There is no “humanity” (jindō) in the current operations of the oyakusho, which 
should be negatively juxtaposed with the “American” state, according to him. 
 “Even though Americans say bodies are just containers of souls, their state treats their 
soldiers’ bodies with so much more respect than the Japanese case,” says he, mentioning the U.S. 
Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), which, among similar Japanese 
activists, is known to have dedicated so much more money and personnel to recovering their 
soldiers’ remains abroad, as compared to the Japanese case. 
 “How do you call it—dignity of bodies? They [the state of the U.S.] respect it. And with 
that respect, they try to repatriate the bodies. Don’t you feel their sympathetic consideration 
(omoiyari) [of the bodies]?” cries he. Here, he might be showing the so-called “mainstream 
conservatism” (hoshu honryū)-type of sensibility of postwar Japan, in which the tradition to be 
conserved is the sixty-three-year old semi-colonialism by the U.S.35 At the same time, “America” 
is also part of the “West,” as the Japanese liberals refer to as the supremely modernized paragon, 
the critical tool that these liberals use against Japan’s conservatism. I could not tell which is the 
case with Akiyama. Conservatism and radicalism seem to strangely cohabit in him. In his calm 
yet strong, heated yet whispering voice, he continues: 
 “So much difference from Japan [is shown by the DPMO project]. Japan, they [the state] 
say things like they’d respect bodies, based on our culture [in which bones are ritually 
significant], but this treatment [by the Japanese state of the Japanese soldiers with no respect 
                                                                  
35  Indeed, the activist who first brought the U.S. DPMO’s existence to my attention is the then retired con-
gressman, Yonetsu Hitoshi, who was once viewed as the lieutenant of another powerful congressman and the popu-
larly perceived mouthpiece of the U.S., Ozawa Ichirō. When I met him, Yonetsu was working for the non-profit that 
I will introduce in the second chapter, Japan Youth Memorial Association (JYMA), in Tokyo.  
35 Akiyama, “Ikotsu no Atsukai...,” Ibid. 
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contradicts what the state says]. They [the Japanese state] are lying (giman desu yo).” His earlier 
contrast between the real and ideal states of Japan is now traced over that between the real 
Japanese and U.S. states, as he sees them.   
 So, responding to my question on his motives, he has mentioned the Japanese funerary 
custom, in which the deceased bones have to be present as the token of the dead. Similarly, 
perhaps to him, his status as a bereaved constructs the limit of the language of what he calls 
humanity, whereby I feel I am expected to naturally and telepathically understand his wish to 
receive his beloved’s body, perhaps based on my sympathetic faculty as the same human being.36 
Other than those two reasonings, his narrative is replete with his indignation against the 
bureaucracy of the Japanese state. At the end of the long interview, it feels as if his purpose was 
not to gain the brother back but to fight the bureaucracy, which should actually be providing the 
means of accomplishing the first objective. 
 Through the Kafkaesque twist of modernity, he even adopts the bureaucracy’s tactics 
itself—law and legalism. To take an example, he would accuse the state, particularly its Health 
and Welfare Ministry, of “destroying and abandoning human bones in violation of the 190th 
clause of the criminal law” at the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery in Tokyo. At the Cemetery, he argues, 
more than 330 thousands sets of the already recovered bones of the soldiers are resting, after 
being “burnt en masse with high-heated gas until they almost completely lose their original 
forms.” This “treatment” (shobun) is illegal also in the light of a Tokyo metropolitan ordinance 
(No.125, Clause 15), to which the management of the Cemetery is subject due to its location. 
The ordinance, according to him, stipulates that an unidentifiable set of human bones be placed 
                                                                  
36  Nearly twelve years after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, Monica Gabrielle and Kristen 
Breitweiser are among others who have been “relentless[ly]” pushing the authority to try to recover their families’ 
remains out of the sixty dump trucks’ worth of soil taken from the trade center site and currently sitting untouched in 
Staten Island. “”I know people think it’s more whining,’ Ms. Gabrielle said. ‘But really, why should this have been 
left sitting out there?’” See Jim Dwyer, “9/11 Remains Still Found, And Sought” in The New York Times, 4/5/2013.  
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in an independent box to be buried as an individual. To begin with, the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery 
is not a legally registered cemetery (a violation of the Cemetery and Burial Act, Clause 14), a 
fact that the citizens of both the surrounding Chiyoda Ward of Tokyo and the larger nation of 
Japan should be informed about. Akiyama concludes his argument by deciding that the state’s 
practices are “illegal” (fuhōna) in addition to being inhumane.37 
 His legal literacy demonstrated in this argument lets us understand the level at which he 
has already been subjectified by the aspect of the state (bureaucracy) that he struggles to correct. 
His subjectification is at such a level that his legal criticism looks to be automatic and without 
meaning; probably there is not so much point in deciding whether such a highly political and 
national practice as burying anonymous soldiers is legal according to the hosting municipality’s 
ordinances. He may or may not be self-conscious about his seemingly meaningless mechanicity, 
yet he resorts to the probably ineffectual legalism in any case. He could possibly escape the loop 
of legalism, which subjectifies and enables him, by referring to real humanitarianism, that is, by 
opposing the state practice of war itself, which ultimately caused the Cemetery. This is not as 
impossible as it sounds—many other bereaved families have been doing that, whether 
mentioning “western universalism” as the conceptual means of ethical transcendence or some 
other means. As for Akiyama, he does not particularly have any problem with war or the warring 
state, as we have seen above.    
 In contrast to his mechanicity, state bureaucracy, as he addresses here, seems to have lost 
its transparency as the pure means and become equipped with the ability for recognition.38 In his 
legal research and meticulous presentations, Akiyama seems to assume that the bureaucratic state 
                                                                  
37  Akiyama, “Ikotsu no Atsukai...,” Ibid. 
38  For the normative model of the modern state, see Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 




is the agent that recognizes the level of his training as its subject. Thus, he apparently prefers 
directly talking to the Health and Welfare Ministry and other relevant agencies over 
cooperatively opposing, or correcting, to use his expression, these agencies. Many other activists 
opt to reach other citizens by handing out their publications on the street, holding meetings in 
city halls, or using the Internet, in an effort to critically improve the kinds of situations that 
Akiyama problematizes. These other activists would not be so focused, as Akiyama seems to be, 
on the idea of distributing their articles at the state-approved “press club,” for instance, from 
which the country’s media is allowed to disseminate the state-issued news.39 I am sure that 
Akiyama goes to the club to reach the dramatically bigger number of people that the state-media 
could officially reach than otherwise. The information distributed through the club-members 
might enjoy more trust among certain populations than the information distributed through civil 
groups. Yet, could the club be just a means to Akiyama? When one remembers where he comes 
from⎯the public oblivion of an “independent” business owner⎯the club might be recast as a 
stage and an object. At and to the club, Akiyama is not only showing his life and purpose, but 
showing off that he too is the state’s competent subject; his legalism aside, a certain kind of 
bureaucratic ability is required in order to act effectively in the club. Even though I lead a life of 
independence, Akiyama at and to the club might be saying, I am no less competent than these 
club-journalists and bureaucrats. As the addressee of the show-off, the club and the state behind 
the club seem to start taking on substantiality⎯some positively assumed existence, the existence 
that is supposed to be able to recognize and evaluate Akiyama’s bureaucratic abilities and legal 
competence. I sense that Akiyama assumes the bureaucratic state is the substantiated agent of 
recognition, even though this agency is separate from the previously discussed sacrifier state’s 
                                                                  
39  On the press club and the state control of information in Japan, see Helen Hadacre, “Aum Shinrikyo and 
the Japanese Media: The Pied Piper Meets the Lamb of God” (an unpublished paper presented at East Asian 
Institute, Columbia University, 1995). 
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agency. The sacrifier state is supposedly in charge of the meaning of the nation, death, and 
history; the bureaucratic state seems to work on the processes of subjectification and 
commodification. As the Subject of those processes, this bureaucratic state seems to help 
moralize the otherwise neutral processes ⎯being “in” the system, competent, and thus well-
subjectified becomes “good,” with good being so-judged by a certain, embodied state-figure, as 
Akiyama seems to assume. It is on the assumptions that commodification is moral and that this 
morality has the Subject of recognition, which Akiyama seems to acquire his willingness as a 
subject. 
 If this is the case, then the bureaucratic state is not so different from his ideal state, the 
Subject of people’s self-sacrifices. According to Akiyama’s earlier contrast between them, the 
bureaucratic state was supposed to be immoral in its working of 
commodification/subjectification. Yet the sacrifier state, which he substantiated as the opposite 
of the bureaucratic state, turned out to be none other than the agent of commodifying 
subjectification. Now, when he seems to try to substantiate the bureaucratic state as the moral 
authority of commodification/subjectification, such a state seems to overlap with the sacrifier 
state in its imagined substantiality and pseudo-metaphysical morality. The overlap is that 
between the agential state (the sacrifier) that commodifies and the commodifying state (the 
bureaucratic state) that is moral. In Akiyama’s discussion, these two kinds of state start with the 
opposite qualities (moral and immoral, respectively). He misrecognizes that these states have 
mutually opposite functions, which are individuating and commodifying. But these states end up 
in exchanging these qualities and functions. Lastly, let me reiterate that these points of 
convergence and divergence between the two types of state seem to ramify from Akiyama’s 
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certain desires regarding the concept of the Subject, its agency, and the morality of 
commodification.  
 Fascism is intractable precisely for the prevalence of the desires that it carries with it. The 
case in point here, Akiyama’s wish to set up a moral authority of the process of commodification, 
is the kind of anachronism that would surely be shared by many in modern capitalism. The wish 
is anachronistic, since from the materialist perspective, the modern capitalist actors no longer 
need the existence of moral authority in order to be the subjects. It is true that schools, mass 
media, churches, and others that Louis Althusser calls “ideological state apparatuses” constantly 
disseminate those authoritative-sounding voices that individuals obey, misrecognizing that these 
voices are truly authoritative.40 But in actuality, these individuals listen to the authoritative 
voices that are delivered by these apparatuses without knowing, or rather without admitting the 
necessity of knowing, whose voices they are⎯thus the allure of the voices, which these 
individuals enjoy and respect as such, i.e. as an enigma. Akiyama and other activists must know 
this allure; what might differentiate them is their persistent and insistent imagination of a 
respectively specific figure (e.g. the agential state, “big brothers,” and so on) that is supposed to 
be the origin of the voices. The results are the same either way⎯whether supposedly known or 
unknown, the voices start and restart the everyday process of over-interpretation and over-
reaction, relevant repression and internalization, and self-discipline and peer education. This is 
the process that Althusser says is more important than the origin of the voices.41  
According to Michel Foucault’s estimation, this process of self-subjection was launched 
in the mid-nineteenth century prisons and other correctional facilities in Europe and North 
America. The process of discipline in these facilities relied on what Foucault calls the “micro-
                                                                  
40  Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation).” in Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. by Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971(1968)), pp.127-186. 
41  Althusser, Ibid.; p.144. 
  
59 
physics of power.”42 This type of power worked on the body, unconsciousness and everyday 
rhythms of the inmates, rather than working through their minds or consciousness. Who ordered 
what became obsolete in the inmates’ repetitious fulfillment of the order, which they imposed on 
themselves as part of their everyday habits. Due to its autonomous and automatic nature, this 
type of discipline rendered any authoritative figure unnecessary. While Bentham dreamt about 
the possibility of constructing a “Panopticon,” the central tower from which an invisible official 
was supposed to incessantly watch each individual inmate, at this point of history it was merely 
“the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form” and “in fact a figure of political 
technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.”43 In other words, the 
Panopticon, when it was theoretically conceived, was already just a model without any pragmatic 
possibility. In spite of what Akiyama might like to think, the modern capitalist subjects are these 
inmates, whose mode of self-discipline Foucault thinks was later exported to the larger society. 
Like these inmates, the subjects in the larger society are always already self-subjectivized 
without the Panoptic eyes or interpellating voices.  
This is not to say that the central eye or original voice is completely absent from the 
modern capitalist society. According to Kant, these voices and eyes remain in the automatic 
system of modern morality as absence itself. To Kant, there is no doubt that empiricism denied 
the idea of moral authority, which could unconditionally guarantee our knowledge of freedom, 
immorality, and God. Empiricism argues that our knowledge is a product of our perception and 
other kinds of representation. As a consequence, the Truth withers, leaving behind what Kant 
calls the “vacant place” that the Truth once occupied. This place remains in its vacancy⎯even 
though morality in the age of representation is not something that is licensed by any authority or 
                                                                  
42  Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books); p.26.  
43  Foucault, Ibid.; p.205. 
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guaranteed by any truth, one becomes moral by postulating truths’ existence. This postulation is 
of course contrary to the knowledge that it is theoretically unsound. In the Kantian sense, the 
erroneous postulation is practically (morally) enabling and therefore necessary. The Kantian 
concept of freedom lies right here, in postulating truths beyond the empirical law that denies 
them. In his words, 
 
I thereby do not indeed learn what the object may be to which this [moral] kind of 
causality is attributed. I do, however, remove the difficulty, since, on the one 
hand, in the explanation of natural occurrences, including the actions of rational 
beings, I leave to the mechanism of natural necessity the right to ascend from 
conditioned to condition ad infinitum, while, on the other hand, I hold open for 
speculative reason the place which for it is vacant, i.e., the intelligible, in order to 
put the unconditioned in it. I could not, however, give content to this supposition, 
i.e., convert it into knowledge even of the possibility of a being acting in this way. 
Pure practical reason now fills this vacant place with a definite law of causality in 
an intelligible world (causality through freedom). This is the moral law.44 
 
In the modern world, it is not any “object” but “the mechanism of natural necessity” that 
determines whether one acts morally. The idea of necessity for morality automatizes moral 
processes and slashes off any requirement for moral authority. Yet, one still “speculat[es]” or 
“suppos[es]” the truth’s existence by keeping the vacant place for the authority of the truth, as a 
sort of vanishing afterimage of the authority’s metaphysical entity (Kant does not explain why 
post-metaphysical humans have to keep acting centripetally ). This speculation or supposition is a 
working of the human faculty of “pure practical reason,” according to Kant. He says the mental 
activities that mobilize pure practical reason “now [fill] this vacant place [that was once 
metaphysically occupied] with a definitive law of [moral] causality.” The empty place that is 
vacated by the Subject of morality is now filled with moral law as a substitute, while this does 
not mean that the moral law in modern times is marked by the Subject’s authorship. Questions 
                                                                  
44  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Third Edition, ed., trans., intro. by Lewis White Beck (New 
York: Macmillan, 1993(1956)); pp.50-1; parentheses and Italics original (Kant’s); square brackets mine. 
44 Kant, Ibid.; p.29. 
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regarding the law’s authorship, origin, or attribution simply become irrelevant and inappropriate 
in the face of one’s pragmatic necessity to act morally. The moral law’s mode of reasoning is 
tautology—humans are moral since there is the moral law; the moral law exists since humans are 
necessarily moral. 
 In the post-Freudian retrospect, the Kantian subject might seem to exercise a certain level 
of consciousness and conscience in keeping the vacant place in the middle of moral pragmatism, 
in order to be human, in order to be free. The vacancy might seem to be stoically and 
courageously kept as such, without any retrogressive fantasy to re-fill the vacancy⎯Slavoj Žižek, 
for example, has analyzed such a fantasy by using the category of unconsciousness and referring 
to the emotional quality of pleasure.45 Nonetheless, one can say that the fantastic element is 
already built in the Kantian scheme as the gap between belief and knowledge, as the subject’s 
“ascent” to the unconditioned, even though this subject does not know the content of the 
unconditioned. From this point of split and ascent, Akiyama-type of substantiation is not so far 
away. Fascist fascination with the concrete body of the “leader” figure (e.g. the cinematic body 
of Hitler) is broadly shared by the larger society, due to this fantastic structure and process of 
modern subjectification in general.  
 In many ways, Kant’s discussion of modern morality is parallel to Marx’s theory on the 
modern productivity. Similarly to the Marxian subjects who produce their commodities without 
knowing why these commodities are going to be exchangeable, the Kantian subject acts morally 
without knowing why s/he has to uphold relevant laws. In Marx, individuals have to 
misrecognize that commodities themselves have the will and power to be mutually exchanged; in 
Kant, individuals have to similarly believe (versus know) that moral law is absolute. Recall Marx 
says the anti-empirical supposition of commodity fetishism frees human actors from their natural 
                                                                  
45  Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989). 
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environments to be the modern capitalist subjects⎯this overlaps with the Kantian notion of 
freedom to law.  
 In the case of Marx, the centripetal nature of Akiyama’s substantiation would be best 
explained in terms of the theory of money fetishism, an epi-theory of commodity fetishism. 
Money fetishism is the theory that addresses the question of why people misunderstand that the 
money commodity such as gold has inherent preciousness.46 Money has come to posses universal 
power as the measure of value and means of exchange just because people during their 
transactions treat it as such for the sake of convenience, not because money (e.g. gold) is 
naturally valuable. See the parallelism with Kant here, who argues that the unconditioned’s space 
is vacated yet kept as such due to people’s pragmatic supposition of the unconditioned and not 
due to the substantiality of the unconditioned. Yet in Akiyama’s discourses and practices, it is as 
if the state, both bureaucratic- and sacrifier-types, held unquestioned moral superiority, for which 
people sacrificed their lives and deaths in order to express their natural deference to it. It is as if 
the state had natural power to render people into the state’s mutually exchangeable subjects. As I 
have mentioned, the truth is that the mutual exchangeability of commodities, including human 
laborers, are guaranteed by the labor-power that all of them congeal to be values. Money in this 
labor theory of value is a materially redundant yet magically centralizing agent of circulation, 
one of the pivotal contradictions of modern capitalism.  
 Due to his fetishistic insertion of the imaginary body of the state as the moral authority or 
as the “money” of moral exchanges, Akiyama might be able to think that he is spared from 
seeing the soldiers as automatically moral, that is, as likely “killing” their individuality anyway 
without any external authority. When these soldiers cannot be but moral subjects in Kantian or 
Marxian senses, Akiyama might think that he can resuscitate the soldiers’ agency and 
                                                                  
46  Marx, “The Process of Exchange,” Ibid.; pp.178-187; see esp. pp.184-7. 
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individuality by supposing the agential state. Of course, everyone else in modern capitalism 
supposes the authoritative center of morality and sacred medium of economy, according to Kant 
and Marx. Akiyama’s anachronism is meaningful only for its modernism. 
 In the age of mechanical reproduction, the built-in anachronism of modernity reveals its 
contradictory nature even more than ever before, in spite of, or rather, because of the 
technologically-availed possibility of the super-commodity. As I have briefly mentioned, the 
habit to see commodities as magically agential leads to another habit to treat money as 
autonomously precious, since both are the results of the same amnesia of human agency, the 
same psychological state of self-subjection. It is the secondary status of money to the commodity 
in general (money is a commodity), which makes money fetishism causally and temporally 
subordinate to commodity fetishism. Hence in the age of mechanical reproduction, the 
maximally expanded, magical realm of commodity fetishism holds room for, or gives birth to, a 
similarly heightened belief in another magic, i.e. the beliefs that the money commodity has never 
been a commodity and that money has an inherent power to centralize human transactions. And 
again, I am arguing that such a belief in the central figure of economy and morality has never 
been so firm as in the age of mechanical reproduction, where people’s ultimately standardized 
labor-power as the mass could produce and have been producing the exchangeable products 
without any authoritative hands.  
 Therefore, Akiyama’s reincorporative activity should be contextualized in the larger 
society’s mode of mechanical reproduction, in which reincorporation of the ideas of “Japan,” the 
emperor, or God(s) are matters of everyday consumption.47 Having saturated Japanese lives once 
in the 1920s, the mechanical reproductive system was mended as soon as the war was over and 
                                                                  
47  Yumiko Iida analyzes the 1990s’ relation between capitalist alienation and the problem of the subject in her 
Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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fortified in the 1960s’ “high growth” and in the overall neoliberal trend that started in the 1970s. 
Within this largely fantastic geography of commercialized Japan, Akiyama with his imagination 
of the Subjective state should be analyzed in terms of his susceptibility to the society’s 
reincorporative acts in general. Akiyama the home-bound engineer is perhaps in a position to be 
more easily interpellated by the fantastic discourses of the Subject than other Japanese might be; 
this Subject matches the independent nature of his job. Somehow placed outside the country’s 
economic prosperity, Akiyama supposes the Subject also in order for it to recognize his life. It is 
only when one considers this redemptive aspect of his activism that one might understand the 
reason that he started his activist work at the age of sixty-one, as he was probably beginning to 
look back on his life. Otherwise, he says he does not remember even playing together with his 
eleven-year older brother. 
 According to what his wife tells me as she prepares our dinner (“Please don’t. I’m not 
even hungry and I’m going home” “Yes I will. You are hungry and you’re not going home until 
you have dinner with us”), soon after his brother was drafted in 1943 at the age of twenty, the 
nine-year old Akiyama became an egg vendor to support the family. One day, with the money 
that he thus earned, he bought a kit of radio parts to amuse himself—he was immediately 
immersed and started to study engineering and electronics by himself. When she met him, he 
was already a self-made engineer. In the small company that was his second employer, she had 
been working as an accounting secretary for a while. 
 “A poor man, why the heck does he have to work for such a meager salary?” she thought 
in her mind, according to her. 
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 “Hmm..., So, apparently, you didn’t marry him for his money. Then for what? Was he as 
good-looking as he is today?” I wink.  
 “Ha ha. You’d be surprised, but he wasn’t!” 
 Akiyama is also laughing behind us, getting the table ready. Tonight’s menu is of course 
special, as his wife made a trip to the nearby supermarket to cook protein-rich dishes specifically 
for me—the couple usually avoids them for health-related reasons. On the kitchen table that is 
covered with red and white plastic “cloth,” dish after dish is placed, pushing everyday traces 
such as various receipts or pictures of their now grown-up kids further and further away to the 
edges. There are sautéed sausages with green peppers; here are stewed beef and potatoes; tuna 
sashimi, sautéed bamboo shoots a la “Chinese” (that is, flavored with sesame oil), a bowl of 
avocado, lettuce, tomato, and steamed squash salad, boiled spinach, brown rice, miso soup with a 
new variety vegetable, “purple vines” (murasaki tsuru-kusa), and slices of cantaloupe for dessert. 
The wife keeps talking over the dinner without eating so much, surely for the purpose of 
entertaining me, but as I sense, perhaps also for some reasons that are related to some surgeries 
that the husband Akiyama said she had had in the prior year. 
 After the dinner, the wife starts to share her daughter’s wedding photos with me—a 
beautiful daughter and her Italian husband, whom she met in London as both studied in an 
English-language school. They live in Italy now. 
 “When was the last time that we saw her? We miss her so much,” cries Akiyama. “But, 
apparently, she can’t afford for the air-ticket [to come see the Akiyamas again in Japan]. She 
doesn’t even have a job; she’s just started to learn Italian [to be able to find a job in Italy]. Of 
course, we’d love to send her the ticket. But, we’re frugal pensioners ourselves. You know, 
we’ve just spent a lot of money in the last year for the surgeries.”    
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 Meanwhile, a few neighbors visit the couple, in order to see their rare dracaena flowers 
that have incidentally bloomed tonight. They have grown the pot of what they call “the tree of 
happiness” (kōfuku no ki), following how it is marketed in Japan, for eight years; and this is the 
first time that they have ever been able to see the actual flowers. The much-anticipated flowers 
are honey-exuding, thick-petaled ping-pong balls, lined up on three or four weeping branches. As 
soon as they are open, the flowers fill the whole apartment with a strong aroma that reminds me 
of lilac. Happiness is perhaps an exaggeration. Yet, the exotic atmosphere that the big pot of 
dracaena on the living-room tatami mattress spreads is powerful anyway, powerful enough to 
distract other residents in the same complex from the middle of their variously hard-working 
everyday. 
 “What a view—great nourishment for my eyes,” sighs a lady with short-cut hair that is 
dyed reddish brown.    
 “My pot of Z [I could not hear] will also bloom tonight,” another in a gray, turtle-necked 
sweat shirt lets everyone know as she leaves. 
 “Finally!” Excited, Mrs. Akiyama stands up to go with her. 
 “I’ll join you guys later!” shouts Mr. Akiyama to their backs. A certain kind of 
reciprocity has apparently been practiced in this complex, which levels out all in the exchanging 
circle as the same, moral neighbors. Invited for their dinner and also sharing the great 
nourishment of dracaena, I feel I am temporarily drawn in a similar relation with the Akiyamas. I 
will aptly express my feeling by sending them a box of assorted sweets (kashi ori) later, 
according to the gift-exchanging common-sense of the country. Here too, as is the case with 
Akiyama’s imagination of a moral relation with the state, gift-exchange is never an alternative to 
commodity-exchange, for its effect is to equalize its players to be the same form of moral 
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communal members. The players become the same with each other to the extent that they are 
equally subject to the rules of gift-exchange. According to these rules, everything—exhaustion 
from surgeries, loneliness for absent kids, and aroma of flowers—is potentially abstracted into 
the exchangeable form. The exhaustion and sickness will accordingly be exchanged for comfort 
foods cooked out of neighborly concern, while the empty nest’s loneliness will be exchanged for 
visits of neighborhood kids, etc., so that food and kids are then returned by more heterogeneous 
things such as an invitation for a neighbor’s dance class’ exhibition (the examples that Akiyama 
gives me). Yet even in the midst of this commodity structure of the neighborhood gift-exchange, 
certain spirit of altruism seems to be irreducibly present. I have no reason to doubt that these 
neighbors provided tapper-wears of food out of true concerns about Mrs. Akiyama’s post-
operational frailty, for example, while I assume that these probably truly self-sacrificing 
moments must be constantly interrupted by the sober calculations of monetary balance between 
gives and takes, of the labor time used by each party.48  
 This insight does not point to the capitalism of gift-exchange only. The same insight 
perhaps enables one to discuss also the moral origin of capitalism. Just as gift-exchange cannot 
exist outside commodity logic, the exchange of commodities between the reified subjects might 
not exist outside moral considerations. Sacrificing of the satisfaction of one’s own needs for the 
sake of the satisfaction of others’ needs must feature every stage of modern capitalism, from 
production on. Without this self-sacrifice, which is fundamentally ethical (see Chapter 5), the 
exchange-value of the commodity could never be displaced from its use-value; and the highly 
labor-divided society of modern capitalism could never be sustained. In such a society, one 
                                                                  
48  See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, trans. by W. D. 
Halls, forwarded by Mary Douglas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990(1950)); Marshall Sahlins, “The Spirit of the 
Gift,” in his Stone Age Economics (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972), pp.149-183; Jacques Derrida, 
Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
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specializes in the production of one particular kind of thing or service, which is meant to be 
consumed by others; the producer consumes a variety of goods and services that other specialists 
similarly produce. I am here talking about the type of morality, or rather ethics, which reflection 
will allow one to discuss Marx together with Kant once again. In addition to their theories’ 
concurrence on the structure of fetishism as one of the main features of modern subjection, these 
two philosophers seem to present similar views of the unexplainable ethicality in human nature. 
Again, Marx’s commodity fetishism can be reread in terms of the producer’s habituated will to 
sociality (self-sacrifice to exchange with others) and unconscious trust in others’ similar sociality. 
Unless using some exceptional concepts such as Kant’s freedom, this will and trust in the middle 
of the labor-divided anomy of the modern capitalist society cannot be explained by reason alone. 
Capitalist production is an unconscious gifting to others, the gifting that is enabled by humans’ 
irreducible freedom to act ethically. At the same time, this freedom is necessarily “freedom” in 
the sense of subjection, to the degree that the ethical intention happens more or less 
unconsciously to the actor⎯the intention is always already incorporated in the habitual system 
of modern morality and capitalism.  
 Akiyama and other activists’ acts of reincorporation imaginatively reorganize this 
habitual system in such a way that the reincorporated entity of the Subjective state, for instance, 
could precede and centralize people’s practices and, perhaps more importantly to these activists, 
generate and orient their intentions. Here too, consciousness seems to be the matter of prime 
concern to these activists; they seem to think that the reincorporation of the center of modern 
morality can restore consciousness back to people. Note, though, that the act of and will to 
reincorporation alone would not make the problem of fascism. For, reincorporation is common 
not only among ordinary (that is, non-fascistic) moralists but also among banal nationalists. I 
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think the definition of fascism is rather predicated on the way in which fascist fantasies (e.g. the 
aryan nation, the agential state, etc.) are combined with what it declares to protect their fantastic 
entities from—the logic of the commodity, and particularly the form of the mass. That is why it 
does not remain to be merely reactionary and fantastic, but advanced and mechanical, 
accommodating both our fear of and fascination with the phenomenon of the mass. It is true that 
nationalism, for example, is characterized by the similar, techno-archaism, i.e., collective 
imagination of the national origin that has become possible only after and through the mass-
technology of printing.49 However, while nationalists are drawn to and drown in the meaning and 
essence of the ur-language, foundational myths, birth places, etc., they seem to understand 
printing as the means with which to explore and diffuse these themes. As for fascists, there is 
something suicidal about them, in their excessive fascination with the technology with which 
their meaning (the agential state, etc.) should be represented. With strange obsession with the 
totalitarian orderliness and machine repetition that camera, cinema, computer graphics and other 
mass-reproductive technologies enable, fascists tend to lose meaning, easily subject to the 
senseless acts of excessive murders, mass-suicides, meritocratic extremes, so on and so forth. 
When authoritative nationalists pledge their neurotic allegiance to “founding fathers,” fascists 
would then wander in dark fits of obsessive compulsion, deprived of purposes, exposed to the 
short-circuit risk of eternity. The difference between nationalism and fascism, I argue, is the 
different ways in which they respectively represent and react to the overall, material condition of 
commodity structure, especially in the mode of mechanical reproduction. To the degree that 
there is no outside of this condition, both nationalism and fascism are the problems that every 
subject of the mechanical reproductive mode of modern capitalism potentially contains.  
                                                                  
49  See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London and New York: Verso, 1999(1983)). 
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 Although I propose to formally differentiate fascism from nationalism for its focus on 
aesthetics, my intention is not to say that fascism has no meaning whatsoever. Far from that, as I 
have supposed, the concept of the Subjective state, for example, to Akiyama is meant to redeem 
the otherwise mechanically killed/killing lives of the soldiers’, as well as Akiyama’s. The state 
here is meaningful; so it becomes Akiyama’s or the soldiers’ everyday that is otherwise the 
empty repetitions of machines. Meaning must be pursued more earnestly by Akiyama than by 
those in other class-groups, when the everyday in his class-group might be felt more 
unredeemable than other cases.   
 Class is important not only in identifying the redemptive meaning of fascism for the petty 
bourgeoisie like Akiyama. I believe class is also the key to understand the historical meaning of 
Akiyama’s choice of the agential state over the emperor as his moral Subject. His is a very 
curious choice in postwar Japan, in which other fascists and nationalists alike are historically 
contextualized to morally substantiate and symbolically centralize the emperor. The last section 
of this chapter will analyze this issue. 
 
The Emperor’s Infants without the Emperor 
 The last dimension that I would like to analyze of Akiyama’s complex thoughts and 
activism pertains to the emperor⎯or rather, the lack thereof in his activism. The institution of 
the Japanese emperor is strictly a reincorporated body that is so created that it symbolically 
occupies the center, or rather top, of the hierarchically conceptualized system of morality, which 
is a modern creation itself. As such, it started to appear in the Japanese society only after the 
country’s modern capitalist system matured. 
 As Marx says about the process in which gold “accident[ally]” becomes money, the 
emperor was relatively randomly selected to be the central body, with the part “relatively” 
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indicating the long history in which the emperor had already acted as a commodity.50 Called 
“jade” (gyoku), the emperor in this prehistory had been a sign for the legitimate sovereign, traded, 
circulated, hoarded, and counterfeited in the hands of various power mongers. Utilizing this 
somehow already advanced commodity-status of the emperor, and especially his status as the 
jade-precious commodity, the new modern state of Japan (1868-) attempted to construct a nation 
as a sort of circulatory realm of the emperor as the symbolic currency. The actual Japanese coins 
were minted and money was printed with the royal couple’s images on them. People were the 
national subjects insofar as they rendered themselves mutually exchangeable with the emperor as 
the medium. To be the subject of this imperial nation one had to recognize the supposed 
superiority of the emperor in his status, morality, and modernity, as the state propagated, and had 
to emulate him in these regards, as his loyal client (shinmin). Prior to this attempt by the state, 
the emperor had been far from the center of ordinary people’s moral lives—people are known to 
have been even unaware of the emperor’s existence. The previously legitimizing function of the 
emperor had been recognized only among the ruling class.51 
 The state’s nation was apparently centralized; and it was centralized so that the 
designated emotion of nationalism converged with the expected sort of money fetishism, i.e. the 
fascination with the emperor as the supposed center among the mutually exchangeable national 
subjects. The state’s conservatism was historically propelled in the context in which the ideas of 
true equality and freedom emerged among the citizens almost simultaneously with the state’s 
project of modernization. During the Meiji period (1868-1912) of modern Japan, the oligarchs 
who ran the government did not gain the peace of their minds by just constructing the center of 
                                                                  
50  Marx, “The Process of Exchange,” Ibid., pp.178-187; p.183.  
51  About the state’s popularization efforts for the emperor, see Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power 
and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). Japan’s folklore studies have tried 
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the nation; they intended to construct this center to be also the apex, from which a hierarchy of 
people was designed to descend. The designed hierarchy was that of the “family nation” (kazoku 
kokka), which treated each family (ie) in Japan as differently statused in its supposed blood-
relation with the royal family. Every family in the county was newly claimed as a close or 
remote “branch family” (bunke) of the royal family. Each individual in this ideological scheme 
was placed in a certain position in a patriarchally re-aligned family relation, depending on his/her 
gender, age, ethnicity, and others.  
 The family-nation was not just the state’s tool for the moral integration of people; the 
modern Japanese also took initiatives in fantasizing and practicing the system. The timing is 
important to understand the popular initiatives. Many historians, including Masayuki Suzuki, 
point out the patriotism (kokusuishugi) that was ignited during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) 
as one of the causes for the ideological success of the family-nation in 1900-10s and after.52 
According to these historians, the ordinary Japanese challenged the Chinese saying that the 
Japanese were unique and superior due to their ideological roots in the family-nation and due to 
the family-nation’s sacred origin in the emperor. Materially though, this nationalism was 
symptomatic in the condition of mass-reproduction that was about to saturate everyday Japan at 
that point.53 According to Benedict Anderson, “the development of [such a mass-reproduced 
                                                                  
52  Suzuki, Kōshitsu Seido: Meiji kara Sengo made (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993); pp.100-4. 
53  According to Harry Harootunian, in the 1920s, ordinary Japanese enjoyed what they called (in Japanized 
English) “modern life,” which was distinguished by “its materiality and its embeddedness in a culture of objects and 
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temporality of modernity.” See his Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan 
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effect of the fast-forwarded process of production, while as consumers, the mass's inclination toward copies and 
fakes and trinkets was the cause of its own birth and growth as the mass. Nationalism, ultimately the ideology of 
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commodity as] print-as-commodity is the key to the generation of wholly new ideas of 
simultaneity,” which is the temporality of the modern nation.54 The modern national simultaneity, 
in other words, emerges from the even appearance of the terrain created by the mode of 
mechanical reproduction. In such a space-time of the nation, “the newspaper reader, [for 
example,] observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, 
or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world [of the nation] is 
visibly rooted in everyday life.”55 The everyday nation of Japan was necessarily born at the turn 
of the last century, perhaps against the concept of the enemy Chinese and perhaps after the 
auspices of the Japanese state, but more materially precisely, due to people’s becoming the 
modern capitalist value. As the holders of the same labor-power, people could not help but feel 
attracted to the identical appearance of the mass-reproduced products. Fascination with these 
products was the origin of the modern Japanese nation of simultaneous tempo and even 
appearance, the fascination that had to emerge from people’s forgetfulness of their own agency 
in producing, circulating, and consuming these products. It is this same forgetfulness that one 
can say was responsible for molding the Japanese nationalism at that time into the form of the 
family-nation. Theoretically speaking, if the nation is based on people’s value as the same labor-
power, then people should be the same national members without the help of any medium. The 
allegory that best suits this situation is that of an egalitarian “brotherhood” and not a patriarchal 
family. The figure of national integration, the emperor, in this materialist insight looks to be 
strictly redundant: his assigned nature of paternity, nobility, and sacredness is excessively 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
sameness, cannot be explained without an understanding of these conditions of mass-culture and massification of 
people. Aaron Gerow focuses on the cinema industry’s shift to mass-reproduction; see his “Narrating the Nation-
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54  Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New 
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55 Anderson, Ibid.; p.35-6. 
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ornamental. But the Japanese at the turn of the last century created and desired the emperor and 
the family-nation in their redundancy and ornamentality, due to people’s own mass-taste. Called 
“modern girls” (mo ga) and “boys” (mo bo), the masses jumped at one short-lived style of 
fashion after another; their fascination with the emperor must similarly have grown for his 
nostalgically inalienable images, mass-reproduced on the movie screens and photographical 
surfaces.56 These images must have seemed to these masses to be magically sacred, just because 
they forgot that the sacredness would have disappeared as soon as they stopped viewing his 
images as sacred. An observer is here encountering the power of the habit of commodity 
fetishism, which had already trained the Japanese masses to be the subjects of the family-nation, 
long before its design by the state, long before the trigger of the Sino-Japanese War. But again, 
the observer ought to be equally attentive to these people’s deep emotionality toward the 
meaning of the family-nation⎯the idea of blood-ties, their inalienability, and the sacredness of 
the patriarch. Unlike fascism, nationalism selects the object of people’s desires. The late Meiji to 
Taishō (1912-1925) Japanese’s habituated formality as the capitalist subjects was realigned to be 
that as the national subjects, therefore, partly by the power of the sign and what it signified. The 
extent of these kinds of power was such that already during the recessionary crisis of the 1920-
30s, it made perfect socio-cultural sense that the left and right revolutionaries of the country used 
the emperor as the “symbol of national integration” (kokumin tōgō no shōchō).57 As the Fifteen-
Year War (1931-45) was started and dragged into the quagmire, the symbol finally grew into the 
                                                                  
56 For further discussions of the modern girls and boys, see Miriam Silverberg, “The Modern Girls as Militant” 
in Gail Lee Bernstein ed., Recreating Japanese Women, 1600-1945 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 1991), pp.239-266. About the emperor in movies, see Hiroshi Kawahara, “‘Chichi-naru Tennō’ wa 
Ika ni Tsukurareru-ka” in Asahi Journal ed. Shōwa no Shūen: 1988.9-1989.2: Tennō to Nihon-jin (Tokyo: Asahi 
Shinbun-sha, 1989), pp.259-267. 
57  Term is probably not the practitioners’. See for instance Osamu Kuno and Shunsuke Tsurumi, Gendai 
Nihon no Shisō: Sono 5-tsu no Uzu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1956) for the way in which it is academically used to 
analyze the emperor’s status in the period. 
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idea of the “living god” (arahito gami), to match the fascist intensification of nationalism.58 As 
the fascists emphasized the formalization of people into the national form (their symbolic and 
real deaths for the nation), the meaning of the emperor had to be evaporated into the absurd 
abstractness of modern divinity, that is, into the semantic “nothingness” (mu), as fascists liked to 
say. 
 In prewar Japanese history, the emperor was thus the reincorporated figure of morality 
per excellence. This status of the emperor continues even today, due to the immediately postwar 
geopolitical interests of the United States in keeping the imperial system intact.59 It is true after 
1945, the emperor lost the political sovereignty that he previously enjoyed. However, in return, 
his morally and culturally central position, which was ideologized in the concept of the family-
nation among others, is acknowledged under the democratic Constitution of 1947, in the new and 
old disguise of the “symbol of the nation” (kokumin no shōchō). In this modern Japanese history, 
what is curious is that Akiyama does not refer to the emperor in his moral endeavor. As I have 
discussed, Akiyama’s endeavor seems to be based on the idea of the Subjective state as the 
embodied center of postwar Japanese morality. Why not the emperor, though? What makes him 
choose the figure of the state instead? 
 The productive angle, with which to address these questions, should be class. The 
emperor was introduced in the modern time as the synecdoche of hierarchical orders. It was 
argued that the hierarchies represented by the emperor among various statuses, genders, 
                                                                  
58  “[T]he personification from which he [god] has resulted must become lasting and necessary,” Hubert and 
Mauss say about the process in which the sacrificial victim becomes a god. “This indissoluble association between 
creatures or a species of creatures and a supernatural power is the fruit of the regular recurrence of the sacrifices... 
The repetition of these ceremonies in which, as a result of a habit or for any other reason, the same victim reappears 
at regular intervals has created a kind of continuous personality. Since the sacrifice preserves its secondary effects, 
the creation of the divinity is the work of previous sacrifices...” The idea of god is the result of habitual sacrifices; it 
is not that people worship the god since he is already sacred. See Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its 
Nature and Function, trans. by W. D. Halls, forward by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1981(1964)); p.81. 
59  See Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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ethnicities, localities, etc., which together constituted the totalitarian system of familial Japan, 
were said to defend people from class disparities. According to this ideology, the differences 
between the newly created “aristocrats” (kazoku) and “commoners” (heimin), males and females, 
Japanese and Koreans, etc. were moral and cultural, so the more differentiated and hierarchized 
people were according to the emperor’s logic, the less displacement they would experience as 
differently classed masses in capitalist everyday. While these differences guaranteed by the 
reincorporated existence of the emperor were of course shallow appearances themselves and 
would not overcome but confirm commodity logic, their effects were and are real. As the 
examples of economic impoverishment among resident Koreans and the so-called “untouchables” 
(burakumin) must show, the moral hierarchies derived from the modern idea of the emperor have 
differently impacted on the thus-hierarchized people, materially causing (and caused by) their 
respective class situations. What I am suggesting here is that this correlation between status and 
class has had the determining power in Akiyama’s omission of the emperor. As a struggling 
member of the petty bourgeois class, probably he has a reason to oppose the idea of anti-equality 
that the emperor symbolizes and materializes among different Japanese. 
 Having said that, I do not disagree with the idea that Akiyama’s substitute for the 
emperor, i.e. the Subjective state, is not an egalitarian concept, either. As I have analyzed, his 
state appears to be the Subject of history, engendering and organizing the Japanese people as its 
subjects. The state here demands people’s lives and deaths in exchange for their moral rights as 
subjects—the relation is always skewed to the state’s overwhelming advantage and primacy. At 
the same time, excluding the state, Akiyama’s scheme requires everything be strictly equal. 
People under the state should be no different from each other, as their equivalence is ultimately 
symbolized by and exercised as their mass deaths. One might further oppose my surmising 
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Akiyama as at least minimally anti-hierarchical, pointing out that the hierarchically imagined 
category of gender remains in Akiyama’s scheme; Akiyama separates males as the only possible 
kind of moral citizens, i.e. soldiers. My response to this point is to ask, “is the maleness of 
Akiyama’s soldiers of inherent importance, when he conceptualizes moral citizenship as 
something that is predicated on people’s biological deaths, which transcend gender differences?” 
While Akiyama’s focus on these soldiers’ bodies makes him opposed to its ideology, the 
Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo, which consecrates the soldiers’ “spirits” (rei), for instance, 
does not discriminate against females’ self-sacrifices for the nation-state. In the shrine, females 
are supposed to be no different from males as the identical spirits of the nation-state. I will 
introduce my ethnography of the shrine in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to mention here that 
Akiyama disagrees with the Japanese prime ministers’ repeated visits of the shrine⎯ “What are 
they trying to do by visiting, when they treat the bodies [of the soldiers] so wickedly?” he says. 
The body or spirit, it seems to me, though, these two groups of activists (Akiyama and Yasukuni) 
uphold the same ideal of subjectified equivalence among people beyond their gender differences. 
Still, Yasukuni is Akiyama’s anathema, not only because of its “slighting” of the soldiers’ bodies, 
but also because of its self-appellation as the emperor’s shrine. We will see below that when 
Akiyama argues that the emperor is accountable for the war, he seems to be arguing that the 
emperor is accountable specifically for the ordinary soldiers’ deaths. Akiyama’s focus on the 
concrete bodies of the soldiers can then be thought of as his remembrance of the actual fate of 
the soldiers, no matter how collectively he tends to treat them. As follows, this remembrance 
seems to be based on his sense of camaraderie with the soldiers and not with the emperor and the 
otherwise statused. It is true that Akiyama seems to hope to differentiate himself from others for 
his supposedly better knowledge and bureaucratic skills. But given the level and kind of 
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sympathy that he seems to have toward the fallen soldiers, as will be discussed below, it is 
unlikely that he does not consider himself as a state-subject among others. 
 From this perspective of class, Akiyama’s concept of people’s complete equivalence as 
the deathly subjects of the state is comparable to the ideology of the family-nation, which aimed 
specifically at hierarchizing groups of people as the emperor’s subjects. Materially, people in the 
family-nation were also subject to commodity logic, as Akiyama’s soldiers are, but ideologically, 
their equally subjectified condition had to be graded and tinted by their differently assigned 
spaces and qualities. Again, the Meiji to early Shōwa (1925-1989) state and its elite ideologues 
might have started to entertain this corporatist concept of the family-nation, as their will to 
hierarchies directed them. In the midst of the massifying force of the age of mechanical 
reproduction, and the accompanying political philosophy of democracy, the elites were desperate 
for kinds of ideology that justified their high-class statuses. Class differences contradictorily 
persisted in and even widened with the massification of the society, while the matching principle 
of democracy was not a solution but a point of contradiction in itself. That is, democratic ideas 
did not mystically explain and cover up the contradictory existence of class in the mass society, 
but accentuated the contradiction by supplying the ideal of equality. The elites’ urgent project 
was then to manufacture moral-cultural hierarchies that overwrote both democratic ideals and 
class-divided reality. One of the first attempts for such a project was the Meiji Constitution of 
1889, in which the emperor’s political and cultural sovereignty was established. The draftees 
were an authoritarian group of oligarchs, including Hirobumi Itō, whose purpose was to make 
the Constitution “the counter-force against the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement” that 
had been vehemently advocated by the farming and petty bourgeois Japanese.60 
                                                                  
60  Suzuki, Ibid.; p.44. 
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 When nationalism in prewar Japan appeared as an ornamental hierarchy, people’s 
fascination with the idea of the nation could not help but be crisscrossed by the democratic 
practices and consciousness. What is curious to explore then would be the relation between the 
democratic concept of equality and the fascist concept of equivalence. While at least a limited 
sense of egalitarianism and anti-elitism seem to feature Akiyama’s thoughts and practices, how 
should one consider them in comparison with democracy? Is fascism in Japan somehow 
connected to the historically earlier moments of the Freedom and People’s Right Movement? 
Could these two movements’ common mass basis provide any rigorous ideas about their mutual 
connectivity, if any, historically or formally? On the one hand, historians of the Freedom and 
People’s Right Movement tend to portray the Movement as part of Meiji elites’ partisan conflicts 
with each other. What are usually emphasized are the affluent farmers’ tutelage of the peasants 
and the bourgeois intellectuals’ lectures for laborers. The conventional historians’ position is that 
democracy (minshushugi) was an imported concept that the Japanese masses never completely 
understood in their hearts, the consequence being they were easily taken by fascism in the 1930s 
as something inherently Japan-specific (that is, as the “imperial absolutism” and others⎯see the 
Introduction). On the other hand, the same historians cannot ignore the historical fact of the 
masses’ enthusiasm about democracy. Political lectures and gatherings on the topic were widely 
attended; newspapers and other periodicals were read to the extent that the oligarchs had to 
regulate these meetings and newspapers as early as 1876. It seems to be too one-dimensional to 
explain the Movement in terms of the ideas of intellectuals’ pedagogical power, patrons’ political 
influence, and other enforcing agents outside the masses themselves. These historians themselves 
state the Movement as “the first political movement in Japan that had a nation-wide appeal.”61 
                                                                  
61  Shōzō Matsunaga, “Minken Undō no Chikasui” in Bunzō Hashikawa, Masanao Kanō, and Toshio Hiraoka 
eds., Kindai Nihon Shisō Shi no Kiso Chishiki (Tokyo: Yūhi Kaku, 1971), pp.55-7; p.55. 
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One can refer to the long history of peasants’ riots in Japan and elsewhere to point out the 
universal-looking human desires of freedom and equality. A more historically specific view 
would thematize the massness of these participants in the Movement. Let us remember Marx’s 
definition of freedom in terms of the individual’s subjection to commodity logic. Although in the 
previous quotation Marx did not specify democracy, this idea of free individuals and what it 
implies, the individuals’ equality in their same, free status, could be and usually are regarded to 
be the basic unit of modern democracy. Historically as well, democracy is a concept that has 
been generated and developed side-by-side with the emergence of modern capitalism, especially 
with the advent of the age of mechanical reproduction. The idea of universal suffrage, for 
instance, could even occur in people’s minds at the turn of the century only as society was being 
massified.62 The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement in Japan has to be regarded literally as 
a mass-movement, a movement that was inspired and promoted by people’s material condition of 
mass equivalence.  
 It is from this materialist perspective that I pursue a historical and theoretical continuity 
between the democratic and fascist concepts and movements, as they were pursued in Japan. 
Perhaps progressive workers, such as Fumiko Kaneko, should be excluded from this picture. 
Kaneko customarily married an intellectual Korean laborer, Yeol Pak, and together published an 
anarchist magazine, Futoi Senjin (Audacious Koreans). Later, she committed suicide in prison 
where she was confined on the charge of treason. As is expressed in their magazine, Kaneko, Pak, 
and other progressive workers pursued status-, ethnic, and gender-equality under the name of 
                                                                  
62  One of the first manifestations of the idea of universal suffrage in Japan was the popular Universal Suffrage 
League (Futsū Senkyo Kisei Dōmei Kai), which was established in 1897. The General Election Law (Futsū Senkyo 
Hō) passed the Diet in 1925, under which suffrage was extended to all males aged 25 and over. Women's suffrage 
was not won, despite vehement movements, until 1946. 
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internationalism and communism.63 In contrast, the non-unionized proletariat, petty bourgeoisie, 
farmers, and peasants who constituted the majority of the masses turned to the fascist ideal of 
equivalence instead in the late 1920s, as it was presented by the ideology of the emperor’s 
infants. I surmise these were the same masses as those who had eagerly participated in the 
democratic movement earlier. What should be problematized is perhaps not their “backwardness” 
or “under-education,” as many historians say, but their ability to underscore a certain radical, 
fundamentalist notion of equality in the fascist ideology. I am not suggesting here that the types 
of equality that were respectively advocated by the movements of democracy and fascism were 
the same. While the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement argued for the positive sense of 
equality based on the idea of the irreducible human rights of each individual citizen, fascism 
argued for the negative concept of equivalence based on the picture of the minimally reduced 
humanity of each individual subject. At the same time, the concept of human rights also has the 
aspect that is attained only through the process of rendition. While democracy’s respect for life 
should be contrasted to fascism’s obsession with death, there is something biologically 
minimalistic about the democratic idea of human rights. This idea in its foundation represents the 
universalism of certain human physiology, common limits for physical pains, the same species-
needs, and the same emotional and intellectual faculties as humans, even though their 
expressions are different among different individuals.64 Democracy in this regard is the 
movement that focuses on the unfairly abused lives that are made to fall short of even this 
rendered sense of equivalence. Mere equivalence among biological humans becomes positive 
                                                                  
63  See Fumiko Kaneko, Road to Nihilism, in trans. and ed. with an intro. by Mikiso Hane, Reflections on the 
Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp.51-74. 
Shunsuke Tsurumi writes a beautiful biography of Kaneko, assuming a position of a historical materialist educator 
of the masses⎯see his “Kaneko Fumiko: Musekisha toshite Ikiru,” Hito ga Umareru: 5-nin no Nihonjin no Shōzō 
(Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), pp.183-228. 
64  As I will discuss in the third chapter, this is the kind of equality that bases anti-racist anthropology of 
Bronislaw Malinowski, for instance.  
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equality perhaps, when democratic actors try to uplift underprivileged lives up to the 
commonsensical levels of welfare. In comparison, fascism as a movement for equivalence does 
not seem to have the moment of transcendence to this positive sense of equality⎯fascists rather 
stay in the realm where variously enjoyed lives are degraded into the bare stoicism of self-
sacrifice. Despite this critical shortcoming of fascism, i.e. its inability to provide the true concept 
of equality, fascism’s attraction is its appearance of utopianism, even beyond democracy. It 
appears beyond democracy, since fascists claim that one does not need the tedious discussions 
and legal procedures of democracy in order to achieve their illusory equality. The false equality 
of fascism started to appear as super-equality in ordinary Japanese eyes in the 1930s and later, 
because of the deepened condition of the mass-reproductive everyday. The masses’ minds 
increasingly sought fascism instead of democracy, since the emperor’s infants’ ideology looked 
to be a better, non-elite response to the hierarchical idea of family-nation. The formerly 
democratically-minded masses were still half-fascinated with the idea of the emperor’s nation, 
which thus coincided in their minds with the newly espoused ideology of the emperor’s infants.  
 Perhaps one can say that each individual mind of these masses was the nexus of 
different ideologies. At the same time, what kind of ideology one emphasized over others must 
have depended on one’s class, since certain ideologies conceptually benefited a particular class 
group, while others did not. Whereas the emperor’s infant ideology did not legitimize elites’ 
existence, the family-nation ideology did. Like the idea of democracy, the emperor’s infant 
ideology insisted on the concept of equality, even though their concept was based on death. 
Perhaps it was because the concept was so radically determined to pursue equality or at least 
equivalence that the increasingly impoverished masses of the 1930s and later gravitated there, as 
opposed to democracy or the family-nation ideology. The family-nation ideology might similarly 
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justify economically underprivileged lives (“we are poor, because we are only remotely related 
to the emperor”), but it could not provide them with the sense of the complete equality that their 
redemption-seeking minds might have thought was promised in the emperor’s infant ideology 
(“we are poor, but we are the same with the rich as the emperor’s infants”). The key here was 
truly equality in this radical sense. If we suppose that the Akiyama-type of postwar activisms as 
the bastard descendants of the emperor’s infants’ ideology (bastard, since Akiyama and other 
activists do not believe in the emperor), the bastardization is perhaps self-selected as a 
consequence of Akiyama and others’ loyal pursuit of the principle of radical equality. 
 Before going back to the discussion of Akiyama and his fellow activists though, let me 
reiterate the three points of difference that I see between fascism, nationalism, and democracy. I 
have distinguished fascism from nationalism for its will to formality rather than meaning. 
Fascism, as I see it, is similarly different from democracy in the very form of equality that it 
seeks⎯rather equivalence in its focus on the process of rendition. In the case of prewar Japan, 
the nationalist aspiration for hierarchical meaning seems to have set nationalism apart from 
people’s desires for democratic, and then fascistic, equality, although this does not mean that 
people were disinterested in nationalism. I have taken the position to see these three movements 
not only from the formalist viewpoint but also from the viewpoint that focuses on these 
movements’ respective constituency. I have also taken the historicist view, that sees the 
trajectory through which people’s political consciousness developed (or perhaps devolved) from 
the initial moments of democracy. Regarding this last view, many historians similarly argue that 
in the official Japanese ideologies, there was a watershed in about 1931, when the Fifteen-Year 
War started with the so-called “Manchurian Incident.” Prasenjit Duara and Takashi Fujitani, for 
instance, frame the post-1931 (to Duara, post-WWI) state-ideology in terms of the state’s “all-
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out” war and other requirements for assimilationist and multiculturalist policies.65 While these 
historians are focused on the Japanese state’s new, indiscriminate biopolitics toward people’s 
ethnicity, I think this biopolitics would be better understood in the overall material condition that 
surrounded fascism instead, which had intensified the massification of people not only in terms 
of their ethnicities, but also in terms of their genders, ages, localities, statuses, and so on. Related 
to this point, another suggestion of mine is that the official ideological change is understandable 
as the state’s appropriation of the farmers’ and petty bourgeois discourses on radical equivalence, 
which they must have already practiced in their mass-cultural everyday since the 1920s. 
 During my ethnographical research, the term democracy is actually used by Akiyama’s 
fellow activist, Kōji Aoyagi. It is through Akiyama’s introduction that I meet this bereaved 
family, who lost his beloved uncle in New Guinea in 1945, when the uncle was 31 years old. 
According to Akiyama, as a matter of fact it is Aoyagi, who first noticed the soldiers’ mass-
treatment in the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery. When Aoyagi visited the approximately 165 cubic 
feet, hexagonal vault of the Cemetery for the first time “some time in the 90s,” he would later tell 
me, he immediately realized that “the 300,000 bodies [of the recovered Japanese soldiers] 
wouldn’t fit in that narrow space.” Later, he would find that the state calls the remains kept in the 
Cemetery “symbolic bones” (shōchō ikotsu), which are supposed to signify the six major fronts 
of the war—China, Manchuria, the Japanese Islands, the Philippines, the Southeast Asia, and the 
Pacific and Russia. “Threatening a young, female, Tokyo Metropolitan bureaucrat with a degree 
from the [elite] Law Department of Tokyo University, telling her, ‘if you told me a lie, I’ll sue 
you according to State Liability Law,’” Aoyagi learned from the “scared” bureaucrat that the 
state incinerated the recovered bones in seven crematoria in Tokyo. “The leftover ashes” created 
                                                                  
65  Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Fujitani, “Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as 
Americans during WWII,” Representations, 99 (Summer 2007): 13-39. 
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here were then buried in the Yabashira Cemetery in Chiba Prefecture and the “shabby” 
containers behind the vault of Chidorigafuchi, after the actual vault had become full. “Terrible,” 
he says he thought. He leaked the state’s secret and secretive activity to the Asahi Shinbun 
Newspaper. Akiyama read the article and called Aoyagi, blindly calling every Aoyagi that was in 
the Tokyo Chiyoda Ward phone book (luckily, he was the third from the top in the list). 
Although these two bereaved families happen to be from the same Katori County, Chiba 
Prefecture, their seemingly close friendship was thus forged recently, through like-minded 
activism. 
 A stocky man with broad and strong-looking shoulders enveloped in a generic black suit, 
even though it is as hot and sticky as Tokyo’s infamous summer can be, Akiyama’s good friend 
Aoyagi could be a retired police officer or high-school gymnastic teacher. Talkative yet dull, 
Aoyagi is also humble, politely waving his hand in front of his face, as he says “I leave the 
theoretical part [of their activism] to Akiyama-san.” “Instead,” he says, he has participated in 
several recovery missions and other memorial trips to New Guinea, Siberia, Indonesia, and so on, 
which Akiyama has not yet done. Selecting Z University’s memorial hall in Tokyo as our 
meeting place (one does not have to graduate from it to use it), Aoyagi, who is now seventy-
three years old (as of 2008), makes an excuse that the house where he lives with his wife is “too 
dirty to invite you [the researcher] in.” According to him, they are still working “from the 
morning till eight or so in the night,” which leaves them little time to tidy up their place. Acting 
and speaking as squarely as any serviceman, Aoyagi would insist on paying at the end of our 




 His dormant masculinity notwithstanding, he states that his activism for his uncle is 
based on his conviction of what he calls “democracy among the dead” (shisha no aida no 
minshushugi). According to him, every dead person should be treated “equally” (byōdō ni) with 
others, with their “individual dignity” (kojin no songen) being respected. 
 “During the war,” says he, “the soldiers were told to give up the hope that their remains 
would be recovered. They were destined to be abandoned [after their deaths]—they were put into 
that kind of place. ‘Die for the emperor’; ‘be part of the natural cycle of wherever you fall.’ 
 “But now, we have a different constitution,” he continues. “I think the new Constitution 
[of 1947] should be applied to the war-dead as well. Their human dignity should be respected [as 
is stipulated in the Constitution of 1947]. That’s why I say their remains shouldn’t be left to rot 
[as the result of the state’s abandonment of them in the former battlefields].” 
 He is now becoming excited—“It’s the Japanese custom that we care about the bones of 
the deceased. That custom is legally sanctioned as well. Then, why would you discriminate 
against the war-dead [by not recovering and/or massively incinerating their bones]? It’s not fair.” 
 A young waitress in an ironed, white apron with a disciplined smile comes every once in 
a while to see if we need more tea. Every time she comes, I momentarily stop moving my hand 
that has been busily taking notes with a blue “zebra” pen. The spirit of the motto, “the customer 
is king (or god, as the Japanese say it),” which has been heightened by people’s recessionary 
anxiety (“thank you so much to allow us to serve you”), the waitress is the reminder of how far 
activists like Aoyagi are from everyday Japan. Without memory or knowledge or interest 
concerning their fallen (great-) grandfathers’ remains, the current generations can hold on to 
reality, perhaps due to that emptiness. I suspend our conversation on cadavers, rot, and the 
natural cycle in the face of her android innocence, perhaps stunned myself by the topic’s 
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grotesqueness, or uncanniness (see Chapter 2), the quality that I might not notice without her 
everydayness. 
 But Aoyagi is insistent. He now mentions the relatives of the emperor (kōzoku) and 
otherwise statused soldiers, whose bodies were of course repatriated as soon as they fell and 
interred immediately. He complains, “ordinary soldiers’ remains are no less worthy of respect 
than theirs.” The bottom line is that “every dead person should be treated equally.” And again, 
the ground of this conviction is democracy, as is declared in the 1947 Constitution. 
 His claim of democracy seems to be two-fold; equality among the dead (no special 
treatment of the statused) and that between the war-dead in the past and ordinary dead in the 
present (no discrimination against the former). Like Akiyama, Aoyagi seems to suggest that the 
soldiers and people be in a mutually equal relation in the past and in the present—and potentially 
in the future. Unlike Akiyama, Aoyagi does not seem to think that this ideally enduring 
relationship of equality should revolve around the state. Aoyagi would certainly agree with 
Akiyama that the soldiers during the war were the state-subjects. According to Aoyagi, the 
soldiers were “placed,” tacitly by the State, in the kind of situation in which their bodies were not 
to be recovered. He similarly sees that the soldiers were so subjected to the various state-orders 
that their condition of subjection seems to have been their “destiny” (unmei). The kind of State 
that places and orders people at will, as if its will was the destiny of people, exceeds the bounds 
of the modern state. Akiyama would say it is the agential state’s auspices, under which the 
soldiers should ideally have been equivalent to each other as the state’s subjects. To him, this is 
the kind of equivalence that should be still observable even today. His historical sense does not 
regard the change in the Japanese regime in 1945. But, Aoyagi does and underscores it. Even 
though he implies he agrees that the prewar soldiers were subjectified by the state, to him, it was 
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bad; and it was bad, retrospectively seen from the current, democratic value system. The soldiers 
ought to have been respected as individuals and not as forced subjects; they should have been 
equal to each other and to the rest of the people. Democratic equality among the dead and 
between the dead and living should naturally be pursued nowadays under the democratic 
Constitution in Japan. If Akiyama seeks trans-historical equivalence among the state-subjects, 
Aoyagi seems to want to see trans-historical equality among democratic people. 
 In close analysis, these two activists thus seem to be different, which Aoyagi admits. 
That is probably the reason that Aoyagi does not participate in Akiyama’s Liaison. By forming 
another non-profit organization, the Southern Cross (Minami Jūjisei Kai) comprised of those 
bereaved whose families fell in the “South” (Nanpō), that is, those areas where the star is visible, 
Aoyagi states that what connects him and Akiyama is his giri or moral obligation to Akiyama. 
According to Aoyagi, he owes Akiyama the “theoretical stuff”—that is, Akiyama speaks for him 
when it comes to the ideological articulation of their activism. Aoyagi perceives this ideological 
articulation to be a favor that Akiyama gives to the (self-allegedly) ineloquent Aoyagi; Aoyagi 
feels he should return this favor to Akiyama. Thus, the immediate reason that Aoyagi accepted 
my interview is that Akiyama introduced me to him. Then, I was confused. In Aoyagi’s moral 
narrative, Akiyama sounds as if he is the ideological mouthpiece for Aoyagi. At the same time, 
Aoyagi denies that his ideologies are like Akiyama’s. In my initial analysis, Aoyagi’s latter claim 
of ideological dissimilarity would probably be accurate. So, what does Aoyagi mean by the 
“obligation of theories”? Is Aoyagi merely humbly admiring Akiyama’s logic and eloquence, 
while admitting there is a difference? Is the difference small enough to ignore and allow Aoyagi 
to think of himself as a voiceless puppet for Akiyama, the ventriloquist? How should we think of 
their differences, the gap between advocacy for state-subjection and conviction of democratic 
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equality? What if it is our common sense that democratic equality and state-subjected 
equivalence are very different, that should be reconsidered, and not Aoyagi’s seemingly 
contradictory remarks? If the democratic and subjectified kinds of equality share at least the 
same condition, will not Aoyagi’s integrity be saved? From the above-discussed viewpoint that 
sees the same massness in the conditions of democracy and fascism, Aoyagi’s narratives and 
behaviors seem to be of perfect integrity. From this viewpoint, Aoyagi’s possible contradiction 
seems to be merely showing the relatedness of the concept of democracy to the state of 
subjection via the general modern condition of people’s subjectification to commodity logic. 
Kant would explain the same relation using moral law instead of commodity logic. This is 
probably the reason that in Aoyagi’s narrative of the fallen soldiers, the idea of equality is gained 
as a result of rendition; and still that idea sounds fitting the concept of democracy. The soldiers 
in the narrative are rendered to a bare, minimal sense of human, to the generic, biological 
condition of death. Because of the rendition to generic biologism, which is necessary for the 
concept of human rights to emerge, every soldier, statused or not, can be equal to others. The 
individual, as Aoyagi calls it, thus seems not so dissimilar to Akiyama’s subject, in its serial 
numbered difference from other individuals that are formally identical with each other (identical 
in the general form of life and death).  
 Aoyagi’s singularity is his ambiguity, with which his conviction of democracy is 
intervened by his seeming desires for and fears of gendered difference (e.g. “scaring” the young, 
female bureaucrat). Similarly anachronistic moments can be observed in his remarks on the 
remains of Korean and Chinese forced laborers and draftees. During the war, they fought and 
worked for or as the Japanese against their will in the mines, construction sites, and battlefields 
of Manchuria, the Pacific, or the Japanese Islands. Like Japanese soldiers’ remains, their bodies 
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have yet to be returned home.66 Making a stark contrast to his democratic advocacy for the 
Japanese remains, Aoyagi states that whether the Japanese state should recover and repatriate the 
Korean or Chinese remains, especially those that are still scattered through Japanese soil, is 
ultimately a “matter of logistics” (gijutsu-teki na mondai), that is, whether Japan has already 
forged relevant treaties with their countries. I would imagine, according to the sense of 
mathematical balance implanted in the concept of democratic equality, that perhaps these 
victimized lives should be more highly prioritized than the lives of the combatant Japanese, since 
these other Asians were enslaved. However, apparently these victims merely mark the national 
boundary around Aoyagi’s concept of democracy. Instead of pursuing true generality as any 
project that endeavors to be modern should, Aoyagi, on the subject of Chinese or Koreans, 
retrogresses with his nationalization of the terms of equality. 
 These conservative tendencies notwithstanding, Aoyagi’s democratic activism still 
seems to try to make a difference from other fascists or nationalists. At least, that is what Aoyagi 
                                                                  
66  According to a Chinese historian, Paoching Luo, out of the approximately 38,000 Chinese on the Japanese 
state list, who were forcefully brought to the Japanese Islands as various kinds of laborers, the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry said about 6,800 committed suicides, while 14,200 otherwise died and 7,000 became crippled (see his lec-
ture, “Sensō no Kioku: Chūgoku to Nihon no Mirai,” delivered in 8/21/2006 in Sarufutsu, Hokkaidō, Japan). Ac-
cording to my informant who was active in the Action Committee to Soothe the Spirits of Those Chinese Hostages 
Who Incurred Difficulties (Chūgoku-jin Huryo Jun'nan-sha Irei Jikkō I'in Kai), resident Chinese in Japan and Japa-
nese cooperated in 1950-60s to recover and return 2,764 (as of 1964) Chinese forced laborers’ remains over 9 times. 
The act was despite the fact that there was no peace treaty yet forged between the two countries. 
 As for Korean forced laborers, a Japanese historian, Shōji Yamada supposes the number to be about 
667,000. Of them, at least about 12,000 were killed in the Japanese Archipelago, according to the American 
military’s investigation conducted in the Korean Peninsula in 1946. In addition, quite a few number of Koreans were 
forced to work on the Peninsula (Yamada is not certain about the number). Since Korea was colonized, more than 
6,000 Koreans were drafted as Japanese soldiers; 145,000 as military personnel; and 100,000-210,000 as sex slaves 
of the Japanese military.  See Yamada’s unpublished paper, “Senji Dō’in (Kyōsei Renkō)-sareta Chōsen-jin to sono 
Izoku no Sengo” presented in Kyōsei Dōin Shinsō Kyūmei Network Kessei Sōkai: Nikkan Kyōdō no Shinsō 
Kyūmei wo Mezashite,” held in Zai Nihon Kankoku YMCA Kokusai Hall, 7/18/2005. Some of their remains are 
still missing in the battlefields (see, for instance, a Korean TV station, KBS’s program, “Witness of Palau: Koreans 
Sent to the Pacific,” which was broadcast in 8/15/2004). Others have haphazardly been returned to South Korea over 
several occasions (e.g. the 4,597 bodies repatriated, according to the GHQ order, to the interim government of the 
Republic of Korea in 2/26/1947) or kept in Japan’s Health and Welfare Ministry (2,328 sets of bones), Yūten-ji 
Temple in Tokyo (1,147), and others. In 2005, the ROK and Japanese states joined the resident Koreans in Japan 
and Japanese activists to “investigate the truth (shinsō kyūmei)” of these kinds of forced mobilization. According to 
a Japanese participant, Kazuyuki Kawamura, as of 6/20/2005, about 20,000 South Koreans have formally asked 
investigation of their individual cases (personal conversation).   
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claims in mentioning democracy in spite of the “theorist” Akiyama’s favoritism of the agential 
state and its subjects. Aoyagi’s difference from Akiyama is not anything like his embrace of the 
emancipatory potentialities that accompany the concept of democracy. Rather, Aoyagi seems to 
show the most rendered sense of equality, based on the biological fact of human mortality, which, 
again, resides in the foundation of democracy as the concept of human rights. Still, I think 
Aoyagi’s insistence on this appellation would make at least a minimal difference when we 
consider it against the historical background in which it is insisted. According to Aoyagi, it is 
only “ordinary people” (shomin) (in its provenance, the “non-statused”) like his uncle, who were 
dispatched and starved to death in logistically neglected battlefields such as New Guinea. The 
“statused” (erai hito) were allowed to remain either within the “inland” (naichi) (i.e. the 
Japanese islands) or nearby, if they were drafted at all, he says. For these “miserable” (mijime-
na), ordinary deaths, “the emperor is accountable three ways,” Aoyagi determines—“he started, 
managed, and delayed the end of the war.” Throughout the Fifteen-Year War, the emperor was 
Hirohito (reigning 1925-1989). Surprising or not, this is the theory that is usually mentioned by 
leftists in Japan. In addition to the leftist-sympathetic Asahi Shinbun Newspaper, he and 
Akiyama talked to all of the major political parties in Japan except for the communists, until the 
social democrats decided to represent their activism in congress. 
 “But,” continues Aoyagi, even though the emperor Hirohito is accountable for the war, 
“His Majesty Himself lived and died a happy life, didn’t He?” That is, a happy life as compared 
to the miserable deaths among the plebeians in the southern battlefields. I sip my cold cup of tea 
in the air of a barely contained grudge. The air is also whirling, as his democratic ambitions 
momentarily try to ascend from the reduced sense of equivalence to the true sense of equality, 
the kind of equality that makes his calling of “His Majesty” sound almost violently sarcastic.  
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 A similarly violent ambition for real equality seems to characterize Akiyama’s narrative 
of the emperor as well:  
 
In the underground of the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery, the dead, who are nine times 
more in number than the 39,000 persons of the whole Chiyoda Ward [of Tokyo, 
where the Cemetery is located], are enraged and shouting, as they are mercilessly 
treated [and pushed] into the approximately 100 square-foot space [of the vault]. 
Living in the vicinity, Chiyoda residents must feel disquiet. Needless to say, on 
the other shore across the Chidorigafuchi Pond stands the Fukiage Palace [in 
which the emperor, currently Akihito, and his family live].67 
 
The passage could be taken as Akiyama’s expression of respectful care for the emperor, who, 
according to him, might be endangered by the “enraged shouts” of the dead—treat the dead 
better, and the emperor is safe. In this interpretation, his moral nationalist position might seem to 
be intact. Yet, he says earlier in the same manuscript that the soldiers’ lives were expended in 
variously harsh battlefields of the Fifteen-Year War, as they were “running out of bullets, cut out 
of food supplies, eating grass and insects, and unable to surrender [they were ordered not to 
surrender to save the emperor’s face], while told to absolutely obey (zettai fukujū) the slogan, 
‘the superior’s order is His Majesty’s order.’”68 Therefore, Akiyama says in a conversation with 
me, Hirohito is “accountable” (sekinin ga aru) for the deaths of these “pitiful” (awarena) 
soldiers, since these deaths occurred by his order, at least nominally (although in Akiyama’s 
thought, Hirohito has less “grave” (jūdai-na) responsibility than that which should be attributed 
to what he calls the “military complex” (gunbatsu), as I have mentioned). But he seems to at 
least have reasons to leave the emperor out as the object of his moral reincorporation, no matter 
how much the emperor is structurally interchangeable with the concept of the Subjective state. 
Here, his visceral sense of ethics seems to be based on his sympathetic identification with the 
                                                                  
67  Akiyama, “Senbotsu-sha-ra no...,” Ibid.; p.4. 
68  Akiyama, Ibid.; p.1. 
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“pitiful” soldiers. This identification is likely class-based, when he clearly separates the foot 
soldiers from the military complex of the state and (implicitly monopolized) industries. 
 In contrast to these petty bourgeois inheritors of the emperor’s infants’ fascism, postwar 
elites, such as the playwright and novelist Yukio Mishima, have been adamant about the fantasy 
of organizing Japan around the concept of the noble emperor yet again. If Akiyama and Aoyagi 
are blind to the Korean, Chinese, and other bodies accumulated under the emperor’s name, 
Mishima and other elites do not see even the Japanese foot soldiers’ deaths as significant at al. In 
one exceptional short story, “Voices of the War-Heroes’ Spirits” (Eirei no Koe), Mishima 
certainly discusses the soldiers’ grudges against Hirohito. In this story, the fallen Japanese 
soldiers of the Fifteen-Year War are among other lives that have been supposedly “sacrificed” to 
the emperor and then resuscitated as their spiritual voices in a séance held in stormy Tokyo. 
However, different from Aoyagi and Akiyama, whose enmity is based on the unequal treatment 
of the soldiers’ lives and deaths as compared to their classed and/or statused superiors and the 
democratically respected postwar Japanese, Mishima’s soldiers chant again and again in their 
ghostly voices, “How come His Majesty [Hirohito] chose to desecrate Himself?” Mishima is 
mentioning Hirohito’s 1945 radio declaration that he would no longer be a “living god.” To 
Mishima, status differences among the soldiers are ideologically important; yet the reality that 
there were heavier casualties among ordinary soldiers does not exist. His pen is instead always 
trapped by the sepia-colored romanticism of ritual suicides by royal princes and “manly” (otoko-
rashii) officers. The foot soldiers have to exist, but exist as the bottom of the pyramid so that 
statuses and ranks can build up from there. In “Voices of the War-Heroes’ Spirits,” the soldiers’ 
chant of their grudge against Hirohito thus questions, why did he not maintain hierarchical Japan 
by remaining the sacred pinnacle of such a pyramid? If Aoyagi and Akiyama’s emperor is 
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morally denigrated due to his betrayal of the promise of fundamental equivalence, then 
Mishima’s emperor is similarly denigrated due to his betrayal of the promise of pyramidal 
harmony. According to Mishima, the particular emperor, Hirohito, is accusable, yet the pyramid, 
i.e. the emperorship and accompanying ideologies of statuses, genders, etc., should rather be 
revived and fortified.69 
 Like the Meiji oligarchs, Mishima’s desires of hierarchies are his fears of the mass-form, 
of its logic of repetition, ethics of copying, and process of alienation. It is in contrast to these 
elites’ inclinations toward corporatist hierarchies that this chapter has analyzed petty bourgeois 
lives as they are situated to select fascist equivalence. While this equivalence is different from 
equality, as democracy promotes, there is certain power in the petty bourgeois advocacy for 
equivalence. Appropriating the commodity logic of equivalence that penetrates their mass-
condition, these fascist actors seem to critique the elites’ anachronistic hierarchies and, 
ultimately, the modern capitalist contradiction of class. If there is at least a minimal level of 
truthfulness, then this truthfulness might be derived from this contradiction itself⎯the 
contradiction that class exists despite the otherwise equivalence-guaranteeing logic and 
philosophy of modernity and capitalism. Proportionately to their disadvantageous class-positions, 
the petty bourgeois actors’ desires of equivalence have to be radical, the radicalness that 
democracy partly shares yet ultimately cannot match. To the extent that class persists in the 
modern capitalist society, the radically accentuated picture of massified equivalence, as fascists 
present, would keep appearing, disguising itself as a utopian picture of classless equality. The 
subsequent chapter will explore this relation between fascism and class some more. 
                                                                  
69  See Yukio Mishima, Eirei no Koe (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shin Sha, 1966). Though not as eloquent as his 
literary works, his manifesto of fascism, “Bunka Bōei Ron,” Chūou Kōron, July 1968: 95-117, might be helpful to 
understand his ideological position. 
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Chapter 2. Theories of Delay: The Petty Bourgeois Formation of Postwar Fascism 
 
 The holders of postwar fascism in Japan, such as Kakunosuke Akiyama and Shōji Aoyagi, 
whom I have introduced in Chapter 1, represent the petty bourgeois class. The petty bourgeoisie 
consists of small industrialists, teachers, tradesmen, artisans, carpenters, clergy, and others, who 
are more or less independent of big corporations and creative in the nature of their trades. When 
the monopoly economy was established during the Great Depression and has been fortified 
throughout the postwar and especially in the current global recession, the autonomous business 
bases and idiosyncratic rhythms of working that the petty bourgeois members enjoy might pro-
vide impressions of delays. Their labor power being derived from what appears to be inalienable 
resources of humanity, such as dexterity, talents, or religiosity, the petty bourgeoisie might seem 
to be outside and behind the world trend, in which humanity and originality exist only as the nos-
talgic traces of mass reproduction.  
The petty bourgeois delay has supplied inspirations to culturalist theories of Japan as 
non-fascist. In these theorists’ portrayals, the petty bourgeoisie embodies “premodern” Japan or 
the time-resistant “Japanese culture.” According to these theorists, it is the non-linguistic vio-
lence supposedly embodied by the petty bourgeoisie, which caused, or at least supported, what 
they call the imperial absolutism or the fascism of the emperor system or other presumably Ja-
pan-specific regimes prior to and during the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945). Since fascism to the-
se theorists is an advanced, modern phenomenon, these supposed regimes maintained by the 
“feudalistic” petty bourgeoisie and emperor should never be regarded as fascism, according to 
them.1 
                                                                  
1  See for instance, Masao Maruyama, “Nihon Fascism no Shisō to Undō,” in his Gendai Seiji no Shisō to 
Kōdō (Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 1965(1964)), pp.29-87. 
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 My position admits the delay and difference of the petty bourgeois class. I also agree that 
the temporal and spatial difference of theirs explains their affinity with fascism. Unlike the cul-
turalists, I suppose that the petty bourgeois difference has been historically and economically, 
versus culturally and traditionally, created. The petty bourgeoisie has been created as the neces-
sary other of the mass-reproducing economy. In 1950s Japan, the petty bourgeoisie as a class 
was made to absorb tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians repatriated from the country’s 
former colonies and occupied territories; during the 1980s, that class was needed as the manufac-
turing basis for the country’s new economic phase of the “small lot production.” 
 At the same time, the aforementioned, culturalist production of the petty bourgeoisie as 
the quintessential “people” (minshū) or “folk” (minzoku) of Japan intervenes in reality. The fan-
tasies of the people or folk are powerful, carrying nostalgic desires of the original and the au-
thentic, which incessantly arise in the late capitalist everyday. The petty bourgeois enclaves of 
fascism, which I have called death spaces in democratic Japan, are subsequently created and mis-
recognized to be the manifested surface of the Japanese ethno. The task of this chapter is to dis-
entangle the dialectic between the fantasy of the Japanese ethno and the reality of the petty bour-
geois class, between the levels of language and materiality, on order to understand why fascism 
remains and emerges in these death spaces. 
 I will accomplish this task by using my ethnographic data as well as written materials on 
a death space of fascism, Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, Tokyo. If Akiyama’s suburban apartment is a 
secretive tomb of postwar fascism, the Yasukuni Shrine is a sensational stage of international 
controversies on the country’s unresolved past. By folkizing the shrine, one is ultimately able to 
exonerate the Japanese of their political and ethical accountability for their past fascism and the 
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war. The issue of politico-ethics will be the guiding thread of my two-tiered (textual and materi-
al) discussion of fascism’s agent, the petty bourgeoisie.   
 
The Setting: A Death-Space Resounding with War-Heroes’ Voices 
 “Good morning,” I say, approaching the first veteran that I encounter in this “Shinto 
shrine” Yasukuni. He is “Shōji Yamada,” an 81 year-old (as of 2008) veteran of the Asia-Pacific 
War and a retired police officer. In the last summer when I conducted my preliminary fieldwork, 
he was one of the most cooperative informants. Today, he envelops his lean, tall body with a 
light blue shirt, grayish pants, a white baseball cap, and black leather walking shoes. On his left 
sleeve is pinned a navy blue armband, on which white letters read the Association to Respond to 
the War Heroes’ Spirits (Eirei ni Kotaeru Kai). Good-postured and easy to talk to, the only out-
ward signal of his age would be a white tank-top (called “running”) worn under his thin shirt—
for some reason, most Japanese males of his age have to wear one. Among several other male 
elders present, who all wear similar running, caps, and the same armbands, Yamada blends in 
well. 
 “Good morning,” I repeat. It is about 10:30. The August sun is already scorching, but the 
air is fresh and propitious with a feeling of unborn futures. These veterans are not tired yet, even 
though they must have already finished about two hours of their ad-campaign for the Association. 
The Association (otherwise called Ei Kai by its younger supporters) was established in 1976 by 
the Imperial Army and Navy’s Veterans’ Associations (Riku Kaigun Taieki Gunjin Kai), the 
Headquarters of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Hon Chō), and other religious organizations. Immediately 
after its establishment, the “Association to Respond” claimed it had 1.2 million members mainly 
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among veterans and other rightists.2 Collectively, they have tried to “respond” (kotaeru) to the 
Japanese “war-heroes’ spirits” (eirei)⎯that is, to remember and memorialize the fallen Japanese 
soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War and prior imperial wars that Japan forged. There is a moral 
sense in their wording; they believe that the fallen soldiers “sacrificed” (gisei ni shita) their lives 
for the survivors of the wars and the subsequent generations. The Association’s ad-campaigns 
and lobbying activities are supposed to be their moral responses to the favor that they think was 
thus given to them by the soldiers. “Lend your ear to the heroes’ voiceless voices” (eirei no koe-
naki koe ni mimi wo katamukeyo) is their motto; they come here to the Yasukuni Shrine, where 
the soldiers’ spirits supposedly reside, in order to listen. 
 Having learnt to speak clearly and loudly among these veterans, not only due to their age, 
but due to their conservatism (articulate speech or haki haki-toshita hanashi-kata supposedly 
shows the speakers’ respect to the listener), I raise my voice and repeat my greeting to Yamada 
for the third time. Surprisingly, he is not even looking at me. There is no sign of recognition in 
the face of this 81-year old. Looking into his eyes, I introduce myself again—likely for the first 
time in his perspective. 
 “Ah,” says he finally. “I’m sorry. I was just absent-minded...wondering if I have such a 
beautiful acquaintance as you.” An apparent lip-service to compensate for his being “absent-
minded.” But at the same time, his empty words here perform. “Performative” speech, according 
to J. L. Austin’s categorization, is a speech act in which “the issuing of the utterance is the per-
forming of an action.”3 Different from “constative,” i.e. descriptive, enunciation, performative 
                                                                  
2  About the history of the Association, see an article by a leftist activist, Satoshi Uesugi, 2006; p.16. 
3  J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd Edition, eds. by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997(1962)); p.6. Strictly, the performative should be limited to only 
those verbs that are in the first person singular present indicative active. Yet, as Austin admits, even descriptive 
enunciation can produce as much social force and (unintentional) results as strictly performative speeches. 
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remarks subject themselves to the category of felicitous/infelicitous, instead of true/false.4 In this 
current case, Yamada’s speech performs to render me a felicitous existence in his kind of mascu-
line world, that is, a female, the supposedly aesthetic object that exists only at her surface level. 
On my part, even a single word of a circumstantially appropriate response would suffice as the 
sign of my interpellation. It is true that this type of creation, repetition, and confirmation of gen-
der relations are a matter of everyday life in contemporary Japan, the United States, or anywhere 
else.5 The difference is probably that here in the Yasukuni, the idea of gender difference is more 
positively asserted as part of a certain moral system, a system that claims to efface the problem 
and jouissance of females’ commodification. As an ethnographer from the larger society, who is 
facing this moral enclave, I could be either offended by the heightened gender difference and 
leave, or ignore the politics and enter the enclave. But like most other situations, the choice is not 
a real choice, since it is already compromised by other necessities (e.g. the research, the norma-
tive concept of sociality, and so on).    
 “Ha ha,” I ambiguously laugh and change the topic. “Have you gotten a lot of visitors 
today?” 
 “So, so,” Yamada mockingly frowns. Behind us, several other veterans are indeed idly 
seated in front of the two folding tables, which are placed parallel to the Approach (Sandō) to the 
Hall of Prayer (Haiden). The Approach is a straight thoroughfare that has about five-lanes-worth 
of width and two traffic-lights-worth of length. Its destination, the Hall of Prayer, is the supposed 
house of the soldiers’ “spirits” (rei). Three or four middle-aged staff members of the Association 
                                                                  
4  Austin, Ibid.; pp.18-20. 
5  About the relation between gender and performativity, see Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993). Rosalind Morris, “All Made Up: Performance Theory and 
the New Anthropology of Sex and Gender,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 1995.24: 567-592 is helpful in 
distinguishing performativity from performance. Whereas performance theorists tend to develop their discussions 
around the motif of inscription of difference, the concept of performativity considers the “origins of difference itself,” 
according to Morris (p.573). 
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are standing near the tables, handing their pamphlets to visitors. On ordinary Sundays like today, 
about a dozen Association members come here and campaign for fallen Japanese soldiers, raising 
awareness of the small number of Yasukuni visitors. While the Association is a powerful lobby-
ist, the Sunday campaign itself is politically meaningless, given the number of the visitors. The 
veterans and other supporters come anyway, as it provides them with the precious time and space 
in which they gather and unite together. 
 The Association’s political power is that of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The al-
most single-handed ruler of postwar Japan until recently, the LDP has sat on the Association’s 
board since its establishment. In return, the Association and other veterans, as well as like-
minded families gathering in the Association of Bereaved Families of Japan (Nihon Izoku Kai), 
have been some of the biggest constituencies of the LDP.6 Representing these conservative in-
heritors of the war, the LDP submitted to the national Diet the Bill to Nationalize the Yasukuni 
(Yasukuni Kokka Goji Hō An) five times over the 1969-73 period. Initially, “nationalization” of 
the shrine was to secularize the shrine, so that the state could own and run the shrine as a war-
memorial. For these rightists, the shrine should be respected at the international state-level as 
“the Japanese version of the U.S. Arlington National Cemetery or Westminster Abbey of the 
U.K., where the Japanese prime minister, emperor, and international representatives can official-
ly visit without any reserve” (their cliché). To them, the “reserve” (wadakamari) that these state 
representatives were supposed to have should not be related to the war-crimes, atrocities, and 
other controversies surrounding the Japanese soldiers, but to the issue of the church-state separa-
tion. Once the shrine abandoned its position as a private religious organization and became a 
secular state-apparatus, the state-representatives (especially the Japanese PM and emperor) 
                                                                  
6  When the families’ association was established in 1947, their number was said to be 8 million. Even as of 
1994, the association claims it has 1 million members. See Nobumasa Tanaka, Hiroshi Tanaka, and Nagami Hata, 
Izoku to Sengo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); p.44 and 76. 
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would not have any reserve (or rather legal problems) visiting it, according to the LDP and its 
supporters. 
 The LDP bill to secularize the shrine was lastly rejected in the 1973 Diet without a possi-
bility of re-submission, due to leftist opposition. The leftists found the bill historically and con-
stitutionally problematic. The constitutional principle of the church-state separation (Article 20, 
Clause 3) should still matter, even after the proposed secularization of the shrine, particularly 
when the shrine had been adamant that the fallen soldiers should remain in a Shinto-designated 
spirit existence. The leftists also problematized the history of the shrine, in which the shrine as a 
religious organization had been established in 1869 and maintained by the prewar state. Accord-
ing to them, as a result of this church-state convergence, the prewar state could mobilize the Jap-
anese in both their public (political) and private (religious) aspects. Due to this history, even if 
the shrine should ever be secularized, the leftists say, people would still be finding a statist, in 
addition to religious, significance in the shrine; the state could use this political-religious conflu-
ence at the shrine whenever it conceives “theocratic” ambitions, the leftists claimed. For these 
two reasons, the leftists argued that their rejection of the LDP bill was a historical result of dem-
ocratic Japan.7 
 The conservatives though, went under the table, establishing a powerfully staffed and 
budgeted lobbyist organization—the Association to Respond to War-Heroes’ Spirits, as I cur-
rently observe in Yasukuni. From the start (1976), its political purpose was to otherwise realize 
the rejected LDP bill—to officialize the shrine. Various strategies have been taken⎯most recent-
                                                                  
7  The representative of this line of argument will be Shinobu Ōe, Yasukuni Jinja (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1984). “Religion” is a highly problematic category to be applied to the shrine, as I will discuss later. Nonetheless, 
when it comes to legal strategies that can be adopted against the shrine, leftist activists have only a few choices, of 
which the reference to the church-state separation has turned out to be a somewhat potent one (several winning cases 
at local levels). About the numerous relevant lawsuits brought against the shrine and the state, see Ōe, Ibid.; pp.154-
160, 190-197 and Nobumasa Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengo-shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002). More discussion to 
follow in Chapter 3 of the current dissertation. 
  
102 
ly, the endeavors to build up popular support for the shrine in its current (religious) status. So far, 
the Association has mobilized local affiliates of Japan Bereaved Families Association, in order to 
facilitate the issuance of the “resolution to urge the prime minister to formally visit Yasukuni 
Shrine”; allegedly 37 out of 47 prefectural assemblies have actually issued such a resolution.8 In 
this resolution, the prime minister is supposed to visit shrine as a religious facility. The Associa-
tion has also been collecting relevant signatures from ordinary Japanese; as of 2006, it claims it 
has obtained 10 million supportive signatures.9 This trend radicalizes the previous LDP’s efforts, 
which sought to secularize the shrine in respect for the Constitutional framework; now, revising 
the Constitution is within the Association’s scope. Still, the old and new efforts are the same in 
their insistence on the moral national remembrance of the war. 
 Given the whole Japanese population of about 100 million, Yasukuni supporters are in-
creasing, yet still in the minority. On regular Sundays like today, what might strike a visitor of 
the shrine would be its emptiness. Standing at the First Gate (Dai Ichi Torii), which is two 37 
yard, horizontal steel poles, lifted and supported by 27 yard-high steel pillars (27 yards in diame-
ter each), one can take in the whole vista that leads to the Hall of Prayer through the concrete 
Approach. Only a small number of visitors would interrupt the view.   
 Even to these few, potentially conservative visitors, the Association’s radicalized nation-
alism might seem to be too extreme, judging from how they pass by its tables. Today for instance, 
the tables are flanked by those paper panels that read, “The Lie of ‘The Nanjing Massacre’—
There Were No Slashers of One Hundred”;10 “We Can’t Stand Any More! We Won’t Forgive! 
                                                                  
8  See the Association’s leaflet, “To Be Our Member” (unpublished). 
9  See the Association’s “To Be Our Member,” Ibid. 
10  The Nanjing Massacre was committed by the imperial Japanese army between December 1937 and 
February 1938. Many Chinese civilians were robbed, killed and raped, while their exact number is still being 
debated among historians. See Joshua A. Fogel ed., Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, forwarded by 
Charles S. Maier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) and Takashi Yoshida, The Nanjing Massacre in 
History and Memory: Japan, China, and the United States, 1937-1999 (Ph.D. dissertation; History Department, 
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Stand Up Against China’s Egoism!—Grab one of our fliers about the demonstration NEXT Sun-
day”; and “The Channel Sakura Will Change Japan—the New Satellite TV Channel, the Japa-
nese Cultural Channel.” Some of the visitors though, might be attracted by these very slogans 
and stop at the tables. Guarded by the staff in the same black T-shirts, the tables look outstand-
ingly Gothic. The T-shirt has the Association’s name in the back, along with imperial Japan’s 
rising sun flag (kyokujitsu ki) and such slogans as “Do Not Let the Glory of the Great East Asia 
War (Dai Tōa Sensō) Wither.”11 A few would buy the T-shirts, which come in different sizes and 
also have a dark blue version. The price is 3,500 yen (about 35 U.S. dollars) each. In this morn-
ing, a middle-aged man wearing a light, moss-green suit and tie hands a 10,000 yen (100 dollar) 
bill for a black shirt and adds he needs no change. 
 According to the members, donations and signatures are made mainly by Japanese males. 
This is the category of people that dominates the Association’s membership (an exception is 
“Misa,” a middle-aged, Japanese female staff, who performs a perfect secretarial role). Among 
the visitors, I see some Japanese females. Foreign visitors are predominantly males, who would 
occasionally sit with the staff and discuss the Asia-Pacific War and other controversial topics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Columbia University; 2001). The “slashers of one hundred” are Second Lieutenants Toshiaki Mukai and Tsuyoshi 
Noda, who were found guilty and executed in 1948 in the Kuomintang Military Tribunal, Nanjing, of using their 
nihon tō swards and murdering more than 100 Chinese civilians each. According to propagandist articles published 
by Japanese newspapers then, Ohsaka Nichi Nichi Shinbun and Tokyo Mainichi Shinbun, Mukai and Noda had been 
competing with each other about which one of them could kill one hundred first. Since 2006, when Mukai and 
Noda's families sued the newspaper companies and others on account of defamation, the two have been brought to a 
new attention of Japanese rightists. The families lost their lawsuit in the Supreme Court (2006). 
11  The rising sun flag was used by imperial Japan and replaced by the current flag of the sun (nisshō ki). In a 
Chinese movie, Devils on the Doorstep (dir. by Jiang Wen; Home Vision, 2005), and other victims’ representations 
of the Asia-Pacific War, the rising sun flag is a symbol of the Japanese invasion and atrocities. Due to that history, 
display of the flag today is a taboo even within Japan. A similar thing is true with the term, the Great East Asia War, 
which is now popularly called the Pacific War (Taiheiyō Sensō). The Great East Asia War carries the reactionary 
racist ideology of “saving (the rest of) Asia out of the whites’ colonial hands.” About the last point, see Stefan 
Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
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 A Chinese man, about 30 years old, who is talking now with one of the Association vet-
erans, bearded “Tagawa,” is a good example. Wearing a huge camera hanging from his neck, 
shallowly sitting in the folding chair that is offered by the staff, he asks in his learnt Japanese, 
 “Do you think Prime Minister [Yasuo] Fukuda will visit this shrine on August 15th [the 
date when Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces in 1945] this year?” 
 Though as didactic as he always is, Tagawa is sincere, unlike other rightists. A typical 
rightist can be condescending to Chinese, based on his/her sense that they were defeated in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and also occupied by Japan throughout the Fifteen-Year War 
(1931-45). Younger generations of rightists can be hysterically hateful about China, reflecting 
their new recessionary anxieties, which must be heightened by the existence of the economically 
emerging neighbor, China. A middle-aged sympathizer of the Association, the man that I re-
member only as an employee of United Airlines, now murmurs on the side, for instance, 
 “Heck, that [whether the PM Fukuda would visit the shrine] isn’t the Chinese’ business.” 
 Rightists have been arguing that China’s strong opposition to the Yasukuni Shrine “in-
fringes upon Japanese sovereignty.” Mr. U.A., who says he had joined an attack on the Soviet 
embassy in Tokyo in the 1960s, is one of the few middle-classed activists that I know among the 
Yasukuni participants. Before 1945, somewhere in one of the either occupied or colonized terri-
tories of Japan (gaichi), his grandfather was a medical doctor and his father was a banker, ac-
cording to him. Mr. U.A. was born in 1948. His sun-tanned, 10 year-old daughter always accom-
panies him to the shrine. These days, he has been active in a rightist-filled Internet-site, Channel 
2, under the pseudonym of “Anonymous Soldier” (Mumei Senshi), he informs me.   
 “Well, listen,” facing the Chinese man, Tagawa hand-combs his long, white beard, about 
to start a long lecture as usual. He looks amused. He is the type of moral person who would 
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strongly believe in orders among genders, ethnicities, and different age-groups—his amusement 
is the emotion that ramifies from his sense of superiority, I suppose, which is based on his likely 
perception of his positionality in these orders (he is an old, Japanese male). “Ask anything to this 
grandpa (ojiichan),” he usually says to me, thus putting me in the place of a younger, female, 
fictive relative of his. He claims that “the more kids you’ve got the better it is” and casually dis-
closes certain reproductive facts between him and his wife, as if she was his vessel. Now Tagawa, 
the self-acclaimed patriarch of the Association, says to the Chinese visitor, 
 “A prime minister of Japan is Japan’s representative. Do you agree? You do? Good. I 
think it is natural that Prime Minister Fukuda, as the representative of Japan, considers to pay 
homage to Japan’s war-heroes’ spirits here in Yasukuni on 8/15, because they died for the coun-
try.” 
 Now, the Chinese man has a problem. Politely, he starts to make a counter-argument. 
 “I agree with you that the state-representatives should pay homage to the fallen state-
soldiers. But, in the Yasukuni, you enshrine even the class-A war-criminals [who were convicted 
in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and accordingly executed in 1948].” 
 In my understanding, he is here repeating the Chinese state’s official position against the 
Yasukuni Shrine. Those ordinary Chinese, Korean, and other victims of the war, with whom I 
have spoken, usually oppose the shrine’s cultural nationalism in general and its egocentric lack 
of political ethical sense. The approximately two million fallen Japanese soldiers, whom the 
shrine has consecrated, are the invaders and colonizers to the victims. The Chinese state has crit-
icized the enshrinement of only the six class-A war-criminals among other two million instances, 
perhaps based on its communist belief in ordinary Japanese and political pragmatism to forge a 
relationship with democratic Japan. 
  
106 
 Nevertheless, Tagawa confidently rejects the Chinese negotiation. 
 “The Tokyo Tribunal was the victors’ tribunal. Did they try the American crime of drop-
ping the A-bombs [in Nagasaki and Hiroshima Cities]? No.” Just like certain Americans regard 
the dropping of the atomic bombs over civilians as not a crime against humanity but an act of 
patriotism, the Japanese class-A war-criminals, including the then Prime Minister and Minister 
of War, Hideki Tōjō, should be regarded as war-heroes, Tagawa continues. According to his log-
ic, de-apotheosization of those, whom he regards as the national contributors, would be immoral, 
particularly when the de-apotheosization fulfills foreign demands. The leftists have also pointed 
out the U.S. immunity in the Far East Tribunal, but their argument has been that both American 
and Japanese crimes should have been equally tried and punished, if found guilty, and not that 
both crimes should have been exonerated and nationally glorified, as they are now.12 
 Thus refusing even the Chinese (i.e. the victims’) offers of tolerance and future-oriented 
friendship, the Yasukuni Shrine and its supporters boast its politics-resistant spatiality. History 
shatters in the shrine, which to many Japanese rightists, must look as the sign of its integrity. 
Hence, toward the weak smile of the Chinese man, Tagawa shows his persistent attitude of moral 
superiority—their debate could be a long one. 
 Among the majority of Japanese as well, the Yasukuni Shrine is not particularly revered, 
though in a different sense than in other Asian and Pacific cases. The shrine’s historical revision-
ist extremity is one reason. For another, when one further reflects on the reason that the shrine’s 
stubborn upholding of the imperial historical views might likely seem extreme to many Japanese, 
it would be helpful to analyze here that a friend of mine and an employee at an elite trading 
                                                                  
12  For instance, see Yasuaki Ōnuma, Tokyo Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisō e (Tokyo: Yūshin Dō, 1985). 
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company in Tokyo remarks that Yasukuni to him is “uncanny” (kimochi warui).13 Comfortably 
living with his wife and two kids, this man in his mid-thirties would never consider spending one 
of his precious Sundays visiting Yasukuni, as the Association veterans and their younger sup-
porters have done for the past decades. Theoretically, the uncanniness of the shrine, which he 
says he feels is that of the repressed memories of the Japanese empire. According to Freud, the 
uncanny (unheimlich) is “something which is secretly familiar [heimlich-heimisch], which has 
undergone repression and then returned from it.”14 Even though the empire collapsed only sixty-
three years ago, it never surfaces in everyday narratives of contemporary Japanese. Every Japa-
                                                                  
13  The English, “uncanny,” might be translated into the Japanese, bukimi. Bukimi divides into the negative 
suffix of bu and kimi. Although I do not find an entry of kimi in Kadokawa Shoten’s Kokugo Jiten (Japanese 
Dictionary), kimi warui, according to this dictionary, means kimochi ga warui, which makes one suppose that kimi 
and kimochi are interchangeable. In the entry of kimochi in the same dictionary, one learns that kimochi means 
kokoromochi (mood), kanjō (emotion), and kibun (feeling). In the meantime, warui in kimochi (or kimi) ga warui 
means bad; ga is a particle that attaches itself to the subject. Since bukimi means “not kimi” and kimochi ga warui is 
“bad kimochi” or “kimochi is bad,” while kimi and kimochi are estimated to mean the same thing, I suppose bukimi 
and kimochi ga warui are extremely similar to each other in their meanings. Perhaps kimochi (ga) warui seems to be 
more colloquial than bukimi, the sheer kanji (Chinese) term. In the last analysis, one of the Japanese translations of 
the English uncanny is kimi no warui, according to Shōgaku-kan’s “Progressive” English-Japanese Dictionary. 
Interestingly, the dictionary, which is regarded as so standard that it is adopted as Yahoo Japan’s dictionary function, 
does not include bukimi as the Japanese of uncanny. Besides kimi no warui, the dictionary lists the following under 
the entry uncanny⎯shinpi-teki-na (mysterious), fukashigi-na (strange), and hitonami hazurete [kimi no warui hodo] 
jōzu-na [surudoi] (extraordinarily [to the degree of creepiness] good [insightful]). Whether kimi (or kimochi) ga 
warui or bukimi, the Japanese translation of uncanny seems to omit the connotation of the return of the repressed 
(see below); both bukimi and kimochi (ga) warui, to me, seem to emphasize the object’s atmosphere of creepiness, 
repulsion, and abject and not so much the subject’s psychologically dynamic involvement in it, like repression.  
14  Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny,’” The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII (1917-
19) (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), pp.219-256. The quote is from p.245; square brackets original. According to 
Mladen Dolar, Lacan invented the term, extimité, as the French translation of unheimlich. Dolar emphasizes the dif-
ference of the extimité⎯ for one thing, according to Dolar, the extimité is a historical concept that marks modernity. 
For another, Dolar says, the extimité is also qualitatively different from the unheimlich, since Lacanian anxiety is 
“not produced by a lack or a loss or an incertitude; it is not the anxiety of losing something (the firm support, one’s 
bearings, etc.). On the contrary, it is the anxiety of gaining something too much, of a too-close presence of the object. 
What one loses with anxiety is precisely the loss⎯the loss that made it possible to deal with a coherent reality. 
‘Anxiety is the lack of the support of the lack,’ says Lacan; the lack lacks, and this brings about the uncanny.” See 
Dolar, “’I Shall Be with You on Your Wedding-Night’: Lacan and the Uncanny” in October 58 (Fall 1991), 5-23; 
p.13; parentheses original. Marilyn Ivy refers to Dolar in her Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, 
Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); p.85. Despite Dolar, perhaps the modernity of the uncanny 
is unmistakable also in Freud’s accounts of involuntary mechanicity, with which the repressed object in the uncanny 
situation is supposed to return⎯see Freud on his Italian journey (Ibid.; pp.236-8). Similarly, Freud mentions the 
symbol’s predominance in his study of carved crocodiles; he says that the inverted dominance of the symbol (the 
crocodiles) over reality is uncanny (Ibid.; pp.243-5). These two qualities of the Freudian uncanny, the symbol’s pre-




nese presumably holds visceral memories of the empire bequeathed by his/her family. However, 
nobody seems to mention them, except symptomatically (e.g. in fantastic nationalistic cinema), 
after the political, legal, and socio-cultural rupture that the country experienced in 1945.15 The 
overt displays of the imperial flag (the rising sun) or the shouts of the Great East Asia War (the 
prewar appellation of the Asia-Pacific War) in Yasukuni are typical examples of the uncanny 
returns of the repressed, that is, the lost empire of Japan. 
 There is more to the shrine’s uncanniness. During and after the war, Yasukuni has pro-
moted not only the imperial glory with the flags and marches, but the fascist beauty of mass-
deaths. Apotheosization of the soldiers, which was and is the shrine’s main purpose, is the sol-
diers’ commodification, their abstraction into the identical form of the “spirit.” In order to erase 
their class differences and become the self-same form of the national spirit, the soldiers engaged 
in suicidal missions, while the rest of the nation was fascinated with the fascist commodification 
of the soldiers. Inside and outside the shrine, the spirit (rei) is otherwise called tama(shii), carry-
ing its etymological root in jade, that is, the ancient commodity-cum-money.16 
 Still promoting and openly presenting the imperial and fascist practices and ideologies, as 
if they had never been condemned and prohibited, the shrine today is the uncanny theater of Ja-
pan’s repressed past. The shrine’s and LDP’s recent efforts to promote the shrine as the “reli-
gious” and not political facility can be regarded as the acts to try to re-repress the returned past in 
the shrine with the new languages of the folk, people, and their customs⎯I will return to this 
point later. My corporate friend merely represents the majority of Japanese’ response to the idea 
                                                                  
15  According to Dick Stegewerns, one of the first cinematic symptoms was registered by a movie company, 
Shin Tōhō’s series of war-representations. As soon as the occupation forces left the country, the company started to 
replicate prewar propagandist themes of devotion, comradely, or bravery in movies entitled Dōki no Sakura, Gunkan 
March, Gunshin Yamamoto Gensui Rengō Kantai, etc. See his “'Nihon Yaburezu (Japan Undefeated)': The 
Cinematic Contest for Japan's Collective War Memory,” presented at the 9th Annual Asian Studies Conference Japan, 
6/19/2005, at Jōchi (“Sophia”) University, Tokyo. 
16  The emperor has also been called “jade”; yet in Japanese, it is gyoku and not tama. See Chap.1. 
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of the Yasukuni in postwar Japan. Even among actual visitors to the shrine, such an explicit ex-
posure of their unconscious past, as staged by the Association, is apparently too uncanny. Many 
of these visitors could be bereaved families, or veterans, or newly interpellated moral nationalists, 
who would like patriotic memorialization of the soldiers without the Real, i.e. too much remem-
brance of the losses. The anomaly among the anomaly (the Yasukuni visitors), the Association is 
probably one of the only few groups in contemporary Japan which have tried to remember or ra-
ther symptomatically embody, the empire and its fascism. 
 
The Class-Structure of the Death-Space 
 The Yasukuni shrine’s fascism-preserving spatiality is its supporters’ spatiality. The sup-
porters, such as the members of the Association to Respond to the War Heroes’ Spirits, have ex-
hibited their affinity with the Yasukuni spatiality through their different class-characters. On the 
top of the hierarchized class-characters, there is one that is represented by the Association board 
of former supreme court judges and LDP congressmen, who rank and file members call sensei or 
sirs. Sensei never spend their time and effort in the Sunday campaign at Yasukuni; probably only 
few of the rank and file have ever got to have a chance to actually talk to them. Sensei’s job is to 
represent the moral spatial claims made by the rank and file and in exchange, to conserve their 
current elite statuses. 
 Even among the rank and file, veterans are hierarchized according to their former ranks, 
which, in turn, seem to be intimately connected to their class statuses. Let us take an example of 
the veteran, who others call the “company commander” (chūtai-chō) (I am not sure about his ac-
tual rank). The commander’s resonant voice signifies and performs to establish his dominance 
over other veterans. While the Japanese call a humble person a “person with lowered hips” (ko-
shi no hikui hito), that is, a person who easily bows, the commander is a man with a straight pos-
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ture, which I have never seen bent. Various gifts are given to him. The Association staff would 
bring with them a big box of expensive peaches from Yamagata Prefecture that they say was 
mailed to the commander. In that particular Sunday, he was not around, so other veterans sat 
around the box during their lunch break, “worshiping” (ogami-nagara) it, as one of them joking-
ly said. Ordinarily, the commander shares with the rank and file whatever is given to him—
bottles of locally brewed sake, ice cream in the summer, or warmed imagawa yaki snacks in the 
winter, which these veterans call “shared hem” (o-suso wake), that is, kindly shared feeling of 
the king’s gown. The gown that this naked king dons is the perception that he commands politi-
cal influence and enjoys business connections. Some say he owns a lucrative, independent busi-
ness; others say he was once a congressman. What I witnessed myself was that an array of his 
subordinates and friends throughout the country sensitively responded to the news of his pres-
ence in Yasukuni on any particular Sunday, apparently compelled to call his cell and dispense 
variously considerate presents to refresh him in the middle of the exhausting ad-campaign under 
the elements. 
 Although the veterans do not salute the commander any more, apparently they never for-
get that they fought under him during the Battle of Imphal. The Japanese started to march from 
Burma to conquer Imphal in Assam, north eastern India, in March 1944. Through the logistically 
inadequate campaign, in which the soldiers died of starvation (40,000 starvation deaths versus 
30,000 deaths in action), the commander led his company out alive, if not intact, anyway.17 To-
day, in his presence, no veterans dare to initiate a conversation, which would interrupt the talka-
tive commander. 
 Among these veterans, it might be easy to find remaining loyalty to the commander. But, 
their deference to him is likely also related to their class differences from him. Whether through 
                                                                  
17  About the Imphal campaign, see Tanaka, et al, Ibid.; p.26-7. 
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politics or business, his seeming success might build on the success of his natal family. General-
ly, many officers were from good socio-economic backgrounds, which they maintained and ad-
vanced in the postwar by taking advantage of the network of other officers. Yasuhiro Nakasone, 
for instance, a former navy officer, became a prime minister that way; Ryūzō Sejima, the former 
CEO of Itōchū Trading Company, was an Army staff member. Lacking family resources and 
military connections, ordinary veterans merely suffered—tiding over day after day was all they 
did after they were repatriated to Japan. 
 The commander at Yasukuni exercises his power to create a hierarchical order among the 
rank and file. Apparently, it is not his style to enjoy monopolizing power; he seems to need lieu-
tenants and wants his lieutenants to have their own subordinates. During the lunch-break from 
the ad-campaign, when the members retire under the trees that are planted on both sides of the 
Approach to the Hall of Prayer, the commander would assign every one of them to a seat, which 
apparently makes concentric circles with him at the symbolic center. 
 “Yo! Z! I haven’t seen you for a while. Why don’t you sit next to me?” he would invite a 
veteran among others in his usual, a bit vulgar and thus “masculine” diction. Amazingly or not, 
the patriarch, Tagawa, is not particularly high-ranked in this order, perhaps reflecting the com-
mander’s anti-intellectualism. As for me, I am the lowest ranked or an irrelevant outsider at best, 
who should be seated in the periphery of the symbolic sphere of his power. The anti-
intellectualism aside, his machismo does not seem to allow him to understand such an existence 
as a female graduate student. Anthropology, my major, would seem to him to be an ominous 
omen of anti-mercantilism and political insignificance. 
 Perhaps for other reasons than my gender or status, some staff members at the Associa-
tion seem to have grown suspicious of me. Everybody knows that I have been merely studying, 
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versus supporting, either the Association or the shrine. I have never spontaneously disclosed my 
political position; neither has any participant directly asked me. In the gray area between partici-
pation and observation, my affiliation with a U.S. university has also played an ambiguous role. 
Once, somebody let me know that some members said I was an “American spy.” Others do not 
seem to mind my existence, perhaps reflecting the U.S. semi-colonialism of postwar Japan. In 
that context, showing political or cultural allegiance to the U.S. dominance has become a sort of 
conservative act⎯my affiliation would not be the sign of my “enemy” status but the embodiment 
of my supposedly conservative deference to the semi-colonial authority. Still, even given the 
broad spectrum of the rightist ideologies in the country, I have always been in the margin of the 
field. I have neither been invited to any events outside the shrine, nor given any member’s num-
ber. I usually just show up in the shrine on Sundays, occasionally to discover that the campaign 
was canceled for some reason. The activists just tolerate my existence, with a volatile increment 
of suspicion. I think the commander has assigned me a symbolically accurate position in his 
lunchtime seating. 
 When the commander is not around, the opening under the thick canopy of evergreen 
trees echoes with quiet murmurs and small laughter, as the Imphal survivors make relaxed jokes 
to each other. Although I tend to be either neglected or forgotten, hanging with the veterans, I 
have never felt the rejecting exclusivity of the commander or staff members. The veterans and I 
would usually sit and nibble on convenience-store-bought rice balls together. 
 These seaweed-wrapped balls of cooked rice with little pickles or tuna salad inside (o-
nigiri) are bought with donated money and carried in the hands of sympathetic college students. 
The leader of these students, “Takuya Kanno,” is now stacking the rice balls on one of the four 
folding tables that are borrowed from the shrine. Lease of the tables and others (folding chairs, 
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plastic cups, strainers, pots, brooms, etc.), in addition to the access to the shrine’s property for 
the campaign purpose, shows the close relation between the Association and the shrine. If leftists 
dared to demonstrate in the shrine, they would likely be arrested.18 
 The student, Kanno, belongs to the Association’s companion organization, Japan Youth 
Memorial Association (Nihon Seinen Ikotsu Shūshū Dan; its another self-appellation is JYMA), 
which supplies voluntary students’ labor-power to the state-project to recover the Japanese sol-
diers’ remains throughout Asia and the Pacific. Established in 1967, the JYMA (also called “J” 
by the students) has dispatched the total of 1,353 students over 4,448 days in 226 different mis-
sions.19 Though somewhat contradictory to the shrine’s ideology (for, the shrine argues that the 
soldiers should be memorialized in the abstract form of spirits), the JYMA has been allowed to 
carry out its own ad-campaign in the shrine side by side with the Association. The two organiza-
tions cooperate with each other on the everyday basis, borrowing stationery from each other, 
watching out for the other’s booth when nobody else is around, and preparing lunch together. 
Kanno was thus handed the Association money by its long-term, “secretary”-type of woman, 
Misa, to buy those foods that the old males would like—the rice balls, bottles of sake, cans of 
beer, smoked and sliced squids, and kabuki sembei (rice crackers that are deep fried and sea-
soned with sugar and soy sauce). 
 With long hair that is died light brown, Misa provides me with an idea of what the so-
called “Yankees,” that is, delinquent Japanese youths with “blonde” hair, would be like when 
                                                                  
18  According to David McNeill, 6 peace-activists, including a 90-year old male, were arrested near the shrine 
in 8/15/2005, at least. See his “Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Japanese Police Crush Peace Protestors” in 
Japan Focus, 9/6/2005. Keiko Yasuhara, a middle-aged female factory worker, who has supported Chinese and 
Korean former forced laborers, witnesses that “some time ago,” when she went to the shrine, accompanying Korean 
families and other protesters, she and others were “surrounded by right-wingers and repeatedly punched in the face 
(boko boko ni kao wo nagurareta).” Although they must have known in advance that these activists were 
demonstrating that day and that the rightists would physically react to their demonstration, the police were not 
around in the shrine that day (in personal conversations, 2/26/2007 at the Tokyo District Court). 
19  Ima, Nani wo Kataran: Tokutei Hi Eiri Katsudō Hōjin JYMA Heisei 17-nen-do Haken Hōkoku-sho (an 
unpublished booklet, 2005); p.12. 
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they hit middle age. As a result of the long years of the Yasukuni campaign perhaps, she is 
tanned to be almost leather-skinned—or, probably she has to go to a tanning salon to attain that 
level of tan. Attentive, formal, and efficient, though, during the break when she is left alone only 
with her truly close cohort, I notice that she would squat over the ground (called yankee zuwari), 
deeply inhaling cigarettes and letting the smoke out of her nostrils. One of her favorite friends is 
a chubby, middle-aged man outside the Association affiliation. Usually in a rather shabby T-shirt 
and a baseball cap, the man says he has his weekday suppers in an Okachimachi (laborers’ town 
in Tokyo) tavern. Trying some of the approximately 500 different kinds of shōchū spirit made 
from sweet potatoes or wheat which the tavern boasts, he usually spends at least 5,000 yen 
(about 50 U.S. dollars) a night, according to him. 
 “Even when I try to save my money by ordering just edamame (boiled, young soy beans 
in pods) and hiya yakko (chilled tofu), the bill always amounts to 5,000—their shōchū is irresist-
ible,” he explains. Another favorite dinner of his is the 2,000-yen fried pork-shoulder, served in 
another downtown district in Tokyo, Kamata. In her conversations with him and other friends, 
Misa’s polite diction is completely replaced with husky-voiced, street-corner slang. Apparently 
uncomfortable in front of me, Misa, however, once let me know that she named her primary-
school-year son “Hayabusa” after a Japanese battleship—a somewhat unusual name for a Japa-
nese person. Kanno might similarly incorporate the country’s past; Taku as in Takuya (his given 
name) could mean colonial development. 
 Presently, Misa has temporarily retired from the exhausting campaign in the Approach 
and started to pour more green tea to each veteran’s plastic cup. As for the veterans, they have 
not even touched the tea. They are good with enough booze and snacks that Kanno brought them. 
They are rather giddy, unleashed from the commander’s voice and eyes. Random talk is struck 
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up everywhere, the kind of randomness that renders any contexts, backgrounds, or differences 
meaningless. It is certainly an important technique of sociality, in which these super-mature 
males (most of them are over 80 years old) must be versed. Yet, used in such a violent stage as 
the Yasukuni Shrine, their conversational randomness seems to have more dimensions than soci-
ality. 
 “I bought a pedometer some time ago,” a veteran says to another, to take an example.  A 
strange everydayness that shatters the veterans in the treed opening, as if it were an innocent pic-
nic with neighbors, as if there had never been the controversies of the invasive soldiers, the in-
vaded others, their deaths, and aftermath. This veteran, who worked in one of the ward offices of 
Tokyo for 37 years after the war, continues— “A pedometer, ‘cause the doctor said I had to lose 
2 kg (about 5 lbs).” 
 “Ah, that’s easy [to lose 2 kilo],” Yamada, the former police officer, chimes in. 
 “You think so, huh? But, that wasn’t that easy,” the retired ward-officer jokingly sighs. “I 
got totally compelled to walk 10,000 steps a day. And now, look, I have a feeling that I’ve got 
bad knees.” 
 “What about your weight, though? Did you at least lose 2 kg?” 
 “I gained some more, actually. I guess I kept drinking, as my knees hurt.” 
 As everybody laughs, the veteran who sits next to me demands my attention. Somewhat 
drunk, he has been positively nodding to every remark made during the lunchtime today. A hap-
py, almost euphoric elder, who I will later know was a landscaper by occupation, pulls a silver 
chain that he hangs from his neck to boastfully show me a free pass to the Tokyo bus system. 
According to him, those who are over seventy years old are given those passes. 
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 “Depending on your income,” another veteran, who comes to our table to get another can 
of beer, stresses. The man with the pass laughs to show that he does not take himself too serious-
ly. He continues that it takes him about an hour and several buses to come here from his place 
near the not-so-gentrified, Arakawa River bank, eastern Tokyo. He has a slight hearing difficulty. 
This former landscaper’s tanned hands and face are covered with age-spots and moles, perhaps 
as a result of long years in working outdoors. His thick fingers are stiff and clumsy, probing into 
his black wallet to pull out a bunch of lottery tickets. According to what he explains in his thick 
accent of downtown Tokyo, he buys about 20,000 yen (200 U.S. dollar)-worth of tickets every 
year. 
 “20,000! Ah, you should at least occasionally win it then, I imagine?” another veteran, a 
ramen-noodle shop owner, who sits next to him away from me, ridicules him. 
 “True. Tell me, how much would you win? A hundred yen (a buck)? Two hundred?” the 
ward bureaucrat asks. 
 “You’d never know. I usually win about 2,000 yen every year!” the landscaper corrects 
them. “Of course I should. ‘Cause, every morning, I put the tickets up on the shrine of Daikoku-
sama [a shinto god] and pray.” 
 Daikoku is one of the Seven Deities of Happiness (Hichi Fuku Jin) that was adopted from 
the Chinese belief system. Mixed with a mythological hero and god, Ōkuni Nushi, Daikoku is 
supposed to be effective for the believer’s commercial success. In practice, this is the first time 
that I have ever encountered a living Japanese who actually believes in the god/deity. According 
to the landscaper, he even owns a shrine (kami dana) that is dedicated to the god. It is not that 
Daikoku has ever vanished from Japanese lives. To the contrary, the deity triumphantly reigns 
over parts of the everyday as a cartoon image of a happy fatso, the corporate identity of Yebisu. 
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By tying the image with the mandolin tune taken from the film The Third Man, Yebisu seems to 
try to promote their beer as a nostalgic product.20 As a real practitioner, the landscaper’s Daikoku 
belief exceeds the corporate goal of the nostalgic effect; and this excess seems to make him dif-
ferent.21 
 The veterans then start to amuse themselves discussing their gambling careers, in which 
some have been lucky, others have been not so lucky. According to their collective conclusion, a 
gambler’s luck will be evened out over years—the ramen shop owner, for instance, who won 
about 1,000 U.S. dollar equivalence in pachinko pinball machines in the last week, has spent 
more than that at least in the last couple of years, according to him. 
 A small break of silence, and we remotely hear “Terasaki Minoru,” the JYMA’s middle-
aged “adviser” (komon)’s amplified speech (agi as in agitation) that he has started some time ago 
in the Approach. 
 
It is deplorable that excessive immorality controls Japan today. Streets are inun-
dated with people’s shameless indulgence in pleasure. A sincere heart will be de-
composed by people’s ignoble forgetfulness of their obligations. Our obligations 
as Japanese today are to inter and memorialize those war heroes who went to the 
battlefields and fell there like blossoms (sange-suru). Their deaths will be truly 
wasted as fallen blossoms, if we don’t remember that the deaths were sacrifices, 
sacrifices for us the younger Japanese. Ladies and gentlemen, now is the time to 
look back, to inherit our predecessors’ (senjin-tachi no) nobleness, integrity, and 
courage, with which they self-sacrificed for us. 
 
The juxtaposition of the veterans’ talks of gambling and Terasaki’s castigation of “shameless 
indulgence in pleasure” might be ironic. Yet in the rightists’ curiously arithmetic sense of mo-
rality, the veterans have already fulfilled their share of obligations, so now they can sit back and 
receive returns. The speaker, Terasaki, is recognized to be the JYMA ideologue; he should know 
                                                                  
20  See Carol Reed dir., The Third Man (London: London Films, 1949); the music score is by Anton Caras.  
21  The company’s power is such that The Third Man’s song now resounds every time a train arrives at Yebisu 
Station on the Yamanote Line, Tokyo. The station’s name is coincidentally Yebisu, of which fact the company takes 
advantage and has constructed its kingdom around the station—collectively called Yebisu Garden Place, its factory, 
office, and shopping center now prepare new commercial and corporate scenes for many commuters. 
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such mathematics very well. A short and chunky man with a mustache, he was born as a son of a 
former Japanese spy among the Korean and Manchurian residents in Manchukuo (1932-45), ac-
cording to him. Already during his college years in nationalist Kokushikan University, he had 
established the Study Group of the Imperial Historical View (Kōkoku Shikan Kenkyū Kai). Now-
adays, as an owner of an independent print-shop in Tokyo, he takes orders from the university as 
well as the JYMA. 
 As usual, Terasaki’s speech is as smooth and appropriate for a speech in the Yasukuni as 
it could be. The smoothness is the result of an excessive degree of formality in his speech, in 
which fallen blossoms, pleasure-inundated streets, decomposed hearts, and other metaphors are 
too clichéd at this point to bear any fresh messages whatsoever.22 A psychoanalyst, Rika Kōyama, 
suspects that nationalists in general might be urged by the “oral pleasure” of pronouncing lofty 
metaphors and ideological terms, rather than by their meaning per se.23 Indeed, provided the 
small number of visitors at Yasukuni, who almost never stop to listen to any “agitation,” Terasa-
ki would not expect too powerful an effect of his efforts on listeners. He seems to be intoxicated 
with the melodramatic tone of his speech itself, the idiosyncratic air of which might further nar-
row down the number of his listeners.   
 On the part of the former foot soldiers as well, Terasaki’s speech easily constitutes a part 
of the mis en scène, which their conversations themselves have turned out to be. At least the vet-
erans are not even listening to the speech except as a sort of scenic buzz. Thus, one of the veter-
ans, “Kamiya,” an owner of a spirit shop in downtown Tokyo, now says, almost out of the blue, 
“Hokkaidō [Island] is great.” He has actually been chewing the dried scallops, the delicacy from 
                                                                  
22  About the use and abuse of the metaphor of cherry blossoms by the fascist state of prewar Japan, see Emiko 
Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese 
History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
23  Rika Kōyama and Eiji Ohtsuka, “’Wata Oni’ to Chōetsu-teki-na Mono” in Shin Genjitsu, Vol.3 (April 
2004), pp.72-92; p.77. 
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the northern island. It was of course the commander who had left the scallops with us—he had to 
leave for some business-related purposes. 
 “Hokkaidō is great. They’ve got everything there; salmon, crabs, sea urchins.” 
 “Salmon roe, as well,” the ward bureaucrat adds. 
 “Ah, salmon roe is good, isn’t it?” another veteran in the table of the spirit shop owner 
agrees. 
 “And then Atka mackerels!” 
 “Ah, Atka mackerels are good.” 
 “In the winter, I always have them with hot sake.” 
 “In the summer, ‘firefly squid’ with the vinegar and miso sauce.” 
 “Dr. Takahashi,” a former military doctor in the commander’s company, who is now 94 
years old, starts talking about his late wife. 
 “She always prepared me firefly squid with cold sake. She took good care of me, you 
know.” 
 He then explains how he cannot make it for 8/15 in Yasukuni this year, since he would 
have the obon ritual for her. Obon is a relatively commonly practiced ritual among ordinary Jap-
anese nowadays, in which the dead are symbolically “invited” back to this world on the backs of 
a cucumber horse and eggplant bull with a chopstick set of legs each. Although I’m sympathetic 
about the doctor’s grievance, the rank and file have become bored. 
 “And then, remember? We used to pickle papaya,” a veteran who has said was dispatched 
to Malaya before Imphal, suddenly interrupts the doctor. Apparently under the influence of sake, 
his skin has turned purple-red with all the veins standing out. I suspect that he might have a long 
history of habitual drinking. There is an impression of gnarled stiffness in his big, box-like body, 
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which might have had to adjust itself to a hard-working environment, where he might have been 
placed. Some time ago, he showed me a laminated picture of himself in an imperial army uni-
form. The stars and other ornaments that he wore in the picture were those of a private 1st class, 
according to him. Smooth and round-cheeked, he was 22 years old. 
 “I do remember,” Tagawa, the bearded “patriarch,” who sits across the table from the 
“Malayan” veteran, nods, “it was good.” I assume the pickled papaya that they are talking about 
had been available before they embarked on marching through Burmese jungles to Imphal.     
 “Then, we ate papaya tempura [deep fried in batter].” 
 “Ah, that was goood!” another sighs. The man who went to Malaya then told me how his 
platoon cut banana trees down (in Malaya?) to eat the soft, white core of the trunk. 
 “It was good,” he squints his eyes, as if to reproduce the taste on his tongue. “But then, 
later I heard that they took 4 to 5 years after they planted a tree before they could harvest bana-
nas. I feel bad [for the Malays, whose banana trees his platoon cut down].” 
 “We had to eat everything—even grass out there,” says Yamada the former police officer, 
probably mentioning later days in the march. 
 “But that didn’t agree with us. Do you remember? We all got our mouths inflamed [due 
to the wild grass].” Before I even notice it, the doctor has joined the new topic of the Burmese 
jungle-diet for survival. 
 The veterans’ conversations make a metonymical chain in which random topics 
line up side by side—death of one’s wife, one’s weight, gambling, drinking, sacrifices and obli-
gations (as in Terasaki’s speech), wartime thefts of civilians’ properties (banana trees), the sense 
of guilt, and the sense of being victimized (about having to eat the grass). The wide-range of the-
se topics might prevent any one of them from making a lasting trace in the participant’s mind. At 
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the same time, one might notice that these topics in their entirety make a vague, overall meaning; 
that is, if one looks at the whole conversations as a set, the randomness of each topic might not 
look so random. Today in Yasukuni I have started to faintly perceive that the veterans, in talking 
about those random-sounding matters, might be avoiding something, avoiding such an unavoida-
ble discussion as the Japanese soldiers’ atrocities to begin with. In the ideological banners or offi-
cial remarks, these veterans easily say “there was no Nanjing Massacre” or “we are here in Ya-
sukuni to protect the heroes’ spirits” (eirei o omamorisuru) from international infamy or leftist 
demonstrations. Part of their declared missions is to prove viscerally, i.e. with their own war-
experiences, that the Japanese soldiers were not atrocious. Yet in the private conversations among 
themselves, the veterans seem to completely omit these politically and ethically controversial 
points. Probably their unspoken logic is that since they, the actual participants in the war, do not 
talk about them, the atrocities did not exist. But then, why would I sense fear and pleasure⎯or 
the feeling of relief⎯in these veterans’ interactions? The fear is sensed in the urgency with which 
the conversations are concatenated together, the hurried rhythm with which a veteran inserts his 
conversation immediately after another, picking up and expanding an arbitrary word or idea that 
is used in the previous conversation. The sense of relief would then be detected in the distance, 
the wide distance over which a veteran leaps to another, totally arbitrary topic, so that nobody, 
including the veterans themselves, notice who they really are or what they really did. The whole 
set of conversations is thus sustained together as a rapidly flowing chain of displacement, the dis-
placement that seems to happen only because the veterans might be afraid. The meaning of the set 
of conversations⎯avoidance⎯might emerge at certain moments, in which the veterans are mo-
mentarily out of topics or when the listener all of a sudden notices the bizarreness of the combina-
tion between gambling and Yasukuni. At other moments, the listener is likely distracted, or may 
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be even amused, by the diversified topics, the surprising transition from one to the next. Accord-
ing to Kaja Silverman, the metonymic formation of language is characterized by this type of 
“transversality,” i.e. a movement back and forth between the words and content, consciousness 
and unconsciousness, as well as between the two adjacent words.24 This is true also to meta-
phoricity, a technique to present a cluster of associative terms, through which a meaning is ex-
pected to be condensed. At the Yasukuni, Terasaki’s speech would make a good example of a 
metaphoric usage of language. A generation apart from the veterans, Terasaki can probably afford 
for those words that associatively remind one of the Real, the life and death in the war, though the 
Real should still be distanced from him⎯hence his use of metaphors.   
 Socially, the metonymic technology of displacement is most prominently mobilized by 
the newspaper. “What is the essential literary convention of the newspaper?” Benedict Anderson 
asks. 
 
If we were to look at a sample front page of, say, The New York Times, we might 
find there stories about Soviet dissidents, famine in Mali, a gruesome murder, a 
coup in Iraq, the discovery of a rare fossil in Zimbabwe, and a speech by Mitter-
rand. Why are these events so juxtaposed? What connects them to each other? 
Not sheer caprice. Yet obviously most of them happen independently, without the 
actors being aware of each other or of what the others are up to. The arbitrariness 
of their inclusion and juxtaposition (a later edition will substitute a baseball tri-
umph for Mitterrand) shows that the linkage between them is imagined.25 
 
The linkage, i.e. the meaning of the newspaper metonymy, that Anderson finds is “calendrical 
coincidence” between the events, for one thing, and “simultaneous consumption” of the same 
newspaper in the imagined nation, for another.26 
                                                                  
24  Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); p.110.  
25  Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and New 
York: Verso, 1999(1983)); p.33; parentheses original. 
26  Anderson, Ibid.; p.33 and 35.  
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 The nation and its simultaneity can of course be said to be the signified of the Japanese 
newspaper as well. Still, I would like to be a little more specific so that I can provide a better 
idea of the social and historical backgrounds that surround the Yasukuni veterans’ talks. I am 
suggesting that the widely practiced operation of metonymy in the Japanese newspaper is creat-
ing and created by the Yasukuni veteran-type of war-narratives. Whereas Anderson would say all 
the papers published in Japan today cannot escape from their imaginary framework of the nation, 
I argue that the nation thus signified by the papers cannot be better grasped without taking into 
consideration the kind of repressive movement that I have discussed⎯the avoidance of Japan’s 
past atrocities, the atrocities that made Japan’s fascism a lost ideal. The newspaper metonymy in 
postwar Japan operates this movement along class- and gender-lines. Take a look at the business 
paper, Nikkei or Nihon Keizai Shinbun, whose front pages are usually the juxtaposition of ran-
dom technical details of economic indices, bureaucratic procedures, or corporate strategies, so 
that the suit- and tie-clad elite males could bring more money to their employers, i.e. big, global 
corporations.27Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi are the papers that are more gender-neutral than 
Nikkei, meaning to provide to both male and female bourgeoisie a wider range of news from 
which the metonymical configuration is made, as compared to the economy-focused Nikkei. 
When it comes to Nikkan Gendai and other tabloids, Sports Nippon and other sports papers, one 
can immediately see that they are totally different affairs from these four national papers in the 
gender and class of the expected readers. If Nikkei the business paper is read by bourgeois male 
commuters, the tabloids and sports papers are also supposed to be read in crowded subways, but 
by male salarymen in small corporations, or hard-working men in shops, factories, construction, 
and so on. In these tabloids and their ilk, naked female bodies are notoriously ubiquitous, juxta-
                                                                  
27  Yoriko Shōno’s prose, Time Slip Combinato (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1998), literarily addresses the male 
metonymies of Japan’s “high-growth period” (1955-1973), taking the form of an everyday travelogue of coastal 
Kawasaki, the now forgotten base of the country’s heavy and chemical industries.  
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posed with pictures from warring Afghanistan or sensational murder cases. When one can occa-
sionally see the repressive-unrepressive movements regarding Japan’s atrocities and fascism vis-
ibly played out among the four national papers, especially between the leftist Asahi and rightist 
Yomiuri, as Asahi’s critical revelation of and Yomiuri’s nationalist excuse for the atrocities and 
fascism, the tabloids and sports papers are comparable to Nikkei in their sheer forgetfulness of 
the past. Nikkei helps the reader sublimate the related libido into the economic activities; the tab-
loids and others in comparison shock the reader into forced oblivion.  
A similar technique of anesthesia was used by prewar Japanese tabloids and other publi-
cations, Mark Driscoll suggests, in order to make the petty bourgeois and lumpen nerves numb in 
the face of fascist violence. These readers of the tabloids were the kinds of Japanese, Driscoll 
argues, who would actually go colonize the peripheries of the Japanese empire as shop owners, 
petty officers, officialized pimps, or military spies. The violence that these Japanese committed 
against other Asians and Pacific Islanders were fueled by the metropolitan tabloids’ erotic-
grotesque articles and at the same time fueled them in return. With the metonymic technique, 
these articles rendered each individual colonized life into a sensational fantasy. Their tolerance 
of shocks and violence being thus heightened, the petty bourgeois readers could freely express 
their class-specific resentment out in the colonies.28 
                                                                  
28  Driscoll, Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan’s Imperialism, 
1895-1945 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010). In the case of the Korean Peninsula, the historian 
Sōji Takasaki says, the Japanese colonizers arrived first as the consulate staff members, and then as postal workers, 
and after 1910 when Japan officially integrated Korea, as the officials at the Government-General. After the Great 
Depression, many Japanese opened restaurants, bars, and brothels. In crises, such as the Great Kanto Earthquake of 
1923, these petty bourgeois colonizers’ violence was turned back to themselves as the fear of retaliatory violence by 
the Koreans. “More fundamentally,” according to Takasaki, this fear must have been “caused by the intuition that 
their [the Japanese] existence was denied by the Koreans.” See his Shokumin-chi Chōsen no Nihon-jin (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2002); p.140.  
About the concept of the grotesque, according to Bakhtin, it is associated with the farmers’ class—the 
“fruitful earth and womb.” “’Downward’ is earth, ‘upward’ is heaven. Earth is an element that devours, swallows up 
(the grave, the womb) and at the same time an element of birth, of renascence (the maternal breasts)... To degrade an 
object [is]...to hurl it down to the reproductive lower stratum, the zone in which conception and a new birth take 
place. Grotesque realism knows no other lower level; it is the fruitful earth and womb. It is always conceiving.” See 
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 Yasukuni Shrine’s petty bourgeois veterans seem to belong to this genealogy of tabloid 
violence. The violence of these veterans’ metonymic talk levels off the political and ethical sin-
gularity of an event in juxtaposition with other events. These veterans’ violence works in the 
same fashion as the prewar tabloid’s working, but with more complexity than the prewar in-
stance due to its different meaning. The prewar tabloid’s meaning is estimated to have been the 
ideals of fascism and nationalism, and their respective ideologies of equivalence and simultanei-
ty. The psychological complex that arises from posteriority, i.e. a delay from the actual violence, 
was not yet developed. To other Asians and Pacific Islanders, these tabloids meant pains and 
losses, due to the ideologies’ exclusivism and totalitarianism. After sixty-three years since the 
end of the war, the veterans add the meaning of avoidance and repression to nationalism and fas-
cism. To other victims, this is not just totalitarian rendition, but also the denial of justice. As I 
will detail in Chapter 5, justice is what these victims seek, in addition to legal, political, and fi-
nancial compensations. These necessarily require the perpetrator’s admission of its atrocities. As 
the inheritor of the petty bourgeois violence of the tabloid, the Yasukuni veterans thus seem to 
have unintentionally enhanced the level, and diversified the kind, of violence toward their vic-
tims, as compared to their predecessors.  
 The bourgeoisie like Dr. Takahashi and Mr. U.A., or the grand bourgeoisie such as the 
commander and the LDP sensei, do not mind the postwar violence of the petty bourgeoisie. They 
not only patronize these petty bourgeois actors, they also join them by promoting the metonymic 
repression via business paper Nikkei and other venues. The petty bourgeois violence seems to be 
indiscriminate, though, trying to slyly exclude the commander and pulling down Dr. Takahashi 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
his Rabelais and His World, trans. by Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968); p.21 (parentheses 
are original). Criticizing the centrality of the problematic concept of folk in Bakhtin, Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
White argue that the idea of the farmers’ grotesqueness should be reconsidered together with the bourgeois desires 
and fears of filth, fat, the feminine, etc., which co-emerged with modernity. See their The Politics and Poetics of 
Transgression (London: Methuen, 1986). 
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onto their grotesque, tabloid plane of gastronomy and, as will be discussed, sexology. The job of 
the bourgeoisie and grand bourgeoisie is to corporatistically and otherwise organize the petty 
bourgeoisie, so that their desires for rendered equality do not become excessive.  
 In addition to metonymy, metaphoricity is another technique that these veterans mobilize 
in order to repress the Real of the past. Listen to how they compare between different fruits from 
different lands that Japan conquered—bananas from Taiwan, mangoes from the Philippines, 
mangostines from Malaysia, and so forth.  
 “I’m from Katsunuma,” Yamanashi Prefecture, the veteran who went to Malaya starts the 
new thread of conversation. “Grapes are awesome in Katsunuma.” 
 “Ah, Katsunuman wine is the best,” Kamiya, the liquor shop owner agrees. “I’m from 
Sendai [in Miyagi Prefecture]; we don’t grow any fruits at all.” 
 “You need a warm climate for that,” “Sakita” comes back from the bathroom and informs 
us. He uses a cane to support his left leg. He used to run a “factory” in downtown Tokyo. “Look 
at Taiwan. I think their bananas taste so good.” 
 “Well, the Philippines is warmer than Taiwan, but their bananas are just plain,” says Ta-
gawa the patriarch—of course he knows it all. I am still not sure about his occupational back-
ground.   
 “They [the Philippine bananas] used to [be plain]. Now, they are all right,” the “Malayan” 
veteran adds. “In the South, I ate mangoes, mangostines, durian fruits, everything. I like them so 
much even now. 
 “The Southern women are hot as well, aren’t they?” he continues. “They are gentle 
(yasashii) and friendly (kidate ga ii)—they are the best.” 
  
127 
 “Is it so?” Sakita the factory-owner disagrees. “I like northern women better. They have 
light and smooth skin. Look at Niigatans.” Japanese nationalism in general represents Niigata 
Prefecture, one of the biggest producers of rice (the Japanese staple), as the place where “light-
skinned” (irojiro-no) women are born—a la “Komako,” the main (“geisha”) character of Kawa-
bata Yasunari’s aesthetic novel, Yukiguni.29 
 “When I came back from the South to Taiwan...,” the ramen shop owner, who had been 
taking a brief nap in his seat, joins the conversation. He is now remembering his 1945 repatria-
tion to Japan. “When I came back to Taiwan, Taiwanese women looked so pretty (kirei). And 
then, when I finally came back all the way to Japan, Japanese women were so much prettier.” 
 “After that kind of life [in the jungle], any women looked pretty to me.” 
 “According to me, the best chicks are in Kyūshū [Island in Japan]. They’ll totally serve 
(tsukusu) you.” 
 “Ah, Kyūshū women. I heard they’d dry their laundry in the lower rack than their men’s.” 
 Now, they are talking about their experiences in brothels (yūkaku) in prewar Japan, where, 
according to them, “no man would dislike to go” (soko ni iku no ga kirai na hito nante inai).  
 Unlike the previous conversations on the pedometer, gambling, or the late wife, which 
randomly succeed each other in a temporal row, the current conversations on fruits and women 
semantically associate each other at the spatial level. It is spatial, since the associative relation 
among either fruits or women refers to a stretch of the socio-culturally institutionalized syno-
nyms. This is how metaphoricity works, which is comparable to the contiguous movements be-
tween metonyms. Metaphoricity is to metonymy what Saussure’s paradigm is to his syntagms. 
According to him, “[t]he syntagmatic relation is in presentia. It is based on two or more terms 
that occur in an effective series. Against this, the associative relation unites terms in absentia in a 
                                                                  
29  Kawabata, Yukiguni (Tokyo: Shinchō-sha, 1957). 
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potential mnemonic series.”30 The syntagm is observed in an actual discourse in which each term 
is arbitrarily selected in the constraint of the discourse’s linear nature. If one looks at each indi-
vidual term thus selected, the term is accompanied by a invisible cluster of related terms, the 
terms that are related to the selected term via the analogy of sound, meaning, or grammatical 
function⎯this cluster makes a paradigm. As Silverman stresses, it is in the combination between 
the selection from the same kind and each selection’s juxtaposition with others, that is, between 
the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, between the metaphoric systematicity and metonym-
ic flow, which signification occurs; and the speaking subject is born.31 Neither term in any one of 
these binary combinations is able to signify or subjectify if it is left alone.  
 Let us go back to the Yasukuni veterans’ conversations on fruits and women. These con-
versations are comparable to these veterans’ syntagmatic displacement of the pedometer, drink-
ing, gambling, and so forth, which seems to be compelled by fear, as well as pleasure, the seem-
ingly cursory selection of each term without so much heed. The paradigmatic association of 
fruits and women seems to differ from this mechanism, due to the dominance of pleasure. By 
naming each individual item in the paradigm of fruits⎯grapes, bananas, mangoes, mangostines, 
durian fruits, and then the paradigm of women⎯Taiwanese, “southern,” Kyūshūan, Niigatans, 
these veterans even look to be playing a certain kind of game, the game to reveal and exhaust 
these ordinarily hidden paradigms. The pleasure is presumed to lie in the act of differentiation, 
whose minuteness might then refer the player to the idea of abundance, the richness of a given 
paradigm. The game that they might thus play seems to unintentionally replicate the theoretical 
                                                                  
30  Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with 
Albert Riedlinger, trans., with an intro. and notes by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1966); p.123; 
italics original. 
31  See Silverman, Ibid.; p.81. Though, here, Silverman is talking about the combination between Freud’s 




game of structuralists. According to the rule that Lévi-Strauss sets, the theorist player is sup-
posed to log all the versions of a myth that there are, in order to see the myth’s meaning (“struc-
ture”) and its historical growth.32 An anthropologist would point to Franz Boas’s similar efforts, 
which were dedicated to clarify the historical pattern of a cultural item’s regional diffusion.33 But 
of course there is a difference. If these scholars’ cataloguing endeavors were motivated by their 
respective theoretical interests, as well as the sense of urgency that native Americans and others 
that they studied were being extinguished as socio-cultural groups, there is some impression of 
wastefulness in the Yasukuni veterans’ conversations. Perhaps this impression is caused by the 
fact that those other Asian and Pacific women who were raped, enslaved, murdered, and other-
wise victimized by the prewar Japanese male civilians and soldiers are dying every day, with 
their unmet demands that the perpetrators admit and apologize for their crimes. These victims’ 
traces become more faint and illegible in history, the more these veterans “remember” and nar-
rate; in the cases of Lévi-Strauss and Boas, their natives are meant to become more “alive” and 
legible in their texts, the more these scholars research and record.  
 In this regard, it is interesting that the waste is manifoldly accumulated in the Yasukuni 
conversations; that is, the Real of the conversations (the Japanese crimes against women) is pro-
tected by multi-layers of displacement. First, there is the overall act of rendition of the Real to 
the supposedly totally agreeable, conversational topics of fantastic women and exotic fruits. As a 
result of this rendition, the victims are coated with the aromatic juice of tropical fruits to be 
“friendly” and “gentle”; or they are screened by snow curtains of northern Japan to be “serving” 
and “pretty.” Certain, ongoing sexism must be working in order for these sexually-rendered, fan-
                                                                  
32  Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire Jacobson and Brooke G. Schoepf (New York and 
London: Basic Books, 1963); pp.216-7.  
33  Boas, Kwakiutl Ethnography, ed. by Helen Codere (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).  
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tastic women to be the everyday conversational objects.34 Second, when one looks at the relation 
between these two clusters of the symptomatic metaphors, viz. women and fruits, one will notice 
that the women do not enter the conversations before the cluster of fruits is conversationally ex-
hausted. Collectively, the fruit metaphors function at the meta-level (“meta-metaphor”), so that 
they metaphorize another collectivity of the female metaphors. The strong, olfactory and gustato-
ry senses that are attached to fruits are introduced first to base the tactility of the female meta-
phors, in the economy in which the more vivid the metaphor is, the more likely the interpreter 
becomes fetishistic about the metaphor and thus becomes distanced from the signified. The result 
is the wasted pile of the metaphor-ornaments, innocently aesthetic-looking without any political 
or ethical meaning whatsoever.  
 Recall the silence in the middle of the veterans’ metonymic conversations earli-
er⎯probably that is the hidden dynamo of the conversations, or more precisely, the fear of the 
silence is, while metaphoric conversations, at least in Yasukuni, might get going around the 
sheer charm of the metaphors, or around the speakers’ attraction to that charm. The force of the 
metaphors is such that the veterans are completely forgetful about my existence. Though graphic 
expressions are lacking in their conversations, their comparative study of those women is shot 
through with strong yearning and honest criticism that are usually kept from being expressed in 
the presence of a woman. I think the reason that they never mention the Real is not my presence, 
neither as a female nor as an outsider. These veterans are attracted without remembering that the-
se metaphors are the products of their own denial of the truths. As soon as they are enunciated as 
an unconsciously-spread screen of protective smoke, the 2-D images of the female metaphors 
                                                                  
34  According to Anne Allison’s ethnographic observation, the “hostess club” women in contemporary Japan 
acquire this type of objectified position vis-à-vis the male corporate workers on their way home, casually trying to 
bond with each other as the subjects⎯an important aspect of the everyday, which accrues no stigma on the part of 
the males. See her Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club (University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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seem to gain their own lives, flying across time and space to associate themselves with the gei-
sha ideal of Kawabata’s Komako or with the vulgar icons in the contemporary tabloid. Here, I 
am not suggesting that only metaphors should be discussed in the larger context of commodifica-
tion, its power to abstract and differentiate, and the enchanted individual’s subjectification 
through awe and pleasure. Again, metonymy in contemporary Japan is the literary mode of the 
newspaper and tabloid, the agents and products of mass-reproduction. The veterans’ metaphoric 
talks of the women merely reveal the ordinarily overlooked foundation of the tabloid metonymy, 
which are the ever-proliferating variations of the masses. Only by being grounded on this foun-
dation, each piece of news in the tabloid can become the slightly different replication of its 
equivalent from the previous day⎯the column that is occupied by a woman in a green bathing 
suit today likely featured another with a red bikini yesterday. The tabloid never exhausts women 
to feature, as long as it taps the inexhaustible pool of female masses with different clothing and 
hairdos, who are, nonetheless, uniformly made to self-commoditize. The female masses’ mode of 
self-commodification would be different, were it not for the desiring male agency, and more his-
torically specifically to postwar Japan, were it not for the former imperial soldiers’ and their de-
scendants’ unconscious wishes to forget their past crimes against women. The tabloid women 
and the Yasukuni women in the veterans’ conversations are of course pretty, and enigmatically 
so, due to the dual kinds of forgetfulness among these men.  
 At the nexus between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic alignment of commodities, espe-
cially female commodities, fascism probably arises as a way of consuming these commodities. In 
the age of mechanical reproduction, consumption is always in danger of turning into excess. 
Since, in such an age, things have historically started to submit themselves to the subject of con-
sumption in the expendable, easily and massively consumable forms. In its turn, the subject is 
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able to expend, that is, thoughtlessly devour, the massive amount of the objects until the act of 
consumption itself becomes meaningless, only since the subject’s senses have accordingly been 
modified to form and accommodate the mass-tastes. The numb subject of mechanical reproduc-
tion is thus fully subjectified by commodity logic to be able to forever enjoy mass-reproduced 
objects as such. This subjectified condition is comparable to what George Bataille calls the “sov-
ereignty” of the expending subject.35 The Bataillean subject is rather the Subject of the “unpro-
ductive glory” of consumption or its post- or ex-reason.36 Think about the Kwakiutl potlatch that 
Bataille discusses, in which rival chiefs literally expend a precious copper shield after another, 
tearing, burning, throwing them to show the chiefs’ excessive generosity, unperturbed pride, and 
masculine bravado. In this discussion of sovereign expenditure, Bataille is surely developing a 
potent critique of the production-oriented modern capitalism and its subjectified producers. 
Again, un-sovereign expenditure, as Bataille might have in his mind as an antithesis of his dis-
cussion, is practiced as the everyday violence of mass-consumption⎯endless intakes of the tab-
loid images, hours and hours in front of the TV, accumulated baubles from penny stores, which 
do not accompany any sense of sovereignty at all. When one thinks of fascism, though, Bataille’s 
criticism of these modern capitalist formations becomes negatively illuminating. In the previous 
chapter, I have argued that an aspect of fascism is explained by focusing on the desire to estab-
lish sovereignty in the otherwise completely automatic everyday, as was shown in the concept of 
the aryan Subject of the Holocaust and other mass murders. From this viewpoint, the way in 
which Bataille develops his criticism seems to be dangerously double-edged⎯its critique of 
modern capitalism might be uncritically participating in the problem of fascism. But if one uses 
it carefully, Bataille’s oscillation would become a useful instrument to see how the desires of 
                                                                  
35  Bataille, “Sovereignty” in his The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy, Vol. 2 and 3, trans. by 
Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1999(1976)); pp.193-361. 
36  Bataille, Ibid.; p.29. 
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sovereign expenditures are generated in a modern capitalist society. And I argue that such desires 
are unevenly distributed in the society along the class, as well as gender, lines.37 
 The petty bourgeoisie and lumpen proletariat might be particularly conditioned for the 
desires of fascist expenditure, to the extent that their humble existence might be characterized by 
deprivation, seduction, and excess of consumption. They might find the possibility of expendi-
ture tempting and even emancipating. In contrast, the proletariat are perhaps too close to the line 
of mass-reproduction to be completely drawn to consumerist fantasies to begin with. As for the 
bourgeoisie, the class joins the petty bourgeoisie in their excessive consumption, yet its figure in 
this sphere is always female. The first difference that this might make is the object of the bour-
geois consumption. When the petty bourgeois habit of emancipatory expenditure and ability to 
feel grotesque joy in the expenditure take the object of commoditized females, the feminized fig-
ure of the bourgeois consumers tend toward self-consumption—bulimia, anorexia, or “binge” 
shopping.38 The violence of their expenditure here targets the commoditized body of the self; 
infinite self-reflexivity is the mode of the bourgeois consumer’s consciousness. Second, even 
though suicidal patterns of consumption might also characterize the petty bourgeoisie (e.g. the 
                                                                  
37  A similar double-edge of Bataille can be seen in his idea of community. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading, 
Bataille tries to come up with the way to move toward the true community of singularities; or Bataille is concerned 
with that movement itself. The Bataillean concepts of the sacred and the sovereign are thus anti-nostalgic, according 
to Nancy. “In this sense,” in Nancy’s word, “Bataille is without doubt the one who experienced first or most acutely, 
the modern experience of community as neither a work to be produced, nor a lost communion, but rather as space 
itself, and the spacing of the experience of the outside, of the outside-of-self.” See Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community, ed. by Peter Connor, trans. by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney, 
forward by Christopher Fynsk (Minneapolis and Oxford; University of Minnesota Press, 1991); p.19. If I rephrase 
my critique of Bataille in Nancy’s term, then I am simply asking the meaning of assuming the Romantic (that is, 
impossible) “space” outside modern capitalism without reflecting on modern capitalism as a temporal regime. 
Similarly to Bataille, Roger Caillois considers modern warfare in terms of the sacred, joy, and regeneration, without 
the view of commodification. See his Man and the Sacred, trans. by Meyer Barash (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1980(1959)). Contemporary Bataillean reflection on fascism and Nazism can be found in Dominique LaCapra, 
Representing the Holocaust History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and History and 
Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Saul Friedlander, Reflections of 
Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death, trans. by Thomas Weyr (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993(1983)). 
38  See Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993). Murakami Haruki depicts fictional addiction to clothes-shopping in his “Tony Takitani,” 
Lexington no Yūrei (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1996), pp.121-159. 
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male friend of Misa, who would drink 5,000 yen-worth of spirit every night, perhaps disregard-
ing his income level), these patterns seem to accompany at least some traces of the subject. As 
compared to their delayed sense of masculinity, through which the predatory Subject of the petty 
bourgeois consumers might be retroactively erected (e.g. the drinking Subject of the spirit 
shōchū a la hardboiled Philip Marlowe in Raymond Chandler), the bourgeoisie might appear to 
be more “advanced” in the sense that their consumption seems to be more automatic. While the 
veterans’ favorite pastime, gambling, can help the Subject be lost in the act of repetition itself, 
the loss of the Subject might be better facilitated when one is equipped with more means than 
underprivileged cases.39 Hence, the petty bourgeoisie awaits the moment of institutionalization, 
perhaps, when their hitherto financially restricted desires for automatic and eternal expenditure 
can be finally fulfilled at reasonable costs through officially fascist programs (e.g. the prewar 
Japanese institutionalization of colonial sex-slaves). 
 Let us introduce a psychoanalytic perspective once again, from which I would like to re-
consider the prominence of the commoditized objects of consumption in the veterans’ conversa-
tions. In addition to women, the conversations feature fruits, seafood, the jungle diet and dieting 
with the pedometer, making me suspicious that these veterans might suffer from melancholia. 
According to Freud, melancholia is pertaining to the loss of an ideal or loved object, in which the 
                                                                  
39  “Where would one find a more evident contrast than the one between work and gambling?” Walter 
Benjamin asks⎯here, he is talking about the “work of the unskilled” in an effort to see the key to the mechanical 
reproductive kind of labor. “The latter [the unskilled work in the factory], to be sure, lacks any touch of adventure, 
of the mirage that lures the gambler. But it certainly does not lack the futility, the emptiness, the inability to 
complete something which is inherent in the activity of a wage slave in a factory. Gambling even contains the 
workman’s gesture that is produced by the automatic operation, for there can be no game without the quick 
movement of the hand by which the stake is put down or a card is picked up. The jolt in the movement of a machine 
is like the so-called coup in a game of chance. The manipulation of the worker at the machine has no connection 
with the preceding operation for the very reason that it is its exact repetition. Since each operation at the machine is 
just as screened off from the preceding operation as a coup in a game of chance is from the one that preceded it, the 
drudgery of the laborer is, in its own way, a counterpart to the drudgery of the gambler. The work of both is equally 
devoid of substance.” See his “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” ed. and with an intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by 




patient is characterized by his/her unconsciousness of the loss itself.40 Freud observes that one of 
the melancholic symptoms is extreme orality. The patient tends to enter a voluble series of exag-
gerated accusations of the self; or s/he might refuse food or drink in the feigned mourning of the 
loss. Freud says this is because the patient is still at the oral stage of his/her psycho-sexual devel-
opment.41 From this standpoint, the patient’s self-accusation, or even suicide in extreme cases, is 
understandable, since the oral stage is the stage of narcissism. The narcissistic ego could merely 
incorporate (“cannibalize”) the object as part of the ego and not as other than the ego.42 Upon the 
object’s loss, the self-accusing subject is actually accusing the lost object incorporated inside the 
subject. Ultimately, melancholia as the amnesia of loss is explainable by this “life” of the object 
in the self; in the psychological reality of the self, the object has not been lost yet. 
 Earlier, I have introduced the concept of the uncanny, which is an emotional quality that 
is generally observable when the repressed returns to consciousness. Similarly, I have argued 
that the metonymic and metaphoric movements that the Yasukuni veterans and the country’s 
newspapers discursively make are at least partially explainable in terms of what is repressed by 
such movements⎯the past Japanese crimes against women. I hope the current discussion of 
melancholia gives more specificity to these repressive formations. Again, according to Freud’s 
argument, the melancholic does not avoid the lost object per se; s/he pathologically omits the 
memories of the transformations that this object went through⎯losses, damages, or defamations. 
The object in the patient’s mind remains to be the hateful or lovable ideal. It is remarkable that 
                                                                  
40  Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” in Philip Reiff ed. General Psychological Theory: Papers on 
Metapsychology (New York: Touchstone, 1963), pp.164-179.  
41  In Freud’s teleological trajectory through which one is supposed to develop from a child to an adult, the 
oral stage comes after the very first stage of “organ pleasure,” which features the subject’s auto-eroticism. The 
narcissist incorporation, the devouring of the object, is then succeeded by the “sadistic-anal” mastery of the object. 
The full maturity of the subject is the complete social situation of genital love, according to the Freudian perspective. 
See his “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” in Philip Rieff ed., General Psychological Theory: Papers on 
Metapsychology (New York: Touchstone, 1997(1963)), pp.83-103; p.102. 
42  Freud, “Mourning…,” Ibid.; p.171. 
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the un-lost ideal of femininity indeed describes a dimension of the Yasukuni veterans’ fantasy 
women. To begin with, the other female victims of the prewar Japanese violence were institu-
tionally incorporated in the Japanese empire not as heterogeneous others with their own political 
interests and ethical rights but as convenient companions of the Japanese acts of invasion. “Com-
fort women” (ianfu), the Japanese called the enslaved ones, an amazing level of narcissism. In 
this calling, I sense that love and consideration were pretended⎯the fantasized traits of deferring 
femininity, perhaps supposedly in awe of the masculine prowess of the invasion. In my faint 
memories, the fantasy of the comfort women was one of the pornographic themes in Japan until 
pretty recently, perhaps up until a South Korean ex-slave, Haksoon Kim, belatedly made public 
testimony in 1990 for the first time among other similarly victimized women. Even before this 
testimony, the way in which the prewar Japanese males had established their masculinized Sub-
jects had long been officially denied since Japan’s defeat in 1945. After these multiple waves of 
denial, the comforting images of other women disclosed in the Yasukuni Shrine today are strictly 
melancholic. According to this insight, the orality of the Yasukuni conversations work to make 
the loss of the feminized object palatable, by letting the veterans symbolically “swallow” the loss 
in the form of fruits, seafood, or drinks. Without the meaning of true mourning, though, this act 
of swallowing is actually de-symbolized; swallowing here is not functioning as a figure of ac-
cepting the facts of loss and of the subsequent transformation of the self. Therefore, the veterans 
are fascinated, creating the imaginary taste of the banana trunk’s core on the tongue, forgetting 
about tasting the bitterness of the loss. The veterans might briefly consider the feeling of the ba-
nana tree owner, insofar as the consideration does not become excessive. When it comes to other 
Asian women they encountered during the war, these women are apparently forever to live in 
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these veterans’ minds as the desirable objects; these women’s scars and deaths that should have 
ended the veterans’ narcissistic dreams do not seem to have ever been recognized by the veterans.  
 Note here that these veterans’ melancholia is attributable also to the larger society. Freud 
briefly mentions that successful mourning is a semiotic process through which the subject is to 
understand the life-transforming meaning of the loss to the subject (see Chapter 5).43 The psy-
choanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok elaborate on this linguistic and social nature of 
mourning, referring to another analyst, Sandor Ferenczi. According to Abraham and Torok’s 
reading of Ferenczi, the process of mourning, or introjection in Ferenczi’s terminology, cannot 
dispense with the subject’s transferential love of another object than the one that is lost, e.g. the 
sympathetic analyst, family members, and so forth. Through the encouraging interaction with the 
new object of love, the subject’s “early satisfactions of the mouth, as yet filled with the maternal 
object, are partially and gradually replaced by the novel satisfactions of a mouth now empty of 
that object but filled with words pertaining to the subject.”44 Here, Ferenczi via Abraham and 
Torok is talking about the original loss of the mother’s breasts and the acquisition of language as 
the symbolic substitute for the breasts. “So,” Abraham and Torok continues, “the wants of the 
original oral vacancy are remedied by being turned into verbal relationships with the speaking 
community at large. Introjecting a desire, a pain, a situation means channeling them through lan-
guage into a communion of empty mouths.”45 One can say that it is the “communion of empty 
mouths” that has lacked in the post-1945 Japanese society. In a sense, the whole society has been 
melancholic, fantasizing that Japanese do not have to mourn and introject the war, fascism, and 
their losses. Or, people have unconsciously tried to forget about these losses in the manic mo-
                                                                  
43  Freud, “Mourning…,” Ibid.; p.165-6. 
44  Abraham and Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, Volume I, ed., trans., and with an intro. by Nicholas T. Rand 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); p.127. 
45  Abraham and Torok, Ibid.; p.128. 
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mentums for economic activities. A certain, corporeal kind of symbiosis with the fascist symbols 
and ideas has thus continued to be unconsciously imagined. In such an environment, the veterans’ 
chance to be able to find in the society helpful inspirations, supports, or discussions regarding 
how to talk about the losses as losses is critically deprived. The leftist activists that I will consid-
er in Chapter 5 are exceptional mourners. In a totally different sense from these activists’ case, 
the Yasukuni veterans are presumed to be uncanny to the rest of the society, perhaps to the de-
gree that these petty bourgeois veterans have been historically spared from the manic aspirations 
for high-growth production. While the bourgeois could at least temporarily sublimate the Real of 
their melancholia (the denigrated ideals of fascism in the invasive war) into the economic ac-
complishments, the slow tempo of the petty bourgeois lives might allow the class members to 
develop another symptom out of the same melancholia⎯the repeated representations of and ver-
bose elaboration on the lost ideals. The petty bourgeoisie, in other words, has had the time and 
“freedom” to dwell on the past. To the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeois representations are un-
canny, since these representations are connected to the repressed source of the bourgeois mania, 
viz. the denigration of the ideals. It is relevant to consider a point of difference between Freud 
and Abraham and Torok here. On the one hand, Freud argues that melancholia occurs in the 
realm of unconsciousness, as in the Japanese bourgeois case. On the other hand, Abraham and 
Torok think that the pathology concerns itself with what they call the “preconscious-conscious 
system,” whereby various representations of the Real are supposed to be first set apart from the 
rest of the psyche and then included in preconsciousness/consciousness⎯like an alien ulcer, a 
secretive addendum.46 What I am suggesting here is that the theorists’ difference be seen as su-
                                                                  
46  Abraham and Torok, Ibid.; p.135. According to them, melancholia, especially when it has something to do 
with the ego’s ideal, should not be repressed in unconsciousness to be subjected to the dynamism between 
unconsciousness and consciousness, between repression and the return of the repressed. The deep disillusionment 
and, in many cases, unspeakable shame, that the subject received from the object should cause the related libido to 
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perimposing the class difference in the Japanese case, viz. the relative difference between the 
petty bourgeois visibility and bourgeois invisibility in light of their symptomatic representation 
of the war and fascism. In either case, the Japanese have suffered from ill mourning⎯even if the 
petty bourgeois veterans turned to the society for support, they would not be able to gain it from 
those who are themselves in need of support.  
 When the past Japanese violence is thus repressed or at least preserved without being 
worked through in both the bourgeois and petty bourgeois instances, the repressive or preserva-
tive language of melancholia gains quite the power of attraction and repulsion. According to 
Walter Benjamin, melancholy is related to Saturn in the Arabic astrology, indicating long jour-
neys, as well as dialectic polarity. According to Benjamin’s reading of a relevant text, “Saturn 
which ‘as the highest planet and the one farthest from everyday life, the originator of all deep 
contemplation, calls the soul from externalities to the inner world, causes it to rise ever higher, 
finally endowing it with the utmost knowledge and with the gift of prophecy.’”47 Evocative, per-
haps, if the passage is read in terms of the utmost knowledge of the historical facts that have yet 
been consciously admitted by the melancholic Japanese of the postwar. Exploring the motifs of 
distance and mystery some more, Benjamin describes melancholia also as “the concept of the 
pathological state, in which the most simple object appears to be a symbol of some enigmatic 
wisdom because it lacks any natural, creative relationship to us.”48 The object’s “natural, creative 
relationship” to the subject is thought to lack in melancholia, due to the unconscious act of re-
pression in Freud’s case and the preconscious act of preservation in Abraham and Torok’s inter-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
“hide, wall in, and encrypt the wound.” “Furthermore,” they continue, “we posit that this activity does not occur in 
the unconscious, but in the system where the wound itself is located, namely in the preconscious-conscious 
system… We propose to call this supplemental topography inclusion and one of us has earlier called its effect 
preservative repression. The derivatives of the fantasy of incorporation are related to the secret life of inclusion 
topography” (p.135; italics original). 
47  Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. by John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977(1928)); 
p.149. 
48  Benjamin, Ibid.; p.140. 
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pretation. Although he is not taking the purely psychoanalytic approach, Benjamin can be read 
psychoanalytically, as he continues that melancholia is the “state of mind in which feeling re-
vives the empty world in the form of a mask, and derives an enigmatic satisfaction in contemplat-
ing it.”49 To borrow the theory of commodity fetishism once more, it is the perpetrator Japanese 
who unconsciously or preconsciously “mask[ed]” their violent past with oral metaphors and mel-
ancholic atmosphere. The enigmatic satisfaction with the mask’s surface enhances even more, 
the more the Japanese are generationally distanced from the chance to recognize and introject 
what actually happened in the past. Before the discussion of the generation, however, I would 
like to think about the class structure of the postwar melancholic formation in Japan some more.  
 
Historical Creation of the Petty Bourgeois Class 
 The Japanese petty bourgeoisie, as well as farmers and lumpen proletariat, have been in a 
position to more easily develop postwar melancholia than any other populations in the country, 
to the degree that they formed the major constituency of prewar fascism. Consisted of retailers, 
carpenters, plumbers, monks, petty bureaucrats, gardeners and others, the petty bourgeois class 
tends to “[view] the production of commodities as the absolute summit of human freedom and 
individual independence,” according to Marx.50 No doubt this petty-bourgeois view about their 
own production is created by the kinds of productive means that the class members possess, viz. 
dexterity, talents, religiosity, and others that might appear to be inalienable resources of humani-
ty. With these resources at hand, the petty bourgeoisie tends to enjoy autonomous business-bases 
and idiosyncratic rhythms of working. In the post-1920s world, this being of the petty bourgeoi-
sie makes a point of difference. An Italian historian, Luigi Salvatorelli, for instance, said in 1923 
                                                                  
49  Benjamin, Ibid.; p.139; emphasis is mine. 
50  Marx, “The Commodity” in his Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1. intro. Ernest Mandel, 
trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp.125-177; p.161; Note 26. 
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that the petty bourgeoisie was “not a real social class, with its own functions and its own forces, 
but a conglomeration, lying outside the productive process essential to the capitalist civiliza-
tion.”51 I surmise that the relative independence of each of the class members made in the histo-
rian’s mind the impression of the “conglomerate” class and the class’s reliance on humanity and 
originality made the impression of a difference. In the age of mechanical reproduction and mo-
nopoly economy, the petty bourgeois difference is of a temporal nature⎯a delay. Of course, I am 
not imagining an epoch prior to modern capitalism, to which the petty bourgeoisie should belong. 
Their delay is that within the regime of modern capitalism⎯what they produce (e.g. crafts, ser-
mons, plumbing services) are commodities after all. In fact, the petty bourgeoisie tends to show 
remarkable mass-character. Perhaps due to its delay in its production means, this class-group 
might be more motivated to be “like others,” as compared to, say, the bourgeoisie, who would 
stop wearing the hitherto trend-setting clothing or accessories, as soon as the petty bourgeoisie 
starts copying them with lesser materials. Desires for equivalence, in addition to material delay, 
thus feature the petty bourgeois class. Marx suggests that these features could ideologically result 
in the Proudhon-type of “scientific,” i.e. unrealistic, socialism. Of many arguments that Prou-
dhon makes, Marx points out that Proudhon wishes “that the inconveniences resulting from the 
impossibility of exchanging commodities directly, which are inherent in this form, should be re-
moved.”52 The idea of direct exchange without money represents at once the nostalgia of a hand-
icraft-bartering community in some past and the fantasy of an immediately exchangeable com-
modities without any medium, i.e. commodity fetishism that has been more advanced in the 
mode of mechanical reproduction than in other modes. Barbaric futurism and mechanical my-
thology, the petty bourgeois radicalism of Proudhon seems to share similar desires and materiali-
                                                                  
51  In Renzo de Felice, Interpretations of Fascism, translated by Brenda Huff Everett (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977); p.315. 
52  See Marx, Ibid.; p.161.  
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ty with those that are exhibited by the petty bourgeois fascism in trans-war Japan.53 Perhaps this 
is the reason that the post-1920s state and other authorities in Japan were initially so careful not 
to let the masses be taken by socialism on the one hand and fascism on the other hand. Socialism 
has never been popular among the Japanese masses except for the immediate postwar period. 
Their affinity rather with fascism seems to show the extent to which they have historically been 
placed in a desperate position, the position in which they are determined to establish equivalence 
even or only in death.  
 The material delay that makes the petty bourgeoisie envy, longing, and oddly futuristic is 
of course not particularly essential to the petty bourgeois members as persons. The delayed char-
acteristics of naturalism, communitarianism, or spirituality, which these members as landscapers, 
priests, or ramen-shop owners likely possess are the historical products of the modern capitalist 
society at large. The historical task that is assigned to the petty bourgeois class is to produce the 
fantastic chronotopes of gardens, cathedrals, or pop and mom’s corner-stores and to insert them 
into the larger society that operates along the abstracted rhythm of the monopoly economy. It is a 
necessary task, since the totalitarianism of modernity has to bear desires for its deleted opposites. 
Although they are not outside but inside the modern regimes, the petty bourgeois existence even-
tually becomes fantastic in itself by professionally fulfilling modern desires. “Green thumb,” re-
ligiosity, morality, and other tools in trade, which are usually associated with the class, grow out 
of its fantasy-fulfilling occupational habits. With their special “talents” or “handiness” or “hu-
manity,” the petty bourgeoisie adds the surplus value to the commoditized fantasies of modernity, 
to which they are professionally assigned. 
                                                                  
53  Proudhon to Marx is the window to the petty bourgeois ideologies. More specifically, Proudhon is the 
representative of the “craftiness of petty-bourgeois socialism,” Marx remarks. See the section “The Process of 
Exchange” in Capital, Ibid., pp.178-187; p.181, Note 4. 
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 A more historically specific way to explain the postwar Japanese petty bourgeois delays 
would be to refer to what Deborah Milly calls “lumpy equality” of the society, that is, “inequali-
ties in earned income and benefits” among the country’s working population.54 According to her, 
the so-called “life-time employment,” generous salaries, good benefits, and other mythically fa-
vorable features for workers are observable only among big corporations. As of 1990, 50% of all  
firms in Japan have 1 to 29 employees, providing them with much worse salaries and working 
environments than those of big corporations.55 “This dual structure,” Milly argues, is “closely 
associated with conditions of underemployment and low productivity in the 1950s. Agriculture, 
small-scale production, a day labor absorbed the surplus labor force in rural areas until the de-
mand for labor began to increase in the late 1950s.”56 Put differently, the currently observable, 
lower stratum of the dual employment structure is a leftover from the 1950s, when the stratum 
functioned as the country’s “reserve army” of labor. This reserve army was created when the 
Japanese empire collapsed in 1945, discharging about 3 million Japanese soldiers and military 
personnel, in addition to 3 million civilians, who had resided outside the Japanese Archipelago. 
They accounted for approximately 10% of the then 70 million population of Japan.57 Repatriated, 
these Japanese (hikiage-sha) found that the domestic infrastructures and workplaces had literally 
burnt down to ashes due to the U.S. airstrikes. In rural villages or subsistent realms in cities, the 
repatriated or otherwise unemployed Japanese and resident Koreans rented out their rooms, if 
                                                                  
54  Deborah J. Milly, Poverty, Equality, and Growth: The Politics of Economic Need in Postwar Japan (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999); pp.7-8. 
55  Milly, Ibid.; p.9. 
56  Milly, Ibid.; p.8. 
57  About the repatriation of these Japanese, see Ryūichi Narita, “Hikiage ni kansuru Joshō” in Shisō, Vol.11, 
No.955 (2003), 149-174; see especially p.149 for the statistics that I cite. Also see Tanaka et. al., Ibid.; pp.101-2. 
  
144 
their houses had not been bombed, or manufactured trinkets for black markets—soap, candies, 
spirit, shoes, and the ilk.58 
 In Milly’s suggestion, the more or less informal stratum for the reserve army that was 
thus created in the 1950s might be traced back ultimately to the 1920s. In the series of recessions 
that eventually led to the Great Depression, the devastated farmers and peasants of rural Japan 
increased its supply of labor force to fledgling capitalism in cities on one hand, and expanded its 
reserve of potential workers in their villages on the other.59 It had been the state intention since 
the late 19th century that the agrarian sector of the country should be neglected and sacrificed for 
growths of the heavy and chemical industries (the policy of shokusan kōgyō). More generally, 
this type of neglect and sacrifice are necessary for capital’s accumulation and concentration. Ac-
cording to Marx, the theoretical origin of the reserve army is in the rate with which capital’s var-
iable component (labor) decreases over time, in contrast to capital’s constant component (e.g. 
machines), which relatively increases.60 The contradiction that the reserve army in general is fac-
ing is that “[t]he greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its 
growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productivity of 
its labour, the greater is the industrial reserve army.”61 For the Japanese economy to develop at 
that moment in history, people had to be gradually unemployed and reduced to the kind of pau-
perism that Marx describes in the 19th century British case. During the Asia-Pacific War, the 
Japanese problem of village unemployment was temporarily solved, since the surplus laborers 
were mobilized as soldiers and colonizers. As soon as they were repatriated, though, these sol-
diers were absorbed back into the village repositories of labor. In Yoshio Asai’s statistics, 48% 
                                                                  
58  Among various literary representations of the then (re-)emerging sectors of subsistent Japan, see a novelist, 
Shōhei Ōoka’s essay, “Shinkei-san” in Ōoka Shōhei Zenshū 3 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1994), pp.337-350, for 
instance. 
59  Milly, Ibid.; p.8. 
60  Marx, “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation,” Ibid., pp.762-870; p.782. 
61  Marx, Ibid.; p.798. 
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of the working Japanese in 1950 was working in the agrarian sector, while 20% of the whole 
population was estimated to be merely “incompletely” employed.62 30% of the whole households 
in the country in 1955 was below the poverty line, another study informs.63 This means that 
many of the underemployed stayed in their home villages, occasionally working as farm hands, 
day laborers, or itinerary workers, Asai surmises.64 
The picture that might arise from these studies would be the vast number of lumpen Jap-
anese, who originated in the impoverished villages of the 1920s, engaged in the war as the van-
guards, and ever after, constantly underemployed in and around the country’s agrarian and/or 
informal sectors. The class of the petty bourgeoisie has related with this population as a supply 
station of jobs and also as a social switchboard, in and out of which the lumpen could move from 
the informal section of the society to the social contacts as carpenters, gardeners, ramen-shop 
owners, so on and so forth. In Marx’s observation as well, “capital usually knows how to transfer 
these [people in the reserve army] from its own shoulders to those of the working class and the 
petty bourgeoisie.”65 No doubt the petty bourgeois class could serve as the reserve army’s tem-
porary job-station, due to the class’s independent business bases and embodied means of produc-
tion. In the “small batch production” (tashu shōryō seisan) that has started in the 1980s, the di-
versified consumption and short spans of the market-trends have been supported by this type of 
“flexibility” of the petty bourgeois labor.66 One of the most typical commodities of such a mode 
of production, vinyl and other faux “leather” shoes, for example, are known to be produced by 
                                                                  
62  Asai, “Gendai Shihon-shugi to Kōdo Seichō” in Rekishi-gaku Kenkyū Kai Nihon-shi Kenkyū-kai ed. 
Nihon-shi Kōza, Vol.10: Sengo Nihon Ron (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2005), pp.197-226; pp.201-2. 
63  Yumiko Wada and Mitsuhiko Kimura, “Sengo Nihon no Hinkon: Tei-Shōhi Setai no Keisoku” in Kikan: 
Shakai Hoshō Kenkyū, Vol.34 (Summer 1998). 
64  Asai, Ibid.; pp.200-1. 
65  Marx, Ibid.; p.797.  
66  About the small batch production in the country, see Marilyn Ivy, “Formations of Mass Culture in Postwar 




family-sized manufacturers in Kamata, downtown Tokyo, or Nada, Kōbe, or other petty bour-
geois towns.67 I am sure that as soon as a boom of certain styles of shoes is gone, some shoe-
makers reduce their production or go out of business, thus discharging their laborers into the 
country’s reserve army. A new boom of another type of shoes, then, will employ some laborers 
out of this reserve, thus maintaining the porousness of the class’s boundary. As the economy en-
ters the current phase of recession starting in 1990, one of the cliché ideas of the unemployed 
salarymen is that these middle-aged, ex-corporate workers become ramen venders on the street. 
The nostalgic images of shokunin or craftsman circulate in the mass media of this period, effec-
tively leading the population of “freeters,” i.e. those who are free of stable jobs, into another 
freedom of the petty bourgeois independent businesses. The delay from the everyday tempo that 
the reserve army is forced to sustain during their unemployment seem to give this population 
elective affinities with the petty bourgeois situations, either in the immediately postwar days or 
now. This genealogy of the interaction between the petty bourgeois class and the reserve army of 
labor is rhizomatous, hidden under the otherwise teleologically modernizing-looking history of 
the Japanese economy.68 In the rhizome, the reserve army has conserved and, when necessary, 
supplied its labor force for and to the economy via the petty bourgeois and proletarian classes. 
Harnessing the surplus and shortage of labor-demands through its institutionally imposed being 
                                                                  
67  Kobe manufacturers of those shoes were spotlighted as the victims of the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. For 
example, see Gavan McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, with a forward by Norma Field (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); p.13. 
68  Rhizome is the metaphor borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Introduction: Rhizome,” in 
their A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translation and foreword by Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); 3-25. The petty bourgeois rhizome in postwar Japan has been 
conventionally neglected by various reasons. Modernization theorists were perhaps blocked by the theory’s built-in 
inability to see delays and multiplicities—see for example, Ezra F. Vogel, Ibid. Sociologists similarly seem to have 
been determined not to see material contradictions and class conflicts in the society. Their focus on people’s 
consciousness, esp. the collective consciousness as mass-consumers, is almost symptomatic of the contradictions 
and conflicts that they try not to see. See Yasusuke Murakami, Shin Chūkan Taishū no Jidai (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron 
Sha, 1984). More recently, a popular author, Atsushi Miura, covers the neoliberal petty bourgeoisization of the 
society by the mass-cultural aesthetic of such a term as the consumers’ “strata” or kaisō⎯of course versus class. See 
his best-selling Karyū Shakai: Aratana Kaisō Shūdan no Shutsugen (Tokyo: Kōbun Sha, 2005). 
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of subsistence, the invisible reserve of extra labor-force has been of the structural importance to 
enrich the economy over the vicissitudes of the Great Depression, the Asia-Pacific War, or the 
current, neoliberal recession. 
 One of the most recently revealed tips of the reserve army-petty bourgeois rhizome 
would be those students, who gather in the Japan Youth Memorial Association at the Yasukuni 
Shrine. Facing the bearish labor-market, these petty bourgeois sons and daughters seem to suffer, 
perhaps partly since their parents’ independent businesses are not meant to bear many corporate 
connections. The students’ leader, Takuya Kanno’s father, for instance, is a local bureaucrat; 
“Shihori Naitō” and “Tōru Mita” are respectively a daughter and son of a suburban Hachiōji City 
grocery-store in Tokyo and a dry cleaner in an affluent ward of Tokyo, Setagaya. According to 
their explanation, one of the reasons that they have been active in the JYMA is their belief that 
the nationalist activities that they conduct there are favorably perceived by corporate recruiters. 
“Keita Sakamaki,” for instance, says that he has secured his “life-time employment” at Tokyo 
Electric Power Company by impressing the recruiter with his experiences of remains-recovery 
missions. Besides the nationalist tenets, I suspect the strict gender and seniority orders, for which 
the students are trained in the JYMA and Yasukuni Shrine, would be welcome by corporations.69 
Still, Sakamaki would be one of the few successful students among others. I know some of them 
have ended up in the rank and file level of the Self Defense Forces. Others have become an iza-
kaya tavern manager, a pachinko pin-ball parlor employee, a worker in a florist chain, or freeters. 
Perhaps it is due to their anxieties and ambitions that I am more amicably treated by the students 
than among other groups of Yasukuni participants, although with a cautious distance (no ex-
                                                                  
69  These orders, which are of course observed in the larger society, are strictly ruling rightist organizations. 
The JYMA almost caricaturizes these rules in its strictness, as its mainly male, core members have traditionally been 
recruited from the violent bands of notoriously nationalist colleges, Takushoku (meaning “implantation and 
development,” that is, colonialism) and Kokushikan (the “hall of national martial arts”). 
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change of numbers, etc.). It seems that my studying in the U.S. provides them with a certain im-
pression in the meritocratic context in which the English language is instrumentalized as one of 
the calibers with which to measure one’s mnemonic and other abilities, and thus one’s potentiali-
ty to find a job. 
 At the same time, the same petty bourgeois situation, which might work to these students’ 
detriment, seems to allow them to don a surrealistic aloofness. Tall, wan, and thin, Mita, the dry 
cleaner’s son, for instance, is almost aristocratic in his bored disdain of the world and serene gen-
tleness—the character that would be inexplicable if he were not supposed to inherit his father’s 
independent business. “Akira Ōishi,” to take another example, so far seems to be content with his 
two-year contract with the Health and Welfare Ministry. After he completes his contract as the 
“second-tiered” (ni kyū), that is, petty, officer exclusively in charge of the remains-recovery pro-
ject, he says he will return to Niigata Prefecture to inherit his parents’ part-time agriculture.70 
 The fantastic character of the petty bourgeoisie, which might be reflected by Mita’s false 
serenity or Ōishi’s temporary contentment, would not be shared by the farmers. Although they 
produce in the similarly fantastic realm of nature and soil, the farmers’ class, according to Max 
Weber, 
 
is so strongly tied to nature, so dependent on organic processes and natural events, 
and economically so little oriented to rational systematization that in general the 
peasantry will become a carrier of religion [and other modern ideologies] only 
when it is threatened by enslavement or proletarianization, either by domestic 
forces (financial or seigneurial) or by some external political power.71 
 
                                                                  
70  It seems that the position that Ōishi currently occupies in the ministry is reserved for the JYMA graduates. 
The state-project of remains-recovery is under the ministry's jurisdiction, which it keeps by providing one “first-
tiered (ikkyū)” officer and the former JYMA staff per mission. 
71  Weber, “Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion)” in Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology, Vol.1, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978), pp.399-634; p.468; parentheses original. 
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Weber argues that this is because the peasants operate on their own “primitive rationalism” or 
the “original, practical and calculating rationalism.”72 Mimetic practices are one example; magic 
or “coercion of the god” is another.73 “It [mimetic or magical behavior] follows rules of experi-
ence, though it is not necessarily action in accordance with a means-end schema,” he says.74 
Counter-intuitively then, the farmers and peasants are made to produce according to their kinds 
of pragmatism rather than socially held fantasies of the agrarian, according to Weber. 
 This does not mean that the farmers are outside the reach of fascist desires. According to 
Masao Maruyama, the prewar Japanese farmers and peasants were ideologically distinct for their 
“tint of ‘agrarian anachronism’” (nōhon mu-seifu shugi).75 As compared to the emperor-capped, 
family-state ideology of the official corporatism, the farmers’ anarchism, which is represented by 
Seikyō Gondō or Kōzabrō Tachibana, idealized a local agrarian unit, such as shashoku. Accord-
ing to the publisher Kadokawa’s “Japanese Dictionary,” sha in shashoku is the god of a given 
locality and shoku is the god of cereals. I suppose it is related to the Shintoist veneration of rice-
production that the dictionary also says shashoku could also mean the state⎯the state in Shinto 
is supposed to protect and promote the production of rice. Gondō explores these implications of 
shashoku and says, “shashoku means the content and substance of the composition in which each 
individual first feels the need to cohabit with others and then makes a village community [with 
them] and then a county, and then a city, and then a country.”76 In Maruyama’s interpretation, 
the “content and substance” of this array of differently-sized community units is agriculture.77 As 
each community should be a self-sustaining, agrarian base, the larger units, such as county and 
                                                                  
72  Weber, Ibid.; p.424. 
73  Weber, Ibid.; p.422. 
74  Weber, Ibid.; p.400. 
75  Maruyama, “Nihon Fascism no Shisō to Undō,” in his Gendai Seiji no Shisō to Kōdō (Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 
1965(1964)), pp.29-87; p.46. 
76  Maruyama, Ibid.; p.46; Shibata Toshio, “Zentai-shugi” in Kawahara Hiroshi et. al. eds, Nihon no Fascism 
(Tokyo: Yūhi Kaku, 1979), pp.190-208; p.199. 
77  Maruyama, Ibid.; p.46.  
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country, were imagined to be assembled “from below,” i.e. combining their smaller units.78 Since 
the purpose of the larger units were promotion and protection of the smaller units’ agrarian pro-
jects, the combinatorial movement within a shashoku country was supposed to go against the 
centralizing force of the state, Maruyama argues.79 The perverted sense of the farmer’s anar-
chism lets Gondō remark that “if the whole world is subsumed under the Japanese control, then 
the concept of the Japanese state would become unnecessary. Yet, one cannot remove the idea of 
shashoku,” that is, agriculture and agrarian village.80 The whole world would then become an 
assemblage of the mechanically replicated shashoku community without the state, if one follows 
this remark.   
 The communitarian model of fascism is contrasted to petty bourgeois fascism that I have 
portrayed, using the concept of expenditure; in the previous chapter, I have also called petty 
bourgeois fascism the “death communal” beliefs and practices. Unlike the pragmatic organicism 
of the farmers’ anarchism, the death community of the petty bourgeoisie starts from the industri-
al mechanicity of the reified “masses.” The masses are totally displaced from the land, and due to 
their displacement, each individual one of them is able to connect directly to others as the same, 
displaced commodities. The organicist fantasies of the emperor and other autonomous Subjects 
                                                                  
78  Maruyama, Ibid.; p.46. 
79  Maruyama, Ibid.; 46. Seiyata Yumino, a student of Kōzaburō Tachibana’s private school (juku), Aikyō 
(Love of the Home Village), also spells out farmers’ fascism as follows. According to him, first, each individual 
should “strive to be a better, great, and independent human being. Individuals [then] should forgive and cooperate 
with each other. [But] in order for this goal [mutual forgiveness and cooperation], one should first live that kind of 
life [forgiving and cooperative life] himself [as an individual]. Then [after mutual forgiveness and cooperation], 
individuals should believe that, if people in the whole world have similar minds to theirs and lead their kind of life, 
peace for the whole humanity will be brought about./ This is the reason that we do not acknowledge class struggle. 
We should make sure that we walk in the path that leads to peace among the whole humanity through the process in 
which everybody self-disciplines and individuals become great./ We hope the state politics and social institutions to 
be better, yet they are not perfect after all. If individuals that base them are bad, then any kind of politics or 
institutions won't be good really./ If you hope the better politics, better institutions, welfare of the nation, and 
welfare of the whole humanity, then, as the first step, struggle to be a good citizen...” In Tetsunari Matsuzawa, 
Tachibana Kōzaburō: Nihon Fascism Genshi Kaiki Ron Ha (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1972); p.100. The fascist part 
of the quote is perhaps Yumino’s rivalry with the idea of class struggle and his ironic conceptualization of the 
“whole humanity” to be constructed with “similar minds” of people—the picture here (possibly unintentionally) 
approximates that of a mechanical reproductive utopia. 
80  Maruyama, Ibid.; p.46.  
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are belated adds-on that the petty bourgeoisie makes to this desolate assemblage of inorganic 
commodities; thus a version of postwar fascism could comfortably be the emperor’s infant ideol-
ogy without the emperor, as I have so termed in the last chapter. The petty bourgeoisie is pre-
pared for fascist anachronism, as the class is socio-culturally made to return to, versus stay in, 
the concept of the organic. 
 As for the bourgeoisie, first, they enter history as the consumers of the “delayed” ideolo-
gies that the petty bourgeoisie produces—the nation, masculinity, or nature, through such prod-
ucts as ramen, bodyguard-services, gardens, etc. The surplus-value that the bourgeoisie could 
and does add in this process is more desires, more elaborate fantasies, until or beyond the point 
where the bourgeois acquisitiveness becomes excessive and violent. Different from the pragmat-
ic farmers and the financially restricted proletariat, the bourgeoisie as the consumers have certain 
understanding of and resources for the fantasies that the petty bourgeoisie creates. 
 Similarly, as producers, the bourgeoisie unconsciously assume the ideologies of the na-
tion, gender, nature, and others that the petty bourgeoisie provides. Computer programs, news-
paper articles, or medical services, which the bourgeoisie produces, would be unimaginable out-
side these ideological frameworks that they have already consumed. For sure, in the understand-
ing of the young Marx, which is inherited by vulgar Marxists, the bourgeoisie and elites single-
handedly produce ideologies as their labor-divided occupation, while the petty bourgeoisie, the 
proletariat, the farmers and others specialize in internalizing the bourgeois ideologies.81 However, 
when one concurs with the mature Marx that ideologies are primarily required in production as 
the unconsciousness of commodity fetishism and are then articulated in discussion as the con-
scious afterthoughts or scientific interpretations, the simplistic view of labor division between 
                                                                  
81  Marx, “The German Ideology, Part I.” in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Edition (New 
York and London: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp.146-200. 
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the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, as between intellectual and manual laborers, looks unten-
able.82 Rather, these classes’ relation seems to develop within the semiotic chain that has no be-
ginning or ending.83 In the chain, the bourgeoisie produces the second-level discourses, based on 
those which the petty bourgeois ideologues have created and relayed to the bourgeoisie. The 
more one climbs up the class ladder toward the grand bourgeoisie, the more the second level ide-
ology or what Roland Barthes calls “myth” tends to work to corporatistically or otherwise organ-
ize, versus sympathetically pursue, the fascist discourses that the petty bourgeoisie creates.84 The 
Yasukuni “commander” and sensei would be good examples of the way in which the grand 
bourgeoisie typically participates in fascist production. Probably it is the nature of its meta-level 
participation, which makes the bourgeoisie and grand bourgeoisie less observable in the process 
of producing the actual fascist spaces like Yasukuni. 
The class of the petty bourgeoisie, meanwhile, is not unitary. In the conglomerate class, 
as Luigi Salvatorelli calls, law-enforcement officers or petty bureaucrats, for instance, would not 
share the same experiences with independent business owners. Depending on where one is locat-
ed in the scale from stable employment to subsistence, the petty bourgeois subject might or 
might not be characterized by autonomy, inventiveness, nature, and others. Ideologically, some 
members of the class, most notably gardeners, might be more sympathetic with the farmers’ type 
of anarchism instead of the death communal ideology, as compared to other petty bourgeois 
                                                                  
82  Marx, “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” Capital, Ibid.; pp.163-77. 
83  According to Charles Sanders Peirce, sign is “Anything which determines something else (its interpretant) 
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so on ad infinitum.” See Peirce on Signs: Writing on semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. By James Hoopes 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991); p.239; parentheses and emphases original. 
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existed before it: it is a second-order semiological system. That which is a sign (namely the associative total of a 
concept and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second.” The “sign in the first system” is 
otherwise called the “language-object, because it is the language which myth gets hold of in order to build its own 
system.” Myth, in other words, is metalanguage. See his “Myth Today” in Mythologies, selected and trans. from the 




members. As I have analyzed in Chapter 1, a self-employed industrialist, Kakunosuke Akiyama, 
unintentionally advocates for the death communal ideology. I am sure that there should be num-
bers of other axes that materially and ideologically crisscross the class. These axes incise the idea 
of the class into the fragments of economic interests and ideological positions. These fragments 
are so heterogeneous that no unitary Subject can represent the class as a whole. Salvatorelli’s 
idea of aggregation is probably the closest that one can get to the conceptual contour of the for-
mation of the class. I have hitherto pushed this idea further and drawn this contour as a collection 
of porous, constantly shifting, yet materially specific borderlines with other class groups.85 Ac-
cording to Gayatri Spivak, this type of relativist approach should be taken to other classes as well. 
She calls this approach the “differential isolation of classes.”86 As she quotes, Marx says “in so 
far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of 
life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical 
confrontation [feindlich gegenüberstellen], they form a class.”87 The structuralist sense of class is 
unmistakable in this quotation, in which a class is defined in its difference from other classes. In 
this understanding, class interest is historically (impersonally) determined so that “the identity of 
the interests [of class members]…fails to produce a feeling of community, national links, or a 
political organization.”88 This is a sort of discrepancy that requires the representation of the class 
in both tropological and political senses (see also Chapter 3). With this discrepancy in mind, I 
                                                                  
85  E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), has 
similarly adopted this relational approach. According to him, “class happens when some men, as a result of common 
experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as 
against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs” (p.9). He is not talking about 
the “subjectivism” of class, viz. a class group as the Subject of history and certain class consciousness as readily 
available to the class members, since he also states that “[t]he class experience is largely determined by the 
productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily” (p.9). 
86  Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Rosalind C. Morris ed., Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on 
the History of an Idea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp.21-78; 31. 
87  Marx, Surveys from Exile, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Penguin, 1973); 239; in Spivak, Ibid.; 29; 
square brackets are Spivak’s. 
88  Marx, Ibid. in Spivak, Ibid.;p.31; emphasis original. 
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have examined different Yasukuni participants’ preconscious narratives of fascism, while pre-
senting the petty bourgeoisie as a material category that is “freer” than the farmers, but not as 
free as the proletariat, with freedom here meaning the Marxian sense of abstraction into and con-
formity to the form of the commodity (or the labor force as the commodity⎯see Chapter 1). 
What prevents the petty bourgeois freedom from becoming as fully free as that which the prole-
tariat “enjoys” would be their institutionally assigned naturalism (in the case of landscapers, arti-
sans, small landowners, etc.), creativity (craftsmen, inventors, small industrialists, teachers, and 
others), and subsistence (shop owners, monks, food venders, restauranteurs, etc.). Hence, even 
Akiyama, a less “naturally” conditioned member of the class, is interpellated by the nostalgia of 
the Subject. 
 In multiple ways and levels, the aggregate group of the petty bourgeoisie is delayed, that 
is, forced to return to the less abstract levels of production. Within the mechanical reproductive 
regime, the class is made to live the myth of autonomy only insofar as the economy requires the 
class to let itself be traversed by the ebb and flow of surplus labor. As a temporary station to ac-
cept this constantly moving force of labor, the petty bourgeois class is characterized by another 
temporal mode of deferral. To each individual member of the class, any kind of determination 
should be deferred all the time, due to his/her incessant travel back and forth between employ-
ment and unemployment, in and out of the petty bourgeois situation. The petty bourgeois de-
pendence on supposedly perpetual ideas (e.g. the nation, Subject, nature, etc.) has been generated 
from these delays and deferrals. These delays and deferrals are generated by specific history and 
the economy of modern Japan, and not by the fantasized culture and essence of eternal “Japan,” 
as some theorists effectively argue⎯I will examine how they do so and how their arguments un-




The Petty Bourgeoisie in Texts: The Emperor’s Folk, the Cruel Ethno  
 The commoditized delays and delayed commodities that the petty bourgeoisie produce 
can easily lead to a misconception of their “folkishness” (minzokusei). While I have attributed 
the petty bourgeois delay to the class-specific factor of their intermediate level of abstraction as 
well as the historical creation of and requirement for the reserve army of labor in the trans-war 
Japanese economy, other theorists tend to see the petty bourgeois actors of fascism as delayed in 
nationally or “culturally” specific ways. 
 The practical founder of the postwar studies of fascism in Japan, the political scientist 
Masao Maruyama argues that the main actors of Japanese fascism were petty bourgeois. He cat-
egorizes them into what he calls the “middle class I,” which peculiarly includes the farmer; his 
“middle class II” is consisted mainly of the bourgeoisie. During the war, according to him, the 
members of the middle class I were all “mini-emperors” (shō tennō) in their respective “mini-
cosmos” (shō uchū), that is, in the workplace, neighborhood, farms, and other socio-cultural orbit 
in which each of them assumed a leading position.89 The Japanese emperor (tennō) to Maruyama 
is a “premodern” remnant, whose cultural power has hindered Japan’s modernization.90 It seems 
that the petty bourgeoisie and farmers as mini-emperors is an idea that sees a replication of the 
cultural power of the emperor in each locality. Japan here becomes the space that is integrated by 
the emperor, or rather by the “Japanese culture” that is supposed to be embodied by the emper-
or.91 Each member of the farming and petty bourgeoisie groups is the microcosmic carrier of this 
                                                                  
89  Maruyama, Ibid.; pp.65-6. 
90  Maruyama, “Nihon no Shisō,” a chapter from his book under the same title (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961); 
45. 
91  The monadic view of the country might have been initiated by a Meiji oligarch, Aritomo Yamagata, who in 
1888-1890 constructed a system of local self-governance so that each local unit would become a micro kokutai or a 
miniaturized version of the moralized idea of the nation-state. See Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in 
the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); 191-7. Yamagata’s invention was inherited by 
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delayed, “feudalistic” culture of Japan or the emperor.92 Supposedly, the petty bourgeois cultur-
alism is despite and against the bourgeois efforts for modernization; Maruyama remarks that the 
Japanese bourgeoisie “speedily” became modernized, since the petty bourgeoisie and farmers 
deposited the backward culture of Japan for them.93 
 Within each mini-cosmos, the farming and petty bourgeois “emperor” is supposed to 
have used the “moral” and “emotional” means to dominate his “subordinates,” that is, laborers, 
students, congregations, tenants, peasants, and so forth.94 The premodern politics of immediacy 
and embodiment (c.f. Maruyama’s definition of modernization is formalization) was coupled 
with the petty bourgeois type of aesthetic representation, Maruyama suggests, which was literali-
zation. In response to the state propaganda that Japan should win the war, even if the Japanese 
had been left only with bamboo spears, with which to poke the U.S. bombers, for instance, the 
mini emperors urged their subordinates to actually sharpen bamboo sticks, Maruyama says.95 
 The cultural tie between the farmer/petty bourgeoisie and the emperor determined even 
the nature of the prewar state, according to him. The reason that he calls the prewar regime “ultra 
statism” (chō kokka shugi) is its extraordinary dependence on this tie.96 The state’s “fanatic” mo-
nopoly on “truth” (shin), “morality” (zen), and “beauty” (bi) was possible only since the farmers 
and the petty bourgeoisie supported the emperor as their cultural, as well as political, sover-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the corporatist state toward the end of the war as the system that built on the smallest units of moral autonomy, the 
neighborhood association (chōnai kai); see my Chapter 3. Many postwar Japanese thinkers apparently cannot sever 
their thoughts from the moral monadic idea of the country—Yoshimi Takeuchi, for instance, thinks that the cultural 
essence of the moral nation-state (or the emperor as its embodiment) is held even by “a single tree and a single piece 
of grass” that grow in Japanese soil and also by “our [the Japanese] skin.” See his “Kenryoku to Geijutsu” in Kōza: 
Gendai Geijutsu, V (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1958), 301-311; 311. See criticism by Harry Harootunian, “Ichi-moku 
Issō ni Yadoru Tennō Sei: Shiji-suru Mono no Nai Shōchō,” trans. by Mitsunobu Sugiyama, in Shisō (November 
1990), 85-101. 
92  Maruyama, “Nihon Fascism no...,” Ibid.; 82. 
93  Maruyama’s metaphor is “as if to proceed into uninhabited plains.” In his “Nihon no...,” Ibid.; 45. 
94  Maruyama, “Nihon no...,” Ibid.; 46. 
95  Maruyama, “Nihon Fascism no...,” Ibid.; 69. 
96  Maruyama, “Chō Kokka Shugi no Ronri to Shinri,” 11-28. 
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eign.97 Outside the network of the “infinite interactions” (mugen no oufuku) between the cultural-
ized emperor and petty bourgeoisie/farmers, the bourgeoisie, the only “awakened” party in mod-
ern rational ways, was the victim.98 The victimization of the bourgeoisie is the ongoing threat 
even today, since the culture shared by the emperor, the farmers, and the petty bourgeoisie repre-
sents the “old layer” (kosō) of the Japanese ethnicity.99 Impregnated with the violence of “non-
objective,” “direct and sensuous” relations, the petty bourgeoisie and farmers to Maruyama are 
implicitly the ethno and folk, which are supposed to still keep a moral cultural space in the oth-
erwise modernized society of postwar Japan.100 
 The implicit idea of the folk in Maruyama seems to be an uncritical and probably unin-
tentional continuation of the earlier, nativist folklorist, Kunio Yanagita’s concept of jōmin. The 
jōmin, which literally means either the folk that is constantly out there or the folk that is there in 
ordinary lives, was “discovered” by Yanagita in the 1920-30s, aesthetically covering the then 
emerging masses in cities. Even though he did not particularly theorize it to be paired with the 
ethnicized emperor, Yanagita’s mostly rural jōmin was timely in the historical context in which 
                                                                  
97  Maruyama, “Chō Kokka Shugi no...,” Ibid.; 17. 
98  Maruyama, “Nihon no...,” Ibid.; 47. 
99  Maruyama, “Rekishi Ishiki no ‘Kosō’” in Chūsei to Hangyaku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1992). There are a 
lot of critical works on Maruyama’s “old layer”—see, e.g., Hirotaka Kasai, “Maruyama Masao no ‘Nihon’” in Nao-
ki Sakai, Brett de Bary, and Toshio Iyotani eds., Nationality no Datsu Kōchiku (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1996), 205-
229. 
100  Maruyama, “Nikutai Bungaku kara Nikutai Seiji made” in Gendai..., Ibid., 375-94. In this article, he 
explains the pre- or non-formalized (“direct”) relations among the petty bourgeoisie, using such terms as “fiction” 
and “fetishism.” See J. Victor Koschmann’s commentary in his Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); 170-93. Maruyama’s folk is implicit, since he does not actually 
use this term. In an earlier article of “Nihon Fascism no…,” whose analysis of the fascist constituency keeps a 
social-scientific position perhaps due to its rivalry with Marxist scientificity, the mini-emperors and their 
subordinates are combined to be called alternately “people” (minshū) and “masses” (taishū). Later, in “Nihon no…,” 
as he starts theorizing these people/masses in terms of the “communal human relations that can be called the ‘natural 
state’ of the Japanese society” (p.51, note***), Maruyama’s early people/masses practically take on the meaning of 
the folk (minzoku) with their supposed “’substance’ of the agrarian village” (p.49). The agrarian substance is said to 
be observable, for example, in the “loud recitation of ‘Fuji no shirayuki-ya nooooe e’ [the white snow of Mt. Fuji 
is⎯taken from the old folk song genre min’yō?] in Ginza [downtown Tokyo] brothels and bars or in village 
meetings or wherever” throughout Japan (p.51, note***)⎯a retrospective articulation of the earlier implication that 
the people/masses are the folk and that the modern, urban development has never changed the village community-
based essence of their folk character. 
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fascists intended to mobilize the masses not as such, but as the nationally and culturally aestheti-
cized being.101  
  While supplying countless insights and inspirations, which are fresh and interesting even 
today, the ahistoricity of Maruyama makes certain part of his theory close to the status of fantasy. 
As Sebastian Conrad points out, the driving force behind Maruyama’s fantasy seems to be his 
nationalist desires for cultural continuity of Japan over the war.102 What is more, there seems to 
be an apologetic intention in his theoretical exoneration of the Japanese bourgeoisie from its ac-
countability for the war and fascism. As he remembers his own personal experience as a bour-
geois foot-soldier dispatched to the Korean Peninsula, he was merely beaten up by his Japanese 
superiors of petty bourgeois and farming origins.103 By implication, it was according to the supe-
rior’s orders that he and other bourgeois soldiers had to join the Japanese efforts to keep colo-
nizing the Koreans. As the same victim of the culturally caused cruelty of the Japanese petty 
bourgeoisie and farmers, Koreans and the Japanese bourgeoisie can be united, he suggests. To 
him, his kind of bourgeois nationalism did not facilitate Japan’s fascism; the bourgeois produc-
tion and consumption of the culturalized emperor and of the folkized petty bourgeoisie/farmers 
would have no material effects.104 
                                                                  
101  The literature on the jōmin is vast⎯See Marilyn Ivy, “Ghastly Insufficiencies: Tōno Monogatari and the 
Origins of Nativist Ethnology” in her Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp.66-97; Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and 
Community in Interwar Japan (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000); esp. the chapter “The 
Communal Body,” pp.293-57. 
102  Conrad, The Quest for the Lost Nation: Writing History in Germany and Japan in the American Century, 
trans. by Alan Nothnagle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010(1999)). “As a result” of Maruyama's 
nationalism, Conrad argues, “it was not the criminal character of the fascist regime (which was merely presumed) 
that took center stage in his study, but rather the alleged backlog of modernity in Japanese society that had led to a 
state of affairs in which even Japanese fascism seemed premodern and irrational, a cheap imitation of the real thing: 
Japanese fascism as a derivative discourse and practice” of nationalism (p.90; parentheses original).   
103  According to Eiji Oguma, Maruyama “hardly wrote about his military experiences. Barely, he once said 
that [his position in] military had been [that of] a ‘handmaid,’ trying to read the superior’s expressions. Also, it is 
said that he was beaten with boots by another soldier.” See Oguma’s ‘Minshu’ to ‘Aikoku’: Sengo Nihon no 
Nationalism to Kōkyō-sei (Tokyo: Shin’yō Sha, 2002); p.55. 
104  About prewar commoditization of the emperor, see Chapter 1. 
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  What might enable these pyscho-fantastic elements (apologism and nationalism) to be 
sublimated into the theory of the folk and the cultural emperor is likely the institutionally caused 
delay of the petty bourgeoisie and the pragmatism of the farmers. Especially the petty bourgeoi-
sie is important here, since without this class-group’s material delay and delayed appearance, the 
postwar rupture of the Japanese society was such that one would have had exceeding difficulty 
conceiving any idea of the past or cultural continuation. In the postwar, the petty bourgeois delay 
was newly created by its refreshed tie with the reserve army of labor, the result of the collapsed 
empire and the subsequent saturation of the labor market with the repatriated Japanese. Yet, the 
petty bourgeois struggles with and away from the lumpen population, their limited access to 
globalized technologies and connections, and their resultant dependence on the local, informal 
sectors of the economy seem to have inspired Maruyama and other leftists to construct a fantasy 
of the feudalistic folk with old Japan’s cruel essence. Maruyama thus theoretically takes ad-
vantage of the material delay and difference of the petty bourgeois class, while the class is raised 
to the status of cultural authenticity through the theorist’s desires and anxieties. To the extent that 
he has been theoretically dominant in the postwar studies of Japanese fascism and also to the ex-
tent that the fantasy of the folk is still powerful in the society for the similar psychological and 
nationalist reasons to Maruyama’s case, Maruyama’s interpretation of the petty bourgeoisie has 
been widely replicated by postwar scholars. 
Post-Maruyaman scholars of leftist intentions tend to discuss the Yasukuni Shrine as the 
fantastic arena in which the folk are supposed to meet the state or the emperor. These scholars, 
such as Bunzō Hashikawa, Shinobu Ōe, or Tetsuya Takahashi, seem to suppose that agrarian or 
petty bourgeois families of the fallen soldiers, especially rural ones, are the perfect representa-
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tives of the folk. Variably, these scholars would call them “moms” or “grandmas.”105 If we fol-
low the scholars’ portrayals, these families typically speak dialects. With them, the families 
would express their tearful gratitude for “tenshi-sama,” a supposedly folk way to mention the 
mythical relation between the emperor and the sun goddess, amaterasu.106 Even though their 
sons and grandsons were “short” (taran) of perfection, they have become the Shinto existence of 
spirits/gods after their deaths under the name of the divine emperor; their gratitude is supposed to 
point to the folk religious belief in Shinto.107 The oft-adopted (and perhaps one of the only) evi-
dence of what the leftist journalist Nobumasa Tanaka calls “people’s Yasukuni” (minshū no Ya-
sukuni) is an article taken from a prewar companion magazine of fascism, Shufu no Tomo 
(Housewife’s Friend).108 Perhaps reflecting wartime censorship, the female families, whose con-
versations at Yasukuni are supposed to have been immediately logged in the article, might seem 
to have “always lived humbly, without complaining about any kind of hardship of the world,” as 
Hashikawa surmises.109 This appearance of theirs, according to him, is the sign of folk callous-
ness, the callousness that is “replete with the monstrosity of ancient primitivism.”110 The shrine 
in his eyes is the place where the mother-folk’s monstrosity and primitivism are appropriated by 
the fascist state. As long as the state is supposed to be “religious,” due to the existence of the 
emperor as a Shinto god, the appropriation should be smooth. For, outside the textual world and 
                                                                  
105  See, for instance, Ōe, Ibid.; the quote is from p.4. 
106  The quote is from Hashikawa, “Yasukuni Shisō no Seiritsu to Henyō,” Chūou Kōron, Vol.1051 (October 
1974), 227-244, Tanaka Nobumasa, Ibid.; pp.48-52, and Takahashi Tetsuya, Yasukuni Mondai (Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobō, 2005); pp.21-6, who all share the same source, as will be discussed. 
107  Hashikawa, Ibid., Tanaka Ibid., and Takahashi, Ibid. 
108  Tanaka, Ibid.; pp.48-52. Yasukuni in his and others’ theories of the folk could be coded with the phonetic 
katakana writing system, perhaps in order to refer to the supposed orality of the folk, which these theories seem to 
assume. The Housewife’s Friend article that Hashikawa originally quotes and then circulates among these scholars 
is entitled “Haha Hitori Ko Hitori no Aiji wo Okuni ni Sasageta Homare no Haha no Kanrui Zadan Kai” and 
published in June, 1939.  
109  Hashikawa, Ibid.; p.229. 
110  Hashikawa, Ibid.; p.228. 
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with their “folk emotions and thoughts,” these mothers are assumed to have been always Shinto-
ist.111 
 Perhaps these post-Maruyaman scholars’ common characteristic is their blindness to the 
commodity character of fascism. Fascism at the shrine will be better understood when ap-
proached from the angle that focuses on how the soldiers have been formalized as the mutually 
identical, commoditized “spirit” for the nation, than when seen from the position that conceptual-
izes how the soldiers and their families have been carrying the supposedly inalienable spirit of 
the folk-nation, which is assumed to be callously cruel and innocently loyal to the emperor. By 
the same token, I argue that the bereaved families, veterans, and other visitors of the shrine are 
all the masses and not the folk. As the mechanically reified masses and not as the fantastically 
substantiated folk, these visitors are fascinated with the soldiers’ sublimation into something 
larger- and better-looking than themselves, viz. the abstract form of the commodity that every 
one of the 100 million Japanese could potentially purchase and consume.112 The families and 
others gather here also since they would like to see their own mass-figure to be organized on the 
TV, newspaper, and other mass-media (as Chapter 4 will demonstrate, the shrine on 8/15 has 
been the stage for mass-rallies, particularly since the 1990s). On ordinary Sundays, as I have de-
scribed, it has specifically been the petty bourgeois members of the masses that have been active 
in the shrine. From my perspective, this is not because they are more folksy than other segments 
of the Japanese, but because their mass character has been historically made to retroactively 
adopt the mode of production and ideology of subsistence, nature, and other delays of modernity. 
                                                                  
111  Hashikawa, Ibid.; p.227. Similarly, Takahashi (Ibid.) argues that the article represents “the folk at the 
bottom [of the society], who might not have had a chance to come out of their locality through their lifetime, had it 
not been the war [and the invitation from Yasukuni to attend its meeting as bereaved mothers]” (p.25). 
112  Therefore, it is possible that kamikaze suicidal pilots’ movies have always been so cheaply and facilely 
made—the whole process of film-production becomes automatic, when it is reproducing already mass-reproduced 
materials (i.e. the Yasukuni spirits). One of its recent representatives would be Ore wa Kimi no tame ni koso Shini ni 
Iku, written and produced by Shintarō Ishihara and directed by Taku Shijō (Tokyo: Tōei, 2007). 
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 The theory of the Yasukuni of the folk bears material effects. Recently, the shrine has 
carried out a campaign to folkize itself, a campaign to which the Maruyaman and other leftist 
scholars have ironically contributed. In the campaign, various ethnological events have been 
forged and appropriated. In mitama matsuri (spirit festival), for instance, which the shrine spells 
in the Japanese writing of hiragana (versus the adopted Chinese writing system of kanji), tradi-
tional-looking lanterns replace electric lights. Various venders adorn the Approach to the Hall of 
Prayer, selling their nostalgic baubles, such as cotton candies or balloons. Young and old visitors 
adopt the shrine’s nostalgia of the folk, wrapping their bodies with yukata or cotton kimono, 
“traditional” clothing for the summer. According to the shrine’s webpage, “’mitama matsuri’ 
started in the year 22 of the Showa reign [1967 A.D.], following the ancient Japanese custom of 
obon.”113 In one of the prefectural branch-shrines of Yasukuni (gokoku jinja) in Aomori, the 
branch-shrine and the local association of families have been promoting the same festival of 
mitama matsuri to “normalize the shrine as an ordinary Shinto shrine” and to “reach ordinary 
Aomori residents.”114 The Hiroshima branch-shrine that I visited on January 15th, 2008, was 
crowded, as women in kimono and men in haori-hakama tried to go through a Shinto rite of ini-
tiation, seijin shiki for 20-year-olds, there. Like Yasukuni, these branch-shrines have existed 
since 1901 for the fascist purpose of abstracting (“spiritualizing”) fallen Japanese soldiers; his-
torically, these shrines have nothing to do with Shinto, customs, or ordinary lives.115 I reiterate 
that the folkization of these shrines is a recent attempt, which probably corresponds to the afore-
mentioned, strategic change of the LDP and the Association to Respond to the War Heroes’ Spir-
its. With the imported orientalism that defines Shinto in terms of related customs and not beliefs 
(see Chapter 3), these political groups as well as the shrines seem to want to forge the alibi of the 
                                                                  
113  www.yasukuni.or.jp/schedule/mitama.html 
114  “Aomori no ‘Yasukuni’ Kaikaku Shidō” in Asahi Shinbun, 10/4/2008. 
115  On these branch-shrines or gokoku jinja, see Ōe, Ibid.; pp.160-4. 
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shrines’ folkishness; this orientalism translates the thusly forged folk customs into some “Japan-
specific” religiosity. According to the LDP and Association’s argument, the shrines should be 
officialized as the religious war-memorials of Japan. They say the Constitution should be revised, 
if this position is problematic due to the Constitutional principle of church/state; the shrines 
should not be modified according to the Constitution.  
 Although many Yasukuni critics have practically had their leftist theories penetrated by 
nationalism, as they suppose the Yasukuni of the folk, the shrine, of course, refuses to ideologi-
cally build on these scholars. The aforementioned “father of Japan’s folklore studies,” Kunio 
Yanagita, is one of the shrine’s officially adopted ideologues, even though his Yasukuni theories 
supply the leftists as well.116 According to his long essay, “A Tale of Ancestors” (Senzo no 
Hanashi), Yanagita says, for instance, that the Japanese “people” (minzoku) have always lived 
with the dead.117 He argues that the dead are culturally regarded as remaining in the nearby 
mountains, river banks, or oceans as generic “ancestors” (senzo). According to him, Japanese 
“gods” (kami-gami) are the conceptual extension or exception of the ancestors, so the gods in 
Japan are much closer to this world than Christian and other monotheisms’ gods. In Japan, hu-
mans, in turn, have appeased and utilized the gods’ power through various everyday rituals, 
Yanagita argues. He suggests that the people of Japan can be defined through these rituals as 
everyday customs (shūzoku). His intention to legitimize the Yasukuni Shrine according to these 
                                                                  
116  Ōe, for instance, extensively quotes Yanagita, arguing that the shrine and the state have appropriated those 
various folk-customs and -beliefs that Yanagita says have been widely practiced among what Yanagita calls “every-
day folk” (jōmin) of Japan. Ōe’s quotes of Yanagita include such potentially useful concept as “goryō” belief, for 
instance, that the “spirits” of the wrongly punished and/or killed victims of the state come back to this world to har-
ass the living (see Ōe, Ibid.; pp.115-120). Ōe, though, would be embarrassed to realize that a postwar fascist novelist, 
Yukio Mishima, writes his problematic “Eirei no Koe” (Tokyo: Kawade Shobō Shin Sha, 1966), based on the simi-
lar idea to the goryō that Yasukuni soldiers have grudge against the emperor (although from a different reason—
Mishima's soldiers cannot accept the self-humanization of the emperor, for whose sacredness they are supposed to 
have sacrificed their lives). Ōe on the g-ryō (likely) unintentionally replicates Mishima, as a result of Ōe’s disregard 
of the everyday, which started in Japan in the 1920s. Like the fascist writer, Mishima, it is as if Ōe did not want to 
consider that the goryō-type of ghosts and spirit in mature modernity takes on another level of spookiness than its 
original, embodied evilness. 
117  Yanagita, “Senzo no Hanashi” in his Yanagita Kunio Zenshū 13 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1990); pp.7-209. 
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theoretical ideas is suggested in the end of the essay, which, according to him, was written dur-
ing the war, “hearing sirens [to warn the U.S. airstrikes] everyday.”118 “At least those ‘lads’ 
(wakōdo) who fought and died for the [Japanese] state should never be alienated into anonymous 
cemeteries,” he wrote.119 The Japanese state’s consecration of the lads at Yasukuni is well 
aligned with Japanese folk culture, thus properly consoling the lads and continuing the culture, 
according to Yanagita’s unsaid argument.120  
 As the right and left theories of the folk in Yasukuni have begun to be practiced by the 
shrine and its local affiliates, the petty bourgeois Japanese are quick in discerning the shrines’ 
interpellating voice. The recent appearances of yukata or kimono (“traditional” clothing) in these 
shrines are the signs of their quickness. An obscure writer, Yōzaburō Satō, who is a former 
worker in the construction industry, similarly states in a newspaper interview that Shinto “shrines 
have been misused by politics in these one hundred years and more, as a result of which the 
shrines have been changed. The Yasukuni Shrine is a good example of this process.”121 Although 
59-year-old Satō admits that Yasukuni is half a “state-shinto” (kokka shinto) shrine, that is, a 
shrine that is a state apparatus for the state’s warring efforts and its efforts to “religiously mobi-
lize people,” Satō says, another half of Yasukuni still carries the characteristics of “old Shinto” 
(ko shinto), that is, the folk Shinto that is said to have been believed and practiced prior to the 
Yasukuni construction. The old Shinto aspects of Yasukuni is associated with his personal mem-
ories of his childhood, when “a shrine that housed a local god had always been in [his] everyday 
                                                                  
118  Yanagita, Ibid.; p.207. 
119  Yanagita, Ibid.; p.208. 
120  Yanagita-type of argument is repeated in Jun Etō, “Seija no Shisen to Shisha no Shisen,” Etō and Keiichirō 
Kobori eds. Shinban: Yasukuni Ron Jū: Nihon no Chinkon no Dentō no tame ni (Tokyo: Kindai Shuppan Sha, 2004), 
pp.8-47, where he argues that Yasukuni is a matter of “the Japanese culture” (p.13). A neonationalist cartoonist, 
Yoshinori Kobayashi, in his Yasukuni Ron (Tokyo: Gentō Sha, 2005), draws nostalgic images of dancing Japanese 
in kimono and yukata as representatives of the “people’s (minkan no) pure wishes to soothe the war-heroes’ spirits, 
which have continuously supported the Yasukuni Shrine” (p.20). See also Yūzō Tsubouchi, Yasukuni (Tokyo: 
Shinchō Sha, 1999). 
121  Below, all the quotes from Satō will be found in “Doyō Hōmon: Jinja Aruki wo Tsuzukeru: Shomin ga 
Takushita Koe wo Kiku: Satō Yōjirō-san (Sakka)” in Tokyo Shinbun, 10/4/2008. 
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life.” “All year around,” he says, “I was playing in the shrine’s ground—sumō wrestling, top-
spinning, hide and seek, and samurai fencing. We picked cherries in the end of the spring, and 
shii nuts in the fall.” His implication is that the Yasukuni Shrine should be seen in the line of this 
mythical-sounding shrine, which was supposedly incorporated in his juvenile everyday. He sup-
ports his folkization of Yasukuni with his kind of theory of the folk as a prelinguistic being. “Un-
like Buddhism,” he states, “Shinto doesn’t have enduring tenets or rules of conduct. In other 
words, no language [has been adopted by Shinto]. That’s why I’m attracted [to Shinto]. History 
is ordinary people’s. Sadly, ordinary people don’t have language, so they can’t leave history [or 
linguistic records of their history].” Buddhism to Japanese nationalists is of foreign origins and is 
associated particularly with Chinese culture.122 Different from the foreign/Chinese religion of 
Buddhism, according to Satō, Shinto does not have language. He suggests that it is because its 
practitioners, “ordinary people” (shomin), have lived outside language. Although the shomin 
could usually connote the mass, Satō’s shomin here seems to be synonymous with Kunio Yanag-
ita’s jōmin, or the (constant/everyday) folk, given Satō’s ahistoricity and culturalism. To the ex-
tent that Satō suggests that Yasukuni is the folkized shomin’s, the shrine similarly becomes an 
oral existence without history. This is a kind of fantasy that could not be constructed unless one 
forgets about the shrine’s connection with a violent past and the political controversies that sur-
round the shrine today. The violence and controversies of the shrine that Satō is amnesiac about 
are those of fascism and imperial wars, in which the shrine’s “gods” (saishin) were killed as sol-
diers, as well as killing 20 million other Asian and Pacific civilians.   
                                                                  
122  One of the first explicit expressions of such anti-Chinese (=Buddhism) nationalism in Japan made by a 
scholar of Japanese literature, Norinaga Motoori in the 18th century. See a Derridean reading of Motoori’s texts in 
Nobukuni Koyasu, Motoori Norinaga (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992). The Japanese version of logocentrism that 
Koyasu thus finds in Motoori is repeated again and again. See, for instance, Takaaki Yoshimoto, Kyōdō Gensō Ron 
(Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1982).  
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 The dialectic between the representation and reality of Yasukuni participants, i.e., the dia-
lectic between the concept of the folk and history of the Japanese petty bourgeoisie is added an-
other dimension by the younger generations, represented by Shihori Naitō, a junior at Takushoku 
University and a member of Japan Youth Memorial Association. The dimension that these gen-
erations contribute to the dialectic is perhaps better analyzed with psychoanalytical tools than 
with others. If we follow the theory of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, the linguistic and 
psychological structures of melancholia are transgenerationally carried and complicated. After 
the grandparents’ repression and the parents’ visceral feeling of the repressed secrets in the 
grandparents’ unconsciousness, Naitō and her cohorts probably do not even know that most Jap-
anese families have war- and fascism-related secrets. The family secrets are totally alienated 
from the subject of the third generation and after, with these secrets only indirectly facing the 
subject behind the ever-enigmatic, and thus fascinating facade, such as the concept of the folk.123 
If the façade was ever removed, the subject would see the grotesque secrets of murders, rapes, or 
arsons creeping out of the yet-to-be-worked-through vault that the grandparents had constructed 
in the inter-generational psyche. In another context, Walter Benjamin says the grotesque does not 
originate in the folk, as Bakhtin supposes, but in “‘burial’⎯in the sense of concealment⎯ which 
the cave or grotto expresses.”124 Imagine the shocking effects of the underground Chinese graffiti 
on the WWII Japanese atrocities, as in Léos Carax’s part of the co-directed film Tokyo! 
(2009)⎯these effects are those of Benjamin’s grotesqueness.125 Note that Carax’s underground 
functions as an arena in which to express wishes for justice. Benjamin similarly says that the 
grotto provides a “refuge for many ideas which people [are] reluctant to voice openly before 
                                                                  
123  See Abraham and Torok, Ibid.  
124  Borinski, Die Antike I; p.189; quoted in Benjamin, The Origin of..., Ibid.; p.171.  
125  Michel Gondry, Léos Carax and Bong Jooho dir., Tokyo! (Liberation Entertainment, 2009). 
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princes…”126 In postwar Japan, the power of the “princes” or the generationally established so-
cial institutional or individual psychological superego has been such that the subterranean graffiti 
of the Real has never been revealed to shock the younger generations. Through the aesthetic fa-
çade of the folk, though, the immured Real exudes the compelling atmosphere of the gro-
tesque⎯what a mysterious and horrendous sound it is, the “folk in Yasukuni”! This structure of 
mysteries and the surrounding desires resemble those of the commodity, its grotesque allures, as 
Marx mentions, and people’s fetishism of such allures.127 It is based on such a structure that 
Naitō could say such politico-ethical nonsense as following: 
 “I like to help the Ei Kai veterans [the veterans at Eirei ni Kotaeru Kai or the Association 
to Respond to the War-Heroes’ Spirits], because they remind me of my late grandparents.” 
 Emphatically, her grandparents had been “ordinary” (futsū no) civilians, according to her. 
“They weren’t rich or anything,” she claims. Having popularized her grandparents this way, 
Naitō suggests that it is by using her ordinary grandparents as the reference point that she has 
seen the Yasukuni veterans. Or it could be that the veterans’ appearances of the ordinary elders 
might come to the fore first to force her to “help” them as her grandparents. What Naitō appar-
ently cannot even fathom is these veterans’ potential criminality in the war, their sustained sup-
port of fascism through the postwar, and these acts’ political and ethical significance to Burma, 
India, Malaysia, and other countries which they invaded during their march to Imphal. 
 Naitō’s grandparents as ordinary people obtain a hint of the folk, when she says they 
were part-time farmers in rural Yamagata Prefecture, until their old age made it difficult for them 
                                                                  
126  Benjamin, Ibid.; p.172. 
127  “Nevertheless,” Marx says, “the table continues to be wood, an ordinary, sensuous thing. But as soon as it 
emerges as a commodity, it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on 
the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain 
grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will.” See “The Commodity” in 
his Capital, Ibid.; pp.163-4. Benjamin would read that the grotesqueness of the commodity as being derived from 
the ever-unconscious secret of people’s own will and creativity.  
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to live by themselves any more. Then they sold their Yamagata farm and house, and continually 
changed their residence in Tokyo from one reluctant relative’s guest room to another. Finally, the 
grandparents passed away in a small room adjacent to Naitō’s parents’ grocery shop in a local 
city, Tokyo. 
 “Before they passed away, my parents had always been fighting over them,” says she. “I 
really hated to be at home in those days. But then, as I think about it now, even I didn’t particu-
larly care about them [the grandparents], either.” 
 According to her connotation, her activity in Yasukuni constitutes the redemption of what 
she seems to regard as her immorality. What makes it count as an act of redemption might be the 
ordinary and folk-like images of the grandparents. For, only as the melancholic images of ordi-
nary people and the folk, which she might have unconsciously created in order to forget about 
her qualms, the grandparents could superimpose themselves over another set of images of ordi-
nary people and the folk, offered by the veterans. Only in the phenomenal realm of melancholia, 
the two totally different sets of elders (her grandparents and the veterans) can connect with each 
other. It is through this common realm of superficiality, her qualms might be resolved as her re-
paying to the veterans, the veterans who are the grandparents in their appearance. 
 Naitō’s redemptive act is likely helped by the above-mentioned, recent campaign of Ya-
sukuni, which is meant to folkize the shrine and its participants. The prior instance, in which the 
image of the ordinary elder was mass-reproduced and consumed widely to wipe off the bad 
memories of the war and fascism, was in 1989, when the then-emperor, Showa, passed away. 
The media and other cultural industries of the country then compared the emperor’s physical ap-
pearance with that of an actor, Chishū Ryū. In the 1940-50s director, Yasujirō Ozu’s movies and 
others, Ryū played many paternal roles. In the nostalgia boom of Ozu, which was conservative in 
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itself, the emperor’s historical accountability for prewar Japanese fascism and the war was ab-
stracted into the cinematic figure of Ryū, the model of a good and old-fashioned father of an or-
dinary Japanese family.128 
 Described as “folkishly simple” (soboku) by her fellow JYMA students, Naitō seems to 
have a certain sense of self-identification with and desires for self-representation as the folkish. It 
is perhaps out of these desires and sense that she has selected a relatively back-breaking part-
time job in a ramen shop in her local city. There, she receives 950 yen (about 10 bucks) hourly 
for her nighttime waitressing job, plus a bowl of ramen as her midnight snack, according to her. 
 “Funny, Shihori-chan,” another student at the JYMA, the usually skimpily dressed “Yuko 
Kogure,” once ridiculed her. “Why, there’re so many more cool (oishii) jobs, you know.” Ac-
cording to her, the nighttime shift in a bar was at least 1,500 yen per hour. 
 “Yes, snacks will come with that as well,” Kogure assured her. She is from an upper-
middle-class family in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo. There is a long story of her adolescent delinquen-
cy and moral salvage by a Shinto-related new religion. 
 “I hate to get money without feeling I actually labored for that,” Naitō then insisted. “I 
think money isn’t like that [that is, money can’t be earned without the equivalent amount of 
physical toil].” 
 One plus one always has to be two—no accrual of surplus-value is allowed. She says she 
learnt that philosophy in her parents’ grocery store, “having looked at their backs,” that is, by 
emulating their moral attitude toward labor and money. Even though she refers to neither the folk 
nor ordinary people as a term, her sense that “hates” the interest-bearing exchange of the com-
                                                                  
128  Eiji Ohtsuka, “Shōjo-tachi no ‘Kawaii’ Tennō,” Chūou Kouron (December 1988), 243-9, ethnographically 
mentions many commoditizing practices concerning the dying emperor then. When the emperor was commoditized 
as the “pure” and “sacred” outside of capitalism (as “senile elders” (boke rōjin)), Ohtsuka supposes, the consumers 
of the commoditized emperor, girls, could project their own designated identity of “weakness and vulnerability” 
upon the emperor (p.248).   
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modity seems to underline her support of the Yasukuni Shrine, where she says is reminded of her 
popularized and folkized grandparents, the supposedly pre- or non-capitalist being. 
 If one can discuss Naitō’s Yasukuni activity in terms of the technique of melancholic 
folkization, then it might be by means of the same technique that she seems to be able to (uncon-
sciously) co-opt other Asian victims’ politics. When I mention the South Korean, Korean-
Japanese, and Japanese project to recover forced Korean laborers’ remains through the Japanese 
Archipelago, her eyes sparkle with interest.129 
 “Would I have a chance to participate? Where would the next site [of recovery] be? 
When? Do you know the contact, Kasai-san?” 
                                                                  
129  Discursive and physical excavation of these Korean and Chinese forced laborers has been conducted for 
decades along ethnic lines and among local blocs. One of the representatives of these efforts would be that made by 
Chongryun (Sōren in Japanese), the resident Korean association of supporters of North Korea, which has collaborat-
ed with sympathetic Japanese intellectuals to establish the Investigatory Task Force of the Truth of Abduction of 
Koreans (Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō Shinsō Chōsa Dan) in 1972 in Okinawa. As of 2007, it has 300 North-Korea-
supporting, Korean residents in Japan, in addition to 400 Japanese, as its members, through its 25 prefectural affili-
ates. See their unpublished pamphlet, “Kinkyū Shūkai: Yūten-ji no Ikotsu Mondai wo Kenshō-suru,” distributed in 
their meeting under the same title in Nihon Kyōiku Kaikan, Tokyo, 3/9/2007. On the Japanese part, a Sōtō-shū Bud-
dhist monk and peace activist, Yoshihiko Tonohira established Karachi Folk History Seminar (Karachi Minshū-shi 
Kōza) in Karachi, Hokkaido, in 1976, in order to exhume about 80 bodies of Koreans and more, who were estimated 
to have been forced to construct the local Uryū Dam. See his “Kaisetsu” to Seiichi Morimura, Sasa no Bohyō (To-
kyo: Kōbun-sha, 2003), pp.359-367. Noriaki Fukudome, a former college professor, has been similarly active in 
Fukuoka Prefecture, Kyūshū Island; Sōtō-shū monks, Tetsuou Sakata and Shū Tanimoto, in Takayama City, Gifu 
Prefecture. Both Takayama and Fukuoka are known to have used these victims to mine their minerals. 
 In 2005, the civil activist-cum-president, Roh Moohyun, of the ROK formally joined these civilian efforts 
in Japan to start renewed investigation and repatriation of the Korean remains. Accordingly in the same year, the 
hitherto haphazard, Japanese and resident Korean groups in Japan have gathered together under the umbrella of the 
Network to Investigate the Truth of Forced Mobilization (Kyōsei Dō’in Shinsō Kyūmei Network). Their united 
movement has gained a momentum, resulting in various meetings and excavation camps throughout the Japanese 
Islands. 
 The most popular among them would still be Yoshihiko Tonohira’s camps in Hokkaido, which he has held 
for decades about a couple of times a year, gathering hundreds of Korean, resident Korean, and Japanese youths, 
scholars, and activists, for excavation, discussion, and friendship. The one in which I participated in 8/17-26/2006 in 
Sarufutsu Village, Hokkaido, was an internally dynamic and contradictory commune in the middle of the somewhat 
hostile Japanese residents in the village. The almost irreconcilable differences between multiple historical views and 
political positions represented by different sub-groups within the camp seemed to be still bonded together against 
the hostility and through the participants’ love and youthfulness. What I mentioned to Naitō in Yasukuni is one of 
the Hokkaido camps. 
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 I remind her that, even though the Korean and Korean Japanese participants in the project 
might try to accept the Japanese efforts for reconciliation, Koreans in general were the victims of 
the Japanese invasion, colonialism, and fascist violence. 
 “Please let me know more about it—I just don’t know.” 
 I feel I should believe her claimed innocence, given her collegiate environment in nation-
alist Takushoku University, plus the larger Japanese context of neo-nationalism since the 1990s. 
Leftist professors let me know that in 2008, they have admitted the first bunch of those high 
school-graduates, who are armed with the revisionist historical knowledge of Japan. These stu-
dents have learnt the knowledge in the textbooks that are forged by the ultra-rightist Association 
to Write a New History Textbook (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai). Established in 
1996, the Association’s textbooks have been sporadically adopted by different schools through-
out the country.130 A neonationalist cartoonist, Yoshinori Kobayashi, and other pop-cultural 
ideologues have mass-mediated similarly revised, neonationalist histories of the war and fascism 
for more than a decade. I have found that the JYMA students seem to read Kobayashi at least, if 
not more theoretical and older Yukio Mishima or Ikki Kita. I, then, tell Naitō what I have learnt 
among the leftist participants in the Korean project—the historical facts that I would never com-
municate to other participants in the shrine. Surely I do have a certain level of trust in her rose-
cheeked naiveté. 
                                                                  
130  The Association to Write a New History Textbook claims that the conventional historical textbooks that 
have been adopted in postwar Japanese schools are “masochistic” (jigyaku-teki) in that they describe the various 
war-crimes that were committed by the imperial Japanese military. Led by such neonationalist intellectuals as Kanji 
Nishio, Hidetsugu Yagi, or Nobukatsu Fujioka, the Association intends that their textbooks will be a “tale of the 
Japanese, through which [the pupils] can be excited about the actions of [their] ancestors, while taking a glance at 
the ancestors' failures; [the pupils] are thus expected to re-experience the ancestors’ joys and predicaments.” In short, 
these neonationalists hope to “restore” the “pride and responsibility as the Japanese” among the students. See their 
homepage, http://www.tsukurukai.com/aboutus/syuisyo.html. See critique by Yōichi Komori and Tetsuya Takahashi 
eds., National History o Koete (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1998). Marilyn Ivy also wrote about this issue 




 “From this perspective,” I continue then, carefully choosing my words, “the Japanese 
soldiers consecrated in Yasukuni might not be heroes. The Koreans might perceive these soldiers 
as invaders.” Then I ask, “Would you be still comfortable about considering your participation 
[in the Korean project]?” 
 “Oh, yes,” says she. Amazingly, her small, round eyes under dark brown bob have turned 
red with withheld tears. 
 “I’m sorry,” she hurriedly wipes them with a towel. In the nationwide trend of ecologism, 
the cafe across the shrine, where the two of us have been sitting over iced coffee, is only barely 
air-conditioned. The three-o’-clock sun is still sweltering even through the drawn blind. After 
hours of Yasukuni campaign, the polyester, black set of a suit, skirt, and vest, which she wears to 
show her “respect to the war-heroes’ spirits,” should have still trapped some heat—not only she, 
but also Kanno and other students similarly show up in dark suits and other formal attire. She 
sips her coffee with completely melted ice cubes and looks at me. 
 “Ever since my grandparents passed away, I just can’t stand the idea of anybody being 
left without being properly buried. I think we should help them [the Koreans].” 
 This is probably the reason that she has joined the JYMA, the organization that is dedi-
cated to recovering the Japanese soldiers’ remains abroad. It seems that her logic is that the vic-
tims and perpetrators should be equally treated as sort of her extended “grandparents.” The ad-
mixture of humanitarianism and melancholia, her concept of grandparents-folk, therefore, effec-
tively contributes to the shrine’s efforts to remain as a death-space of unresolved fascism. Fas-
cism’s key characteristic is “equalization” and its function is the rendition of politically and ethi-
cally heterogeneous points into the nominally identical existence of the commodity. It is through 
the trans-generationally operative, psychological mechanism of melancholia that a youth like 
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Naitō is compelled to subscribe to the fascism of the folk today. The folk is a discursive repre-
sentation of the petty bourgeois class; ultimately Naitō is expressing her own class-character by 
discovering the same folk in Yasukuni and among the Koreans. 
------------------- 
 In this chapter, I have argued that the petty bourgeoisie throughout modern capitalist Ja-
pan has had special affinity with fascism, due to its historically assigned delay and difference 
within the country’s overall regime of mechanical reproduction. Their delay and difference have 
been materially created through their intimate interactions with the country’s reserve army of 
labor in a given period of time. These interactions have endowed the petty bourgeoisie with a 
sort of surrealistic aloofness as the producers of sermons, gardens, or crafts on the one hand and 
with a devouring acquisitiveness as the consumers of mass-reproduced, everyday products on the 
other hand. When fascism promotes the aesthetics of mechanical reproduction and contradictori-
ly stirs the desires for the Subjective organization of such aesthetics, many petty bourgeois 
members are historically positioned to find in fascism an apt expression of their historical posi-
tionality and a perfect representation of their everyday desires.  
One of the Japanese fascist theaters, the Yasukuni “Shinto” Shrine in Tokyo, has thus 
been maintained by the petty bourgeois participants, who have been magnetized by the shrine’s 
commoditization of the fallen Japanese soldiers and ideologization of the emperor as these sol-
diers’ sacrifier. For the postwar Japanese psychology of melancholia, the shrine’s attractive and 
repulsive force is even enhanced. While the term, fascism, is completely omitted in and around 
the shrine, the shrine adorns itself with the new ornament of the folk, becoming ever more enig-
matic and grotesque than any other moments in the 140 years of its history. This chapter has ex-
amined the way in which the everyday ideologues of the postwar petty bourgeoisie have contrib-
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uted to this melancholic formation of the “folk Yasukuni” in interaction with the second-level 
ideologies produced by the leftist and rightist bourgeoisie.  
 Recreated in the immediate postwar as the shock absorber of the lost empire, the Japa-
nese petty bourgeoisie is far from vanishing even after sixty-three years since then. For, the class 
supplements the otherwise monolithic-looking, monopoly economy of postwar Japan. In the 
midst of the society’s democratic discourses, the petty bourgeoisie preconsciously embraces fas-
cist ideologies and maintains imperialist memories of the war. With its class-specific technolo-
gies of delay and difference, the class group significantly facilitates the generation of even new 
violence, the violence of second fascism that threatens to efface the memories and history of the 
actual violence exercised in the past.
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Chapter 3: Incorporating the Everyday: Or, the Corporatist Representation of War Ma-
chines 
 
[D]ifferences are mainly imposed from outside; they are distinctions of rank, sta-
tus and property. Men as individuals are always conscious of those distinctions; 
they weigh heavily on them and keep them firmly apart from one another. A man 
stands by himself on a secure and well defined spot, his every gesture asserting 
his right to keep others at a distance. He stands there, like a windmill on an 
enormous plain moving expressively; and there is nothing between him and the 
next mill. All life, so far as he knows it, is laid out in distance—the house in 
which he shuts himself and its property, the positions he holds, the rank he de-
sires—all these serve to create distances, to confirm and extend them. 
 
—Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power 
 
 
 Again, I am in a train at its full speed. Every little gap between the parts in the car and 
between the junctures in the rail makes vibrant noises, which are then absorbed in the vast ex-
panse between stations. The car is sparse with only a couple of elderly females with hats and a 
young businessperson smilingly checking his cellphone. The early March’s cold yet relaxed sun-
shine adds a nimbus of pale euphoria. With its abundant space and flat monotony, the landscape 
outside the window makes one’s eyelids heavy. Mass-produced houses, a brand new city hall, 
and supermarkets around the station; and then, as soon as we pass the center of the town, we see 
the parallel highway again, along which are aligned neat factories in green lawns or under tall, 
rhododendron shadows. It is the existence of these factories that seem to differentiate one’s im-
pression of the area from that of purely residential Musashino, Tokyo, for instance. The station 
of “South Toda,” Yokohama, is in the middle of this hauntingly new, industrial land, ten minutes 
train-ride to the south from bustling Yokohama Station and ten minutes to the north from “Mi-
nobe,” the hub that connects this formerly state-owned Japan Railway line with several others. 
On weekday afternoons like today (2007), the train arrives at South Toda only once every thirty 
minutes, startlingly differently from more populated and hectic, coastal Yokohama. 
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 Making a good contrast to the dark empty platform, the sun is abundant in the South 
Toda concourse, warming people through the glass ceiling and making the dust visibly shiny, 
like quietly falling snow. Under the silver dust, outside the automatic wickets that talk (“beep, 
beep, beep, there is not enough money on your ticket. Please proceed to the manned wicket”), 
there is a buzzing crowd that is hastily passing one another. None of them comes through the 
wicket to take the train. They are apparently just passing from right to left, left to right, leaving a 
colorful whirl with their casual, daytime clothing. As it will turn out, there is a shopping complex, 
“Rainbow Garden” to the left (east), adjacent to the station. To the right (west), there is a bus 
terminal. The west of the railroad is all over dotted with multiple “project” buildings, inhabited 
by factory workers and others. Featuring the only department store in the area, the Rainbow Gar-
den seems to attract customers from much further away than the project district. This part of 
Yokohama is far more accessible by motor vehicles than the walkable coast. 
 Being the only person who is standing by the wickets, “Mutsumi Machida” is easily 
distinguishable. About 5’1’’, in her 50s, she wears a tad overgrown hair and a wrinkled gingham 
shirt of yellow, red, and pink. One end of the worn collar sticks out of the soft, quality-looking, 
black leather jacket, while the other is pushed somewhere inside. With no makeup and an obso-
lete vinyl bag, Machida, nonetheless, is adorned with an odd class-consciousness that sparkles in 
a big ruby ring in her left hand.  
 An “ordinary matron” (futsū no obasan), this retired banker’s wife likes to call herself, 
as I have noticed in our preliminary phone interviews. There is a derogatory connotation in the 
word, obasan (matron), in the capitalist culture in which a woman’s age, her role of reproduction, 
and the social definition of sexual attraction are intimately connected together.1 Machida is not 
                                                                  
1  Obasan is otherwise called babah, which is even more disparaging than obasan. In one of the most 
notorious instances, the then Tokyo Governor, Shintarō Ishihara, remarked that “I heard that the worst and most 
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the first woman who has let me glimpse at a certain, inverted violence inside her, with which she 
denigrates herself with the self-appellation of obasan. My observation is that “housewives” (shu-
fu) like Machida tend to show this type of violence, which indiscriminately reduces each of these 
women’s unique life-histories, sexualities, hopes and despairs into the assigned role and image of 
an “ordinary” middle-aged woman. The self-reducing violence then seems to sink into the pleas-
ure of the bourgeois life—conformist moderation, far-from-moderate consumption to create con-
forming self-images, and the sense of security gained in exchange for conforming self-images. 
Yet, as a ruby glittering on the bourgeois finger carries wild memories of geological time, the 
seemingly tamed life in the suburb still holds violence, the violence of reducing and “equalizing.” 
At least the suburb that I studied was replete with hints and traces of such violence.  
 The violence at issue is that of fascism—as I have argued in the previous chapters, 
the minimal definition of fascism is reduction of singularities into a single form. In the exceed-
ingly labor-divided society of suburban Japan, everyday fascism seems to be incessantly arising 
from the relation between genders, capitalist production and consumption, and the all-leveling 
pressure to be ordinary. In this chapter, I will ethnographically describe how male and female 
residents in a suburb like “Toda Town” express everyday frustration, anxieties, and desires to be 
mechanical copies of each other.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
harmful thing that civilizations had ever created was babah”; and also that “I also heard that it was worthless and 
sinful that those women who lost their reproductive abilities [due to their age] were still living” (Ishihara supposedly 
“heard” these opinions from an astronomical physicist and emeritus professor at Tokyo University, Takafumi Matsui 
⎯Matsui denies this allegation). Deficiency of the country’s criminal law is such that gender-related hate-crimes are 
not legally punishable. Apparently Japan’s civil law does not recognize Ishihara’s offence as an offence 
either⎯both the District and Appellate Courts of Tokyo dismissed 131 female plaintiffs’ suit against Ishihara in 
1995. Insofar as this current chapter is concerned, it is important to note that Ishihara’s remarks were published as 
“Dokusen Gekihaku: Ishihara Shintarō To-Chiji Hoeru!” (Exclusive Interview with Ishihara Shintarō: the [Tokyo] 
Metropolitan Governor Roars!) in Shūkan Josei, 11/6/2001. Shūkan Josei literally means Weekly Women. “Why did 
the weekly targeting mostly middle-aged and elderly women publish Ishihara’s sexist remarks in uncritical ways?” 
is one of the questions that this chapter addresses.   
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 While proceeding along this theme, the second and third sections of this chapter will 
introduce the institutions and ideologies of corporatism, as they seek to organize the Toda every-
day. Briefly, corporatism aspires to be the device that “organically” separates, categorizes, and 
hierarchizes people, who might otherwise be inclined to be a mutually equalized mass. In post-
war Japan, corporatism has developed as the recycled prewar ideology and practices of the “body 
of the nation-state” (kokutai). In the second section of this chapter, I will examine how the pre-
war kokutai was imagined to be gendered and hierarchized according to the concepts of the pub-
lic/private dichotomy and of the patriarchal nation. The third section will explore the postwar 
advancement of these concepts into the new kokutai, the body of the hierarchical nation. Among 
various corporatist institutions, I will focus on the so-called “neighborhood association” (chōnai 
kai or chōkai). I will examine the process through which this transwar apparatus of the neighbor-
hood association in its postwar phase sublimates the mass desires for fascist equivalence into the 
discourses of the “religious” hierarchy. The sacred association in these discourses is the nexus 
between its representation of the neighborhood women and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP)’s representation of the neighborhood. As in the prewar, the gender relation is the key to 
understand the ideological configuration of the postwar kokutai, perhaps to the degree that the 
excess of massification is supposedly embodied by women⎯their historically assigned roles of 
the consumer and reproducer. I will locate the women’s position in the prewar and postwar koku-
tai in an attempt to understand the way in which the bourgeois desires for hierarchy and order 
intervene in everyday fascism.  
 Mutsumi Machida, the main informant of this chapter, hints at the violent desires for 
everyday fascism not just in her self-appellation of obasan. She has also sued her own town in an 
effort to ensure the principle of church-state separation regarding the half-state institution, the 
  
179 
neighborhood association. Put in the context of the overall commodification of the suburban eve-
ryday, her suit has the aspect of critically fortifying the corporatist order of the town by opposing 
it or of unintentionally substantiating such a supposedly sacred order by even acknowledging its 
existence. Conformism thus seems to be the last instance of the bourgeois mentality. And it is 
this conformism that bears the violent, fascist moment in the everyday. This chapter intends to 
differentiate the moments of violent conformism and fascism-as-conformism, for a better under-
standing of the everyday genesis of fascism. 
 
The Classed Space, Gendered Time: The Everyday Genesis of Suburban Fascism 
 The women with hats and male businessperson that I saw in the train make a snapshot 
of the suburban time that is gendered. Perhaps on the way home from Kamakura, a favorite day-
trip destination among mature women, these seeming girlfriends might be representatives of 
women having a lot of free time in daytime. Meanwhile, the businessman in a suit and tie could 
be a sales representative for the daytime female customers at home or could have visited some 
local offices near railroad stations around here. In either case, these women’s and men’s attires 
represent the gendered division of labor between bourgeois production and reproduction. This 
division directly translates into the dual configuration of the contemporary Japanese space, espe-
cially in its bourgeois segment, viz. the office areas where mainly male workers operate and the 
residential areas where mainly females stay to consume and reproduce.  
 The suburban town of Toda in daytime is accordingly the female sphere. By tracing 
the tour of the town that Machida gave me on my first day there, I will be able to show the way 
in which the women’s space-time is so structured by the corporate needs to reach women as the 
consumers and the women’s attraction to the commodities that corporations promote. The corpo-
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rations also cast the classed net over daytime Toda. For one thing, not all the class-groups can 
afford to keep solely consumerist females.2 For another, the corporations interpellate the women 
as bourgeois consumers. Even if one economically falls short of the class’s standard, she is ex-
pected to consume as a bourgeois member; or rather, she comes to look to be bourgeois through 
her bourgeois-like consumption.3  
 Let us go back to the South Toda wickets to see the classed and gendered chronotope 
of Toda. A couple of steps to the left (east) and you will already be in the Rainbow Garden, a 
commercial-residential complex. Comprised of several sky-scraping residential buildings, a de-
partment store, and a supermarket, the complex is etched with the leftover “bubble” sensibility of 
the developer. Constructed in the 1980s, the luxurious apartments in the “Rainbow Towers” were 
called “million-dollar mansions” (oku shon). Their catch phrase was that “from every window 
you can see Mt. Fuji.” According to Mutsumi Machida, “only elites, such as Asahi Newspaper 
journalists,” live there. These apartment buildings stand in the middle of the corridors that con-
nect the station with the department store. The idea is probably that both the commuters and con-
sumers in the buildings need only a couple of seconds to reach either the station or the store. The 
tacit assumption behind the idea would be that the westward route to the station and the eastward 
route to the store are almost exclusively used by males and females respectively.  
 The department store physically maps out the gendered frequency with which the res-
idents seem to be expected to use the store. Men’s clothing and others are compactly put together 
                                                                  
2  According to an ethnographic survey done by Glenda S. Roberts in 1983, local blue-color women have to 
learn how to “value their jobs highly, marshaling their considerable energies toward their careers as regular 
employees while simultaneously being wives and mothers.” See her “Careers and Commitment: Azumi’s Blue-
Collar Women,” ed. and with an intro. by Anne E. Imamura, Re-Imagining Japanese Women (Berkeley and Los 
Angels: University of California Press, 1996), pp.221-243; p.241.  
3  About the relation between class, appearance, and “race,” see James T. Siegel, “Fetishizing Appearance, Or 
Is ‘I’ a Criminal?” in his Fetish, Recognition, Revolution (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
pp.54-93; Jean and John L. Comaroff, “Fashioning the Colonial Subject: The Empire’s Old Clothes,” Of Revelation 
and Revolution, Vol. II: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1997), pp.218-73.  
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on the fifth floor, where one has to change the escalator a couple of times in order to reach. Other 
floors are apparently occupied by women’s casual wear, formal wear, office clothing, in addition 
to the labyrinthine arrangements of accessory- and cosmetic showcases. These showcases on the 
first floor are still an island in the middle of even more women’s paraphernalia⎯shoes, hand-
bags, hats, and perfume. On top of that, girls have a relatively big section of their own on the 
fourth floor.  
 At the end of the outdoor upper-level corridor that leads from the station, the entrance 
to the store is a theatrical space that gapes open for females in Toda and the vicinities. The space 
is a grandiose stairwell, lush with gigantic pots of monumental palm trees and weeping tropical 
plants. Under the high glass ceiling, an escalator theatrically climbs up through the spaciously 
arranged alabaster podia, on which the plants elegantly rest. The day after a spring storm, wild 
winds constantly blow into the open stairwell this afternoon. The air is still heavy with humidity, 
yet pungent with mysterious fragrance of rare jungle flowers. Dull, thick leaves of taro wave and 
chatter. They even play taped sounds of exotic birds and animals. The approximately one minute 
of escalator-riding is probably long enough to raise the customer’s class-consciousness. The 
bourgeois culture of laid-back comfort and playful squander is well-expressed in this mini-
theater. Whether one is actually bourgeois or not, she is apparently expected to join the bour-
geois expression of consumerism by spending money upstairs.  
 The escalator brings Machida and me to the third floor, where neatly packaged hand-
kerchiefs, silk scarves, or brand-name umbrellas allure even us, who enter the store only as part 
of the “short-cut” to Toda Town. As we march through the commodities, I have not even noticed 
that we have already been in the adjacent supermarket. As big as any suburban supermarket in 
the United States, the “Rainbow Mart” is congested. On the second floor, to which we have de-
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scended with the electrically moving slope, the buzz and movements are ceaselessly made, per-
haps due to the vast array of choices of food given—yaki tori the skewered and roasted chicken 
pieces that are neatly piled up on trays, individually packed sandwiches, spring and summer rolls, 
salad, cakes, wine and sake—you name it. The fishmongers are shouting “hai ’rasshaaaaii” 
(c’mon, take a look customers, c’mon) in their thick husky voices. Competing with them is the 
taped music that repeats “fish, fish, fish, fish you eat, smart, smart, smart, smart you become” 
(sakana, sakana, sakana, sakana wo taberu to, atama, atama, atama, atama ga yoku-naru). As 
we pass the isles, a man at the counter of deep fried meat and vegetables (age mono) would say, 
“Hey Mrs., what about croquettes for dinner tonight?” The supermarket’s difference from the 
department store might be that the croquette-seller is not approaching Machida and me as mem-
bers of any particular class-group but as general females of the age to be “Mrs.” (oku-san). If the 
department store demands its female customers be bourgeois by keeping up with the bourgeois 
appearance, then the supermarket’s direction seems to be that women across the class-boundary 
fulfill their families’ gastronomical and other domestic needs. Many working females in Japan 
seem to be suffering from the social and familial expectation that they perform both the produc-
tive and reproductive roles. 
 Out of the supermarket, and we are out of the whole complex of the Rainbow Garden. 
We cross a bridge over busy “Route 40.” Suddenly a serene residential area starts. This is Toda 
Town. The whole area looks inviting with the dark green shades that old camellia trees make. 
Immediately I recognize the aroma of plum flowers. The “ridge road,” as Machida simply calls it, 
runs through spacious houses, sporadic farms of cabbages and leeks, and miniature orchards of 
apples and plums. Parallel to Route 40 and also to the railroad, the straight road will eventually 
bring us to the area where Machida lives. Through the one-lane road, we would occasionally 
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pass a car or scooter. The main part of the town occupies the good-sized, southeast lowland of 
the road, while the houses and farms on the road also belong to the town. As we walk to the 
south, thus diagonally away from the station and the Rainbow Garden, we command a good view 
of the lowland on our left hand side. In the middle of the relatively congested lowland with mass-
produced houses and condos, there is a little hill, on which stand “Toda Primary and Middle 
Schools.” Machida’s two daughters went there. 
 In contrast to these purely functional condos and townhouses, the houses along the 
ridge road please one’s eyes. Many of them are handsomely modernist with abundant glass and 
rectangular motifs. They could be called sumptuous by any standard, registering unique traces of 
the architects’ custom-made efforts. Multiple numbers of Mercedes Benz, Audi, or Jaguar are 
parked in their neatly pebbled parkways; new soil is placed among aesthetically arranged rocks 
and stone statues, waiting for the gardening season to come. According to Machida, the residents 
around here were formerly “farmers” (hyakushō), who climbed up the class ladder by selling or 
renting out their lands to the railroad company and the Rainbow Garden-developer among others. 
They are landlords also of the condos in the lowland as well as the offices and clinics around the 
station. 
 After fifteen minutes or so of walking from the Rainbow Garden, the straight ridge 
road ends at a cell phone-tower. Two narrow back roads branch out from there, going down the 
ridge into the right (western) and left (eastern) directions. The right path eventually hits Route 40. 
The state road then makes a curve around the end of the ridge to the southeast. There is a small 
hill that lies between the end of the ridge and Route 40 after the road makes the southeast curve; 
that is the hill on which “Yawata Shrine” stands. The left path is a long, concrete staircase, which 
leads to a whole separate residential area, which Machida calls “Kōwa Collective Residence” 
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(Kōwa Danchi). Although the residence comes under the Toda Town’s jurisdiction, this is 
Machida’s home that she would like to think of as modernized new residents’ versus the old, 
“farmers’” area of the town.  
 In this chess board-square land, on which spacious blocks of houses are elevated from 
the asphalt road, whatever image that one might have with the naming, collective residence 
(danchi), might fail him/her. Besides the fact that they share the same sources of utilities, the 
more than sixty houses in this formerly farm-land are all differently designed and shielded by 
neatly trimmed spindle trees or azalea bushes. In the early 1980s, when the major conglomerates 
in the country, “Kōwa,” developed the area, these houses were immediately sold out as “luxuri-
ous” properties. Of course this luxury shrivels in front of the custom-made aura of the ridge-road 
grand-bourgeoisie’s. Like the banker Machidas, the Kōwa residents are all employed “salary 
men” and their families, albeit elite ones. As they moved here in the 1980s, they were interpel-
lated by such a mass-entertainment as TV shows. Everyone whom I have talked to mentions “To 
the Wives on Fridays” (Kinyōbi no Tsuma-tachi e) in particular, a popular drama series in the 
1980s on the comfortable everyday of suburbs—home parties, big dogs, and extra-marital affairs 
among bankers, business owners, physicians and their “housewives.” According to “Mrs. Kotaki,” 
Machida’s backdoor neighbor, the female residents of this collective residence still enjoy what 
she calls “celebrity competition” (celeb kyōsō), that is, flaunty fashions and lifestyles for mutual 
recognition. Perhaps reminiscent of the time when bridge was still an aristocratic pastime, these 
females would invite each other for bridge parties over home-baked coffee-cakes on Wedgwood 
plates. They would also go to tennis or Italian restaurants together “in all frills and jewelries,” 
Kotaki frowns.  
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 On an early summer day, when I visit her house, Kotaki herself puts on worn-out cot-
ton pants and jean shirt, with the sleeves casually rolled up. With no makeup and short-cut, gray-
ish dark hair, this small woman in her 50s looks boyish. Consciously then, Machida’s neighbor-
hood best-friend, Kotaki is different from other female neighbors. 
 Kotaki accompanied her elite businessman husband to live in Düseldorf for five years. 
When he was then dispatched to Singapore, she remained in Toda with their high-school-age 
children, in order to prepare them for the college entrance examinations. The family then flew 
back and forth between Singapore and Yokohama for three years. Now, after retirement, her 
husband is “out there” in China, “doing whatever volunteer works he likes,” according to Mrs. 
Kotaki. 
 The celebrity competition among Japanese wives was everywhere, she says—in 
Düseldorf and Singapore, in addition to Yokohama. Upon leaving Germany, every one of her 
friend wives of elite Japanese businessmen bought Missen tableware. She knows somebody who 
renovated her home back in Japan, so that the expensive furniture that she and her husband 
bought in Germany would fit. Proudly, Kotaki refused to join the competition of snobbery. 
“Heck! They are useless for tea over rice!” said she then, according to her, dismissing expensive 
Missen bowls. Tea over rice or ochazuke is a supposedly “Japanese” dish with the nuance of 
folkish simplicity and care-free masculinity.4 Instead of “frills and jewelries,” Kotaki would 
                                                                  
4  Some of the most impressive tea over rice or rather tea-flavored gruel in literature might be consumed by 
those elder “untouchable” (burakumin) women in Kenji Nakagami’s Nichirin no Tsubasa (Tokyo: Shincho Sha, 
1984), who I guess are assigned the job of representing not only the untouchable class’s lives but also some 
generalized “folk” culture of local Japan. At this point in his career, Nakagami seems to be obsessed with a pseudo-
structuralist map of Japan, constituted of the peripheries that are supposed to be lower-statused and/or folkish and 
the center that is supposed to be inhabited by the emperor, the summit of the status-system and the essence of the 
folkish-national culture of Japan. Nonetheless, in this particular text, the routinized making of the morning o-kai-san 
(the dialect for gruel) and the rough aroma of its not-so-sophisticated bancha tea are “alive”⎯thus impressive at 
least to me. Perhaps Nakagami’s introduction of the olfactory sense contributes to his seeming strategy to forge a 
certain unity with the reader. “Music,” Alan Tansman would say, which “inextricably links being and meaning. 
Music speaks directly, without the interference of ideas. Music’s ‘general state of arousal and its simultaneity’ in 
Anthony Storr’s words, triggers Freud’s oceanic moment, when the boundaries between self and world collapse…” 
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“arm [herself] with Goethe and Nietzsche” and discuss with German intellectuals, according to 
her.  
 She says that it was also the time when she learned that it was difficult to explain the 
“Japanese thing” (nihon no koto) to her German friends, since “the Japanese culture is negative.” 
“Look at the tatami-matted room” (nihon zashiki), she says. “We [the Japanese] don’t have a 
bed; we don’t have drawers. There is no table; there is no chair. The Japanese culture is ‘minus.’ 
You have to keep subtracting.” As we sip her perfectly brewed green tea on her living room ta-
tami mattress that afternoon, surely do I see no object in the about 30 square foot room but a 
good-sized pot of bamboo. Shooting almost to the ceiling and rustling its dry leaves in the re-
freshing breeze coming through the open window, the bamboo tree is beautifully and unusually 
presented. Perhaps it is the “Germans”’ or “westerners”’ eyes that Kotaki adopts here, in order to 
produce “Japan” or generic “Asia” with its orientalist symbol, bamboo. It might be that Kotaki 
thinks that the adopted eyes of the orientalists let her reconsider the consumerist culture, in 
which she has been embedded. The thought of tea over rice, for instance, made her resistant to 
the attraction of Missen, according to her. The concept of the “Japanese room” seems to be simi-
larly effective against the idea of acquiring more furniture and interior goods, since the concept 
of such a room requires her to “keep subtracting.” Ultimately though, the loan idea of the west’s 
Japan cannot make her transcend the snobbery competition among her shopping-addicted female 
friends. Such an idea has long been appropriated by the country’s mass-cultural industries. Bam-
boo, cherry blossoms, the color red, and other “Asian” motifs are eagerly consumed in contem-
porary Japan, the misrecognized subject of the “western” culture. Even Kotaki’s decision not to 
purchase according to the supposedly subtracting tradition of Japan will be promoted by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
According to Tansman, Nakagami’s fascism should be found in the oceanic moment of music that Nakagami seems 
to try to establish in his texts. See Tansman, “Filament of Fascism in Postwar Times,” The Aesthetics of Japanese 
Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); p.270.   
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2010s Japanese industries as the “eastern” thought of dan sha ri (to decline new acquisition of, to 
give up possession of, and to cut off attachment to things). Related books are well sold; the recy-
cling business is booming.5 One of my female friends in her 50s set a goal one day to throw 
away 1,000 objects hers within a year, the kind of goal that is not so unusual in these days. Run-
ning out of the objects to throw away toward the end of the year, she apparently got rid of at least 
some of her family albums. Given this level of determination, the boom cannot be explained 
solely by orientalist nationalism. The determination probably reflects the desperation of the ma-
terially slashed and deprived economy of the post-1990s. The whole country seems truly desper-
ate⎯many people literally cannot afford for luxuries anymore, while industries have to survive, 
holding on to the simple fact that one obviously cannot keep subtracting; one has to start pur-
chasing again in order to fill the lack that the subtraction has made (of course one cannot pur-
chase new family albums though). There is still pleasure, in other words, of replacing old belong-
ing, of pretending seihin or purity in poverty, of losing oneself in excess, the excess of discarding 
the massive number of belonging to purchase massively again.6 
 In addition to the orientalist Japan, Kotaki seems to use inversed gender-signs of the 
bourgeoisie in order to refuse consumption⎯with no make-up, no frills, she is a black-belt kendo 
(a martial art) instructor. Since she is self-consciously a “tomboy,” she does not have to be com-
petitively consuming with her bourgeois girlfriends, she would say. Or rather, her reluctance to 
consume might be a tactic for gender-inversion.  
                                                                  
5  According to Nikkei Woman Online, one of the dan sha ri advocates, Hideko Yamashita’s Shin Katazuke 
Jutsu: Dan Sha Ri (Tokyo: Magazine House, 2009) sold more than 150,000 copies as of 2011. See Nikkei’s 
“Dokusha no ‘Real Dan Sha Ri’ Before & After,” www.http//wol.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/special/20101125/109339/, 
1/17/2011. 
6  Seihin was the term invented by the writer and German literature scholar Kōji Nakano in 1995 in his best-
selling Seihin no Shisō (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū Sha, 1995). Its obvious morality aside, the book hints at 
neonationalism in idealizing the all-out war poverty of ordinary Japanese as one of the prime examples of the seihin.  
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 Mutsumi Machida shows similar traces of having reflected on the relation between 
consumption and gender. In the backdoor of the Kotakis’, the Machida household is rather dark 
and stuffy⎯there are no plants, no hangings, no cupboards, no other decorations that ordinary 
bourgeois homemakers in contemporary Japan seem to be eager to purchase and introduce into 
their houses. Her place impresses me with her (intentional) neglect of the interior⎯the curtains 
are always left drawn, while the somewhat worn-out carpet in the living room is a congested mo-
saic of piled documents and open books.  
 As we sit together in one of the formless couches in the afternoon when I first visit 
her, Machida’s husband serves us flavorful coffee in cups and saucers. Tall and handsome, in his 
mid-50s, this former banker was forced to resign, after “Keizō Hirata,” the vice president of the 
“Toda Neighborhood Association,” threatened his bank that he would withdraw all the 100 mil-
lion yen (1 million dollars) that he had deposited there; the condition was that the wife Machida 
withdraw her trial against the association. As I will describe later, the lawsuit is a highly political 
one, based on Mrs. Machida’s accusation that the association violates the Japanese Constitutional 
principle of the church-state separation. Mr. Machida quit the job instead, in order to save both 
the bank’s business and his wife’s politics. 
 “You know, we housewives are bored...,” says Mrs. Machida, casually sipping the 
coffee that her husband made. Mr. Machida politely sits next to her as usual—like a bureaucratic 
assistant to an appointed politician, he sits there to support his wife’s speech with adequate pa-
pers and other evidence. Before a dozen of her supporters and on other occasions, when Mrs. 
Machida is expected to make a speech, I have seen this couple inverting gender relations this 
way (the wife as the subject and the husband as her supporter). But perhaps not completely. The 
scattered books on the floor and other symptoms of the interior-neglect seem to show that the 
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wife’s political masculinization does not accompany the husband’s feminization. Consumption 
and reproduction seem to be simply abandoned in this household, except at least for the hus-
band’s service of coffee.    
 “We housewives are bored,” Mrs. Machida still says, “bored enough to start tedious 
lawsuits like mine.” Rebelliousness and obedience sound so deeply convoluted in her expression 
“housewives” that I cannot help but glimpse at her face. The corners of her lips are pulled down, 
as I will be seeing them often from now on. As I look back now, I do not ever remember her 
smiling. Obviously, cynicism is the way for her to socially solve the amazing contradiction be-
tween the implied will to refuse assigned roles and the expressed willingness to comply (by call-
ing herself a housewife and obasan). The abandoned bourgeois interior or the coffee-serving 
husband must be another way⎯the nominal way⎯to solve the same contradiction. Both the 
nominal inversion and everyday cynicism may ultimately serve the gender relations of the socie-
ty by “giving a break” to the rebellion-minded Machida. After all, she “has never worked out-
side,” as she says with a class-conscious mixture of pride and condescension. As it is usually the 
bureaucrat’s knowledge that has real, manipulative power over the elected politician, it is the fi-
nancial power of the bourgeois husband that generally determines the terms of his relation with 
his wife. The ruby ring is thus worn, the congealment of the husband’s financial power and the 
wife’s compliance, comfort, security⎯and nonetheless, resentment.  
 In the case of Kotaki, she explains that her ultimate submission to the bourgeois norm 
of gender is to “let a long thing wind itself around [her]” (nagai mono niwa makarero), that is, to 
let herself be incorporated by the system. While martial arts, for instance, are usually practiced 
by and associated with males and she seems to be conscious about the aesthetics of her black-belt 
reversal of gender, she says she has never doubted her job as a homemaker. “Ha ha, impressed 
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that my house is neat and clean?” she laughs, “I’m usually pretty focused on chores throughout 
the morning. And then in the afternoon, I sit back and read or go see a movie. [Chores are] im-
portant, you know⎯Nietzsche is important, but things of the house (ie no koto) are also im-
portant.”  
 So, these two friends are not so different from their female neighbors from whom 
they seem to try to separate themselves. Even though they refuse to join these neighbors’ com-
petitive consumption-practices, Machida and Kotaki are consciously housewives. The neighbors 
competitively consume, in order to fulfill their role as bourgeois housewives. Within the same 
role of housewives, these two groups of women seem to emphasize their respective attitudes to-
ward consumption as the point of their difference. Particularly Kotaki expresses her desires to 
negate consumption, at least the “celebrity” type of competitive consumption, whereas she states 
that she performs other chores with as much “focus” (shūchū) as other females in her position 
would have. It seems that it is the excess of the celebrity consumption that Kotaki is refus-
ing⎯otherwise, she is a willing consumer of “Japan,” for instance, its image sold in the forms of 
bamboo, subtracted tatami rooms, and tea over rice. Neither does Machida seem to reject the act 
of consumption per se (e.g. the ruby ring)⎯she just seems to be selective in terms of the areas in 
her life in which she spends money. As for the celeb-type of females, they appear to know nei-
ther selection nor subtraction. They seem to consume blindly as their industry-molded instincts 
dictate. Their molded instincts seem to augment and proliferate, as soon as they meet each other 
at the intersection between the Kwakiutl potlatch-excess of showiness and the mass-reproductive 
mechanicity of mutual commodification.7  
                                                                  
7  According to Marcel Mauss, “In a certain number of cases, it is not even a question of giving and returning 
gifts, but of destroying, so as not to give the slightest hint of desiring your gift to be reciprocated. Whole boxes of 
olachen (candlefish) oil or whale oil are burnt, as are houses and thousands of blankets. The most valuable copper 
objects are broken and thrown into the water, in order to put down and to ‘flatten’ one’s rival. In this way one not 
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 The excess and mechanicity of these females’ consumption reflect the underlining 
mode of mechanical reproduction, in which the larger society operates, and particularly the me-
chanically efficient division of gendered labor. Among highly specialized, gendered consumers 
(or producers), the pressure to be the same, to be competitive, with others in the same gendered 
category of consumers (or producers) will be more intense than among cross-categorized people. 
Deprived of any better occupational chance than staying at home with “three meals a day and 
afternoon naps” (sanshoku hirune tsuki) or relieved from household chores to be totally expend-
able “corporate worriers” (kigyō senshi), bourgeois women and men in postwar Japan have been 
made to be lifeless copies of each other within their own gender group. Freud says organisms in 
general are equipped with what he calls the “death instinct” (thanatos), which makes the organ-
ism eternally repeat some acts unto its death. Unless it is “repressed,” “sublimated,” or distracted 
by the “life instinct” (eros) of sexuality, the death instinct dominates the organism and contains it 
in the primordial pleasure of sameness sans evolution, sans diversity.8 While sublimation or di-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
only promotes oneself, but also one’s family, up the social scale. It is therefore a system of law and economics in 
which considerable wealth is constantly being expended and transferred.” It is interesting that both the Kwakiutl 
chiefs and Toda wives are situated in the kind of context in which meaning of each individual object has lost. 
“Thousands of blankets” introduced into and used in the Kwakiutl society may not be comparable with mass-
reproduced accessories or dresses consumed in contemporary Japan, but both categories of objects seem to be 
equally rendered to numbers and quantities, with which to measure one’s position in the “social scale.” Just as the 
blankets would not be used to warm one’s body, Gaultier of Channel dresses would not be appreciated for its 
function to cover one’s body only. See Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 
trans. by W. D. Halls and forward by Mary Douglas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); p.37.   
8   Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, intro. by Gregory Zilboorg, with a 
biographical intro. by Peter Gay (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1989(1920)); see esp. pp.40-51. “But how 
is the predicate of being ‘instinctual’ related to the compulsion to repeat?” Freud starts his discussion (p.43). “It 
seems…that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity 
has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, 
or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life” (p.43; italics original). The “earlier 
state of things” that Freud talks about here turns out to be “inanimate” conditions of death⎯“we shall be compelled 
to say that ‘the aim of all life is death’ and, looking backwards, that ‘inanimate things existed before living ones’” 
(p.46; italics original). He continues, “For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being constantly created 
afresh and easily dying, till decisive external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the still surviving 
substance to diverge ever more widely from its original course of life and to make ever more complicated détours 
before reaching its aim of death” (p.46; italics original). He seems to imagine organisms’ ideal state, death, as a 
simple state, from which “diver[sion],” “complicat[ion]” and “détours” have gradually occurred; the death instinct is 
the instinct to remove diversion, render complication, and cut detours. To me, Freud seems to have been 
unconsciously thinking about the issue of the commodity and inchoately envisioning the problem of fascism. 
  
192 
versification could produce something truly transcendental or heterogeneous, these kinds of 
products are not what are demanded in the age of mechanical reproduction. Mono-categorical 
labor among only men or women in such an age seems to be dangerously death-oriented in the 
Freudian sense, but efficiently fitting the age and its demands.   
 Kotaki’s Japan or Machida’s gender-inversion might be meant to trim the excess and 
halt the mechanicity of their neighboring consumer-robots. One can probably call Kotaki and 
Machida’s strategies self-protective⎯protective from the mechanizing power of everyday fas-
cism. It is not that Machida and Kotaki do not know the dangerous attraction of that power; it is 
the attraction of disguising their sexuality in the normative obasan appearance. It is only that 
Machida and Kotaki seem to try to slow the velocity with which other females seem to jump at 
one new image of the housewife after another and exchange these images among themselves. 
Machida and Kotaki’s goal is the same self-molding, albeit into one particular housewife-image. 
The image of their selection, that of obasan, seem to make a difference in speed, when the oba-
san is supposed to be an asexual, i.e. non-exchangeable, existence (Although an obasan can be 
substituted for another obasan, her image would not circulate easily in the market of sexuality). I 
am not sure if the celeb-type of married females are willing to call themselves anything but 
housewives, the generic term for home-makers that are open to sexuality (as in the “Wives on 
Fridays”).9 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Compare his idea of death with that discussed by Jean-Luc Nancy in his Inoperative Community. ed. by Peter 
Connor, trans. by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney, forward by Christopher 
Fynsk (Minneapolis and Oxford; University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
9  Artistically, the oba-san dynamic between the desire to be commoditized like others and determination not 
to be substituted for others is played out in such films as Barber Yoshino (Dir. by Naoko Ogigami; Tokyo: Euro 
Space, 2003), Cha no Aji (Dir. by Katsuhito Ishii; Tokyo: Clockworks and Rentrack Japan, 2004), and Kamome 
Shokudō (Dir. by Naoko Ogigami; Tokyo: Media Suits, 2006). A mature Banana Yoshimoto, a novelist, is also good 
at describing this dynamic with nuances⎯see, for instance, “Ashi Tebichi” in her Nankuru Naku Nai (Tokyo: 
Shinchō Sha, 2007), pp.53-77. 
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 It seems that Machida’s lawsuit is another solution with which a conservative mind in 
a suburb might attempt to tame the excessive force of everyday fascism. To tame the fascist 
force, which seems to inevitably emerge in the vacuum made by the super-accelerated produc-
tion and consumption of mechanically reproduced products among different gender groups, the 
state of Japan has prepared the ideology and institution of the neighborhood association. Oppos-
ing the association’s “religiosity,” Machida’s lawsuit joins the state’s project, albeit from the 
critical standpoint, the project to articulate the mass-reproduced unconsciousness of the suburban 
everyday. Such articulation is to be made in terms of the consecrated nation and moralized gen-
ders. Through the association’s discourses and practices, as well as their criticism by Machida, 
the smooth surface of the commodity’s circulation is symbolically demarcated into parts of the 
national body (kokutai). The neighborhood associations throughout the country are supposed to 
be such parts, the locally-anchored “cells” of the kokutai body. The ideological organization of 
the everyday by the neighborhood association is not concerning localization only. The associa-
tion intends also to correct a certain ambiguity that is built in the capitalist division of gender. 
That is, commodity logic, on which modern capitalism is predicated, cannot provide an answer 
to the question, “why does the production/reproduction have to be divided primarily along the 
gender line and not according to other socio-cultural distinctions?” Capital surely divides, while 
it “equalizes,” humans and things. Yet, in order for a certain line of labor division to be stabilized, 
one needs the power of extra-economic principles. It might be tempting to see sex as one of such 
principles, as Friedrich Engels famously does, but perhaps the biological reasoning cannot ex-
plain more than conception and labor⎯other reproductive jobs could be shouldered by males as 
well, biologically speaking.10 If it is not biology, one might further wonder, then would it be the 
                                                                  
10  Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1972(1884)). Henrietta L. Moore summarily introduces other criticisms of Engels made by various feminists⎯see 
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symbolic extension of the biological facts of female conception and labor, which is inevitable 
and responsible for gendered commodification?11 The idea of symbolism seems to me to indicate 
an intervention by the society⎯this kind of argument might be showing the arbitrariness, rather 
than inevitability, of the gendered division of labor. The aporia of the market, which is then con-
ventionalized by history⎯this is how I conceptualize the gendered division of labor in a capital-
ist society or rather its conventionalized stability and duration. This is the view that sees a built-
in contradiction in a capitalist relation of gender, the contradiction that the more some historical 
factors in a given society try to fix and stabilize the gender division, the more efficient the pro-
duction and reproduction processes become, augmenting the death-instinctual automaticity in 
each process and threatening to abstract and erase the historically made gender distinction, the 
possible abstraction into the general mass condition. In the modern to contemporary Japanese 
case, it is the ideology of the neighborhood association that has tried to fortify and ended up in 
endangering the capitalist division of gender by explaining that genders are divided and hier-
archized according to the organic national order of the kokutai. Division and hierarchization ac-
cording to organicisim is the working of corporatism. I will show how corporatist endeavors by 
the Toda neighborhood association has collaborated with Machida’s oppositional activism to 
ideologically organize and effectively cause everyday desires of fascism.    
 In the completely modern capitalist everyday of suburban Toda, the morality claimed 
by the neighborhood association or the religiosity of which Machida accuses must sound abrupt. 
As the kokutai body of the nation-state was one of the official ideologies of prewar Japan, the 
whole affair of the neighborhood association might seem to be anachronistic and irrelevant. Per-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
her Feminism and Anthropology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); p.46-9. 
11  See Sherry Ortner for this line of thought in her “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?” Michelle Z. 




haps the shock of abruptness and the anachronistic appearance of tradition are the conservatives’ 
strategies to halt the flow and mold the desires in and of the everyday. Before showing how the 
(probably) intentionally irrelevant institution of the neighborhood association works in re-
organizing the everyday rhythm of Toda Town, I will introduce a brief history of the institution 
in its relation with the prewar kokutai ideology.  
 
Incorporating the Everyday: The Neighborhood Association 
 Anachronism and supplementality have characterized the neighborhood association 
since its birth in the 1920s. When the country’s cultural industry was fledgling and masses start-
ed to appear in cities, prototypical associations emerged everywhere with the reactionary will to 
voluntarism and nostalgic yearning for communitarianism. It is common among scholars to lo-
cate the association’s root in the mutual surveillance system of the Group of Five (Go-nin Gumi) 
in the Edo era (1600-1868).12 But the association should rather be compared with its coeval, the 
consumer co-op, for instance, advocated by the French solidarity movement.13 Like the solidarity 
                                                                  
12  The view that traces the neighborhood association back to the Group of Five tends to be connected to the 
view that sees cultural continuity between these two institutions. Sociologists seem to be particularly drawn to the 
idea of finding the “cultural pattern” of Japan supposedly shown by the neighborhood association—see e.g. Tetsuo 
Ōmi, “Toshi no Chiiki Shūdan” in Shakai Kagaku Tōkyū, Vol.3, No.1, 1958: 225-6. More specifically, these 
sociologists say that the association is the lens through which to see “collectivism of the Japanese society,” which is 
the “remnant of [Japan’s] feudalism.” These quotes are respectively from Susumu Kurasawa, “Chōnai-kai Kenkyū 
no Igi to Kadai: Takagi Shōsaku Shi no Taisaku wo Yomu” in Shōsaku Takagi, Chōnai-kai Haishi to “Shin Seikatsu 
Kyōdō-tai no Kessei” (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2005), pp.1047-62; p.1049 and Hidefumi Tanaka in 
Hiroyuki Torigoe, Chi’iki Jichi-kai no Kenkyū (Kyoto: Minerva Shobō, 1994); p.34; note 14.  
What these theories cannot explain is the neighborhood association as a global, modern phenomenon. 
According to a friend of mine, as soon as he moves into a middle-class Connecticut suburb, “Kensington,” the 
“Kensington Association” left a welcome basket in front of his door⎯popcorns, pens and notepads, local business 
guides, and little towels. According to the “2013 KA Membership Dues,” “The Kensington Association celebrates 
its 66th year, 1947-2013, one of the oldest neighborhood associations in the country. We address all ‘quality of life’ 
issues including flooding, traffic, road conditions, commercial development at our borders, planning & zoning, 
historic preservation, area beautification, school donations, scholarships for Kensington students and many other 
programs/issues. / Become actively involved in the preservation of Kensington, by becoming an active and dues-
paying member of your Association” (unpublished). Many activities by the U.S. association seem to overlap with its 
counterpart in Japan, except for the planning and zoning and scholarship programs, perhaps.  
13  “Solidarity was a theme⎯indeed an ‘idée-force,’ in the expression of Alfred Fouliée,” says Dominick 
LaCapra. See his Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
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movement, the association at the start was characterized by its rivalry with the dispersing masses 
of the urban proletariat or the modernizing force in rural villages. In villages, well-to-do farmers 
mobilized voluntary power of the villagers to extend electric lines; in cities, suburban farmers or 
downtown merchants got together to build locally-based occupational groups.14  
 The communitarianism of these movements had to wait for the state’s appropriation 
in order to totalize themselves into the picture of the nation-state’s body. A manifestation of the 
will to integrate the post-Great Depression masses, the state’s appropriation of these moral com-
munities accompanied the ideology of their organic totality. Called kokutai, or literally the body 
of the nation-state, this totality was allegorically the body of the then sovereign of Japan, the em-
peror. The allegorical body of the emperor was ideologized to overlap with the actual geograph-
ical totality of the Japanese territory. The kokutai body was supposed to consist of the neighbor-
hood associations as the smallest moral geographical units, and then villages and towns as the 
associations’ congregates, and then cities, prefectures, etc. The bodily allegory was used to natu-
ralize the centralizing domination by the corporatist state. This centralization succeeded, carrying 
people’s longing for organicism, solidarity, and sacredness all the more after these had been dis-
appearing from the everyday.15  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1972); p.69-70. Marcel Mauss is known to have been drawn to the co-op movement⎯see David Graeber, Toward 
an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001); p.156. Mauss’ 
“Conclusion” in his Gift is filled with such sentences as “honour, disinterestedness, corporate solidarity are not vain 
words” or “Social security, the solicitude arising from reciprocity and co-operation, and that of the occupational 
grouping, of all those legal entities upon which English law bestows the name of ‘Friendly Societies”⎯all are of 
greater value than...the mere skimpy life that is given through the daily wages doled out by employers, and even 
better than capitalist saving…” (Ibid.; p.69). Structural functionalists, structuralists, and other fin de siècle social 
scientists were similarly entwined with desires to find organic solidarity once more in the midst of the massified 
society. See, e.g., Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, with an intro. by Lewis Coser, trans. by W. D. 
Halls (New York: The Free Press, 1984).  
14  See Shōichi Amemiya, “Kisei Seiryoku no Jiko Kakushin to Gleichschaltung: Sōryoku-sen Taisei to 
Chūkan-sō” in Yasushi Yamanouchi, Victor Koschmann and Ryūichi Narita eds. Sōryoku-sen to Gendai-ka (Tokyo: 
Kashiwa Shobō, 1995), pp.239-266; p.246-8 and 251. 
15  The thesis of the monolithic state and the idea of the neighborhood association as a functioning part of the 
state-monolith have been developed by political scientists in particular. Ritsuo Akimoto, for instance, argues that the 
association was an administrative “net” that the “all-out war” state cast over local Japan. See his Sensō to Minshū: 
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 Although gender is usually overlooked by conventional studies of the neighborhood 
association, I would argue that corporatism that involves the association cannot be fully under-
stood without taking into account its deeply gendered structure. Gender is one of the elements 
that make the corporatism of locality not just total but also hierarchical. This corporatism tried to 
crisscross the imagined totality of geographical/symbolic Japan with clearly demarcated and hi-
erarchized male/female spaces. If each community was supposed to be an organic part of the 
half-symbolic, half-geographical body of the kokutai, the community as such a part was also ide-
ologized to be aesthetically and politically representing the female sphere of reproduction. Here 
in this structure in which the hierarchical idea of gender was meant to base not only everyday 
lives but also the nation-state, one is seeing what was most pleasurable and anxious to the Taisho 
(1912-1925) Japanese⎯the blurring of the gender distinction, in addition to people’s geograph-
ical mobility, both of which the maturing economy had enabled. It is true that people in this peri-
od were not just massified⎯they were massified as the male and female masses. Just like today 
when capital interpellates Todan females as consumers and reproducers, Taisho females’ mass-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Taiheiyō Sensō-ka no Toshi Seikatsu (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1974); p.54. According to Akira Okada, such a net 
should be considered in the context of the overall history of the modern Japanese state, which has struggled to 
“grasp residents” through census registration (koseki) and other institutions. See his “Jichitai Gyōsei Shi: Shiryō wo 
shite Katara-shimeru” in Takagi, Ibid., pp.1063-75; p.1070.  
 Certainly, these political scientific studies of the neighborhood association in modern Japan lack the view 
of the subject. Ezra Vogel is one of the pioneers in this regard⎯see his Japan’s New Middle Class: The Salary Man 
and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). According to him, at least in the 
early postwar period the association was not an effective vehicle of people’s political participation, since the middle-
class Japanese focused on economic activities instead. Theodore Bestor in his Neighborhood Tokyo (Tokyo: 
Kodansha International, 1989) inherits Vogel’s thesis and argues that the postwar association has been meaningful 
(in the Geertzian sense) not so much to the bourgeois participants as to the petty bourgeois members. In his Molding 
Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), Sheldon 
Garon similarly sees the association in terms of the dialectic between the moralizing state and the anti-communist 
society. Mary Alice Haddad revisits the association from the perspective of the civil society, in which volunteering 
and other types of civil participation are the key to understand local lives in Japan. See her Politics and Volunteering 
in Japan: A Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
The political scientists’ focus on the state power should surely be supplemented by these studies of how 
such power is subjectified and practiced by individual participants. My study recasts these previous works by 
introducing the category of the everyday and the idea of fantasy that emerges from the everyday⎯the state and its 
subjects are corroborative at the fantastic as well as practical level in imagining such a thing as the body of the 
nation-state, of which the neighborhood association is supposed to be a part.  
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ness was expressed as that of female consumers, while female workers in the period were em-
ployed based on their capital-assigned role as reproducers (e.g. as nurses versus physicians). Yet 
an observer has to notice here that the gender difference was less accentuated, the more one de-
scended the class ladder; in mines, construction sites, or factories, the proletariat women worked 
as hard as their male colleagues.16 Even among the bourgeois members of the society, their de-
sires for and fears of the power of the commodity’s appearance were expressed in the form of the 
Takarazuka Theater, for example, in which the all-female troupe played both male and female 
roles.17 The gendered masses were perceived to be that ambiguous. Therefore, the state’s corpo-
ratism did not merely trace over the capitalist division of gender; I have said corporatism also 
hierarchized the genders. In addition to the organicist division of gender based on sex, this is 
probably a significant feature of corporatism, which is likely derived from the potentiality that 
the male and female masses can lose their gender at any time, like the tuxedo-clad “male” (otoko 
yaku) on the Takarazuka stage. Corporatists are perhaps those who fear that the gendered distinc-
tion made during the commodification process is not enough to mitigate the indiscriminate pow-
er that is also inherent in commodification, the power that is indiscriminate due to its emphasis 
on things’ appearance and not their substance. Extra-economical orders, such as a moral statist 
hierarchy, to corporatists might look to be a reliable stabilizer of gender in addition to the gen-
der-differentiating dynamic of commodification.  
                                                                  
16  Therefore, their contemporaries doubted female factory workers’ reproductive abilities. See Mariko Asano 
Tamanoi, Under the Shadow of Nationalism: Politics and Poetics of Rural Japanese Women (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 1998). 
17  See Jennifer Robertson, Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998). Takarazuka has a predecessor, an all-male, theatrical genre of 
kabuki. While Robertson attaches a certain, sexist connotation to the Japanese evaluation of kabuki higher than 
Takarazuka (pp.53-5), I would add that their discourse of kabuki authenticity might have something to do with these 
two forms of play’s timing⎯on the one hand, the newly produced Takarazuka represents the sensibility of 
mechanical reproduction. On the other hand, older kabuki in modern times stirs a nostalgia of the pre-mechanical 
reproductive order of the genders.  
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 Therefore, there was more to neighborhood corporatism than being a demarcator of 
neighborhoods as the female sphere. Corporatism in the neighborhood also endeavored to main-
tain the females’ neighborhood by letting the male leaders of the town represent females’ repro-
ductive/consumerist practices. The logic of the commodity per se cannot build such a representa-
tional hierarchy between males and females. In addition to the patriarchal ideology of the “fami-
ly nation” (kazoku kokka) that I have analyzed in Chapter 1, the corporatists resorted to the statist 
category of the public (kō)/private (shi).18 About the family nation ideology, recall that it tried to 
organize people according to their gender, status, age, or ethnicity. The allegory of a patriarchal 
family was employed to hierarchically order these categories; the high-statused, elder male Japa-
nese were meant to prevail in such an order. Using the female hands to distribute rations, making 
women clean the neighborhood, and letting them hold peer learning sessions of cooking, child-
bearing and -rearing, and so forth, the neighborhood association facilitated the process through 
which the imagined patriarchy of the nation was practiced in such a visceral space-time as the 
household or the neighborhood. Represented by elder male executives, the association replicated 
the national patriarchy as its monad, the second smallest after the household. The nation in turn 
was a kind of macrocosm, to which the patriarchal essence of the household or neighborhood 
was extended, the nation as a large family. So, the idea of the family nation ideologically suf-
ficed to secure the gender distinction and hierarchy among the masses. Corporatists still intro-
duced the public/private ideology additionally, in order to formerly check the female participa-
                                                                  
18  Of course, the statist subjugation of the female sphere was simultaneous with the nationalist valorization of 
the same sphere. According to Partha Chatterjee in his The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), in postcolonial Indian nationalism “The home was the 
principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of the national culture, and women must take the main 
responsibility for protecting and nurturing this quality” (p.126). A similar ideology of women as the “repository of 
national culture” was observable in prewar Japan, according to Tamanoi, Ibid. But different from the postcolonial 
Indian state, which Chatterjee says defined itself according to “the ideology of the modern liberal-democratic state” 
(p.10), the Japanese state at least since the 1920s might try to derive its self-definition from the newly advocated 
state-form of corporatism. Women in such a state were not used to juxtapose the concept of the cultural nation vis-à-
vis the modern state but were the symbolic basis of the public state itself.  
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tion in politics. The masses had to be gendered not only in terms of their socio-culturally as-
signed gender roles in a symbolic family of the nation, but also in terms of the politically as-
signed statuses of the male citizens and female subjects, the subjects without the right to partici-
pate in the state-centered politics.  
 Reading the Meiji Enlightenment thinker Yukichi Fukuzawa and Fukuzawa’s postwar 
inheritor Masao Maruyama, Victor Koschmann suggests that the public/private distinction 
throughout modern Japan be considered in light of  
 
the effect of a particular liberal tradition, perhaps founded in part by John Locke 
but contributed to importantly by Kant, Hegel, and others, in which freedom is 
sought through a process of self-discipline, or self-legislation, focused on the na-
tion-state. In this tradition, the exercise of self-discipline differentiates the pri-
vate world of desire from the public world of reason; family and civil society 
from the state; and also, significantly, the realm of the female from that of the 
male. Politics, moreover, tends to be limited to a narrow sphere of activity cen-
tered on the state.19 
 
In the first chapter of the current dissertation, I have discussed the subjected freedom of Kant. By 
“self-discipline,” Koschmann means this type of subjectification, on which Michel Foucault also 
elaborates.20 The argument that the modern ideology of the public/private erroneously and self-
contradictorily makes is that only men are able to self-discipline and that only men are thus qual-
ified for freedom. As for women, it is interesting that Koschmann uses the term, fetishism, in an 
effort to explain the “desire” that Fukuzawa and Maruyama think accompanies women and sub-
sequently depoliticizes women.21 The usage is made when Koschmann mentions the related con-
cept of wakudeki or literally “drowned attachment” that both Fukuzawa and Maruyama present. 
Neither Fukuzawa/Maruyama nor Koschmann is here mentioning the commodity. However, in-
spired by this terminology of fetishism, one might be tempted to think that in modern Japan, the 
                                                                  
19  See his Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996); 
p.181. 
20 See my discussion of Foucault in Chap.1. Koschmann mentions Foucault in his Revolution..., Ibid.; p.179.  
21  Koschmann, Ibid.; p.183. 
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conservatives such as Fukuzawa try to contain the irrational attraction to and fear of the com-
modity in the supposedly female sphere, the sphere of consumption and reproduction, without 
the realization that such irrationality must accompany the supposedly male sphere of production 
as well.22 If one would like to push this thought a little further, then the term of prewar citizen-
ship, the right to participate in the state-centered politics, could be defined in terms of the self-
disciplined distance that one (or a man) is supposed to be able to take from the drowned fetish-
ism among consumers (or women). In the same vein, one might be able to reconsider political 
representation as an act of the disciplinary taming of others (women), the controlled abstracting 
of others’ attachment. Although the all-out war paucity has to be taken into consideration, the 
control of the women’s consuming behaviors was indeed one of the biggest goals among the 
neighborhood associations at least during the Asia-Pacific War. As an important institution in the 
state corporatist Imperial Rule Association between 1940 and 1945, the association promoted the 
slogan “Luxury Is Our Enemy” (Zeitaku wa Teki da) in an attempt to cut the consumerist excess 
and the excessive fetishization of the commodity. When the fetishism of the commodity, or at 
least generic desires as Koschmann terms it, was thus assigned to women and the citizen’s free-
dom of political participation was exclusively assigned to men, the association was the vanguard 
of this gender categorization and representation. The association aspired to be the foundation of 
the state-corporatist hierarchy as the first public sphere to represent the private desires. From the 
association’s male leaders’ representation of neighborhood females, this representational hierar-
chy of the sublimated private started to build up⎯from the association to the town, from the 
town to the city, the private element was supposed to be attenuated. So was women’s participa-
                                                                  
22  In previous chapters, I have discussed my view that commodity fetishism motivates both the producer and 
consumer in modern capitalism. 
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tion in politics. Still the hierarchy of public representation was based on the pri-
vate⎯consumption, reproduction, and females⎯and thus looked organic.23  
 Thus, starting as relatively straightforward, communitarian reactions to moderniza-
tion and its displacement, the neighborhood association toward and during the war grew to be the 
foundation of a dynamic socio-political system of gender, the state, the nation, and their corpo-
ratism. Again, this system was allegorized to be the emperor’s body. Reflecting corporatism’s 
totalizing and grading nature, the emperor as an allegory was the most original patriarch of all 
and also the supremely public figure, signifying not just the possibility of national unification but 
also the location of the apex in the unified nation-state’s political representational realm. The or-
dinary Japanese accepted such an allegory and even attempted to climb up the imperial hierarchy 
through symbolical self-masculinization, status-raising marriages, and others.24 At the same time, 
they competed with the hierarchizing momentum of corporatism by appropriating the emperor’s 
sign for their death-communal movement that aimed at “equalizing” men and women (see Chap-
ter 1). The gendering and localizing grid of corporatism, the neighborhood association, every-
where stood in front of such a movement, representing the bourgeois interest in lands, houses, 
and good neighborhoods for education. Patriarchy and the public/private distinction promoted 
the bourgeois property formation, since the types of gendered division of labor, which these 
ideologies effected, fit and accentuated what capitalism promoted⎯the labor-divided efficiency 
                                                                  
23  Of course, the statist subjugation of the female sphere was simultaneous with the nationalist valorization of 
the same sphere. According to Partha Chatterjee in his The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), in postcolonial Indian nationalism “The home was the 
principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of the national culture, and women must take the main 
responsibility for protecting and nurturing this quality” (p.126). A similar ideology of women as the “repository of 
national culture” was observable in prewar Japan, according to Tamanoi, Ibid. But different from the postcolonial 
Indian state, which Chatterjee says defined itself according to “the ideology of the modern liberal-democratic state” 
(p.10), the Japanese state at least since the 1920s might try to derive its self-definition from the newly advocated 
state-form of corporatism. Women in such a state were not used to juxtapose the concept of the cultural nation vis-à-
vis the modern state but were the symbolic basis of the public state itself. 
24  The question that women with upward mobility asked was whether and how they could contribute to the 
public. More discussion to follow.  
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based on gendered appearances. The death-communal gender-equivalence was of course similar-
ly based on commodity logic, yet there was something extra-capitalist in its fundamentalism. 
Though it might have started as the farmers’ or petty bourgeois movement of nostalgia, the 
neighborhood association toward the end of the war had been fully subsumed under bourgeois 
statist auspices.  
 The neighborhood association perished in 1947 according to the Allied Forces’ Gen-
eral Headquarters (GHQ)’s theory that the association as a member apparatus of the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Association was responsible for “militarizing” the ordinary Japanese. In the 
1950s, as soon as the GHQ withdrew and the country regained its sovereignty, the association 
started to be re-established all over the country. The resurrected association might seem to have 
lost its fundamental significance in the new nation-state of Japan. This nation-state was that of 
democratic nationalism, in which the idea of the public and the patriarch no longer integrated 
men and women. The neighborhood association might seem just an irrelevant remnant of the past 
in the booming economy.25 Or, the association might look to be the “other” space, in which eco-
nomic “losers” gathered for status- (versus class-) construction.26  
 Nevertheless, the association to me appears to have continuously been the center of 
the everyday national formation, especially to the degree that this nation is desired to be hierar-
chical. When the new nation is supposed to be democratic, of course the prewar neighborhood 
techniques of the public/private dichotomization and patriarchal hierarchization of men and 
women are not explicitly mentioned by the postwar association of the neighborhood. The post-
war conservatives who gather in the neighborhood association rather imply these prewar systems 
in their new and old “religious” discourses of the nation. As I will discuss below, religion, or 
                                                                  
25  See Vogel, Ibid. 
26  See Bestor, Ibid.   
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Shinto in this case, is the nexus of different imaginations of the postwar nation. The conserva-
tives seem to participate in this competition by adopting the idea of Shinto as a tool to consecrate 
the concept of national authorities, as a momentum to hierarchize the space-time of the nation. 
The prewar patriarchy and public/private duality seem to be absorbed and developed by this dis-
course of the religiously sacred nation under the divine or at least central emperor, which the 
neighborhood association and other conservative actors advocate for.  
 Observing a similarly hierarchical momentum in the turn-of-the-last-century milieu of 
Indonesian nationalism, James Siegel remarks that “the wish for nationalist hierarchy is the wish 
that language and the world coincide.”27 Nationalism, according to him, is based on what he calls 
the “power of communication”⎯the power of signs, appearance versus content, or exchange-
value versus use-value, which renders everyone equivalent at least on the printed surface of the 
imagined nation, as in Benedict Anderson’s nation imagined through the newspaper metonymy 
(see Chapter 2).28 Simultaneously an “impulse to hierarchy…occurs within the development of 
nationalism,” the impulse to domesticate the excessive production and circulation of signs that 
can disguise, lie, leak, and proliferate.29 Remember from my examples that not all the women 
who shop in the Rainbow Garden are actually bourgeois; even those working women in the “pro-
ject” housing become bourgeois by purchasing the bourgeois signs of comfort. The neighbor-
hood association in postwar Japan represents the hierarchical nationalist impulse to remove these 
disguises and limit other excesses that their nationalism has caused. The mold into which such an 
impulse might like to contain the nationalist excesses is corporatism⎯the new corporatism of the 
gendered and communitarian nation. 
                                                                  
27  Siegel, “The Wish for Hierarchy,” Ibid., pp.161-180; p.180. 
28  See Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London and 
New York: Verso, 1999(1983)). 




The Shinto Neighborhood of the Neo-Corporatist Nation-State 
 The thesis of hierarchical nationalism pursues the contradiction between the equiva-
lence-oriented movement to realize the people’s nation and the order-seeking impetus to grade 
the people. While the postwar neighborhood association aspires to be the basic and original unit 
of the people’s nation, the association also intends to be the conservative and reactionary advo-
cate for the emperor’s nation. Different ideas of Shinto are the key to understand the postwar as-
sociation as the arena in which equivalence-oriented nationalism competes with the nationalists’ 
contradictory promotion of hierarchies.   
 Let us examine these relations in what is called the “jade fence” (tama gaki) that the 
“Toda Ward United Associations of Neighborhood” (Toda-Ku Rengō Chōnai Kai), including the 
Toda association, constructed in the Yawata Shrine in the town of Toda. The united associations 
donated the supposedly symbolically precious piece of slate, the jade fence, in 1990 upon the 
death of the emperor Showa (1925-1989) and the enthronement of his son, Heisei (whose per-
sonal name is Akihito; Heisei is Akihito’s reign’s name). The etched surface of the dark green-
gray slate, approximately 2 yards square, reads as follows⎯ 
 
It is awe-inspiring that in November of the second year of Heisei, the one hun-
dred twenty fifth [emperor of Heisei] held the enthronement ritual and the ritual 
to present his reign’s first rice to the gods. Coincidentally, this was the year of 
two thousand six hundred fifty in the imperial calendar. As an embodiment of 
the people’s insurmountable joy, we humbly build and donate this jade fence. 
 
 
Heisei is mentioned here also as a temporal unit, gengō, which counts each emperor’s reign as a 
meaningful period of time. The “second year of Heisei” is the gengō way to denote the year 1990 
A.D., since Akihito was enthroned as Heisei in 1989 A.D. Whereas the gengō is ordinarily used 
in contemporary Japan side by side with the Gregorian Calendar, another temporal system men-
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tioned in the slate, the “imperial calendar” (kōki), is not. Probably due to the kōki’s clearly impe-
rial origin (1872), as compared to the gengō system that has longer history beyond the modern 
times, the kōki was abolished upon the collapse of the empire in 1945. A designated rival of the 
Gregorian Calendar, the kōki sets its origin in the mythical figure, Jimmu, the “first” emperor 
from some three thousand years ago. The kōki aggregates the gengō periods into a unitary flow 
of time, perhaps to create the impression that the country has continuously been under the current 
royal family’s reign. The “donors,” as they sign so on the slate, say that they built the slate relief 
in the “year of two thousand six hundred fifty” in this currently repressed calendar of imperial 
Japan. By referring to the imperial calendar, these donors who are the united associations of the 
Toda Ward neighborhoods, seem to show their willingness to subject themselves to the prewar 
imperial order. This order is narrated in terms of neither the private/public dichotomy nor the pa-
triarchal familial hierarchy, but by the religious category of the sacred/profane⎯the “ritual to 
present his [Heisei’s] reign’s first rice to [Shinto] gods” (ōname sai). The religioized emperor is 
consistent with an aspect of the kōki temporality; Jimmu the original emperor and many others 
that appear in the collection of myths that the kōki refers to (Kojiki) are supposed to be divine. As 
a supposedly remote descendant of these emperor-gods, Heisei could claim his divinity, accord-
ing to the kōki ideology. Besides the kōki calendar and the ōname ritual, the religious idioms are 
abundant in the slate. Take a look at the inscription of the relief, its Rococo embellishment made 
from “humble” and “honorary” suffixes and postfixes (kenjōgo and keigo respectively).30 The 
writing that is so humble and respectful that it eschews mentioning the emperor or his reign by 
name is etched with the so-called “Shinto character” (Shinto tai), suggesting that its deference is 
of the religious nature. The Shinto character is a form of writing that combines old Chinese and 
                                                                  
30  About the relation between the kenjōgo and keigo system and the postwar emperor’s socio-cultural status, 
see Carol Gluck, “Tennō Sei to Babel no Tō” in Sekai, January 2000, pp.129-133. 
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Japanese katakana, a system of phonetic writing. To ordinary Japanese, the Shinto character 
might be the reminder of the long-abandoned, prewar Japanese writing, which similarly used old 
Chinese and katakana Japanese (kyūji).31 But to Shinto practitioner, the Shinto character is dif-
ferent from the kyūji Chinese-katakana system in its supposedly religious meaningfulness. The 
use of Shinto characters implicitly show the users’ deference to the emperor as the supposedly 
highest priest and god of Shinto.32 
 How should one think of the religiosity of the slate? Why does the neighborhood 
seem to try to produce religiosity in the midst of the otherwise completely commodified every-
day? What is the nature of this “religion” anyway, when it is laced with anti-westernism (e.g. the 
kōki system as an intended alternative to the Gregorian Calendar) and traditionalism? Is Shinto 
here a religion or the source of a certain cultural authenticity? Prior to 1945, religious logic and 
rhetoric were indeed used to create and represent people’s desires for the patriarchal authority 
and the sanctioned idea of the public. Could the Todan slate be considered as a case of the “re-
turn of the repressed,” with repression here being the establishment of democracy in 1945? Is the 
sacredness of the prewar and postwar instances of religion the same thing? And again, why do 
the Toda associations lend themselves as one of the sites in which these questions are raised and 
contemplated?  
 During the period it was constructed, the slate was not alone in representing the po-
tentially uncanny religiosity of the emperor. Heisei would legitimize his new reign with the so-
called three sacred treasures (sanshu no jingi) of red agate, mirror, and sword, which were sup-
posed to have been bequeathed to him from the god-emperors of the mythical era. In addition to 
the above-mentioned ōname rice ritual, Heisei’s vow at the imperial spirit’s palace (kōrei den) 
                                                                  
31  Postwar Japanese adopt the combination of Chinese and hiragana, another system of phonetic “alphabets.” 
32  Concerning the shinto concepts of the emperor, see Shinobu Ōe, Yasukuni Jinja (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
1984); p.78.  
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similarly impressed 1990s Japan with the emperorship’s religious nature. Perhaps it was a sheer 
coincidence that those heavily mass-mediated items and rites of emperorship (though their imag-
es were prohibited) created the impression of a sudden burst of the religious in 1989 and 1990, 
upon such an occasion as funeral at least, the usually religion-required occasion. If one pays 
closer attention to what the media, and through the media, the people meant by religion, one 
could see that the seemingly new discursive field of religion was not that new or opportunistic. 
These discourses’ consistency with democratic principles would be seen in the fact that the reli-
gious parts of the funerary and enthroning rituals were conducted and represented as the royal 
family’s private affairs. This is where the theory of the uncanny does not quite fit; the state, 
while having regulated and facilitated these rituals, was not meant to be the signified sacred of 
these rituals, unlike the prewar case. Shinto as the emperor’s private affair took on a more pro-
found significance to the people than saving the state and emperor from any accusation of the 
church-state violation, due to the postwar logic of the emperor as the national cultural symbol of 
Japan. Thus the people through media discussed the “imperial spirit” (kōrei) together with the 
assumed spirit of the nation; what the emperor wore, ate, enunciated in the series of those rituals 
were connected to the supposed tradition of the larger society. As the whole nation watched and 
various ideologies interpreted, Shinto’s religiosity was displaced into Japan’s nationality, nation-
ality that was partially overlapped yet not quite identical with the patriarchy of the prewar nation. 
One can probably say that postwar Japan’s overall discourse of the popular nation (i.e. the nation 
as people’s, as compared to either the patriarch emperor’s nation or the state’s nation) found a 
renewed, religious way to express and consecrate its force upon the emperor’s death and en-
thronement. In this Durkheimean understanding of religion, or rather of the sacred society, the 
concept of the nation contains such force as to fit even the religious discourse of the sacred.33 In 
                                                                  
33  Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. and w/ and intro. by Karen E. Fields 
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this interpretation, the Toda associations can be thought of as contributing yet another discourse 
of the sacred nation as its member. I will reconsider this interpretation that certain Japanese left-
ists and rightists present regarding religion’s position in postwar Japanese society. When these 
scholars and Durkheim himself seem to assume that the force of the society is self-evident, this 
assumption should be questioned in terms of the commodity, or more specifically, commodity 
fetishism.34  
 To further explore the relation between the nation and religion, let us examine how 
the term “people” (kokumin) enters the Todan relief, intervening into and interacting with its oth-
erwise religious rhetoric and logic. Usually, the kokumin almost exclusively indicates all Japa-
nese nationals. It can be either the legal term that designates the sovereign of the Japanese na-
tion-state, as in the 1947 Constitution, or the socio-cultural term that refers to the imagination of 
the Japanese nation. There is another term that exclusively indicates the former connotation of 
the kokumin people, i.e. shimin, the Japanese equivalent to the English citizen. When the shimin 
is usually used to indicate people’s political rights and their participation in the civil society, 
probably it is safe that this term should be withdrawn from the discussion of the slate. In the 
meantime, kokumin people became the sovereign of Japan only in 1947; prior to this, the ko-
kumin was synonymous to the shinmin, the emperor’s subjects and servants. When the slate’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(New York: The Free Press, 1995). He says “Thus we can repeat about society what was previously said about the 
deity: It has reality only to the extent that it has a place in human consciousnesses, and that place is made for society 
by us. We now glimpse the profound reason why the gods can no more do without their faithful than the faithful can 
do without their gods. It is that society, of which the gods are only the symbolic expression, can no more do without 
individuals than individuals can do without society” (p.351).  
34  This criticism of Durkheim is inspired by Michael Taussig, “Maleficium: State Fetishism” in his The 
Nervous System (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.111-140. “It is fascinating,” Taussig says, “that what we might 
call (with some perplexity) the image itself should be granted such a power⎯not the signified, the sacred totemic 
species, animal, vegetable, and so forth, but the signifier is itself prized apart from its signification so as to create a 
quite different architecture of the sign⎯an architecture in which the signified is erased…Which force, for Marx, in 
the form of commodity fetishism, would exist and be effective precisely on account of erasure⎯of the erasure 
locked into the commodity in its exchange-value phase ensuring its dislocation, its being prized apart from the social 




donors say, probably pretending to represent the people, that they are “awe-inspir[ed]” by the 
emperor’s enthronement, people here could be interpreted as something similar to the shinmin 
subject/servant. At the same time, when the word kokumin actually appears in the slate in the last 
sentence, it does so as the designator of the holders of the supposedly “insurmountable joy” to-
ward the enthroned emperor. This designation is contradictory to the rest of the slate⎯its refer-
ence to (people’s) awe, its religious rhetoric, and self-subjection to the sacred temporality kōki. 
This is because the insurmountable joy of the emperor’s enthronement requires one’s sympathet-
ic faculty, i.e. the capacity to feel for the emperor. People, the owners of this faculty, are the sub-
jective kokumin nationals and not the subjected shinmin subjects, due to the equivalent relation 
between the subject and object that this faculty enables. 
 Sympathy, as thus seems to be evoked by the Toda slate, needs more discussion here, 
due to the important role that this affect has performed in the postwar formation of the Japanese 
nation in general. According to Emmanuel Levinas, sympathy should be differentiated from the 
kind of relation with other that respects other’s alterity. Levinas says:  
 
To be sure, the other (l’Autre) that is announced does not possess this existing as 
the subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious. It is not unknown 
but unknowable, refractory to all light. But this precisely indicates that the other 
is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence. The 
relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of com-
munion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other’s place; we 
recognize the other as resembling us, but exterior to us; the relationship with the 
other is a relationship with a Mystery. The other’s entire being is constituted by 
its exteriority, or rather its alterity, for exteriority is a property of space and leads 
the subject back to itself through light.35 
 
Comparable with communion, the relation that sympathy allows one to forge with other does not 
treat other as a “Mystery,” Levinas suggests, as the “unknowable, refractory to all light.” To the 
contrary, sympathy’s gesture to “put ourselves in the other’s place” is usually meant to treat oth-
                                                                  




ers just like “us.” In contrast to this leveling mechanism of sympathy, religious emotions such as 
awe, as the Toda associations and the rest of the country would like to mention, more likely in-
volve the hierarchizing momentum. The religious minds would try to detect the ultimate alterity, 
the noumenon, in other and submit themselves to such alterity. The sympathetic minds are those 
which try to discover irreducible similarity in other and equalize themselves with others based on 
this similarity. In anthropology, sympathy is the faculty that anti-racist researchers, such as 
Bronislaw Malinowski, introduced in order to understand, instead of analyze, natives as the same 
human beings. In his words, one of the goals of ethnographers, of which they “should never lose 
sight,” is “briefly, to grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of 
his world.”36 The gendered representation of the natives (“he”) seems to be in line with Levinas’ 
argument, i.e. sympathy’s function to abstract others’ unique differences, in this case, into the 
universalism of a “man.”37  
 Kōjin Karatani helps one push this insight further and reconsider the affect of sympa-
thy in terms of commodification. According to him, in modern times, sympathy became the mor-
al philosophical buzzword with Adam Smith’s elaboration. Karatani argues that the principle of 
                                                                  
36  Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanisian New Guinea. preface by James G. Frazer (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, 
1984); p.25; emphases original. 
37  Clifford Geertz’s critique of what Malinowski values as “empathy,” one of the most important 
ethnographical tools according to him, hinges on this point⎯ “But at least some conception of what a human 
individual is, as opposed to a rock, an animal, a rainstorm, or a god, is, so far as I can see, universal. Yet, at the same 
time, as these offhand examples suggest, the actual conceptions involved vary from one group to the next, and often 
quite sharply. The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and 
cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole 
and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, however 
incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures. Rather than 
attempting to place the experience of others within the framework of such a conception, which is what the extolled 
‘empathy’ in fact usually comes down to, understanding them demands setting that conception aside and seeing their 
experiences within the framework of their own idea of what selfhood is.” See “’From the Native’s Point of View’: 
On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding” in his Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive 
Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp.55-70; p.59. And the result is ironically the extremely “Western” 
technique of “textual analysis,” with which Geertz would read Balinese cockfight as a native version of the 
Flaubertian “sentimental education,” for instance⎯see his “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” in The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp.412-453; p.444. 
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laissez-faire, with which Smith’s thoughts are usually associated, is not particularly contradicto-
ry to the Smithian moral philosophy of sympathy. Karatani suggests that Smith believed that 
modern sympathy should rather complement capitalist interactions as a sort of the moral affec-
tive liaison among the mutually independent, differently interested subjects.38 This argument 
might remind one of Marx in the first chapter of this dissertation, where he says that the modern 
capitalist subjects are motivated to produce only on the assumption that others are as moral in the 
market as s/he is. Likewise, Kant might not have been even interested in studying modern moral-
ity, if he was not facing the possibility of the capitalist outliers, viz. “free riders.”39 To the degree 
that the free rider is exceptional, the modern capitalist actors are always already subjected to the 
law of morality, Kant and Marx would say, and to the affect of sympathy, Smith would say. The 
relation of sympathy to morality might be that of supplementality⎯the moral law that everyone 
should be mutually affinitive and harmonious is construed to be imaginatively assumed and af-
fectively felt by the subjects with their faculty of sympathy, so that the law could be “alive” and 
effective in the subjects’ minds. Mediating the capitalist subject and moral law this way, sympa-
thy is also estimated to be instrumental in constructing a moral community, realizing it at the im-
aginative and affective levels prior to and apart from the actual construction of such a communi-
ty. The imagined community of the modern capitalist nation could be thought of as being imag-
ined specifically with people’s sympathetic faculty.40 The community of sympathy of course ex-
                                                                  
38  Karatani, Sekai Kyōwakoku e: Shihon=Nation=Kokka wo Koete (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), pp.167-
170. 
39  According to Ross Poole, Morality and Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp.17-21, 
the problem of free riders, as Kant entertains, is the problem of instrumental reason that considers only the causality 
of one’s relation to other, as the means to end. Kant’s moral philosophy can be thought of as an attempt to explore 
why such a haphazard relation based on self-interest only rarely occurs and how the universal institution of moral 
duties usually prevails in everyday transactions.   
40  About a contemporary Philippine case, in which the nation is imagined through people’s sympathy with the 
death of an overseas Philippina worker, Flor Contemplacion, who was executed in 1995 in Singapore for murder, 
see Vicente L. Rafael, “’Your Grief Is Our Gossip’: Overseas Filipinos and Other Spectral Presences” in his White 
Love: And Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp.204- 
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cludes Levinasian alterity. The sympathetic community is that among the subjects; by definition, 
it emerges only where the concept of alterity is put aside.  
 Now, what the Toda associations implicitly claim to represent in their slate oscillates 
between the nature of the awe-inspired shinmin of the apotheosized emperor and that of the sym-
pathetic subject of the commoditized nation. At the same time, when one looks at the object of 
the awe and sympathy respectively, the oscillation might seem to be settled one way or another. 
Let us go back to Adam Smith and others’ concepts of sympathy. In these thinkers’ discussion of 
the relation between sympathy and subjectification, the existence of any authority is lacking; the 
process in which the mutually sympathetic community of the subjects is constructed is suggested 
to be autonomous. In contrast, one should notice once more in the Todan slate the fact that the 
kokumin as the sympathetic nation emerge only in front of the emperor. If the Smithian commu-
nity enjoys a certain level of solidarity due to its members’ sympathy with each other, the Japa-
nese people, as they appear in the slate, seem to be united due to their sympathy with the same 
object, the emperor. One can argue here again that the emperor is the objectified expression of 
people’s mutual sympathy. If so, it is interesting that the emperor as the supposed expression is 
so spotlighted as to appear he had the power to cause people’s mutual sympathy. The emperor in 
the slate may not be the authority to demand people’s moral behaviors toward each other, but he 
seems to be the central figure to collect their sympathetic affect.  
 And the slate is not alone in presenting this extra-Smithian formation of the sympa-
thetic nation of postwar Japan. In the 1950-60s, Akihito (Heisei) commanded the democratic 
Japanese sympathy as he fell in love with the “commoner” Michiko and together constructed an 
American-looking family on the palace’s lawn.41 Here, Akihito and Michiko were sympathized 
not so much for their exceptional statuses or qualities, if there were, as for their common sensi-
                                                                  
41  See Keiichi Matsushita, “Taishū Tennō Ron” in Chūō Kōron, April, 1959, 30-47. 
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bility of democracy that they ironically seemed to share with the people. The couple was none-
theless the center of people’s sympathetic attention and subjectifying efforts; and as such, the 
couple integrated the nation as a centralized community. This formation revealed itself once 
more in an even more intense form, when Akihito’s father, Hirohito (Showa), passed away in 
1989. At that time, the lugubrious sympathy toward Hirohito was expressed through closed of-
fices and shattered shops, TV programs that excluded the word genki (health or wellness), and 
the cancellation of various festivals and other events.42 The “totalitarianism of self-restraint” 
(jishuku no zentaishugi), as the country’s intellectuals called it, was restrained in order to respect 
others’ assumed feeling of mournfulness. Unlike the Smithian community, the Japanese sympa-
thy at the time was expressed primarily toward the emperor as the central figure, and by exten-
sion, with others’ supposed sympathy toward the emperor. The sympathetic totalitarianism was a 
peculiarly postwar phenomenon, which had not been observable when Hirohito’s father, Yoshi-
hito (Taisho), had died in 1925, according to Masao Maruyama’s observation.43 Given the com-
plexity of the emperor’s sign in prewar Japan, where it had stood at the juncture between the stat-
ist distinction of the private/public and the fascist idea of the death-communal equality, in addi-
tion to the nationalist imagination of the family-nation, the non-totalitarian mourning of Yoshihi-
to’s death that Maruyama said he had observed might mean this very state of competition be-
tween the differently interpellating forces of different ideologies. In postwar Japan, the national 
affect of sympathy seems to overwhelm the everyday, due to the nationalism’s conceptual preva-
                                                                  
42  See Asahi Journal ed., Shōwa no Shūen: 1988.9-1989.2: Tennō to Nihon-jin (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun-sha, 
1989); Norma Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991); Akira Kurihara, 
Mitsunobu Sugiyama, and Shunya Yoshimi eds., Kiroku: Tennō no Shi (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1992); Naoki 
Sakai, “Return to the West/Return to the East: Watsuji Testsurō’s Anthropology and Discussions of Authenticity,” 
in his Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997). 
43  Maruyama Masao Shū, Vol.15 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996); pp.14-5, mentioned in Yoshio Yasumaru, 
“Tennō-sei Hihan no Tenkai: Kōza-ha, Maruyama Gakuha, Sengo Rekishi-gaku” in Yoshihiko Amino et. al. eds., 
Jinrui Shakai no naka no Tennō to Ouken (Iwanami Kōza: Tennō to Ouken wo Kangaeru, Vol.1) (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 2002), pp.57-81; p.68. 
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lence over other possible momentums for Japan’s ideological integration. In the wake of the na-
tional aura created by the sympathetic Japanese upon Showa’s death, the Toda neighborhood as-
sociations in 1990 should surely have been able to easily assume and effect that all the Japanese 
beyond Toda were the same nationals in their common insurmountable joy toward Heisei’s en-
thronement.  
 In the first chapter of this dissertation, I have examined the concept of reincorporation 
in the light of its relations to the automatic process of commodification and to the co-emergent 
desires for the origin or center of the commodification process. In order to compare the Smithian 
and postwar Japanese communities of sympathy, one needs to revisit the concept of reincorpora-
tion⎯of course, only if one admits postwar Japan’s modernity and its commoditized everyday. 
Sympathy toward the dying or familial emperor to me seems to represent people’s anxiety about 
their own autonomous morality that does not require any authoritative models or guidance. This 
autonomy of the Smithian community is further dramatized by Rousseau, whose reference to the 
emotion of passion erases any trace of the object, which Smith still explores⎯sympathy neces-
sarily takes the object, reincorporated or not. According to Jacques Derrida’s reading of Rous-
seau: 
 
All passion is to some degree passion inutile, made gratuitous by the non-
existence of an object or a cause. The possibility of passion distinguishes man 
from the animal: “The need for subsistence forces man apart from other men, but 
the passions draw them together. The first speech was not caused by hunger or 
thirst, but by love, hatred, pity an danger.”44 
 
 
Paul de Man also cites this portion of Derrida and argues that contrary to Derrida’s interpretation, 
Rousseau is in fact theoretically aligned with Derrida. De Man highlights that to Rousseau, it is 
passion, and not need, which makes society. “Made gratuitous by non-existence of an object or a 
                                                                  
44 The sentences between the quotation marks are by Rousseau, cited in Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997(1967)); p.505.  
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cause,” as Derrida interprets Rousseau, the speech of passion that bears sociality is that of figu-
rality, de Man says.45 Resembling what the psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok 
call the “community of empty mouths” (see my Chapter 2), Rousseau’s society, then, is commu-
nicative due to its fundamental lack. As I have discussed, in the postwar Japanese nation, the 
lack in the mouth does not seem to have been filled with figurative language, figuratively speak-
ing. Rather, the lack made by the defeated war and lost fascism seems to have been filled with 
the new, re-incorporated object of sympathy, the postwar nation’s emperor. Instead of starting to 
discuss among empty mouths the politics and ethics of Japan’s invasions and fascist violence, 
instead of critically debating these matters to effect a truly democratic and civil society, the Jap-
anese in the postwar have tried to imagine and fantasize a powerful enough object to collect peo-
ple’s sympathy into a community of affective subjects. The sympathy with the emperor could 
have been replaced with the passion regarding the other Asian and Pacific victims of Japan’s past 
violence, with the ability to be acted upon by these victims’ sorrow, desperation, and justice-
seeking indignation. The fantastic nation of the sympathetic subjects is constructed instead of the 
civil society of passionate mourners.  
 Let us further examine the reincorporated emperor, focusing on the force that this 
emperor seems to contain. Earlier, I have stated that the emperor is narrated in the religious terms, 
at least during the 1989-90 period. I have mentioned the possibility that this religiosity of the 
emperor might be derived from the sacred nation, which extends its sacredness to the emperor. If 
this is the case, then the nation and its sacredness has to somehow precede the emperor and his 
religiosity. The emperor in this scenario is the instrument with which people express their al-
ready existent nationality. The emperor here is comparable with, say, bamboo branches or tea 
                                                                  
45  De Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism. intro. by Wlad Godzich 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983); pp.102-141. 
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over rice, as the same semiotic vessel of national significance; his own unique materiality does 
not seem to be so significant in this case. Nevertheless, when one looks at the actual processes 
through which these signs, including the emperor’s, unify people into the Japanese nation, these 
seemingly arbitrary emblems of Japan re-appear as respectively forceful agents of national unifi-
cation. I am not arguing that this force is of properly religious nature. Yet the object of national 
sympathy, such as the postwar emperor, might likely contain another kind of sacredness, due to 
the collected power of people’s moral aspirations and modern desires. It is true that the emperor 
as the sympathetic national object collects these desires and aspirations precisely because he is 
common⎯he allows other Japanese to put themselves in his place. But when each Japanese is 
identified with other Japanese due to the assumption that others are sympathetically identified 
with the common emperor, the emperor’s commonness comes to be distinguished as his generali-
ty. The generality of the emperor as the national objet of people’ sympathy easily acquires the 
sacredness of the fetish object, especially in the historical context in which the prewar sign of the 
emperor was circulated as the figurative and actual money fetish.  
 Past the 1920-30s, after the country was saturated with the mode of mechanical re-
production, the emperor as the sign of the nation-state had come to overwhelm the signified. 
Stamps, postcards, films and other forms of imperial signs were sold in the market, attracting an 
enormous amount of popular fascination, desires, and fears. The money-generality that the em-
peror’s sign came to acquire was embodied by actual coins minted with his images.46 By 1945, 
the sign of the emperor had become as potent as even atomic bombs⎯they shared at least the 
power to end the war.47 When the emperor’s sign was so powerful, it is assumed to have been 
with the help of the force of this sign that conservative Japanese, such as the moral philosopher 
                                                                  
46  See Takashi Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996).  
47  See Yoshikuni Igarashi, Ibid. 
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Tetsurō Watsuji, could imagine the nation-state of Japan once more out of the ashes of the de-
feated war. In Watsuji’s immediately postwar works, Naoki Sakai reads, “the relationship be-
tween the emperor and the totality of the [postwar] nation [of which the emperor is supposed to 
be the signifier] is in a reverse order,” according to Sakai.48 That is, in Watsuji, “the totality of 
the nation is not anterior to the emperor and… [the totality of the nation] does not express the 
emperor; the figure of the emperor in a sense creates its [the nation’s] totality.”49 This relation 
between the emperor and nation is “reverse,” since the emperor is inherently equipped with nei-
ther the money-fetish power of national integration nor general attraction as the sympathetic cen-
ter. Money would lose its supposedly generalizing power as soon as its users stopped believing 
in such power.50 Likewise, the emperor would not exist as the object of Japanese sympathy (and 
its opposite, hatred) without their sympathy (or hatred). Yet in Watsuji’s and other conservatives’ 
fantasies, the emperor does not exist because of people’s love and belief; people exist as the 
postwar kokumin (the nationals) because of the lovable and/or generalizing emperor. The emper-
or’s supposed religiosity, as the Todan slate and the 1989-1990 Japanese media so emphasized it, 
might overlap with his sacredness as the fetishized currency of national integration. In this analy-
sis, the emperor’s religiosity is not just an expression of national sacredness. The idea of the em-
peror in Watsuji-types of beliefs also emanates the supersensible force of national unification in 
itself. This is another dimension of the relation between the nation and religion that one has to 
take into account in interpreting the Todan slate, and more generally, in considering the postwar 
national formation of Japan.  
                                                                  
48  See Sakai, Ibid.; p.110. 
49  Sakai, Ibid.; p.110. 
50  See Karl Marx, “Money, or the Circulation of Commodities,” Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 
Volume One, intro. by Ernest Mandel, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books in association with New Left 
Review, 1976), pp.188-244. About money theory’s application to the concept of divinity, see Henri Hubert and 
Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, trans. by W. D. Halls, forward by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1981(1964)).  
  
219 
 When one imagines the nation around the fantasized medium of integration, the cen-
tral figure for sympathy, the nation becomes centralized. Or, perhaps it is one’s conservatism that 
unintentionally summons the centralizing momentum of money into the national formation. Re-
ligion, in this insight, is a misplaced, albeit effective, category with which to elaborate on the im-
agined center and related hierarchies of the nation. Shinto, as mentioned in the Toda slate, is no 
exception; it seems to be equipped with the idea of divinity, the vocabulary of humbleness and 
respectfulness, and the historical view based on these orders. The kokumin of postwar Japan, as 
the slate represents, now seems to be in the position of pious “believers,” the equivalent of the 
prewar shinmin, the subjects and servants of the fetish-sacred emperor. To the extent that money 
fetishism involves automatic, uncontrollable moments, the rhetoric of religion might be em-
ployed to exhibit the actor’s will to make fetishism’s subjectification process conscious, articu-
late, and thus tamable. As Marx suggests, religion provides the language with which the actors 
could express their attraction to and awe of such an untamable process, the otherness of the pro-
cess.51 
 The nation in the Todan slate might cause attraction and anxiety in the beholder, since 
the order that Shinto is thought to introduce in the linguistic, political, social, and historical rela-
tions of the nation is not that stable. This instability points to the fact that the postwar discourse 
of Shinto is woven with another warp, which insists its existence to compete with the conserva-
tives’ desires for centralized and hierarchical orders. In the previous chapter, I have mentioned 
the discourse of the “folk” (minzoku) and its connection to a certain idea of Shinto. The chapter 
has discussed a little known writer, Yōzaburō Satō, representing Shinto as “ordinary people’s” 
(shomin no), an emphatically anti-status remark. Recall how the writer has associated his idea of 
Shinto with the generic yet personal memories of his childhood, such as top-spinning or cherry-
                                                                  
51  See his “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” Ibid.; pp.163-77. 
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picking, adding the folk flavor to this idea of ordinary people. Despite the Todan slate’s effort, 
the emperor as the central or consummate figure seems to be irrelevant to this folkish under-
standing of Shinto. The religious rhetoric of humbleness and respectfulness that the Toda associ-
ations use are similarly unable to represent folk Shinto, since folk Shinto is supposedly featured 
by the bodily outside language. Note that the folk Shinto discourse also lends itself to the idea of 
the nation. Allegedly ordinary people’s, the idea of folk Shinto merely provides another imagina-
tion of the same nation as Toda nationalism’s hierarchical one. What I am suggesting, though, is 
not that the kokumin, as the Todan slate mentions it, is a hierarchical notion that stands opposite 
to the minzoku folk. The kokumin is rather an overarching concept that is supplemented by and 
encompassing the mythological-populist discourse of the minzoku folk as well as the religious-
royalist discourse of the shinmin servants. By explicitly referring to the Japanese as the kokumin 
and not the shinmin, the Todan slate might try to appeal to as many people as possible without 
losing its position as royalists. The imagined kokumin’s ambiguity allows this maneuver; this 
ambiguity is ideologically attributable to Shinto, its religio-folkish duality.  
 Mutsumi Machida’s and countless other lawsuits against different neighborhood as-
sociations contribute to this dialectic. Observing the Todan slate and other religious artifacts and 
practices presented and conducted by the publicly-funded associations throughout local Japan, 
the plaintiffs in these lawsuits have accused these associations of violating the constitutional 
principle of church-state separation. These Christian, Buddhist, and other plaintiffs (Machida is 
not religious) complain that their freedom of religion has been violated by their respective neigh-
borhood association’s practices and support of Shinto. Obviously, these plaintiffs stand on the 
same ground with these associations in their definition of Shinto as a religion. In the Todan case, 
the jade fence seems to prove the association’s reference to Shinto as a religion. Machida’s suit 
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that was filed on March 4th, 2004 in the Yokohama District Court and dismissed on July 11th, 
2005 reveals that the fence is just a part of the whole story.52 In her expression, the Toda associa-
tion and the local shrine, Yawata, are “organizationally merged” in sharing the same board, per-
sonnel, properties, and utilities. According to her, it is in such a merged situation that the Toda 
neighborhood association has urged its sub-leaders (kumi chō) to attend the shrine’s New Year 
divination ritual, the “pot of boiled water” (yu gama shinji). For the shrine’s annual festival, the 
sub-leaders are also told to collect 1,000 yen (10 dollars) from each member-household and do-
nate the money to the shrine. In place of the receipt, each household receives what are called 
“divine candies” (shin sen), i.e. rice flour and sugar molded in the form of the shrine’s crest.53 
The courts do not deny these facts. Yet they allege that Shinto is not a religion but a system of 
“socially prevalent ideas” (shakai tsūnen) or “customs” (shūzoku). Since Shinto is not a religion, 
the half-official associations’ Shintoist practices are not unconstitutional.54 These practices, ac-
cording to the courts, represent people’s common sense; the courts are practically saying that 
townsfolk are predominantly Shintoist and they are so in terms of their habits. In the court’s log-
ic, the association is representing and catering to the neighborhood habits. While ruling favora-
bly for the half-official association, the courts ideologically oppose the association’s claim of 
Shinto’s religiosity.55  
                                                                  
52  See Heisei 16-nen (Gyō U) Dai-12-gō: Baishō Meirei Tō Seikyū Jiken (“Mutsumi Machida” versus the 
mayor of Yokohama City). Her appeal filed at the Tokyo Appellate Court was also dismissed in November 29th, 
2006 (Heisei 18-nen (Gyō Ko) Dai-100-gō: Baishō Meirei Tō Seikyū Kōso Jiken (“Mutsumi Machida” versus the 
mayor of Yokohama City).  
53  Ordinarily, they are called rakugan. 
54  The Toda association receives 1.4 million yen (14,000 dollars) annually from Yokohama City as of 2004.  
55  The Toda association, Machida, and the Yokohama District Court seem to have followed a pattern from 
their respective positions. One of the first cases that made the pattern was the 1974 Hamamatsu case, Shizuoka 
Prefecture, whereby a Christian, Tadashi Mizoguchi, sued the Hagi Association for its automatic counting of its 
members as the local shinto parish. Following the suit is the Towa case, Kōchi Prefecture in Shikoku Island, where 
the local association used the provided subsidies to repair the village shrine building (1994-8). In Saga in Saga 
Prefecture, Kyūshū Island, a lawsuit has revealed that the association collected the village shrine membership fees 
(1999-). Similarly, Karachita Shrine in Sunagawa, Hokkaido Island, is found to have been constructed in the 
property of the association. Many of these and other similar lawsuits have ended up in these rulings that decided that 
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 In a non-“western” country like Japan, an indigenous religion can be and has been 
defined as a system of “mere customs,” indeed, which theory the courts seem to abuse. Accord-
ing to Talal Asad, the idea of behavioral religion (versus dogmatic religion) is generally assigned 
to others of the “west.” Strictly, behavior-based religion is not religion at all⎯religion in the 
post-Enlightenment west is defined as the opposite to behavior and practice, viz. as belief, dog-
matism, spirituality, etc. According to Asad’s Foucaultian understanding, moralization of the 
post-Enlightenment state, production, and exchange demanded religion put weight “more and 
more onto the moods and motivations of the individual believer. Discipline (intellectual and so-
cial) would, in this period, gradually abandon religious space, letting ‘belief,’ ‘conscience,’ and 
‘sensibility’ take its place.”56 Religion’s specialization in belief occurred, when the larger society 
had become behaviorally religious, that is, disciplined in the moral subjective ways. Christian 
missionaries’ or western anthropologists’ pictures of others’ ritual-based “cults,” for instance, 
were the post-Enlightenment western society in caricature.57 Ironically, Machida lends the court 
the opportunity to officially pronounce that this caricature is right and legally binding. Ever after, 
the neighborhood in the state’s recognition will be behaviorally Shintoist, while the association 
will be its socio-cultural representative.  
 Facing Machida and other leftists, the courts took the position of the folk Shinto dis-
course. This might be the result of each court’s local strategy to protect the neighborhood associ-
ation, which is partially funded by each local government. Intentionally or unintentionally, these 
local strategies by the courts seem to be well-coordinated with the larger movement made by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the neighborhood association represented the socially prevalent ideas and customs of the nation. See Nobumasa 
Tanaka, Yasukuni no Sengo Shi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002); pp.132-6 and 249.  
56  See Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); p.39; parentheses original.  
57  A variation of this caricature could be found in Ruth Benedict, who says that the Japanese act according to 
a “map of duties” versus “abstract ethical principles.” See her The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of 
Japanese Culture (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1967(1946)); p.71.  
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Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Yasukuni Shinto Shrine, and the Association to Respond to 
the War Heroes’ Spirits to folkize the Yasukuni Shrine (Chapter 2). This is a relatively new 
movement for these conservatives, who previously struggled to officialize Yasukuni as a reli-
gious facility, despite the church-state principle. As for Machida and leftists, their complaints 
based on the theory of Shinto as a religion are already defeated by the court’s logic of folk Shinto, 
since these leftists simultaneously exhibit their nationalist desires for the same folk Shinto (see 
below). Every actor⎯the LDP, neighborhood association, court, and leftists⎯seems to move 
back and forth between the religious and “cultural” views of Shinto, depending on the instrumen-
tality of each view at any given moment in their respective struggle.  
 In their culturalist moment, the leftists thus contradict their litigious strategy and 
place Shinto in a small-sized community in the immemorial past of Japan. There, the leftists say, 
the “ethnic religion” (minzoku shūkyō) of Shinto was already practiced as both the cultural fabric 
and moral principle of the community, if not believed as a dogmatic system of the worldview.58 
The prototypical emperor reigned people’s lives in the form of the sun goddess, Amaterasu, and 
other agrarian deities, according to the leftists. When they assume this type of nation and the na-
tion’s emperor, it is not surprising that they come up with the idea of appropriation. In this idea, 
the Shinto nation was appropriated by what they call the “modern emperor system” (kindai tennō 
sei), which to them was roughly a modern state-system fortified by the emperor’s religious, cul-
tural, and moral power.59 According to the leftists, the effectivity of the emperor-system’s en-
forcing power was the endurance of the shinto-practicing, emperor-believing nation of the theo-
retically folkized Japanese. According to this theory, the modern state’s “political and non-
                                                                  
58 Shigeyoshi Murakami, Kokka Shintō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970); pp.1-11.  
59  Although his term is “ultra statism” (chō kokka shugi), Masao Maruyama best theorizes the spirit of the 
chimera, the modern emperor system. See his “Chō-kokka Shugi no Ronri to Shinri,” Gendai Seiji no Shisō to Kōdō 
(Tokyo: Mirai-sha, 1965(1964)), pp.11-28. 
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political” ways to integrate the nation worked, not just because the monolithic state was forceful, 
but also because people had already been shintoist and as such believed in the state’s sovereignty, 
the emperor, in the ethnic way.60 The leftists argued that upon modernizing the country’s space, 
for instance, all the state had to do was to recognize shinto parishes (ujiko ken) as its minimal 
administrative unit (mura or machi).61 Even before the neighborhood association was institution-
alized as part of the state’s Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the association had already 
been there in the prototypical form of the shinto-national community, according to the leftists. 
 In this leftist view of the Shinto nation, Tetsurō Watsuji’s type of fetishism of the 
emperor’s integrative power seems to be tempered. In the leftist theories, it is the concept of the 
nation, not the emperor, that seems to have acquired the mysterious power to transhistorically 
integrate itself. According to these theories, it is ultimately the folkishly naïve, primitively cal-
lous nation of Shinto that had the power and agency to even start and sustain the Asia Pacific 
War.62 In my view, while the most accountable agents of Japan’s fascism and war were indeed 
the people, their power and agency should be instead attributed to the historically specific con-
text of mechanical reproduction. The people were not the folk but the masses; and as the masses, 
they were interpellated to support the fascist images of equivalence. Without historically specific 
materiality, the nation that the leftists theorize resembles Durkheim’s “society” in its abstractness.  
 Mutsumi Machida exposes the discrepancy between her belief and knowledge, when 
she says that the Yawata Shrine represents what she idiosyncratically calls “the cult of Ama-
                                                                  
60  The quote is from Ōe, Ibid.; p.81. 
61  This is part of the theory that Ōe (Ibid.) calls that of the “shakaku seido.” According to him, the shakaku 
seido or the system of shrines’ ranks “constructed a neat hierarchy descending from the Ise Shrine [the family shrine 
of the royal family] to village shrines (son sha), the basis of ‘home villages’ (kyōtō shakai)” (p.81). With quotation 
marks though, Ōe here uncritically borrows the term, “home villages,” from a Meiji oligarch, Hirobumi Itō. 
Accordingly, Ōe seems to inherit Itō’s concept that a home village as a communal unit was naturally delineated by 
the religious orbit of its corresponding village-shrine. Likewise, in the space of the Ise Shrine, the emperor as the 
embodiment of the nation-state was supposed to correspond to the emperor as a god of shinto. The system of shrines’ 
ranks supposedly mediated between the shintoist nation, communitarian nation, and the modern state, physically 
spreading these relations over the actual geography of Japan, according to Ōe.  
62  See Masao Maruyama, Nihon no Shisō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961); p.44-52. 
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terasu (the sun goddess),” among the “farmers around here.” This contradicts her legal complaint 
that the shrine represents the religion Shinto regarding the emperor. Now, she says that the farm-
ers around here (kokoira hen no hyakushō) made their original fortunes not by selling their land 
to developers in the 1980s, as she has informed me in another moment, but by murdering and 
robbing those Edo (1600-1868) travelers who used to walk nearby on the Tōkaidō Post Road, the 
current Route 40. There is a landmark in Toda called “Throwaway Mound” (Nagekomi Zuka), 
which she says was the place in which the farmers hid the travelers’ bodies. Adding to Bunzō 
Hashikawa’s motif of the cruel folk (see Chapter 2), Machida cruelly says “that’s why the farm-
ers around here have so many maimed family members⎯we all say that’s the travellers’ curses.” 
The cult of the sun goddess in this context contains the nuance of not so much an organized reli-
gion as a folk superstition or custom among those farmers whose lives are supposed to depend on 
the elements⎯by implication, even now. On another occasion, Machida stated that those farm-
ers-cum-large landlords still kept small patches of their land as farms, taking advantage of a legal 
loophole to gain tax exemptions. Yet Machida seems to simultaneously believe that her litigation 
counts as one of the enlightening crusades that many other leftists engage in. In this line of dis-
course, she implies she is trying to correct these farmers/landlords’ non-democratic, extra-
modern control (“gyūjiru” in her expression) over the town’s politics.  
 Religion here is rendered to Machida’s excuses for her suit. Otherwise, she says to 
me and the court that the primitive Japan, as in the Toda association, in whose board the land-
lords sit, ought to be enlightened, since otherwise the state would appropriate it specifically for 
its warring efforts. Asked about the motivation for her activism, Machida says, “I’d like to do my 
best, when I can still do it—one can’t oppose the local shrine and the neighborhood association, 
once they’re mobilized for a war. I just don't like to find myself in a war again.” Referring to the 
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popular leftist term, “in-town Yasukuni” (machi no Yasukuni), Machida explains that during the 
war each community shrine was reconfigured as an affiliate of the state-run shrine, Yasukuni. In 
Yasukuni, according to her, the Japanese were taught “how to die for the emperor.” As the local 
branch of Yasukuni, each village-shrine inculcated the residents on the Yasukuni ideology of the 
death community, she tells me. She lets me know that the school children were made to clean the 
shrine ground (cleanliness has a certain shintoist significance); draftees also came to the village-
shrine to pray for their “long lasting military luck” (buun chōkyū). The neighborhood association 
came into the picture as the lender of state-endorsed community services to the shrine, according 
to her. Ideologically supported by the shrine, the association in turn enjoyed broad political pow-
er in the neighborhood, she says. Certainly, the supposedly ethnic tie between Shinto and the 
neighborhood was practically severed by the GHQ’s so-called “Shinto order” in 1947, she re-
minds me. However, hers and others’ lawsuits are supposed to show that the neighborhood asso-
ciations with Shinto inclinations were spontaneously revived again in the 1950s and then offi-
cially endorsed throughout the country. To the degree that the shinto-neighbor tie is deep-rooted 
in the national fabric, as these leftists see, the tie will never be completely severed. A war-hungry 
state can surely depend on the existence of this tie, they say, to convert it into the state’s war-
machine for “another” war.  
 “Look at my late parents,” Machida says. “they passed away not in the war, but be-
cause of the war.” According to her, her parents were the victims of the atomic bomb that the 
United States dropped over Hiroshima in 1945. Gradually developing different kinds of cancer 
after the war, her father passed away in 1957. Her mother did not suffer from cancer, but from an 
unidentifiable weakness, which the daughter Machida thinks was related to the bomb. Machida 
herself is a recent survivor of breast cancer. Ironically embodying the emperor’s nation with her 
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given name, Mutsumi, which was likely taken after the emperor Meiji (1868-1912)’s personal 
name, Mutsuhito, Machida seems to have personal reasons to oppose such a nation. In addition 
to the irony of the emperor-named leftist, another twist is that her opposition seems to have end-
ed up in substantiating the imaginary nation of Shinto theoretically and legally.  
 Despite the leftists’ pacifist apprehension, I would like to return to the impression of 
the postwar neighborhood-association’s anachronism and irrelevance. In contemporary Japan, 
one might wonder, to what extent is Shinto alive as either a religious or cultural category? Even 
if the Japanese state was truly as war-hungry as Machida and other leftists claim, would Shinto 
be the point of the state’s mobilization of people? How much grasping power would the neigh-
borhood association’s Shintoist representation of the nation hold in the otherwise completely 
commoditized everyday? Does not the nation arise rather from marketized Japan⎯from the scar-
let container of Shiseido shampoo, TSUBAKI (camellia), which carries the catch-copy, “the Jap-
anese women are⎯beautiful” or from the computer-generated cherry-blossoms in the commer-
cial films for cell-phone companies, au, NTT Docomo, etc. or from these “Japans”’ supposed 
opposites, Goethe or Nietzsche? If the emperor is fantasized to be able to integrate the national 
ephemera emerging from and disappearing into the capitalist everyday, should not this be due to 
his completely commoditized power of money? Is it not his generality among the mass that ena-
bles him to regularly occupy a certain duration of time in the celebrity gossip shows on TV or 
page after page in the above-mentioned “Weekly Woman,” “Woman 7,” and other magazines? Is 
not the emperor’s supposed power of national integration derived from people themselves, who 
eagerly consume his family saga, rumors, and fashion to provide points of small talks in the 
household, neighborhood, or workplace? How should one think about the ornamental excess of 
the totalizing force that the leftists discursively attribute to Shinto? 
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The leftists’ solution to these questions is to introduce the category of unconsciousness. 
In previous chapters, I have discussed the leftist-nationalistic theories of the emperor system that 
is supposed to be contained in “a bit of grass, a single tree” (ichimoku issō) grown in the Japa-
nese soil, as Yoshimi Takeuchi says⎯by implication, without any consciousness on the grass’ or 
tree’s part.63 In more sophisticated versions than Takeuchi, the emperor system and the nation, 
which bases this system as the trans-historical substance, are said to represent the ethnic Japa-
nese “habitus” in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense of the bodily and the pre-linguistic.64 In the structural-
ist branch of Japan’s leftism, the emperor system has been analyzed in terms of the deep struc-
tures of the center/periphery, order/anarchy, or sacredness/profanity, which are at once Japan-
specific and universal, according to them.65 If one follows these theories, the emperor system and 
its supporting nation could or rather should be unnoticeable and irrelevant, since it is deep-rooted 
in the Japanese unconscious. As compared to Freudian unconsciousness, which dynamically 
transforms its contour and structure, going through multiple cycles of repression, the return of 
                                                                  
63  Takeuchi, “Kenryoku to Geijutsu” in Kōza Gendai Geijutsu, V (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1958), pp.301-11. 
64  Akira Kurihara, “Gendai Tennō Sei Ron: Nichijō Ishiki no Naka no Tennō Sei” in Amino Yoshihiko et. al. 
eds., Ibid., pp.129-161; 155-6. According to Bourdieu, “[t]he conditionings associated with a particular class of 
conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generates and organize practices and 
representations that can be objectively adopted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends 
or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ 
without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the 
product of the organizing action of a conductor.” Themes of unconsciousness, body, collectivity and reproduction, 
must be unmistakable in this passage. See his The Logic of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1990); p.53. 
65  Masao Yamaguchi, Tennō-sei no Bunka Jinrui Gaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000). “If, as we believe to 
be the case,” Lévi-Strauss says, “the unconscious activity of the mind consists in imposing forms upon content, and 
if these forms are fundamentally the same for all minds⎯ancient and modern, primitive and civilized (as the study 
of the symbolic function, expressed in language, so strikingly indicates)⎯it is necessary and sufficient to grasp the 
unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, in order to obtain a principle of interpretation 
valid for other institutions and other customs, provided of course that the analysis is carried for enough.” See his 
Structural Anthropology, trans. by Claire Jacobson and Brooke G. Schoeph (New York and London: Basic Books, 
1963); p.21. If one reduces the deep structure of the “emperor system” to such a generic and abstract contrast as the 
essential center and phenomenal peripheries, for instance, of course such a structure could be observable in ancient 
or present Japan, even in (a-historical) “Africa,” as Yamaguchi insists. See Roland Barthes for the fantasy that the 
emperor is the empty center of the Orientalist Japan⎯Empire of Signs, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1989).   
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the repress, the working through and acting out of the repressed, the national unconsciousness, as 
these leftist Japanese present, seems to be characterized by identity and stasis.66 In the end, what 
these leftists say is contained in either the deep structure or constant habitus actually appears 
closer to such an existence as the essence of the nation. It is unlikely these leftists would say that 
the ideas of the nation are multiple, historically created and competing with each other. There are 
the historically specific material causes for each of the family-nation of the emperor-father, the 
subjective nation of the emperor-currency, and the Subjective nation with the autonomous origin 
in the folk. Instead of asking, “when did the Japanese become able to fantasize the nation as au-
tonomously generated through people’s unconsciousness, habitus, and other categories that re-
quire neither the authority nor center?,” these theorists start from the fetishized nation of the folk 
outside any historical context and narrate the whole span of the country’s history in terms of that 
fetish. 
In the rightist theories as well, Shinto as the code of Japanese behaviors has to be found 
in the unconsciousness of the nation, the “everyday/constant folk,” jōmin, in the deep mountain 
out there (see Chapter 2). This idea by Kunio Yanagita is different from Yukio Mishima’s, since 
Mishima tends to valorize the country’s high cultural forms as the repository of what he regards 
as the Japanese cultural essence. If Mishima is obsessed with the idea of the emperor, his obses-
sion is not with the folk’s emperor but with the aristocrats’ emperor, the emperor who is sup-
posed to embody the “poetics” and “erotics” of the formerly aristocratic waka poem, kemari ball 
play, and other items of high culture. The essence of high culture, which he theoretically extends 
to be that of “the Japanese culture” as a whole, is similar to Yanagita’s and the leftists’ essence 
                                                                  
66  Freud, “Repression.” in Philip Rieff ed. General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology (New 
York: Touchstone, 1997(1963)), pp.104-115. His later Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the 
Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics, trans. by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950) might be an 
abuse of his own theory, essentializing and culturalizing unconsciousness. 
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of Japan in its dissimulated nature. According to Mishima, the cultural essence has to be discov-
ered and then consciously/conscientiously conserved in the middle of the modern capitalist eve-
ryday. Unlike the leftists and Yanagita, Mishima’s reasoning for culture’s dissimulation is relat-
ed to his espousal of Romantic philosophy. In regards to the cultural essence’s supposed embod-
iment, the emperor, Mishima thus says “the inherent and current beings of the object [i.e. the 
emperor] who should be conserved, do not necessarily coincide with each other.”67 The always 
displaced emperor or rather his “inherent…being” as the totality of the Japanese culture tends to 
be “appropriated” by “politics,” without or before fully manifesting its being, according to Mi-
shima.68 To him, politics has always tamed the emperor’s or Japanese culture’s poetics and eroti-
cism; politics has rather objectified these qualities into something “instrumental” for politics.69 
What could be taken as the anachronism and irrelevance of the supposed essence of Japan is to 
Mishima the emperor’s or the inherent nation’s heterogeneity and transcendence⎯it might look 
irrelevant presently, but its relevance has to be recognized as the yet-to-be-attained truth of the 
Japanese ethnicity.  
When these leftists and rightists essentialize their respective Shinto-folkish nation (in Mi-
shima’s case, the yūga aristocratic nation) by means of the abused concept and logic of uncon-
sciousness, the question whether this nation exists in reality becomes unimportant. The actual 
national fragments scattered through the commoditized everyday and the gossip-laden emperor 
at the center of people’s everyday attention, to these theorists, are either inessential phenomena 
or the active hazards that threaten the national essence. The essential nation at the unconscious 
level should rather face the living Japanese as their fate, the fate that by definition belongs to an-
other time⎯either the time in some past, from which the Japanese are supposed to have come, or 
                                                                  
67  Mishima, “Bunka Bōei Ron,” Chūou Kōron, July 1968: 95-117; 103. 
68  Mishima, Ibid.; both terms, “appropriation” and “politics” appear in both p.106 and 117. 
69  Mishima, Ibid.; p.96. 
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the time in some future, to which they are supposed to go, no matter how far ahead that destina-
tion lies. Conservatives rely on this entangling and intractable sense of fate as anchorage and sta-
bility. Without the ideology of the fateful nation of the folk (or aristocrats), the conservatives 
would think, society is a haphazard whirl of exchange, repetition, and dissemination. They would 
say that Toda females, for example, would totally expend their “souls” in their celebrity competi-
tion, if they were not provided their supposedly pre-determined identity as the Japanese folk.70 
Without considering the irrelevance of these leftists and rightists’ folk-Shinto nation seriously, 
that is, without calibrating the stubbornly kept distance that this nation imaginatively takes from 
its everyday genesis, this nation’s designated function as the catcher-in-the-rye barrier against 
the capitalist dispersion would not be understood. What I am suggesting here is that the seeming 
anachronism of Shinto, the discourses of the bodily and unconscious that seem to try to sustain 
the Shinto concept’s distance from reality, might point to the alienating power of the commodity 
and the conservatives’ defense mechanism against such power.  
The other kind of discourses that have surrounded Shinto in postwar Japan, viz. the reli-
gious discourses of Shinto, should be discussed again as another contributor to the determination 
of Shinto as the anti-commodity essence of the nation. As I have discussed, religion, as the To-
dan and other conservatives refer to, could be a displaced expression of either the fetishist belief 
in the emperor-“money” or the sympathetic structure surrounding the otherwise reincorporated 
                                                                  
70  “Tamashii” was the word that the late nativist psychologist Hayao Kawai used in developing his 
paternalistic diatribe against teenage consumerist-prostitutes, enjo kōsai girls, who in the 1990-00s shocked many 
moralist minds by selling their time, presence, bodies, and bodily traces for Louis Vuitton bags and other brand 
name commodities. According to him, those high school girls should stop such prostitution, since it is “’bad for 
[their] souls’” (tamashii ni warui). See Kawai, “Nihon-jin no Kokoro no Yukue” in Nihon-jin to Nihon Shakai no 
Yukue (Kawai Hayao Chosaku Shū: Dai Ni Ki: 11) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). pp.3-183; p.126. This Jungian 
analyst, Kawai, says “we cannot help but introduce the word ‘soul’ [tamashii in hiragana] here [in discussing the 
girls’ prostitution]. ‘Soul,’ it is an important thing that eludes as soon as one divides up a human completely into the 
‘body’ and ‘mind.’ I suggest [we] think that ‘soul’ is that which underlies [both] the body and mind to make a 
human alive as a ‘living being.’ We can neither see nor touch soul. But if soul is deprived, a human cannot live as a 
human” (p.125). Kawai’s “soul” here seems to be the concept that is connected to the idea of the “Japanese soul,” 
which seems to emerge in its simplistic juxtaposition with what he calls “Euro America” (ōbei) or “Christian 
cultural sphere” (Christ-kyō bunka ken), their supposedly “complete” separation of the mind/body.  
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emperor. This expression of religion in either case is distinct from the folk-Shinto discourses for 
its will to establish and to subject itself to the idea of the central or supreme figure. This distinc-
tion, however, might become diminutive in the face of modern alienation and capitalist dissemi-
nation⎯these two kinds of discourses might be different representations of people’s anxieties 
about these historical material factors. If the idea of the Shinto folk is supposed to work as the 
unconscious anchorage in the mechanical reproductive flows and dispersion, then the religion 
Shinto might be expected to function as the conscious order among the massified producers and 
consumers. In the nexus of these two aspects of the Shinto discourses, the neighborhood associa-
tion provides people with the opportunity not only to discover the allegedly unchanging identity 
as the Shinto folk, but also to reorganize their already materially differentiated groupings (e.g. 
genders, generations, and ethnicities) in the religious terms.  
Therefore in Toda Town, the association’s several executives are all elderly males of the 
grand bourgeois background, who are also the board members of the Yawata Shrine. In compari-
son, in each of more than sixty sub-units (kumi) of the association, the rotated position of leader-
ship (kumi chō) is almost always assumed by women. It is these female sub-leaders who have to 
do all the tedious routines in the neighborhood⎯to clean up the collective dumpsters, to walk the 
town’s children to and from school, to circulate the plastic kairan ban bulletin board for official 
notices, to collect the 500-yen-a-month membership fee, or to cook for the association’s fall fes-
tival. In their relation to the shrine, these women are partly the customarily assumed ujiko fol-
lowers and partly the secretaries to collect other resident-“followers’” donations for the shrine 
festivals. These sub-leaders’ designated roles to collect the shrine festival money and to partici-
pate in the otherwise unpopular ritual at the shrine, the boiling pot divination, are well-
camouflaged as some of these habitual, neighborhood duties. At least Machida did not notice that 
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the sub-leaders’ half-forced participation in the divination qua the sub-leaders of the officially 
financed association was constitutionally problematic, until a sub-leader, who happened to be a 
member of Jehovah’s Witness, refused to participate. “Hmm, interesting, a great opportunity to 
learn the Japanese thing,” Machida says she had thought at first, seemingly unconsciously sub-
scribing to the folk Shinto discourses of the Japanese nation. At the same time, these sub-leaders’ 
position behind the male elders, as these two groups lined up in front of the supposedly sacred 
pot for the divination, should be explained not just by the folk Shinto line of argument. In terms 
of folk Shinto, the sub-leaders’ symbolic subordination to the elders here would be explained 
either by Engels-type of imagination of biologically-caused female domination in ancient Japan 
or by the prewar type of ideology on partiarchally nationally justified domination of females. 
According to a feminist scholar, Junko Minamoto, the religion Shinto discriminates against 
women due to its differentiation and hierarchization between the clean and dirty, symbolically 
speaking (jōe shisō). Women are lower than men in this Shinto hierarchy due to their “blood dirt” 
(ketsue)⎯menstruation.71 This kind of symbolic yet ultimately biological explanation of the cur-
rent gender relation in Japan may not be exceedingly relevant, given the completely commodi-
fied everyday. Or, perhaps one can gather that it is due to this irrelevance that the ultimately bio-
logical concept of gender hierarchy in Shinto, as Minamoto surmises, performs a certain role 
against commodification, like the Shinto nation’s anachronism and its ideological salvation as 
the Japanese fate. 
As for the religion Shinto’s supposed god, the emperor, Masako as the current crown 
princess has been criticized, since she refuses to walk behind her husband, Naruhito (Hironomi-
ya), as other female members of the royal family do. That this former diplomat is rendered to be 
a vessel is apparent in the fact that she has to give birth to a boy; otherwise, the emperorship is 
                                                                  
71  Minamoto 
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going to be eventually inherited by her nephew-in-law, Hisahito.72 Accoridng to a feminist histo-
rian, Yūko Suzuki, a series of late-Edo to Taishō emperors, viz. Ninkō, Kōmei, Meiji, and Taishō, 
were all born out of the patrilineal ideology⎯these four emperors were born into fathers’ “mis-
tresses’ stomachs” (mekake bara), as the Japanese say. That is to say, if a wife does not bear a 
boy, other women’s wombs should be “borrowed” for the smooth inheritance pattern of patrilin-
earity.73 Ninkō to Taishō might be thought of as the model for the prewar patriarchy, according 
to which the ideology of family nation was practiced. Masako and Naruhito’s issue, or rather 
their bearing no sons being an issue, might show the degree to which the patriarchal nationalism 
is carried by postwar Japan. At the same time, one of the most important tenets of the religion 
Shinto, symbolic cleanliness, seems to underline the royal family’s ability to consider women as 
vessels. Of course there should be a plethora of other motives for the degradation of the female 
sex and sexuality in Japan like elsewhere, yet given the royal family’s embeddedness in the reli-
gion Shinto, there seems to be a certain, religiously explainable motive at work here, in addition 
to the nationalist cause of patrilineality. Again, these analyses are derived from Minamoto and 
other feminists’ theories of the Shinto essence of gender relations in Japan. Unlike Mishima, 
Yanagita, and other nationalists, these feminists suggest such an existence as an essence for criti-
cal purposes. The reader of these feminists would then like to refer to them as the providers of 
the Weberian ideal type, perhaps, the theoretical device to critically understand certain aspects of 
the contemporary Japanese gender relations.74  
                                                                  
72  Whether this rule, legislated as the Article 1 of the Imperial Household Law (Kōshitsu Tempan), should be 
rewrited to accommodate Masako and Naruhito’s only child (daughter), Aiko, has caused a nation-wide debate. 
According to the constitutional law scholar Kōichi Yokota, the academic and other supporters of the article “often 
times point out those reasons that are gender-discriminatory, such as that women are not meant for political duties or 
that women are under the strong influences of their husbands or that people have to devise how to deal with 
empresses’ husbands.” See Yokota, Kempō to Tennō Sei (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990); p.232-4. 
73  See Suzuki, Feminism, Tennō Sei, Rekishi Ninshiki (Tokyo: Impact Shuppan Kai, 2006); p.24. 
74  See Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A Finch, 
forward by Edward A. Shils (New York: Free Press, 1997); p.90. 
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My observation of Toda is that the neighborhood association seems to exercise the patri-
archal-gerontocratic governance over the female residents and that the association does so in the 
space of the local shrine and the time of the kōki calendar. The embodiment of the association’s 
organizational merge with the shrine, the building that the association uses as its official hall is 
registered also as the shrine’s office. The building is physically located in the shrine’s property, 
at the foot of the little hill on which a cluster of religiously significant buildings (such as the Hall 
of Prayer) is laid out. Similarly, the kōki is the calendar that the association refers to in its 
minutes and also at the court where they stood as Machida’s defendant. Given its interpretation 
of Shinto as a religion, as seen in the enthronement-commemorating slate, the association might 
be seen as struggling to legitimize or consecrate its gendered governance of neighbors by resort-
ing to Shinto’s religious discourses. Revering the emperor with the honorary and humble rhetoric 
and relegating women according to the Shinto cosmology, or at least according to the royal (di-
vine) patriarchy, the merged shrine-association in Toda is the magnetic field where the hierar-
chy-minded souls in the neighborhood gather together. These actors do not just dominate the 
neighborhood women, but dramatize the domination⎯a miniature theater for female domination, 
with which to act on the commoditized reality of the neighborhood. But when one looks at this 
theater’s structure, it paradoxically resembles what it is meant to criticize; with the exceeding 
stress on the appearance of religion and the immense force to function in reality as and in that 
appearance, the neighborhood association as a theater seems to have the structure of the com-
modity. The audience’s half-believing, half-disbelieving oscillation between the religious and 
folk views of Shinto, their indetermination between conformity and rebelliousness, is already 
taken into account in this theater, as another Kōwa Residence homemaker, “Kiyomi Shiraishi,” 
shows.75 
                                                                  
75  I owe my idea of fetish theater to David Graeber, who imagines “a moment of profound historical change,” 
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Shiraishi describes the theatrical nature of the association’s monthly meeting, which is 
held in the association hall/shrine’s office. According to her, in such a meeting, the female sub-
leaders are “made to sit in front of the horizontally lined executives on the stage, just like stu-
dents in a class-room.” 
“When I moved here in 1990, I didn’t know the culture [of the association] so I’d raise 
my hand at the monthly meeting and ask about some stupid details of the festival. Everybody 
looked at me with certain expressions. All the executives then started to yell and sandbagged me 
into dropping my questions (boro kuso ni hangeki-suru). Ever since, I’ve never even coughed 
when the executives are around.” 
On a sunny morning of the early summer 2007, Shiraishi treats me to a chilled glass of 
mugicha roasted wheat tea at the vinyl covered table in her small kitchen. She seems indifferent 
to the “celeb competition” that her neighbor Kotaki talks about. Her two children are at the Toda 
Primary School; her husband is working in his office. In the afternoon, she is riding a bike to the 
school for a PTA meeting and then to the Rainbow Mart to get some ground meat for supper. 
Hamburger is one of the favorite dishes of her younger kid. She invites me to the second floor, 
from which we see one of those grand bourgeois “farmers” working in the good-sized field adja-
cent to the Shiraishis’.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in which “no one involved could possibly know what the total system in question actually consists of.” He continues, 
“When it comes to establishing value, one common response to such confusing situations is to circle off a space as a 
kind of minimal, defacto ‘society,’ a kind of micrototality, as it were… The larger social reality does not yet exist. 
All that is real, in effect, is the actor’s capacity to create it. In situations like this objects really do, in a sense, bring 
into being what they represent. They become pivots, as it were, between imagination and reality.” See his Toward 
an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Judith L. 
Goldstein presents a similar view in a Lebanese case⎯see her “An Innocent Abroad: How Mulla Daoud Was Lost 
and Found in Lebanon: Or the Politics of Ethnic Theater in a Nation at War” Richard G. Fox ed., Nationalist 




“We came to see this property some 17 years ago, you know, having been told by the 
realtor that we had a good view here. We fell in love with it at the first glance⎯the moment I 
saw this farm from this window, I knew I was going to live here.” 
No clouds today. A white butterfly crosses the farm. It is quiet, with the occasional brass 
band march of Anchors Aweigh, remotely delivered by the wind, probably from the school. With 
peace in the house and the love of her children, Shiraishi of course has no reason to “even 
[cough] when the [association’s] executives are around.” Mutsumi Machida, openly rebellious 
against the association, is truly an exception in this bourgeois suburb. Even though those women 
whom I have talked to during my fieldwork all express their dismay, frustration, and sometimes 
resentment concerning their respective association’s non-democratic governance, which includes 
the executives’ official appointment and the kind of gender hierarchy that I have discussed, they 
usually acquiesce, at least superficially. “It’s because our kids are sort of taken hostage” by the 
association, Shiraishi explains. According to her, it is the association that organizes those moth-
ers who walk the kids to and from school. If Shiraishi rebelled against the association and its ex-
ecutives, would they tell other mothers not to walk her kids? Similarly, at the shrine’s and asso-
ciations’ festivals, kids receive the assorted snacks that they look forward to. Since these snacks 
are purchased and distributed by the association, it has the right to select who should receive 
them, technically speaking. In the past, a rebellious mother’s kid was actually excluded, which 
Shiraishi would like to avoid for her own kids. “Kids don’t know anything⎯they are innocent. 
Its’ too poor” that they might get excluded because of their parents’ political actions, she says. 
This mother in her 30s believes Machida might even think about suing the association, only after 
her two daughters left the town for college.  
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“I don’t really support her [Machida], like going to the court for her. If I did that, I’d be 
scapegoated [by the association]. But whenever I hear other mothers [in the neighborhood] talk-
ing ill of her behind her back, I say to them ‘no, that’s wrong, she’s not like that, she’s just trying 
to correct the wrong.’ That’s how I support her,” says Shiraishi. 
And still, children taken hostage are not the only story here. Shiraishi cooked, cleaned, 
and took care of her children already in her household, long before she was told to do so as one 
of the sub-leaders of the association. While she would do these chores out of love and for the 
sense of security, she is also assigned to that role by the capitalist system. When the whole set of 
capitalist institutions and their subjectifying processes are based on the ideology that women are 
the reproducers and consumers, there are usually no economic, social, aesthetic, or personal rea-
sons that a woman does not conform to that ideology. When the capitalist cult of production and 
productivity ranks male producers above female reproducers, Shiraishi already lives in the reality 
that the association merely hyperbolizes in its sacred theater.  
Desires of hierarchies and other orders are also Mutsumi Machida’s. Anybody who talks 
with her for more than 30 minutes would realize that “levels” is her favorite term. “I’m not 
boasting,” she boastfully says, for example, “but my [intellectual] level is pretty high.” Accord-
ing to Machida, her high intellectual level is the product of her “studying” (benkyō-suru). The 
scattered and piled books on her living room floor are likely the traces of her studying⎯among 
those books, I see such titles as “Japanese Religion,” “What Is State Shinto,” “The World of Ku-
nio Yanagita,” or “The Takamatsuzuka Mound: An Invitation to Ancient Japan.” A history major 
in her college, she explains that she studies in order not only to prepare herself for the lawsuit but 
also to raise her intellectual level. “Since I have a plenty of spare time, I do pretty intensive stud-
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ies,” she says, making her usual, cynical-conformist reference to her “housewifely” situation. 
Her neighbor friend Kotaki similarly says,  
 “There is actually another Machida family in the neighborhood. They’re also a banker’s 
family. I try not to associate with them though, as the wife is one of those celeb-types (celeb-kei). 
They were in the U.S. [as the other Mr. Machida’s bank dispatched him there]. So one day, I said 
to her [the other Mrs. Machida], ‘Cool. Let’s read Hemingway together in English.’ I don’t know 
if she even speaks English⎯anyway, she’s apparently started to hate me since then.” Kotaki 
laughs. So, it seems she is better than the other Mrs. Machida, due to her suggested ability for 
English and intellectual appetite for Hemingway.  
One context to frame Machida and Kotaki’s obsessions with intellect, or rather with a 
certain ranking system of different people’s supposedly different levels of intellect, is meritocra-
cy. The principle of meritocracy has motivated the whole society, particularly its bourgeois 
members.76 At the same time, the way in which Machida and Kotaki talk about study, intellect, 
and the intellectual hierarchy would not be fully understood without the view of women’s com-
modification. Kotaki has already told me that she read Goethe and Nietzsche instead of adorning 
herself with frills and jewelry. Her reference to Hemingway also seems to be made in order to 
separate herself from the “celeb types” of female consumers. Machida similarly makes one won-
der if boring hours and hours in which she studies might be saved by her not complying so much 
with the supposedly housewifely duties of chores. These female friends might deploy intellect as 
                                                                  
76  According to Anne Allison, “Producing Mothers,” ed. and w/ and intro. by Anne E. Imamura, Re-Imaging 
Japanese Women (Berkeley, Los Angels, London: University of California Press, 1996), pp.155-135, bourgeois 
children in contemporary Japan start to be immersed with the meritocratic culture already in kindergartens⎯if one 
focuses mothers’ roles in such a culture, one can also argue that competition starts from the children’s births or even 
conceptions. Allison’s earlier work, Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess 
Club (University of Chicago Press, 1994), mentions Japan’s meritocracy today in a more comprehensive fashion.  
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another anti-consumption tool so that it presumably spares them from being super-massified con-
sumers or reproducers, like other women.77  
The anti-massification tool of studying not only spares Machida and Kotaki but also 
ranks them high; in the hierarchy of intellect that they create, Kotaki suggests that she and 
Machida are about the same rank, of which she might judge I could be qualified, if I prove my-
self better. “I’m glad you visited me today,” she generously says anyway, “since around here, 
there’s nobody who actually reads⎯Matchii is probably the only other person [besides Kotaki, 
who reads].” In a somewhat professorial way, she similarly makes me feel honored, as she says, 
“Wow, that’s impressive that you’ve read [Nobukuni] Koyasu. Let’s discuss Norinaga [Motoori], 
then.” The supposed rank of intellect might therefore be meant to divide the otherwise massive 
group of female consumers. A wish for hierarchy seems to be unmistakably there among these 
neighborhood friends, the wishes that the other Mrs. Machida in Toda must surely share (hence 
the “hatred” of Kotaki), but apparently not so obsessively strongly as with Kotaki or Machida. 
Probably, the other Machida is too busy plunging into the pleasure of massification⎯Missen ta-
bleware, tennis, Italian restaurants, frilly blouses, and jewelry. Machida and Kotaki seem to 
claim that they are raising their intellectual levels in order to bulwark them from the inundating 
force of such pleasure.  
                                                                  
77  Here, the above-footnoted work by Haruki Murakami, “Nemuri,” becomes relevant once more. More 
broadly, Kōjin Karatani argues that intellect, sensibility, emotionality, and other faculties that are supposed to 
constitute human “internality” (naimen sei) were “discovered” in Japan by early modern writers, as these writers 
reacted to the accentuated externality of the commodity. See his Origins of Modern Japanese Literature, trans. by 
Brett de Bary (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993). The thus-invented contrast between the 
commodity and internality seems to be played out best in the figure of female consumers for some reasons⎯a 
material girl in contemporary Japan is likely told to “polish” (migake) her internality instead of “looking into the 
mirror.” “Read more,” she will be further advised as an effective way to polish her internality. The obverse image to 
this would be that of an intellectual woman, who is supposed to have “unkempt hair” (kami wo furi-midasu). 
“Coexistence of intellect and beauty” (sai shoku kenbi) in one woman is said to be desirable yet rare. As for men, 
“one should not judge a man by his face/appearance” (otoko wa kao/mikake ja nai). The irony is that of course it is 
men’s massification into the suit and tie-clad “corporate warrior,” which is responsible for the idea of their 
supposedly appearance-overwhelming smartness.  
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Of course, these two women’s Canetti-esque wishes to be the independent “windmill[s] 
in an enormous plain” are not equivalent to the Toda neighborhood association’s vision to organ-
ize the neighborhood according to the Shinto religious cosmology. Between these two groups of 
the (grand) bourgeois neighbors, one can probably say that there is a relation of appropriation, 
sophistication, or representation. For one conservative reason or another, these neighborhood 
women seem to willingly or unwillingly let the association aesthetically and politically represent 
their spontaneous, idiosyncratic wishes for independence and order in the religious discourse of 
the emperor’s nation. And yet, it is the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that aspires to 
bring this representational relation onto another level. In this regard, the neighborhood associa-
tion in general is called the “vote paddies” (hyōden) of the LDP, that is, a political field in which 
votes are organizationally guaranteed and readying themselves for the LDP’s “harvesting,” as it 
were. As discussed, the LDP vehemently promoted its policy that the fallen Japanese soldiers of 
the Asia-Pacific War be religiously memorialized as the divine emperor’s sacrified, as the sacred 
spirits in themselves. Although the policy’s defeat in the 1973 Diet made them shift their posi-
tion to adopt the folk Shinto ideology (Chapter 2), this does not seem to mean that they regard 
folk Shinto as non-religious. Folk Shinto to them might be the point to mobilize the mass and not 
the excuse to de-religioize Shinto and the Yasukuni Shrine, where the soldiers are apotheosized. 
For example, even after this policy shift, a former LDP prime minister, Yoshirō Mori (2000-
2001) stated, “Japan is a divine nation centered around the emperor.”78 Similarly “theocratic” 
views have been presented again and again by other LDP members, particularly those who gath-
er at the “Shinto Political Alliance Diet Members’ Roundtable” (Shintō Seiji Renmei Kokkai Giin 
Kondan Kai), which was established in 1969 to accommodate the non-partisan conservatism in 
                                                                  
78  For criticism, see Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in American Embrace (London and New York: 
Verso, 2007); p.11. 
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the Diet.79 The LDP’s Shinto discourse represents Toda Town, according to Machida, while the 
LDP is supported by the association’s vice president, for instance, who is willing to lend his own 
property to the district’s LDP candidate, Kenzō Yoneda, during election campaigns. In a wooden, 
two-storied prefab, which is constructed for Yoneda in the corner of the vice president’s mansion, 
the association’s “Ladies’ Department” (Fujin Bu) is habitually mobilized to supply rice balls 
and miso soup to Yoneda’s staff. Machida further informs me that the monthly meeting of the 
association was once moved to another day so that Yoneda could deliver a speech one day before 
the election day in that year. Shiraishi similarly witnesses that in one year in the association’s fall 
festival, her elementary-school children were “forced” to line up with other children and Yoneda 
on the stage⎯a perfect photographical opportunity for any populist politician. As for Yoneda, 
one of his stressed policies is to solve Japan’s border dispute with Russia. It is not known if he 
believes that the geographical territory of Japan overlaps with the symbolic body of the emperor 
(kokutai), as many rightists do. According to Machida, on the wall of the association’s hall are 
posted pictures of Yoneda and the association executives, as they visited some of the disputed 
islands off Hokkaido. Machida tells me that the association executives call Yoneda “Ken-chan,” 
an informal and affectionate way to mention his first name, Kenzō. Likely carrying these execu-
tives’ political wishes, Yoneda will later serve as the secretary general of the “Association to Re-
alize Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine” (Koizumi Shushō no Yasukuni 
Sampai o Jitsugen-saseru Kai). According to Machida, an LDP politician, Eriko Yamatani, who 
served as the vice secretary of the above-mentioned Shinto Political Alliance Diet Members’ 
Roundtable and the chief secretary of the “Project Team to Investigate into the Facts of the Radi-
cal Sex Education and Gender Education” (Kageki-na Sei Kyōiku, Gender Kyōiku Jittai Chōsa 
                                                                  
79  See critique by Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, “The Abe Cabinet: An Ideological Breakdown,” 
trans. and explanations of Diet groups by Matthew Penney, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 1/28/2013.   
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Project Team), calls Yoneda aniki (bro), perhaps to show their close ideological as well as per-
sonal ties.80  
---------------- 
 This chapter has discussed the way in which the gender-divided labor of contempo-
rary Japan has accelerated the process of commodification and massification. As a result, the 
everyday possibility for fascism is exhibited as both women’s death-instinctual propensity to-
ward excessive identification with each other, as well as men’s self-consuming tendency toward 
the so-called karōshi or death as a result of overworking. I have examined the trans-war institu-
tion of the neighborhood association in order to explore the trajectory through which people’s 
desires for and anxieties about this condition have been historically expressed via this institution. 
While the prewar association struggled to organize the mass-reproduced excesses of the every-
day according to the molds of the public/private dichotomy and the patriarchal nation, the post-
war association synthesizes and advances these emperor-centered hierarchies into the new theme 
of a hierarchical nation centered on the divine (or sympathized) emperor. Because of its vacilla-
tion between the nature of the national habitus and that of the national religion, Shinto becomes 
the key to mediate the contradictory elements in the idea of the hierarchical nation, viz. the gen-
                                                                  
80  What is truly radical is of course Yamatani’s reactionary gender politics, which initially focused on the sex 
and gender education practiced in junior high schools under the banner of the “gender-free” education. In May 2002, 
she made a speech in the Education and Science Committee, Lower Diet, problematizing the idea of “women’s right 
to self-determination,” as it was mentioned together with abortion and birth-control pill in the junior high school sex 
education booklet, “Love & Body Book.” As a result, the booklet was recalled and gone out of print in the summer 
in the same year (Mieko Takenobu et. al. “Fumareta Skirt: Abe Seiken to Josei: Chū: Josei no Kettei Ken Yaridama,” 
Asahi Shinbun, 7/11/2007). In the background were the Japanese state’s continuing denial of its wartime 
involvement in the military institution of sex slavery: the above-mentioned controversy of teenage girls’ prostitution 
for brand name products: and the declining population due to women’s rejection to bear children. As the chief 
secretary of the Education Rebuilding Council (kyōiku saisei kaigi) established within the Cabinet Secretariat under 
the first Shinzō Abe administration (2006-7), Yamatani tried to promulgate the council’s proposal, “’Reflection on 
Child-Bearing’: To Guardians and Everyone,” asking the “guardians and everyone” who were responsible for child-
bearing “not to turn on TV while having meals [with children] or feeding [them with] milk,” “to look into the baby’s 
eyes” during nursing, or to set up filters in the children’s computers and cell phones, since “the Internet and cell 
phones could lead directly even to the evil of the world.” As a result of the nationwide criticism, the proposal was 
not published. See “Osekkai? Kosodate wo Shinan” in Asahi Shinbun, 5/2/2007. 
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der hierarchy and the democratic nation. The neighborhood women doubt, resent, and challenge 
the ancient primitivism and sanctioned hierarchy that Shinto can simultaneously represent, but 
their doubts, resentments, and challenges seem to effectively corroborate with the association in 
the Shinto disguise. Sharing the same aspiration for nationalism and the same background of the 
bourgeoisie, any fight between these women and the association seem to be subsumed under the 
larger dialectic between the neighborhood corporatism for hierarchies and the death-communal 
movement for equivalence, to which I will return in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4. Internet Fascism and Resurgence of the Grassroots 
  
The corporatist imagination of local Japan that I have discussed in the previous chapter is 
closely connected to technologies of distancing. The so-called “circulating board” (kairan ban), 
which I have mentioned, would be a good example of such a technology. The circulating board is 
a plastic board, to which hardcopies of official notices are supposed to be attached. Physically 
handed from neighbor to neighbor on a set route, the circulating board is meant to create a hu-
man-sized community within a certain distance between the office and residents, and between 
the residents. 
If the circulating board is a remnant from prewar corporatism of local integration, televi-
sion would be the postwar technology to advance such corporatism in even more sophisticated 
and totalitarian ways than the board. Television is a technology that is meant to keep its object in 
its “location,” which is by definition somewhere else and by implication far away. The viewer of 
TV is established as an “us,” who did not have to experience that accident, murder case, or war, 
which is on the screen in a given moment. “We” are always collective, e.g. middle-classed, “or-
dinary” citizens in a safe metropolis. At the same time, the TV collectivity is a false multiplicity, 
whereby the viewers are interpellated as the gendered, ethnicized, or localized existence. TV at-
tempts to create these categories (e.g. gender) and keep distance between the groups within a 
category (e.g. men and women).1 TV thus divides masses, yet the divided groups are always al-
ready assembled as “us the nation,” the subjects, etc. In the postwar days, the neighborhood as-
sociation-type of corporatist endeavors could rely on the TV technology of making and maintain-
ing a national totality of Japan and its organic-looking parts. 
                                                                  
1 About the contemporary Indian case, see Purima Mankekar, Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: An Ethnogra-




 It is not coincidental that the televised field of corporatist Japan seems to have been going 
through its demise in the neoliberal period. The ur-mass of neoliberalism, that is, the mass that is 
brought to the highest possible level of reification, demands a new technology. The spatial model, 
on which TV or the circulating board depends, cannot accommodate the new temporal urgency 
of “nowness” that neoliberal dislocation and super-mobility have generated. TV’s replacement 
by the Internet is inevitable, when the newly “equalized” (that is, mutually exchangeable) mass 
opts for the concept of simultaneity, participation, and interaction, which the Internet enables. 
The Internet’s hyper-sensibility of time, though, sacrifices any consciousness of history. The In-
ternet process of constant renewal and the resultant erasure of history/historicity are perhaps 
summoned by the neoliberal workers’ survival strategy—they have to be always kept technically 
up-to-date, while politically tuning out. 
 Velocity without history or politics, where temporality collapses into spatiality—this is 
one image of what I have called the death community. Death communal fascism assumes total 
repression of history; the result is accelerated exchangeability between the members, who are 
rendered to be mutually identical. Advocates for fascist equality would thus find the Internet-
field presenting an easy opportunity for its usage. 
Still, even at the current point (2013), this seems to remain a mere opportunity. As op-
posed to corporatist advocates, who have enjoyed seeing their vision firmly institutionalized as 
the neighborhood association among others, the Internet mass of neoliberalism seems to see the 
aestheticized equality of simultaneity only as an inchoate image. The same image seems to pro-
vide inspirations also to such democracy-minded practitioners as the anti-nuclear activists after 
the Fukushima earthquake in 2011. This chapter analyzes Japan between 2006 and 2008, when it 
was vacillating between different potentialities and suggestions that the Internet had indicated. 
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How could mere potentialities, suggestions, and inchoation⎯Charles Sanders Peirce’s “first-
ness”⎯be logged and analyzed?2 I will adopt multiple methods so that the Internet futures would 
be presented as an image. 
 First, I would like to start with the overall framework of neoliberal violence, based on my 
conviction that the quality of the Internet masses in pre-Fukushima Japan would not be adequate-
ly described without mentioning the violence that they seemed to contain. The then prime minis-
ter, Junichirō Koizumi (2001-2006), adopted the fascistic technique of appearance-orientation in 
order to cover the neoliberal disruption of the country’s class-structure. The Internet masses of 
the period seemed to be more or less organized by the appearance of the nation that Koizumi 
newly provided, while unconsciously registering the material violence of neoliberalism. Before I 
move on to an ethnography of such masses, who gathered in Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo, in 2006, I 
will turn my attention to Christian peace activists against the shrine. By examining the effects of 
the violence that these Japanese activists had sustained, I will be able to illuminate the way in 
which the technology of the Internet was connected with the fascist-inclined masses. Then, I will 
proceed to the ethnography of the masses at the Yasukuni Shrine, so that I can negatively de-
scribe the atmospheric existence of the death-communal violence that the masses seemed to take 
on. I will describe and analyze the corporatist devices that the shrine and the state used in order 
to tame the violent atmosphere of the masses. Through these descriptions and analyses, the vio-
lent possibilities of the Internet masses will textually emerge as the dialectical other of state cor-
poratism. The final section of the chapter will be dedicated to a historiographical exercise to ex-
                                                                  
2 According to Peirce, “It seems, then, the true categories of consciousness are, 1st, Feeling, the conscious-
ness of quality, without recognition or analysis; 2nd, Consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, 
sense of resistance, of an external fact, or another something; 3rd, synthetic consciousness binding time together, 
sense of learning, thought.” See his “One, Two, Three: Fundamental Categories of Thought and of Nature” in James 
Hoopes ed., Peirce on Signs: Writing on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991), pp.180-185; p.185. 
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plore the relation between different media technologies and fascist possibilities throughout mod-
ern Japan. 
In retrospect, it might be the interaction between the corporatist state and the death-
communal inclination of the Internet masses that might be responsible for the prevented future of 
participatory democracy in 2006 Japan. The socio-political geography of the country at this time 
did not seem to point to this future of new democracy, which the post-earthquake Internet may 
be promising today. In 2006, the masses seemed to be attaining participation and equality in an-
other way, the way that had been inherited from the country’s fascist past. 
 Still, it is too early to decide that history of the Internet in Japan has moved from the fa-
scistic to democratic. The Internet seems to be always ready to offer itself to violent and con-
servative usages by death-communal aspirations. This chapter will be the reminder of this aspect 
of the Internet in the days of participatory movements. 
 
“Koizumi Theater”: The Fascistic in the Neo-Liberal Crisis 
 On the morning of August 15th 2006, I wake up at 4:20 a.m. Today is the sixty-first an-
niversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War. In the country, where its warring past has yet to be 
resolved, there will be numerous demonstrations and gatherings staged by the whole political 
spectrum. I am planning to attend them, starting with Japanese Christians’ memorial meeting 
held in Chidorigafuchi (anonymous soldiers’) Cemetery (Chidorigafuchi Senbotsu-sha Boen) in 
Tokyo from 7 to 8 o’clock. The train that leaves a nearby, coastal Yokohama station at 5:30 a.m. 
lacks the usual pack of commuters. It is Tuesday, but many Japanese take advantage of the obon 
holiday and take summer vacations during this time. The car, though, is clamorous because all 
the walls are covered with black, red, and other colored letters, advertising for sensational tab-
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loids and weeklies. Photogenic females, who show their bikini-clad forms mainly to the young 
male readers of comic magazines (called “gravure” idols or gra dol), provocatively pose and 
smile in the magazines’ ads that hang from the ceiling. Apparently, the advertisers assume gen-
dered commuters. Today, however, the ads are misdelivered, as the only other passenger in the 
car besides me is another female. She looks to be in her 30s. She is already perfectly protected 
from the still-rising sun with a hat, scarf, and gloves. The recent Japanese females’ overprotec-
tion from not only the sun but other natural environments—“free radicals,” germs, virus, etc.—
could reflect these females’ symptomatic accusation of their socio-culturally damaging environ-
ments. 
 I am glad that railroads in neoliberal Japan became mostly privatized just for the reason 
that the trains are cooler because they do not abide by the new nation-wide rules of staying at 78 
degrees or above. Though non-binding, the rules have resulted in warming up most of the public 
facilities in the country. This is because it is the prime minister, Junichirō Koizumi, who has ad-
vocated for the rules. These rules are part of the eco-campaign that he calls “Cool Business,” in 
his sense of English. In addition to the reduced A/C usage, the PM recommends half-sleeved 
suits and no tie for male office workers. All the public offices from libraries to ministries are ap-
parently compelled to follow the PM’s initiative. Many private companies have started to intro-
duce “casual Fridays” at least, where bosses and customers are asked to forgive their otherwise 
formally clothed subordinates and business partners in polo shirts and chino pants. “Cool Biz,” 
as it is widely called in this country, is also meant to grow the country’s eco-business by creating 
a new market for eco-suits and Okinawan kariyushi shirts, for instance. I have also seen mini-
booms of those nostalgic commodities that are reminiscent of pre-A/C days, such as folding fans, 
handkerchiefs, shaved ice to eat, or wind chimes to help us notice the breeze. People have also 
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eagerly purchased such inventions as a sweat-drying textile, sold at “Uniqlo” for example, which 
is a burgeoning clothing chain catering to neoliberal thrift. 
 In many ways, Cool Biz represents the essence of the influential administration of Koi-
zumi. To begin with, there is a certain perverted sense of nationalism always involved in post-
recessionary ecologism in Japan. As the future PM, Tarō Asō (2008-9) will vociferously argue, 
the expression, mottainai or wasteful, is supposed to carry a Japan-specific eco-consicousness 
that should be spread through the world. The fact that the Kyoto Protocol for climate change was 
adopted in Japan in 1997 is a point of nationalist pride. Japan’s anxieties about its decreasing 
technological and economic leadership in the world seem to be expressed by claims that the 
country should teach China (of course) and other “developing” countries with Japan’s technolo-
gies and consciousness of environmentalism. The irony of Minamata and other instances of envi-
ronmental pollution that Japanese industries have caused, especially in the 1950-60s, are posi-
tively narrated as the lessons that other countries can learn.3 
 Second, Koizumi in rough kariyushi shirts, the idea of half-sleeved suits, and other vi-
sions presented in the Cool Biz campaign might show the PM’s orientation toward theatricality. 
The country’s journalism has indeed called his administration “Koizumi theater” (Koizumi 
gekijō). The term seems to represent a certain nature of the administration, in which one ex-
tremely radical political change is accomplished after another, while people are being mesmer-
ized by its ostentatious presentation. Coinciding with the Bush administration in the United 
States and Tony Blair in Britain, the Koizumi theater is meant for the people, their desires for 
                                                                  
3 According to the Asahi Newspaper, “Wasting or trashing things as little as possible, the Japanese have long lived 
the kind of life that respects ecological environments. [The Japanese] made efforts to save energy upon the oil 
shock; [they] worked as the chairman of the Kyoto [environmental] Conference [of 1997]. The whole world rec-
ognizes these accomplishments [made by the Japanese].” Since the “developing countries such as China and In-
dia” would be “interested” in the “technologies of energy conservation and natural energy sources, at which Ja-
pan is good,” Japan should sell these technologies to these countries and promote global ecologism, according to 
Asahi. The quotes are from their 5/3/2007 editorials, “Soft Power: Hottoke-nai, Mottai-nai, Hekotare-nai” and 
“Kikō no Anzen Hoshō: ‘Kyoto’ wo Chikyū Hozen no Genten ni suru” respectively.   
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catharsis at least aesthetically. The feeling of violence that I might have toward the case of the 
half-sleeved suits for instance might be shared when one thinks about such suits together with 
the popular resentment of the business world’s corruption and bureaucracy’s privilege. Big cor-
porations and central ministries are otherwise the world of dark suits and ties, as well as heavily 
air-conditioned offices.4 Like Bush or Blair, Koizumi apparently prefers to look like he brings 
about catharsis as the “ordinary,” yet strong-willed leader. He is supposed to be a Robespierre 
reformer of the otherwise corrupt “ancient regime” of postwar Japan, as he and the rest of the 
country call. He calls his political opponents “resisting forces” (teikō seiryoku), as if they were 
merely old and stubborn. He would release “assassins” (shikaku) to those resisting politicians’ 
electoral districts—he selects and supports actresses, newscasters, and other known, new faces to 
electorally beat the resisting politicians. People love Koizumi’s revolutionary image—I guess 
this is how the long-lasting recession has made them feel to be vulnerable and desire charisma. 
Being a grandson and son of Yokosuka politicians, Kanagawa Prefecture, and the biological fa-
ther of a popular actor, Kōzaburō Koizumi, and a burgeoning politician, Shinjirō Koizumi, Koi-
zumi the prime minister is surely part of corporate Japan and its political interests of conserva-
tism. However, he acts as if he represented the recessionary Japanese desires for change. There is 
a certain truth in his appearance, since he actually changes the system. Yet the changes that he 
pursues cannot be real changes, since he changes in order to make the system even more system-
atic than before. The setting of the A/C at the higher temperature than before is not meant to 
change the dominance of big corporations and bureaucracy over people’s lives. On the contrary, 
                                                                  
4  In the neoliberal discourses of a “small government” and people’s “self-sufficiency” (jiko sekinin), one of 
the most heated national debates in the period is whether the nation should allow welfare-families to have A/Cs. The 
haves ask if A/Cs are an additional luxury to the “healthy and cultural, lowest-possible standard of life” that is 
guaranteed in the Constitution and whether public monies should cover A/Cs. As welfare-families have started to 
bear the moral connotation of these discourses of A/C usages, elder or diseased members of these families have 
started to pass away in the heated natural environment of global warming. About neoliberalism and poverty in 
general, see Osamu Aoki and Hiroshi Sugimura eds., Gendai no Hinkon to Fubyōdō: Nihon, America no Genjitsu to 
Han Hinkon Senryaku (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006).  
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the new A/C rule is meant to benefit the corporations and bureaucracy by promoting eco-
business and increasing points of governmental control over ordinary people. 
 Similarly, as a PM candidate in 2001, his slogan was “wreck the LDP” (Jimin Tō o Buk-
kowase), with the LDP being the Liberal Democratic Party the almost sole ruler of postwar Japan. 
The irony is that Koizumi himself is an LDP member. Moreover, the new Japan that he has pro-
moted since then would alternate between two conservative parties, the LDP and the Democratic 
Party (DP), which gathers former LDP fractions and others. Beneath the theatrical exchanges of 
political arguments and personal enmities between the new LDP and DP members, conservatism 
is thus meant to become even more monolithic a principle to rule over Japan than even before. 
What is excluded from this new monolith of political conservatism are social democrats and oth-
er progressive parties. In the “small electoral district system” (shōsenkyokusei), which was 
launched in 1996 and has been advanced by Koizumi, oppositional candidates in each district are 
destined to lose. When only one Diet member is supposed to represent a miniatualized district, 
the relatively smaller amount of votes that socialists or Minsha laborers’ candidates could usual-
ly attract in each district as compared to those that are cast for the LDP or DP will be disregarded. 
Many oppositional party-members are compelled to join the DP. Although it is true that the DP 
has the appearance of the other party of the LDP, the matter of fact is that the Japanese are left 
only with a false choice, the choice between slightly different kinds of conservatism.5 
 The radical conservatism of Koizumi, which does not allow even the existence of opposi-
tion (c.f. the metaphor of assassins), matches the neoliberal totalitarianism that he endeavors to 
construct. With the recession as a subterfuge, an ultimately smooth surface for exchange has 
                                                                  
5  The small electoral district system is a system of “distorted representation (min'i ga yugamu),” the 
communist party of Japan criticizes. See “Jimin Asshō no Karakuri Shō Senkyo Ku Seido,” Shinbun Akahata, 
9/25/2005. See also Gavan McCormack’s criticism in his Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London and 
New York: Verso, 2007); pp.34-9. 
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been constructed. Possibly discriminatory, yet surely protective laws for women are abrogated.6 
Theoretically all the jobs there are in the country are standardized and assignable to any worker 
beyond gendered, ethnic, or regional differences.7 The capital market boasts infinitesimal inter-
est-rates, while the commodity market is freshly rid of various “non-numerical barriers” and 
supposedly totally porous to any domestic or international players. Although the neoliberal mo-
mentum is bequeathed from the preceding administrations, Koizumi has promoted the momen-
tum exceedingly. In the resulting totalitarianism of the commodity-logic, both workers and goods 
have become dislocated from their socio-cultural surroundings. Geographically based mobiliza-
tion of voters has come to be dysfunctional—local post-offices or the neighborhood associations 
can no longer adequately work to represent the neoliberal movements. Supposedly policy-versus 
interest-led politics of the new LDP and DP are meant to accommodate the dispersed fabric of 
the post-1990s society. The monolithic similarity of these parties’ policies reflect the almost 
unanimously conservative mood of the public, but more fundamentally, the newly emphasized 
totalitarianism of the commodity’s massifying power. 
 In summarizing the Koizumi administration, what strikes me is its relevance to Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of fascism, which might be simplified as the covering of politics with the 
aesthetics of the mechanical reproductive mode, to which neoliberalism is subsumed as its cur-
rently most advanced stage. This is another way to say my thesis that the fascist subjects misrec-
ognize the fascist representation of the mechanically reproduced equivalence as the presentation 
of political equality. According to Benjamin’s observation of 1936 Germany, the society-wide 
issue of the masses was about to be solved by aesthetically organizing them in cinema. The 
                                                                  
6 See Yasuko Shimamoto, “Kaiko: Kaisha no naka de Nani ga Okonawarete-iru no ka” in Sekai, No.710 (February 
2003): 85-90. Again, these abrogated laws were protective—the question is whether both male and female work-
ers should become as protected as women under these laws used to be. Women’s emancipation seems to be 
abused as an excuse to deprive male workers of the chance to be protected.  
7  Shimamoto (Ibid.) provides a concise chronology of how neoliberal labor laws have developed.  
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masses emerged then as the producers and consumers of mechanically reproduced products, in-
cluding cinema. The real problem that the masses were facing, though, was their increasing im-
poverishment. “The growing proletarianization of modern man and the increasing formation of 
masses are two aspects of the same process,” Benjamin wrote. 
 
Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without af-
fecting the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees 
its salvation in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to ex-
press themselves. The masses have a right to change property relations; Fascism 
seeks to give them an expression while preserving property. The logical result of 
Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life.8 
 
While they had a “right” to realize politico-economic equality with the elites, the masses were 
made to be content with the artistic “expression” of equivalence in film and other mechanically 
reproduced technologies.9 Recall the example of such an expression that I have provided in the 
first chapter, viz. the CG image of the imperial Japanese soldiers mutually equalized in their 
deaths. Benjamin similarly mentions the cinematic, photographic, and other mechanical repro-
ductive representations of the masses “in big parades and monster rallies, in sports events, and in 
war” and remarks that “mass movements, including war, constitute a form of human behavior 
which particularly favors mechanical equipment.”10 In the Benjaminian understanding of history 
that focuses on the materiality of human behavior, the “mass movements” that he mentions here 
turn out to be the result of what he calls “mechanical equipment,” actually, or rather the econom-
ic mode which facilitates and adopts such an equipment. The utmost degree of human reification 
or massification is in the base of people’s favoritism of their aesthetic representation over their 
                                                                  
8 Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. 
and with an intro by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zone (New York: Schocken Books, 1968(1936)), pp. 217-
251; p.241. 
9  See also Frederic Jameson 
10  Benjamin, Ibid.; p.251; note 21. One of the representations that Benjamin talks about would be the 1934 
Nazi Rally in Nuremberg, which mobilized 700,000 supporters, according to Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” 
New York Review of Books, February 6, 1975. 
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political emancipation. If fascism is the name for this movement of replacement, the replacement 
of political rights with the aesthetic appearance of their realization (note that in the artistic ex-
pression of equality, equality looks to have already been there in reality, whose representation 
the artistic expression is supposed to be), then people in the mode of mass reproduction are al-
ways already conditioned to be the subjects of such a fascistic replacement; they are habituated 
to be apolitical.11 Therefore, although he does not depend on cinematic media like German fas-
cists did more than sixty years ago, Koizumi uses theatrical performance to be more than well 
received by the contemporary Japanese masses. Koizumi’s shock-inflicting performances ac-
commodate people’s desires to avert their attention from the fact that he is politically impover-
ishing people by depriving them of real choices—that is, by promoting the miniaturized electoral 
district. Economically, his neoliberalist policies have been taking away full employment and de-
cent benefits from the working Japanese. Instead of staging political oppositions to such political 
and economic policies of impoverishment, people contradictorily turn to the policy maker, viz. 
Koizumi, and clap their hands as he covers these poor policies with his excellent theatricality. 
The potentially oppositional masses are thus converted into the image of the new nation that 
Koizumi promotes. 
 Ideologically, Koizumi thus depends on neo-nationalism, with whose force he has tried to 
integrate the Japanese, the Japanese that his neoliberal policies have atomized and strewn. Prov-
ocation of the country’s new rival, China, beyond the hitherto observed protocols of the bilateral 
                                                                  
11 Among other critics of fascism, Sontag focuses her attention on the aspect of temporal inversion, which, accord-
ing to her, is an abuse of modern capitalist temporality in general. Analyzing Leni Riefenstahl’s 1935 film, Tri-
umph of the Will, Sontag says the film “represents an already achieved and radical transformation of reality: his-
tory become theater.” The film on the above-mentioned Nuremberg Rally was accordingly “planned not only as 
a spectacular mass meeting—but as a spectacular propaganda film...The event, instead of being an end in itself, 
served as the set of a film which was then to assume the character of an authentic documentary... In Triumph of 
the Will, the document (the image) is no longer simply the record of reality; ‘reality’ has been constructed to 
serve the image.” In addition to the 700,000 supporters that I have mentioned, 30,000 extras were employed for 
film production. See Sontag, Ibid.; parentheses original. 
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diplomacy and the violent dismissal of the resident Korean or dissident Japanese human rights—
these taboo-breaking behaviors of Koizumi have made only a few in Japan frown.12 One of the 
arenas on which Koizumi has staged his neonational plays is Yasukuni Shrine. Every year since 
his taking the office in 2001, Koizumi has visited this controversially “religious” facility, which 
consecrates the fallen Japanese soldiers of the Asia-Pacific and other imperial wars that Japan 
forged. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, the shrine’s tenet that the soldiers were not invaders of 
other Asian and Pacific countries, but war-heroes of the Japanese nation, has met strong opposi-
tion from the victims. By visiting the shrine as the prime minister, Koizumi has apparently at-
tempted to build up the impression that the shrine is backed by Japanese national support. This 
will eventually “normalize” the shrine as a national war-memorial, according to the neonational-
ist logic⎯currently the shrine is a private religious organization. But the fact that is covered by 
this logic is that the Japanese are ethically and politically impoverished by the existence of the 
shrine. 
 The first PM who visited the shrine in his capacity as the PM was Takeo Miki, in 1975. 
Miki was followed by Mikio Fukuda in 1978, Zenkō Suzuki in 1980, Yasuhiro Nakasone in 
1985, and Ryūtarō Hashimoto in 1996. Whether the date of visit should coincide with August 
                                                                  
12  Koizumi’s anti-Chinese and -Korean policies, which have been inherited and exacerbated by his successor, 
Shinzō Abe (2006-7 and 2012-), have another aspect besides neonationalism⎯anti-communism. This is the reason 
that not all the Korean residents in Japan have been persecuted, but only those who publicly espouse the North 
Korean identity (the difference between the North and South Koreans in contemporary Japan among the ethnic 
Korean residents are not determined by these residents’ geographical origins, but by their public identification with 
either of the two governments in the Korean Peninsula). The Japanese state persecutions include the cancellation of 
the North Korean defacto embassy, sōren’s tax exemption status and new, strict rules for North Korean residents’ 
reentry into Japan⎯see Zai Nihon Chōsen-jin Jinken Kyōkai, Shinsō Report: Keishi-chō Kōan-bu no Chōsen Sōren 
Tokyo-to Honbu nado to Zainichi Chōsen-jin Josei ni taisuru Kyōsei Sōsa no Futō-sei ni tsuite (unpublished 
pamphlet, 2006). Particularly after one of the first missile tests conducted by the North Korean state on 7/5/2006, the 
Japanese state should be accused of being neglectful of saving the North Korean residents’ (esp. students’) lives 
from being physically harassed by the Japanese. According to the above-mentioned pamphlet, until 7/31 of that year, 
there were 121 cases of such harassment, ranging from being slapped on the face (a six-year-old boy in an Osakan 
street, 7/6) to being yelled at over the phone, “I’ll kill you,” “Get out (of Japan),” “I’ll demolish the school to the 
ground,” and so on (a North Korean residents’ school in Yamaguchi, 7/7). About Koizumi’s radical provocation of 
China, see below on his Yasukuni policies.  
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15th has been a sensitive issue, when the date is memorialized variously as that of liberation in 
other Asian and Pacific countries that Japan occupied. Some PMs (Miki, Fukuda, Suzuki, and 
Nakasone) dared to do so. Koizumi’s previous visits avoided the date, which the neonationalists 
have criticized as wimpy acquiescence to the “Chinese” opposition. Still, the PM’s visit to the 
shrine (on any date) has supplied the (neo)nationalists with a certain level of triumph, as if the 
act had redeemed the nation, which they seem to perceive as being besieged by foreign “intru-
sion in the internal affairs” of Japan. Koizumi in past years in Yasukuni has thus steadily accu-
mulated his popularity, whereas his popularity has always been simultaneously eroded by the 
criticism that he should choose August 15 as the day of this visit. Today, on 8/15/2006, after five 
long years of mediocre satisfaction, the neonationalist frustration seems to have reached the tip-
ping point, trying the true nature of Koizumi’s populism. 
 
Opposition Groups in New Surveillance Systems 
 When I get off the train in Ichigaya Station, which is about a 10-15 minute walk from 
Yasukuni Shrine, the road in front of the station, Yasukuni Boulevard, is unusually empty under 
a drizzle of rain. Is it because it is still early in the morning (6:50)?, I wonder. On the same date 
of last year, the late morning boulevard was lined with two incessant rows of rightists’ vans on 
both sides. Called “armored cars” (sōkōsha), these black vans usually gather together from all 
over the country around Yasukuni on August 15. The dormant violence of the everyday is 
dragged into broad daylight by these black vans, which carry white or red inked slogans, such as 
“Return Us Our Northern Territories” or “Heavenly Wrath on X” (with X being whomever they 
regard as unforgivable for whatever reasons at any given time). Self-acclaimed agents of such 
heavenly wrath (tenchū), the “rightwingers” (uyoku) are known to have truly attacked and mur-
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dered leftists and others in the past.13 The rightists around Yasukuni usually shout heavenly 
wrath and other terms and slogans with full-volumed microphones. The surrealistic silence and 
emptiness of the boulevard on this morning is then ripped by the siren of a couple of official ar-
mored cars (ACs) run at full speed from behind, that is, from the west. There, the three Self-
Defense Forces are stationed side by side. Yelling something along the lines of “vacate the road” 
as they go, the ACs speed off the shrine’s direction (to the east). 
 Overwhelming even the ACs’ siren is the deafening noise from up above. I ask a woman 
for directions to the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery, but the noise completely erases my voice. Look-
ing up, I locate a white, enormous helicopter hovering in midair. From now on, every three 
minutes or so, I will be hearing one helicopter after another, which makes me think of war. But 
more realistically, it should be the sign of Koizumi’s arrival, I think in my mind. In that case, the 
helicopter would be functioning as a mobile surveillance-camera of the state. Surveillance cam-
eras in general have surrounded citizens’ lives for some time now, facilitated by the anti-criminal 
and anti-terrorist rhetoric.14 Particularly Christian and other anti-war activists, whom I am seeing 
now, are said to be on the black list of the state’s renewed efforts for surveillance.15 Although to 
                                                                  
13 There are dozens of such instances, the most notorious of which might be what is called “Shimanaka Incident 
(jiken)” of 1961. The incident involves a writer, Shichirō Fukazawa, and his novel, “Fūryū Mutan,” published in 
Chūō Kōron, December 1960. One of the scenes in the novel that infuriated the rightists of 1960s Japan featured 
the Japanese prince and princess being decapitated by riotous people⎯the 1960s was the period of students’ and 
other citizens’ movements and riots. A seventeen-year-old male rightist visited the publisher, Chūō Kōron’s 
CEO’s house in Tokyo, ending up in stubbing and killing the housekeeper and severely injuring the CEO’s wife. 
See John Treat, “Beheaded Emperors and the Absent Figure in Contemporary Japanese Literature,” PMLA (Jan-
uary 1994): 100-15: Marilyn Ivy, “Revenge and Recapitation in Recessionary Japan” The South Atlantic Quar-
terly, Vol.99, No.4 (Fall 2000); 819-840.  
 One of the post-recessionary instances of similar violence would be the “Incident of Gunning Down Nagasaki 
Mayor Motoshima” of 1990, in which Mayor Hitoshi Motoshima of Nagasaki City was hit by a rightist gunman. 
A couple of years earlier, the mayor had remarked that he had thought the emperor Shōwa (Hirohito) had been 
accountable for the war, that is, for the war-crimes committed by the Japanese during the Asia-Pacific War. Mo-
toshima survived the attack. Norma Field’s analyze the crime in her In the Realm of a Dying Emperor (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1991). 
14 In Tokyo’s wealthy Setagaya Precinct alone has introduced 440 cameras in 220 places as of 2007. See “Anzen ni 
Yureru Ko no Sonchō” in Asahi Shinbun, 4/28/2007. 
15 Supposedly, the Ground, Air, and Maritime SDFs’ “Investigatory Teams (Chōsa Tai)” were restructured and 
fortified in 2003 to be “Information Security Corps (Jōhō Hozen Tai)” with 927 personnel in total (as of the end 
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witness Koizumi’s possible arrival at Yasukuni Shrine is tempting for an ethnographer, I follow 
a narrow back-road off the Yasukuni Blvd, to go see Christians at the Cemetery. Not that I am 
heroic enough to share the dissidents’ fate; rather, I promised that I would meet Seiji Suga, the 
chairman of the Committee on the Yasukuni Problem in Nihon [Japan] Christian Conference 
(NCC) (Nihon Kirist Kyō Kyōgi Kai Yasukuni Jinja Mondai Iinkai). 
 Pastor Suga says that ever since 1989, when the emperor Shōwa’s death “steered the 
country rightward,” Christianity in Japan has been suffering from decreasing membership. In a 
country where atheists are the majority, Christians are not particularly treated unfairly as mem-
bers of certain “new religious” organizations might be, but regarded as different. According to 
Suga, the remaining and aging population of the Japanese Christians is becoming more conserva-
tive every day. “Particularly those big churches in cities,” he sighs. Shigenori Nishikawa, a 
member of the Yotsuya Reformed (Kaikaku-ha) Church, Tokyo, and one of the leaders of the 
National Liaison among Peace Families Associations (Heiwa Izoku-kai Zenkoku Renraku-kai), 
stresses what he regards as the inheritance of the churches’ co-opted past, in order to explain 
Christian conservatism in Japan. In 1940, according to him, 34 Protestant denominations in Ja-
pan gave in to state pressure and declared themselves as one united group to be subsumed by 
corporatist Japan as a group. The united group of Protestants formed the United Church of Christ 
in Japan (Nihon Kirist Kyōdan). Together with Catholics and other Christians, these corporatist 
Protestants prayed in Shinto shrines and morally supported the idea of the sacred emperor until 
the end of the war in 1945.16 The Calvinist-led United Church still remains a functioning organi-
zation, to which Suga’s NCC Yasukuni Committee belongs; Nishikawa is also a member. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of 2006). Upon the SDFs’ dispatch to Iraq in 2003-4, more than 290 peace groups and individuals were spied on 
in detail. See “Iraq Haken: Riku-ji, Hantai Shimin-ra Chōsa”; “Shimin ‘Kanshi’ Nan no Tame”; and “Shasetsu: 
Jiei-tai wa Kokumin wo Kanshi-suru no ka” in Asahi Shinbun, 6/7/2007. 
16 See also Shinobu Ōe, Yasukuni Jinja (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1984); pp.39-58; and Sheldon Garon, Molding 
Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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1967, the United Church formerly admitted the role that it performed during the war; yet it had to 
overcome much conservative opposition inside the Church, according to Suga. 
 The several progressive Christian leaders who gather at the NCC Yasukuni Committee 
focus their oppositional efforts on the Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine is the place where “the state 
controls one’s worldview and one’s philosophy of life and death,” in Suga’s word. Arguing that 
this ideological control by the state is “against the freedom of belief,” Suga and other NCC 
Christians have demonstrated, lobbied, and supported relevant lawsuits by civil activists. “Chris-
tians don’t believe in spirits (rei), as in the soldiers’ spirits which are allegedly resting in Ya-
sukuni,” Suga lets me know. Christian funerals, according to him, express the powerlessness of 
humans and their gratitude to God, to whose care the dead are now fully entrusted. He says that 
funerary rituals among Christians are literally memorials, where the dead are remembered and 
enlivened again in participants’ talks and songs. 
 Those 300 or so Christians who gather in the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery this morning are 
woven by the woof of counter-cultural love and peace rather than religious gratitude and submis-
sion. Young and old participants in rough T-shirts and shorts sing hymns to the accompaniment 
of the acoustic guitar. Flowers are shared. One of the several preachers prays, “Let Christ’s peace 
spread to every corner of the globe.” Sounding as orthodoxically banal as it could be, the phrase, 
though, might strike the participants with refreshingly new potency in the otherwise particularist 
context of the larger society. At the same time, the hidden warp that entangles this emancipating 
counter-culturalism is a thick and dark kind, which a middle-aged female participant, who stands 
next to me, represents as the Japanese “Christians’ sense of war-guilt” (Kirist-sha no sensō 
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sekinin). Every participant today is well-aware of the church’s collaborationist history. Today’s 
prayer, then, is partly their collective ritual for atonement.17 
  In the lush 4.1 acres crisscrossed by flower-adorned promenades, the cemetery houses an 
approximately 35 square-foot, hexagon reliquary for “representative” bones of the Japanese sol-
diers.18 This morning, at the crossing to the path to the cemetery, I have seen about twenty police 
officers; only about 30 feet away through the path, at the front gate of the cemetery, twenty more. 
Even during the current, open-air meeting among the Christians in front of the reliquary, the 
preachers’ amplified speeches are at times erased by the still patrolling helicopters in the air. The 
police are known for their willingness to arrest peace activists. Father Kenzō Kimura once told 
me that some time before, the police had hit him with batons and fractured his ribs in Yasukuni. 
This man who looks about 70 years old was peacefully demonstrating there then. The dominant 
feeling that at least I have in this morning is we are being watched by the police instead of pro-
tected by them from possible rightist attacks. 
 Just before the meeting ends at about eight, Suga announces that Koizumi is reported to 
have visited Yasukuni at 7:47. The crowd instantly breaks into a buzz. Yet fresh excitement is 
lacking in the buzz, as everyone apparently has given up the hope that Koizumi would have se-
cond thoughts about his visit. “Yappari (I knew that)…,” everybody murmurs. Soon, people start 
to talk about the details of his visit, such as whether he signed as the PM, offered flowers, vowed 
in the Shinto way, and so on, each of which has political significance.  
                                                                  
17 It is for a religious reason that a pastor, Hisashi Wakimoto, for instance, confesses in his book that he followed 
the Religious Teacher Mobilization Act (Shūkyō Kyōshi Kinrō Dōin Rei) of 1944 and worked as a moral teacher 
among Korean laborers in the Kawasaki factory of Showa Electric Industry. See his Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō to 
Watashi: Kawasaki Shōwa Denkō Chōsen-jin Shukusha Shakan no Kiroku (Kōbe: Zaidan Hōjin Kōbe Gakusei 
Seinen Center Shuppan Bu, 1994). 
18 The cemetery is not a cemetery in the strict sense of the word; it contains some remains “sampled” from each of 
the six major fronts of the Asia-Pacific War, which are China, Manchuria, the Philippines, the Southeast Asia, 
the Japanese Islands, and the former Soviet Union and the Pacific combined. See the first chapter of this disserta-
tion for details. 
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 In front of the reliquary, which we are facing at a distance of about fifty feet, a more au-
thoritative and bigger-sized ritual than the Christians’ has been initiated by the Nichiren denomi-
nation of Buddhism. Formally dressed in black and pearls, the attendants sit in the perfectly 
aligned folding chairs. Through the long rows, apparently high-ranked monks in their silk kesa 
costumes and hoods with gold embroidery walk about. Incense and a branch of white chrysan-
themum are offered to the dead by one attendant after another. Chants are heard; the mokugyo, a 
wooden percussion instrument, is played. According to a bereaved participant who is about 70 
years old, the cemetery is more appropriate as a place for Buddhist prayer than Yasukuni, since 
“there are no bones (okotsu) in Yasukuni,” but only the supposed spirits of the soldiers. As a 
Buddhist, he believes in the religious efficacy of the deceased remains, he tells me. While the 
majority of the Japanese today seems to prefer Buddhist funerals, the rightist insistence that the 
Shintoist Yasukuni shrine be a national memorial has to have an extra religio-cultural reason. It 
is perhaps for the extra-religio-cultural reason that this Buddhist male that I am talking now says 
he is “not particularly opposed to Yasukuni.” 
 Since about 8:15, we have not heard any more helicopters. Since the Christians left, I 
have been hanging out a little more in the pleasantly gardened promenades of the cemetery. On 
the side of the rest house, I find a big chunk of lime stone, to which is attached a sign, sazare ishi. 
The sign must refer to the “small” (sazare) “stone” (ishi) that is sung about in the controversial 
national anthem, “Our Lord’s Reign” (Kimi ga Yo). In the song, the current royal family’s reign 
over Japan is wished to last for the duration it takes for a small stone to become sedimented, 
growing to be a full-scale rock and hosting a carpet of moss. Several bus-tour groups of families 
arrive from Fukuoka Prefecture in the south and Hokkaido in the north; they start to gather 
around the embodied wish for the eternal nation of the emperor, the sazare ishi stone. One of 
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these families informs me that they will go to the nearby Hall of National Martial Arts (Nihon 
Budō-kan) to attend the National Memorial Ceremony for the War-Dead (Zenkoku Senbotsu-sha 
Tsuitō Shiki). Every year, the emperor and empress attend the ceremony and lead a one-minute 
prayer for the dead. The beginning of the prayer is timed to be at noon sharp. TV and radio 
broadcast the moment of the silent prayer live, in order to restart the capitalist time of the every-
day according to the national cadence. 
 I leave the cemetery before 10:00 to attend the peace families’ annual meeting, which is 
held in the Japan Hall of Education (Nihon Kyōiku Kaikan) in a walking distance. On the both 
sides of the road that leads back to the Yasukuni Blvd, the rightists’ black vans have apparently 
been allowed to park again, though under the police’s watchful eyes. In front of the Education 
Hall, three police ACs are parked and about ten police officers are standing. Before the audience 
of about 500, one of the leaders of the peace families Shigenori Nishikawa states, “Beware that 
we will be surrounded by the rightwingers as soon as we’re out” for a demonstrative walk to the 
national Diet after the meeting. “Some of us could get in trouble and be arrested,” Nishikawa fur-
ther says. “We’ve prepared lawyers. Until they show up, don’t tell anything to the police.” A de-
fiant-looking, middle-aged woman in an Indian silk blouse, who sits next to me, scoffs, “Ha! The 
plain-clothed [police] (shifuku) and public safety [police] (kōan) are already among us.” She then 
warns me, “Watch out those who take our pictures and not the speakers’.” 
 Tall, thin, gray-haired Nishikawa, who lost his elder brother in the war, actually has a 
similar idea about surveillance from within. Some time ago, when we sat together in the Yotsuya 
Church, of which he is a member, he said, “The right-wingers nowadays immediately come [to 
get the leftists], as soon as we do something public, wherever it is—because of the Internet.” The 
last time when this somewhat known activist had appeared on TV, according to him, the rightists 
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apparently put his name in search engines and called him at his house no less than three minutes 
after the broadcast. The Christian chairman of the Yasukuni Committee, Seiji Suga, is not sure if 
it is the influence of the Internet, but he says the recent rightists dare to come inside oppositional 
meetings as part of the audience. According to him, this is a drastic change from their previous 
tactics to surround the meeting place with their “AC” vans. The Kanagawa Human Rights Center 
(Kanagawa Jinken Center) in Yokohama City knows this old tactic very well. According to the 
center’s worker, Reiko Waki, an example would be drawn from “about ten years ago,” when the 
center formerly complained that the city had asked Yoshiko Sakurai, a neonationalist, to make a 
speech in a half-municipal organization. “Immediately the right-wingers’ AC vans came,” Waki 
witnesses. They parked their vans outside the center, keeping taped nationalistic songs at full 
volume and making loud speeches with amplifiers. The center, which works for the “outcast” 
(burakumin), has been attacked in this fashion numerous times before and after this episode.19 
But the rightists have always limited themselves to the parking lot—they would never even get 
out of their vans, according to Waki. The sight of the vans outside has eventually become “pretty 
banal” and “ignorable,” brave Waki laughs. What the Christians Nishikawa and Suga let us know 
about, therefore, was the newer, more invasive types of right-wing interventions than their AC 
days, which the new technologies of the Internet might have enabled and the idea of surveillance 
cameras might have inspired. 
 In today’s meeting among the peace families, which is entitled “Toward a Japan That 
Lives with [the Rest of] Asia (Asia to tomoni Ikiru Nihon o),” the keynote speech is made by an 
emeritus professor of constitutional law, Kōichi Yokota. “Yasukuni Shrine,” he says, “is the 
place that houses not so much those who died for the state as those who died for the emperor.” 
                                                                  
19 The literature on buraku min is vast; for a concise and comprehensive history of their discrimination, see e.g. 
Tomohiko Harada’s Hisabetsu Buraku no Rekishi (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1975). 
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Such an abstract body as the state cannot function as the center of national integration, he argues, 
for everyone in the nation must have a different idea about what the state is. The emperor’s con-
crete body, in contrast, is useful in this sense, according to him. 
 The topic of the emperor does seem to work to engage the audience, at least on this par-
ticular occasion of the speech. Mentioning what is called the “Tomita memos,” that is, the mem-
oranda that Asahiko Tomita, the former Grand Steward of the Imperial Household Agency 
(Kunai Chō Chōkan), made over the decade of 1977-88, Yokota the law professor makes a joke, 
“When I first heard about the memos, I thought ‘what a cold fish’” the emperor Showa was. Ac-
cording to the memos, Showa showed a strong gesture of dislike for the idea that Yasukuni 
Shrine consecrated in 1978 the seven Class-A war-criminals executed according to the ruling of 
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.20 Those war-criminals were executed in 1948, 
leaving their statements that their deaths were sacrifices for the Japanese nation-state, which to 
them was symbolically the emperor’s “jade” body (gyokutai) itself. Suggesting that he opposed 
the idea of the war-criminals’ Yasukuni consecration, the emperor practically denied their deaths’ 
symbolic significance as sacrifices for himself. “Cold fish” (tsumetai hito), Yokota describes the 
emperor and smiles. The audience breaks into laughter. Yokota continues,  
 “Even though the emperor might never veto what’s determined in the cabinet, he often 
made such comments like ‘I hate that guy.’ These comments were of course taken by ministers 
as the emperor’s unsaid opinions; and of course the ministers moved as the emperor seemed to 
wish. He wasn’t just saying, ‘Ah, so.’” 
 Everybody laughs again, hearing the clichéd mimicking of the emperor (i.e. “Ah, so,” 
which happens to be “Ah, so,” also in Japanese). The performative part that I sense in the meet-
ing is the speaker’s and audience’s integration using the emperor’s jokes as the point of their in-
                                                                  
20 See “Showa Tennō, A-kyū Senpan Yasukuni Gōshi ni Fukai-kan” in Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 7/20/2006. 
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tegration. It is ironic, since they must all be hardcore dissidents in the society, which upholds the 
emperor as the “cultural symbol of the nation.” 
 After raising more than 1,200 U.S. dollar-worth of donation (kampa), the participants 
walk out of the building. No rightists were waiting for us, but the police were. Some of the mid-
dle-aged and elder families and their young supporters wear hats, hold cloth banners, and start 
walking to the Diet in nearby Kasumigaseki. The banners read “Shame, Koizumi,” “No to Ya-
sukuni: Japan Was an Invader,” or “Cohabitation with [the Rest of] Asia.” I see them off at the 
hall’s exit and leave for Yasukuni Shrine. As far as I know, there is no arrest made nor other vio-
lence done to the Christians during their demonstration this day. 
 
Yasukuni as a Corporatist Device 
 It is already noon. The drizzle that let up at about 9:30 is still hinted at on the faintly wet 
asphalt. The leaden clouds that cover the sky foretell more rain to come. The gray air is soupy 
with humidity, stifling breaths and squeezing sweat. Soon I pass the deeply moss-green moat of 
the “palace” (kōkyo), which contains static water far below the street level. This Chidorigafuchi 
part of the moat runs parallel to Yasukuni Blvd. Across the boulevard, Yasukuni Shrine is a rec-
tangular stretch along the boulevard over two traffic lights. The 97,000 square-foot shrine, how-
ever, accounts for just a portion of the whole scene of the state’s display of its military potential. 
 If you go down the sloped boulevard turning your back to the Ichigaya Station (i.e. to the 
east), then the Chidorigafuchi Cemetery is on the right hand side, through back-roads among res-
idential houses. Keep walking the boulevard along the long stone wall of Yasukuni Shrine. Even-
tually, on the right side of the boulevard as the boulevard starts to make a downhill, you will see 
the palace moat and then the Shōwa-kan, a revisionist history museum for the “ordinary” 
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(shomin no) Japanese during the war. The Shōwa-kan was constructed in 1999 during the gover-
norship of the ultra-nationalist, Shintarō Ishihara. And then, on the same side of the boulevard, 
you will be seeing the Kudan Hall, which used to be an army and navy facility for their veterans 
and reservists. The above-mentioned National Martial Arts Hall also adds to the scene; it is far-
ther away to the right, beyond Chidorigafuchi. I have already mentioned the Self-Defense Force 
facilities behind the Ichigaya Station. The whole setting is lined with rows of thick, gnarled cher-
ry trees, whose flowers have been said to fall as fascist soldiers fall en masse. 
 Today, sidewalks on both sides of the Yasukuni Blvd. are filled with people, who are 
streaming to and fro, fanning themselves and taking pictures in disarrayed intersections of chats 
and laughter. They appear and disappear from and into the Kudanshita Subway Station, whose 
entrances are two cool caves opening in the middle of the humid downhill of the boulevard. 
There are several entrances to Yasukuni Shrine, but the main one (the First Gate or Dai-ichi To-
rii) is only about 50 feet away from the subway station on the top of the hill. From the first gate, 
the boulevard starts to level off until it eventually hits the Ichigaya Station. In front of the gate, a 
Chinese man stands in the middle of the crowds, trying very hard to hand his anti-Yasukuni fliers 
to the mainly Japanese visitors. These visitors’ faces are flushed with cold excitement, which is 
laced with urban disinterest and irritated anticipation. 
 “Everyone in Japan,” the Chinese man shouts in his Sinicized Japanese, “the Class-A 
war-criminals should not be consecrated together with ordinary soldiers like yourselves!” 
 Facing Chinese, Korean, and others’ vehement opposition to the shrine, the prime minis-
ter Koizumi notoriously cited a saying, “hate the crime and not the criminal” (tsumi o nikunde 
hito o nikumazu). That is, the victims and leftists should not attack the shrine where the soldiers’ 
“spirits” are supposed to be, but the war crimes that they committed—as if the crimes just hap-
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pened one day without human agency. According to a leftist Japanese activist, Yasushi Torii, 
“hate the crime...” is a phrase that is usually used by the victims to show their difficult will to 
forgiveness.21 
 Even before the Chinese man in front of the Yasukuni gate finishes his words, people 
come and go in-between the spaces that separate him and me, erasing his voice and cutting his 
flier’s reach toward me. There is an elder female in a light pink blouse with a small flower pat-
tern, whose white, lacy parasol suddenly blocks my view. Even after she passes, I do not see the 
Chinese activist, as a middle-aged man in a pale blue shirt comes in my sight. From downhill, a 
young man in a red “Abercrombie and Fitch” shirt and small-framed glasses is almost running up 
to us, giving a fleeting, indifferent glance at a young couple carrying a stroller nearby. The baby 
is crying for some soft serve in a cone that somebody else in the crowd is working on. The yan-
kee, that is, delinquent-looking, couple with dyed “blond” hair bend their bodies in over-sized T-
shirts and “baggy” shorts, in order to talk to their kid. “Afterward,” the woman tells. “After we 
pray, you’ll get anything.” The kid still clamors and my attention fades out. The next time I no-
tice, the Chinese man is completely lost in the confusing flow of people. 
 The flow, though, is momentarily halted by two junior high-school boys in their school 
uniforms, who look back at the crowds with their cell phones in their hands. 
 “I have never seen this many crowd,” one of them cries and takes a picture of moving 
people. 
                                                                  
21 Although the Bible might have the phrase, “hate the sin, but not the sinner,” Koizumi must have referred to 
Kongzi’s word, “古之聴訟者、悪其意、不悪其人.” I have introduced Torii’s interpretation of Koizumi’s reference to 
show how the Japanese leftists critique the PM on this matter. Torii is the secretary general of Jinkotsu no Kai or 
the Association on Human Bones. The association has endeavored to excavate truths about those dozen sets of 
human remains that were buried until recently in an imperial army’s facility in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo. Torii, 
Keiichi Tsuneishi, and other activists in the association suspect that the facility was related to the imperial ar-
my’s Unit 731 in Manchuria, which notoriously conducted vivisection and other criminal medical experiments 
on illegally captured Chinese, Manchu, and other bodies. 
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 “Let’s send it to Y [another friend of his, I guess] as a picture mail (shashin mail or sha 
mé),” the other almost shouts with excitement. 
 Inspired, I take a couple of digital pictures as well. In the instantaneously available imag-
es, people are looking into all directions. One man in the foreground is gaping as he looks into 
the camera; another in the background intensely gazes at something else on the side, off the 
frame. Revealing their unconscious secrets between flashes of the moment, silent people in the 
pictures look inadvertently honest, and thus sad. The somber stillness of the truthful moments 
might be reflecting the cloudy day; without sunlight, people in the pictures do not look excited at 
all. The dissipated excitement, in another thought, might be mine and not theirs. For, my examin-
ing eye separates each individual in the pictures from the otherwise buzzing crowds, as a social-
scientific specimen, perhaps, of neonationalism and fascism. 
 I look away from my camera and mingle with the crowds once again. Now I am facing a 
humongous concrete structure, which, as I look up, turns out to be the foundation of one of the 
two 27 yard-high steel pillars of the First Gate. The gate is the combination of these pillars and 
the two 37-yard horizontal poles, which are lifted and supported by the pillars, 2.7 yards in di-
ameter each. Before the right pillar, I discover that there is a wooden post, on which is carved, 
Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni Jinja). Several visitors stop by and take pictures there. Blocked by 
the crowds, this is how my partial vision in Yasukuni today can perceive objects and events. Lat-
er through the eye of mass-media’s helicopters above, I will be learning that the straight Ap-
proach (Sandō) to the Hall of Prayer (Haiden) is quite spectacular. In the retrospectively provid-
ed images by TV or newspapers, I will get to know that the crowds have turned the Approach 
into a booming stretch, without leaving even a bit of space empty. Still, the situated eyes of mine 
can easily recognize that the rectangular Approach is marked first by the 40-foot high statue of 
  
270 
the “father of the army,” Masujirō Ōmura. Further away, I see the towering Second Gate (Dai-ni 
Torii), similarly designed to the First Gate. Then, even though the twenty-five square-foot, third 
and last gate, the Divine Gate (Shin Mon) is even more remote than the Second Gate, it still 
looms large over the crowds. In the media images, the crowds are compartmentalized by these 
gates and a statue into three almost equally-sized, lively blocks. 
 The sheer size of these monumental structures seems to provide some sense of organiza-
tion even to the confused vision of the participant. According to Susan Stewart, the gigantic in 
the age of mechanical reproduction is characterized by its abstractness. The giants of this age are 
neither those mythological ones in the genesis of the world, who boasted their sublime “overa-
bundance of the natural” nor those Rabelaisian ones in markets and carnivals, who already repre-
sented the state’s abstractness but still carried “the underbelly of official life.”22 In the mode of 
mass reproduction, the gigantic is the commodity itself, Stewart states, the spectacle, which 
stands before the subject as the hidden totality of the society’s productive relations, reproductive 
apparatuses, and class structure.23 Benjamin’s big parades and monster rallies are some examples 
of the mechanical reproductive giants, whose endlessness, seamlessness, and perfection put the 
viewers in their subjective and subjected position vis-à-vis capital and the state, which organize, 
and are signified by, these events. Time stays still in these spectacles, for any movement of indi-
viduals is trivialized in reference to the spectacles’ settings that are exceedingly larger than these 
individuals. The size difference should also have something to do with the false idea that the in-
dividuals in the spectacles must entertain, the idea that the mechanicity, repetitiveness, and other 
rules of the gigantic are naturally given and already justified. In the last instance, however, the 
individuals willingly submit their bodies to the gigantic, attracted to and fearful about its enig-
                                                                  
22  Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993); quotes are from p.73 and 81 respectively. 
23  Stewart, Ibid.; p.85-6. 
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matic atmosphere, which in postwar Japan tends to be expressed as “religious” (see Chapter 3). 
The enigma is derived from the way in which the totality of the gigantic is hidden; the individu-
als are always given just partial views. Why do these individuals gather together in one place, 
why do they walk in the same direction without any order, why do they all look alike in this 
movement and probably even before that⎯that is, why have they become totalized as the same 
commodities? These questions incessantly arise in massive events, while their answers are never 
given. This is the reason that the individuals participate, charging the events with the collected 
power of the utmost degree of their commodity fetishism and thus attracting even more partici-
pants.  
 In the gigantic event, the state takes the opposite position to the individual’s; the state 
pretends to know the totality of the event and tries to organize the participants based on that pre-
tention. The gigantic monuments here in Yasukuni seem to represent the state’s will to not just 
such totalitarian pretention, but also fake organicism. Corporatism is the ideology that I see un-
derlying the architecture of the shrine⎯the ideas of genders, ethnicities, generations, and other 
organic-sounding groups and their integration into the whole, in this case, the whole of the em-
peror’s body, the kokutai. Look at the stone set of koma dog statues, for instance, which are 
placed before the main gate. Confiscated by one of the Meiji (1868-1912) oligarchs, Aritomo 
Yamagata, from China during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the statues were “presented up-
wards” (kenjō-sareru) to the emperor Meiji by Yamagata. The shrine acquired the statues, as 
they were “given down” (kashi-sareru) as the emperor’s generous gift to his subject (shinmin). 
Even before entering the shrine property then, the visitors are expected to understand the imperi-
al order as well as their own subjective position in it. Taiwan’s incorporation into that idiosyn-
cratic order, to take another example, is similarly announced by the Divine (third) Gate, whose 
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magnificent cypress is supposed to have been presented upwards by the Taiwanese under Japa-
nese colonialism. 
 In the overall culture of militarism and masculinity of the shrine, the female gender enters 
as “mothers” (haha). Maternal symbols are of course hidden deep inside either the thick shields 
of evergreen trees that are planted on both sides of the Approach or behind the last gate to the 
Hall of Prayer, viz. the Divine Gate. The first such symbol on the side of the Approach, which is 
usually not even noticed by the visitors, is the Spirit-Soothing Spring (Irei no Izumi). The spring 
is a man-made flow of water under the marquee that is abstractly composed of gray stone bricks. 
According to the placard on the side, the spring “abstractly represents a loving mother, who 
gives pure water” to the “many war-dead” who “passed away, remembering their mothers in 
their hometowns and craving for pure water.” Another motherly figure in the shrine is the stone 
Statue of Mother (Haha no Zō) behind the Divine Gate on the side of the Yūshū Kan Museum. 
This mother stands in kimono dress with two children in each of her hands. Carved is the follow-
ing—“Mother, who was strong, strict, and gentle. Mother, thank you. [I swear to you I] won’t 
repeat this sadness ever again.” Sadness (Kanashimi)?, I think in front of the statue. Yes, but 
should the Japanese be in the position to lament their sadness before they apologize for causing 
sadness among other Asians and Pacific Islanders?24 Gender might be the strongest of all the 
corporatist categories as an instrument to aesthetically cover the politics, ethics, and economy of 
war and its consequences, perhaps due to the level of emotion that it can stir up. The other side 
of the coin is that the gender difference in corporatism is important only to the extent that it aes-
thetically contributes to the collectivist end (e.g. war) of the whole. One of the latest expressions 
                                                                  
24  Of course orders matter to neonationalists as well. See Norihiro Katō, Haisen-go Ron (Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 
1997) for argument that the Japanese should mourn the Japanese losses first; otherwise, according to his logic, Japan 
would not be able to set up the national subject, with which to mourn other Asian and Pacific losses. Countless 
criticisms of Katō have been made, of which see e.g. J. Victor Koschmann, “National Subjectivity and the Uses of 
Atonement in the Age of Recession” in The South Atlantic Quarterly, 99:4 (Fall 2000), 741-61 and Marilyn Ivy, 
“Trauma’s Two Times: Japanese Wars and Postwars” in Positions, 16:1 (Spring 2008). 165-188.  
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of such a logic might be made by the then Health, Labor and Welfare Minister, Hakuo Yanazawa. 
Notoriously, he remarked that “females are child-bearing machines” for the state’s goal to enrich 
its pension funds.25 
 Today, in the middle of the crowds, nonetheless, the heat seems to melt away the stately 
and statist differences, be it the status that was created in the modern time (the emperor, “aristo-
crats” (kazoku), the ordinary subjects (shinmin), etc.), the imposed colonial order, or the collec-
tivist gender-norms. Everyone here now seems the same with everyone else in the shared humid-
ity and the neonationalist excitement of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15. Still, as soon 
as one falls into the dull and attractive hiatus of illusory equality among the Yasukuni masses, 
s/he cannot help but notice that s/he is designated to wake up once again in the sight of more po-
lice officers, more plain-clothed SPs, and other blunt signs of the state force that divides. The 
corporatist orders are thus at least partially maintained through physical means, protected from 
not only the leftists but also from the masses. That is why, I guess, the officers on the side of the 
Approach look inward at the Approach, watching us, the crowds of visitors passing on the stone 
pavement and on the “jade” pebbles (tama jari) that are laid on both sides of the pavement. 
                                                                  
25 See “Josei wa Kodomo wo Umu Kikai,” Asahi Shinbun, 1/28/2007. The head of Japan’s socialist party, Mizuho 
Fukushima, asked Yanazawa to resign, arguing that his “remarks practically said ‘women should bear children 
for the nation-state.’” See “Kōrō-sō Hatsugen wo Hihan” in Asahi Shinbun, 1/29/2007. A socialist feminist or-
ganization, I-Women’s Conference (I-Josei Kaigi), and three other similar groups met Yanazawa in person at the 
Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry to hand him their letter, which asked him to resign. The letter also stated that 
his remarks “revealed that [he] lacked the view to respect women’s right to self-determination regarding their 
own sexuality and reproduction.” These organizations were joined by about 50 demonstrators, who gathered in 
front of the ministry and maintained that “the remarks violated the human rights of women.” See “Josei Dantai 
ya Rōso Yanagisawa-shi Jinin Yōkyū” in Asahi Shinbun, 1/31/2007. Yanazawa did not resign⎯the superficial 
reason was that another minister had resigned in December 2006 due to his involvement in a bribery case. Alleg-
edly, the cabinet of the then prime minister, Shinzō Abe, was “afraid that…it would collapse if another minister 
had to resign” in such a short period of time. See “Suku’enu Shitsugen” in Asahi Shinbun, 2/1/2007. Yanazawa 
made another problematic statement regarding gender relations in 2/6 of the same year; he said, Japanese 
“youths are in the remarkably healthy condition [today] in which they hope to get married and have more than 
two children.” See “Yanazawa Kōrō-sō ‘Kenzen’ Hatsugen: Yatō Sorotte Hanpatsu” and “Shitsugen Umareru 
Dojō towa” in Asahi Shinbun, 2/6/2007 and 2/10/2007 respectively.  
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 Menacingly, many participants today carry red paper uchiwa fans with the slogan, Exca-
vate and Raise the Grassroots (Sōmō Kukki). On the obverse side of the fan is the Japanese flag 
of the red sun in a white background (nisshō ki). According to my later conversation with one of 
the supporters of the ultra-rightist Association to Respond to the War-Heroes’ Spirits (Eirei ni 
Kotaeru Kai), which printed and distributed the fans today, the phrase is taken from what they 
call “Master” (Sensei) Shōin Yoshida. Yoshida is an early nineteenth-century nativist scholar, 
who taught many pro-emperor revolutionaries against the Tokugawa Shōgunate (1600-1868). 
According to this Association sympathizer, Yoshida preached that “if you can’t excavate and 
raise [the political consciousness of] even those ordinary folks [who are otherwise supposed to 
be politically inactive], then you can’t dare to launch a state-level project.” Even during our con-
versation by the Association booth along the Approach, the sympathizer keeps giving away the 
fans to one eager hand of a visitor after another. Behind us, there are several cardboard boxes 
filled with more fans. When I come back at about 3 o’clock, he is regretful that not even a single 
fan is left for me. People’s apparent willingness to receive the slogan, Excavate and Raise the 
Grassroots, makes a stark contrast to their attitudes on ordinary Sundays; they would go around 
the Association’s booth to avoid it. In the wording, the grassroots (sōmō), there is a certain nu-
ance of democracy, which might be favorably received. At the same time, connoted democracy 
is smeared with a smack of violence, as at least I sense in the word, ki (to raise). In the original 
context of the nineteenth-century Shōin Yoshida, the slogan was after all meant to instigate an 
insurgence against the shōgunate. Yoshida was executed in 1859 for an attempted coup (the An-
sei no Taigoku persecution). The constantly flickering signs of revolution, the grassroots, and 
Japan in the red and white fans seem to be showing people’s old self-identity as the Japanese na-
tional and their new palate for violence.  
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 After I finally pass the Second Gate, I start to see such conventional rightist banners as 
“Return to Us Our Northern Territories,” “Viva His Majesty,” and the like. The rightists must 
have entered the shrine through the Second Gate, which marks an ordinary road horizontally 
traversing the stretched shrine. Since the First and Second Gates are made of just pillars, every-
thing should be thoroughly visible from afar. It is the sheer number of the crowds today that must 
have hidden this view of the banners from me so far. I then notice that the crowds past the Se-
cond Gate are divided to make space for rightist-minded mobsters or mobster-like rightwingers 
in their uniforms, colorful jumpsuits. “One, two, three, four (Ichi, ni, san, shi),” they would yell 
in flamboyantly “masculine” voices, as they march. In between these groups of several young 
males each, older males in the oddly sized uniforms of the imperial army or navy similarly 
demonstrate in march formation. According to one of them, the costumes are available in 
Okachi-machi, Tokyo, for about 1,000 U.S. dollars a set. As they play brass instruments and 
shout “march forward (mae e susume)!” the onlookers click their shutter buttons. 
 Every once in a while, the bands or rightist-mobsters completely stop still, to accommo-
date the photographers. From behind the throng of such amateur and professional photographers, 
I see layers of digital screens, big and small, bright and ambiguous, all of which register similar 
images of a given group of demonstrators. In each of these proliferated images, perhaps the most 
threatening in the whole scene, the excessively masculinized voices of the rightist-gangsters, 
seem to be muted. The muted image would likely be then reproduced en masse in photo journal-
ism or as a picture attached to blog or a picture mail. The precarious atmosphere of the live scene 
will be tempered in the neatly processed image for whatever mass-media one chooses. The irony 
is that by stopping and posing for the camera, even the rightists themselves cooperate with their 
own domestication. Between oddly compromising self-control and showy desires for self-
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expression, the rightists operate in the realm of the everyday, the everyday logic of the commodi-
ty. 
 These demonstrators are accompanied by the police, yet I am not sure if the officers are 
watching or guarding them. In the previous year (2005), several peace activists, including a 90-
year-old Christian male, were arrested, peacefully demonstrating near the shrine.26 Ideologically, 
the rightists and gang members tend to be the practitioners and enforcers of the state’s moral or-
ders regarding gender, ethnicity, status, and others—only to an excessive degree.27 Perhaps the 
police are afraid of that excessive part, while fundamentally sharing the rightists’ state-
corporatism, at least theoretically speaking.28 
 I wade into the crowd to the side of the Approach in order to see my rightist informants, 
who are active in the Association to Respond to the War-Heroes’ Spirits (the ARWHS) and Ja-
pan Youth Memorial Association (Nihon Seinen Ikotsu Shūshū Dan or JYMA). As usual, I see 
they are campaigning for the shrine and the fallen Japanese soldiers behind several folding tables 
near the Second Gate. Through the minor marches and resonant “Viva His Majesty!” I distin-
guish “Shihori Naitō” shouting, “About 1.13 million sets of holy bones (go-ikotsu) [of the Japa-
nese soldiers] are still scattered unrecovered throughout Asia and the Pacific!” Another college 
student at JYMA, “Takuya Kanno,” follows, “We’re going to Palau! Siberia! Indonesia [to re-
cover the remains]! Donations are welcome!” As they later let me know, they will be selling 100 
                                                                  
26 See David McNeill, “Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Japanese Police Crush Peace Protestors” in Japan 
Focus, 9/6/2005. 
27 One of the uncritical representations of the relation between thug violence, thugs’ rightist pretension, and their 
organization according to corporatist morality (the emperor, ethnicity, gender, etc.) will be found in a Kenji Son-
oda-directed movie, Kyōki no Sakura (Tokyo: Tōei, 2002). 
28  It is ingenious that one of my neighborhood informants, “Mutsumi Machida,” whom I have discussed 
extensively in the last chapter, compares the neighborhood association’s “control” of her town with the “gangsters”’ 
violence⎯its various techniques of threat, anachronism, reference to the “religious” idea of the emperor. Like the 
rightists and gangsters, the neighborhood institution of neocorporatism is protected by the police⎯when Machida 
tried to file a complaint, claiming that the association defamed her, with the local police dpt, it was her who was 
apparently investigated and recorded in detail. The complaint was not even received. The next day, Machida would 
find out that the association executives had already known about her attempt at the police.   
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copies of their 1,000 yen (10 dollar) annual report within today. Several veterans at the ARWHS 
are seated at the tables next to the JYMA booth, talking to visitors and selling copies of a thin, 
unpublished book, “There Was No Nanjing Massacre,” for 100 yen (a dollar) a copy. Middle-
aged staffers in dark T-shirts with the association’s logo are busy handing out the above-
mentioned fans. 
 All of a sudden, “Minoru Terasaki,” the middle-aged JYMA “advisor,” yells to the crowd, 
“Now, it’s 30 seconds before noon!” In the middle of the chaotic vortex of talking, brass bands, 
flags, and movements, a couple of people pick up Terasaki’s notice and stop where they are. 
“Fifteen seconds till noon!” Some more people stop. “Ten seconds! Nine, eight, seven, …. Now, 
it’s noon!” As I am left with puzzlement, Terasaki deeply bows in the direction of the Hall of 
Prayer. As he keeps that posture, I hear the amplified, digital signals, “pip, pip, pip, piiiiiip!” 
probably broadcast through the shrine’s radio system. Everyone—I am not exaggerating—in the 
shrine apparently bows now, since my vision, which has been blocked by taller people’s backs 
and heads, is now totally clear. Everyone is bowing toward the Prayer Hall—I realize that people 
have already aligned their bodies into that direction seconds before noon. Now, everything is 
tranquil; not a single sound is heard. 
 “Dumb me,” I say in my mind, “it’s the silent prayer (mokutō) at the anniversary of the 
end of the war (shūsen kinenbi).” Though I was raised in Japan, I did not realize what was meant 
by the bowing of these Yasukuni crowds until now, probably since I had never (consciously) par-
ticipated in the designated moment of the noontime prayer. Or, am I seeing a manifestation of the 
new, neonationalist culture, from which I have hitherto been spared, having stayed in the United 
States? Or, have the Yasukuni visitors always been participating in the silent prayer this way 
since 1945 and I just did not know that, for I had never visited the shrine before my fieldwork? 
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By bowing for a minute, these people currently in front of me are apparently showing their will-
ingness to look like the subjects of the Japanese nation-state in any case and I assume the nation-
state that is culturally represented by the emperor. I have mentioned that the annual National 
Memorial for the War-Dead features the emperor and empress leading the one-minute prayer. 
Across spatial distances, the Yasukuni visitors connect to those Japanese who are presumably 
sitting in front of TV or radio and closing their eyes, following the royal couple’s live, tele-
vised/radioed lead. The corporatist stage-setting at Yasukuni turns out to be unnecessary to or-
ganize the crowds, since they are always already organized and totalized as “the Japanese” in this 
way. Noticing that I am practically the only one who stands upright in the middle of the bowing 
subjects, I stop observing and quietly walk away to the stone wall on the side of the Approach, in 
order not to offend anybody. 
 
The New Grassroots as the Internet Mass 
 Exactly one minute later, Terasaki prompted the crowds to be released from the still time 
of the nation-state. Confusion and congestion return. The Divine Gate is just right there, glitter-
ing with a gold set of the imperial crest, chrysanthemum, on its cypress doors. Yet, that short dis-
tance of about 30 feet takes forever to go; in the clotted flow, people are inching forward at an 
excruciatingly slow speed. There is not even elbow room between people. All I see now is peo-
ple’s backs and also those faces who try to walk back to the First Gate. I still hear blaring trum-
pets and drums behind. Over people’s heads, I see the upper parts of the imperial rising sun flag 
(kyokujitsu ki), which the rightwingers must carry with them. Feeling awkward about the slowed 
speed and over-crowding, I strike up a random conversation with a man in his late twenties, who 
happens to be next to me in that moment. 
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 “I guess you work for the SDF?” I say, truly just a guess, if not a wild one, based on his 
crew cut and also on my fieldwork observation that many eager Yasukuni participants are con-
nected with the armed forces in one way or other. “What!?” stunned, he turns his red eyes to me, 
which are wide-open. He then stumbles, “Why? Yes—no. I'm sorry, but I meant... Well, I used 
to, but not any more. How did you know— do I look like it?” According to him, even if he does, 
I should not have pointed that out so loudly in the crowd, since he is now on the “state’s secret 
mission.” “It’s really secret. I can’t tell anybody about it; sorry.” Having learned about my own 
mission of ethnography, he apologizes. As he says sorry, his breath reeks of leftover alcohol 
from the not-so-distant past. As I look closer, his light green suit looks worn and stained. He then 
whispers into my ear, “I came here today, ‘cause I had something to tell to Koizumi.” Now it is 
my turn to be stunned. I tilt my head to the side in order to place a distance between us and 
glance into his eyes. He calmly looks back and says in a normal voice, “But apparently I missed 
the chance.” He laughs.  
He says that this morning somebody in the neonationalist Internet site, Channel 2 (Ni 
Channel), has uploaded his/her live report and photos of Koizumi at Yasukuni. “If I didn’t see 
their logs (kakiko[mi]),” he continues, “I might probably have skipped it [a visit to the shrine on 
8/15] this year. I didn’t wanna be as disappointed as I was last year, you know.” 
 He is probably talking about a similar disappointment to that which I have heard being 
expressed among my rightist informants about Koizumi's hitherto avoidance of the historic day. 
On August 15 last year (2005), for instance, when the prime minister betrayed the Yasukuni 
rightists’ expectation, one middle-aged male visitor told me, “If he is a real Japanese, he should 
have come on the 15.” According to this visitor, who threw some bills in the donation box of the 
Association to Respond to the War-Heroes Spirits (ARWHS), “He [Koizumi] should definitely 
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have come today (8/15/2006); and then his popularity among the nation must have been hiked 
soooo (paaaatto) high.” 
 Disappointment usually bears the self-justifying denial of the favorable emotions that one 
must have had before these emotions are betrayed, ending up in often excessive hatred toward 
the disappointing object of former love. I had noticed that some rightists had started to criticize 
the prime minister as a “national traitor” (kokuzoku) for what they had perceived as his “wimpy” 
(yowagoshi) foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis China. China had vehemently opposed a Japa-
nese prime minister’s visit to the shrine on 8/15. When thunder suddenly roared about 4 o’clock 
that year (2005), drawing the ominously dark curtain of premature twilight over the shrine, one 
association activist made a joke to another, “Ho! It’s a heavenly punishment of Koizumi [for his 
failure to show up that day]!” 
 These days, it seems that the neonationalists have expressed their disappointed hatred and 
frustrated anger of politics, the society, and culture in general particularly on the Internet site, 
Channel 2. The site, which was established in 1999, allegedly has monthly users numbering 10 
million (as of April 2006).29 According to a sympathizer of the ARWHS, who has been active on 
the site under the alias of “anonymous soldier,” the site is a place in which “freedom of expres-
sion is guaranteed.” But anonymous soldier’s freedom refers to the force with which the bloggers 
go over the social taboos, democratic rules, and ethical limits, abusing the environment of open-
ness and anonymity that the Internet promises. For instance, Koreans, Chinese, and others dis-
liked by the neonationalists are not mentioned in Channel 2, unless in names. Women appear in 
the site only in reference to their appearances, marital statuses, or reproductive choices. “Degra-
dation” (Rekka), the bloggers will say, whenever certain media-images of their favorite gravure 
                                                                  
29 Tomoya Ishikawa and Mariko Sugiyama, “’Ni Channel’ Takamaru Hihan” in Asahi Shinbun, 5/22/2007. 
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idols do not satisfy their expectations. Suspects of criminal cases who are minors are fully identi-
fied, despite the postwar media’s convention to do otherwise. I have mentioned a Christian activ-
ist, Shigenori Nishikawa’s experience of the abused search-engine to locate his private number. 
Those show-biz or amateur celebrities who somehow touch the nerves of Channel 2 users would 
receive server-crashing bombardment of e-mails from them, which they call “flaming” (enjō). As 
a result of these “freed” expressions and “interactive” violence, various defamation suits against 
Channel 2 were filed and won by the plaintiffs. Hiroyuki Nishimura, the founder of the site, 
owes them hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensation, plus more than 4.3 million dollar-
equivalent fines to be paid to relevant authorities.30 
 In addition to freedom in this sense, certain collective power seems to be promised by 
Channel 2, which might attract its users. This power might be flamboyantly exhibited and also 
created through instances of flaming, for instance. A known such instance would be the one that 
involves the pop singer Ayumi Hamasaki. According to the rumor that circulated through the 
2002 Internet field, she criticized a seated fan in the front row in her concert, in which every per-
son attending was expected to stand in excitement. “How offending” (Kanji warui ne), she sup-
posedly said into the microphone. The fact was that, the rumor said, the fan was wheelchaired. It 
took only moments for Hamasaki’s official home page, fan sites, and others to be crashed with 
an overwhelming amount of critical e-mails, which were apparently sent according to some-
body’s suggestions on Channel 2 and other popular sites. The violence that was involved in this 
instance was perhaps that of pretended democracy or mass-hysterical humanitarianism. It seems 
                                                                  
30 About these trials, see Ishikawa and Sugiyama, Ibid. 
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to be the massness of the mass-hysteria that might be violently shown off against the super-
celebrity (ōmono), Hamasaki’s rumored arrogance and insensitivity toward ordinary lives.31 
 The power of the massness that might proliferate and accumulate through the reproduced 
reactions (the plethora of the e-mails) to Hamasaki’s rumor might allow one to reconsider the 
concept of the grassroots as in the slogan, “Excavate and Raise the Grassroots.” Of course, the 
grassroots after the neighborhood’s demolition by neoliberalism and by the miniature electoral 
district system should not be found in actual, geographical locality. Even before the demolition, 
the grassroots were perhaps already relocated somewhere in the interstices between the TV 
viewers’ everyday desires to express themselves and the sponsoring corporations’ need to know 
“ordinary Joe”’s reception of their consumer products. The Internet has perhaps concretized the-
se interstices by providing the virtual space in which the consumer/grassroots’ common-sense 
and -moods are expressed and surveyed more easily and visibly than before. It is this new space 
of the Internet that looks to have provided the consumer-grassroots with the leverage that they 
now can better express themselves, connect with other consumers’ self-expressions, and augment 
their consumers’ power through the collective opinions formed in this way. That this leverage of 
the Internet grassroots is illusory will be understood as soon as one remembers that these expres-
sions and opinions are expected and encouraged by corporations. The Internet grassroots remains 
to be bound by the allure of everyday commodities that the corporations marketize; Ayumi Ha-
masaki, for example, is to many one of the most alluring commodities of 1990-2000s Japan. It is 
their responsiveness to her and other commodities’ interpellation that the Japanese Internet users 
                                                                  
31 The term, flaming, to any recent observer of Yasukuni Shrine would be reminiscent of the fire set in an LDP 
politician, Kōichi Katō’s house in Yamagata Prefecture on 8/15/2006. Katō had repeatedly criticized Koizumi’s 
visit to Yasukuni. The fire burnt down his house completely, in which nobody was hurt but the rightist perpetra-
tor, who tried to kill himself by ritually slicing his stomach. See “Katō Kō Shi no Jikka Zenshō: Otoko, Hōka-shi 
Kappuku Jisatsu Hakaru?” and “Katō-shi Jikka Zenshō: Sanpai Hihan, Sono Tōjitsu” in Asahi Shinbun, 
8/16/2006. Although one has to distinguish this and other rightists from the users of the Channel 2 and other In-
ternet sites, the rightists and the Internet users seem to be connected with each other by means of their violent 
willingness to set (virtual) fire against whomever they deem as their opponents. 
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of the period might share in common and violently express, as if to demonstrate the commodity’s 
interpellating force negatively. In my view, therefore, these users represent their subjective and 
objective massness (their collective identity and mass-reproduced materiality as the consumers), 
when they use the self-appellation of the grassroots, as in the Yasukuni fan of and for the sōmō 
grassroots. 
 That the mass-character of the self-acclaimed grassroots is structured still by TV as well 
as by the new technology of the Internet might be shown by the naming of their favorite site, 
Channel 2. The Internet users’ transitional character in this period seems to be reflected by their 
pretension that the Channel 2 is a TV station. In the lingering dominance of TV in the country’s 
media space, the newness that the Channel 2 is claiming is merely that of the number 2—the 
hitherto seven TV channels in Japan from 1 to 12 skip 2 (as well as 5, 7, 9, and 11). Dispropor-
tionately to the quality and quantity of violence that its users seem to be willing to inflict on so-
ciety, Channel 2 in media history intends to be conservative. In comparison, those civic media 
that will be emerging after the Fukushima Earthquake of 3/11/2011 seem to explore the possibil-
ity that the Internet could challenge the way the conventional TV stations monopolize claims of 
truth.32 If the post-Fukushima Internet activists intend to be alternative journalists, Channel 2 us-
ers might intend to be alternative users of TV journalism and entertainment. The alternative part 
that the Channel 2 usership is claiming might be to stop letting their effervescent emotions and 
incipient opinions be molded or repressed by TV and to aim at directly presenting themselves by 
and for themselves on the web (“freedom of speech”). Of course, the form of self-presentation 
that Chanel 2 is aiming at is possible only with the advent of the Internet. However, according to 
                                                                  
32 Among many publications on post-Fukushima Internet journalism by Japanese civic activists, the following 
might be some of the most concise and “ethnographic”: Nicola Liscutin, “Indignez-Vous! ‘Fukushima,’ New 
Media and Anti-Nuclear Activism in Japan” in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol.9, Issue 47, No.1 
(11/21/2011) and Nobuyo Yagi et. al., Real Time Media ga Ugokasu Shakai: Shimin Undō, Seron Keisei, Jour-
nalism no Aratana Chihei (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 2011). 
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the way in which Channel 2 users employ the interactive technology, the newness of the idea of 
self-presentation is meaningful only within the overall regime of TV production. The new, inter-
active way of consumption that is proposed by Channel 2 seems to barely undermine the TV 
domination over other media. 
 It is perhaps his acute sensitivity of populism, which enabled Koizumi to discover the 
fretful and fleeting collectivity of the grassroots in the transitional process from TV to the Inter-
net. His theatrical politics are eagerly presented through the electric mail-list, Koizumi Admin-
istration Mail Magazine (Koizumi Naikaku Mail Magazine), as well as in such entertaining TV 
shows as SMAP * SMAP or TEAM.33 The cost that Koizumi has to pay for his aesthetic repre-
sentation of the new grassroots, though, is the continuous caution that he must use to the spec-
trum with which the grassroots opinions “swing.” For example, the Gothic ostentation of Koi-
zumi’s visit of Yasukuni Shrine in a diplomatically suicidal opposition to China and other Asian 
and Pacific countries apparently found a willing audience in 2005-6—the shrine’s visitors on 
8/15 surged from 60,000 in 2004 to 205,000 in 2005. In 2006, when this ethnographic research 
was conducted, the number rose to 258,000. Nonetheless, past the dramaturgical climax of 2006, 
when Koizumi visited the shrine on 8/15, the dwindled number of 165,000 visited the shrine on 
August 15, 2007 and 152,000 in 2008, despite the LDP’s and DP’s continued focus on Yasukuni 
politics.34 The anti-swing strategy taken by Koizumi apparently places even more emphasis on 
appearance than in other cases, whose peacock theatricality seems to have successfully provided 
the swing-voters with the center of their distracted attention. 
                                                                  
33 Especially noteworthy might be TEAM (Fuji TV, 1999), in which Ko’izumi plays a role of an education minister 
even before he assumes the PM office. A deep level of inversion between desires and reality as well as between 
reality and its representation, which Sontag above talks about, seems to be demonstrated in this episode. 
34 The statistics are taken from the following articles—“60-nen no Fushime: 20-man-nin Sampai” in Asahi Shinbun, 
8/15/2005 and “Rupo: Yasukuni Fuyu no Jidai” in Sankei Shinbun, 8/15/2008. 
  
285 
 With whimsical loyalty and apathetic eagerness, the new grassroots receives Koizumi 
apparently as a certain prominent figure—if not the leader, then at least the eye-catching main-
character in his mass-mediated theater. Walter Benjamin’s contemporary the Japanese Marxist 
Jun Tosaka said in his ephemeral writings on 1920-30s mass media that people as the media-
consumers then were similarly interpellated around the center of their gaze. Tosaka called this 
center or rather any figure that occupied this central place at a given moment the “fascistic aris-
tocrat of the highest rank” (fascist-teki saikō kizoku).35 “One characteristic that distinguishes fas-
cism from mere political absolutism,” Tosaka continued, “is to look as if [the fascistic aristocrat] 
had the mass-base or to look as if [s/he politically] organized the masses.”36 In other words, the 
suppositional aristocrat of fascism (i.e. the central figure of people’s media-attention) had an aes-
thetic versus political grasp of people, according to Tosaka’s observation. In this sense, the me-
diated leader of fascism was a “demagogue,” Tosaka says;37 if so, then it is the constantly de-
flected, fluxing state of mass attention, which might make the flashy existence of the demagogue 
necessary. 
 That the contemporary Japanese masses are fascinated with the idea of the literal aristo-
cratic might be shown in their embrace of family dynasties of politicians, including the Koi-
zumis’. The country’s show business, which should otherwise crystallize the capitalist principle 
                                                                  
35 See Tosaka, Nihon Ideology Ron: Gendai Nihon ni okeru Nihon-shugi, Fascism, Jiyū-shugi, Shisō no Hihan 
(Tokyo: Hakuyō-sha, 1938(1935)); p.377. 
36 Tosaka, Ibid.; p.377-8; italics original. In reality, “the characteristic of so-called fascism’s idea of masses is not 
to allow the masses to organize themselves by themselves,” he says (p.378). The gap between the appearance of 
the mass organization by the leader and the reality of the lack of the masses’ self-organization would be bridged 
by demagogy, in Tosaka’s observation (380). Tosaka’s Benjaminian moments do not stop here. In order for the 
masses to overcome the fascist demagogy, Tosaka thinks, they should not try to develop their faculty of under-
standing but their pragmatic relation with reality (380-1). That is, the masses will be “evolved” as “a result of 
[their] advanced relation with reality, which will correct the relation between [their] ideas [of reality] and it [real-
ity]” (380). Parallel to Benjamin, a Marxist of the everyday, Tosaka, who would be interested in analyzing such 
everyday “demagogic” tools as radio and magazines, did not have enough time to fully develop his ideas—he 
prematurely passed away in a prison, days before Japan’s defeat. 
37 Tosaka, Ibid.; p.380. 
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of the equal chance to everyone, according to Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno, abounds 
with the offspring of “stars,” reflecting the consumers’ tastes for them.38 Those second- or third-
generation politicians and stars are called “thoroughbred,” a marker of the extent to which people 
seem to be fascinated with the idea of “blood” (chisuji) or “nobility” (iegara).   
 The grassrooted masses’ conservatism that is exalted with the sight of the quixotic “aris-
tocrat,” Koizumi, lets us reexamine the term, the grassroots once again. In the previous discus-
sion, the revolutionary potentiality of the grassroots is partly that of the mid-nineteenth century 
Shōin Yoshida, with which he attempted a coup against the shōgunate. Now, if one sees a tint of 
conservative orientation toward status (blood and nobility) dyeing the newness of the Internet 
concept of the grassroots, then that is the conservatism that inhabited Yoshida’s radicalism as 
well. The grassroots in this reconsideration has been a loaded term in Japan, which points to the 
culturalized idea of the emperor. According to the historian Isao Inoue, Yoshida found the sōmō 
or sōsei, that is, the grassroots, only together with its twin and logically primary category, the 
emperor (kun).39 Against the then-cultural dominance of Chinese Confucianism (jukyō in Japa-
nese) and also against the newly prominent modern forces (represented by the United States) in 
East Asia, Yoshida would state that “the national body” (kokutai) of Japan is “unique” (doku), 
since it is made of the autonomously “sacred” (shinsei) emperor and the grassroots that is mutu-
ally equal in their veneration of the emperor. The prototypical community of death, Yoshida’s 
concept of the national body, then is theoretically guaranteed by the “equally, directly, and spon-
taneously loyal acts” made by the grassroots toward the emperor, in the historian Inoue’s under-
                                                                  
38 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 
1998(1944)); see esp. the chapter, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” pp.120-167. 
39 See Inoue, “Yoshida Shōin no Sōmō Kukki Ron” in Bunzō Hashikawa, Masanao Kano, and Toshio Hiraoka eds., 
Kindai Nihon Shisō Shi no Kiso Chishiki (Tokyo: Yūhi Kaku, 1971); pp.10-1. 
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standing of Yoshida.40 Usually summarized as “one lord and equal people” (ikkun banmin), the 
force of the proto-fascistic theory of Yoshida, the historian suggests, lies in its aspiration to over-
come Edo’s “caste” system and regional sectionalism. Comparable to fascism about sixty or sev-
enty years later in the 1920s to 40s, Yoshida’s thought seems to be characterized by incipient 
modernity—the nativist idea of the post-Edo equivalence—and its opposite, archaic mytholo-
gism (the “sacred” emperor). 
 The same dialectic characterizes Yoshiaki Yoshimi and other postwar leftists’ criticism 
of what they call “fascism of the grassroots” (kusa no ne no fascism).41 The grassroots (kusa no 
ne) to these leftist scholars is part of the naturalized ethnoscape, where even “a bit of grass, a 
single tree” in the country is supposed to grow out of the cultural soil of what they call the “em-
peror system” (tennō sei) of Japan.42 According to them, the idea of the emperor seeps into the 
“habitus” or the “unconscious” of the Japanese, which was totalized by the modern state and 
abused as the dynamo for the Asia-Pacific War (see Chapter 3). More than a century later than 
Shōin Yoshida, these leftists seem to show the degree to which Yoshida’s ideology has been 
proved true as grassrooted fascism during the war.  
 The Internet masses that I observe in Yasukuni today obviously do not use the leftist ter-
minology of the kusa no ne. These masses’ choice is the loan Chinese word of sōmō, which 
might sound more “masculine” than kusa no ne with the nuance of revolution and violence. 
However, when even the leftists cannot imagine the grassroots in Japan outside the ideological 
landscape of the national emperor, the Yasukuni masses’ reference to the rightist sōmō becomes 
the same with the case in which they call themselves kusa no ne. In either case, as long as they 
                                                                  
40 Inoue, Ibid.; p.10. 
41 See Yoshimi, Kusa no Ne no Fascism: Nihon Minshū no Sensō Taiken (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 
1987). 
42 See Yoshimi Takeuchi, “Kenryoku to Geijutsu” in Osamu Kuno and Jirō Kamishima eds., “Tennō Sei” Ron Shū, 
Vol.1 (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1974), 301-311; p.311. 
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use the term of the grassroots, the Yasukuni masses can never look to be truly new, due to their 
implication of the emperor. Perhaps that is their intention. They sally forth onto Yasukuni with 
the participatory violence and the violent aspiration for equality that the new Internet technology 
seems to guarantee (“I have something to tell to Koizumi” via and only via the Internet-type of 
interactive/democratic imagination); but they prefer to do so only within the confines of such a 
conservative space, Yasukuni Shrine. The conservatism of the shrine is that of the symbol of 
“tradition,” the emperor, which it espouses in addition to the radicalism of fascism (i.e. the idea 
of equality in death within a capitalist formula). The Internet masses’ reception of the produced 
leader, Koizumi, is then pre-conditioned by their self-identification with the emperor’s grassroots. 
  The contemporary Japanese grassroots’ conservatism seems to be supported by their spa-
tialized sense of temporality that the Internet promotes. A female college student in a prim navy-
blue blouse and sharply pressed gray pants, who is now walking next to me, would say, for in-
stance, that she is here in Yasukuni today, since she received a text message through a mail list, 
informing her of Koizumi’s appearance. “I’m not particularly a huge fan of his, you know,” this 
student of elite Tokyo University winks at me, having apparently been convinced that she has 
somehow discovered the common political sense with me. “But I came here anyway, ‘cause I 
want to witness the historic moment [of Koizumi’s visit] by myself.” 
 In order to be able to perceive the current moment as already historic, I think that one 
needs to adopt something similar to what Eduardo Cadava calls “photographic temporality,” in 
which the object of photography has to be made “dead” upon being shot.43 Photos are taken for 
the future beholder; the temporality of photography always renders the present to be the past 
(dead) seen from the future. In the current instance, Koizumi’s visit that happened only half a 
                                                                  
43 See Cadava, “Words of Light: Theses on the photography of History” in Patrice Petro ed., Fugitive Images: 
From Photography to Video (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp.221-244; p.233. 
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day ago already becomes history, when the event is completely consumed and possessed, that is, 
rendered to be the dead object of interpretation, as soon as or even before the event happens. An 
intensified mode of capitalist consumption might be underlining this sense of time. Perhaps the 
Internet enhances this temporality, by facilitating the users to constantly record their everyday 
moments in blogs, social networks, and Twitter (2006, though, was a year of pre-social-networks 
and pre-Twitter). The Internet users do so for the sake of the potentially worldwide audience for 
sure, but perhaps also for the sake of themselves—the future them, who would nostalgically look 
back at the current moments of blogging as everyday landmarks in their personal histories. By 
uploading banal snapshots and tweeting instant thoughts in the shutter-clicking speed of photog-
raphy, the bloggers hasten the advent of the future and equalize the present with the past except 
just a blink of moment of delay. History here is a flat space, where the past, present, future are 
photographically juxtaposed with each other. It is probably this type of historical consciousness 
that underscores the sense that Koizumi’s visit today is already historic, as well as that the Japa-
nese atrocities did not even happen (“the lie of the Nanjing Massacre”).44 
 Political conservatism of the Internet masses likely builds on this kind of obedient adap-
tation of their temporal sense to the technological assignment of the era. Whether Koizumi’s 
neo-nationalist visit of Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 is looked back on as historic or, say, the 
then social democrat prime-minister, Tomiichi Murayama (1994-6)’s apology to the rest of Asia 
on 8/15/1995 should be regarded as historic is a judgment that not only history but also ethico-
                                                                  
44 Of course, the photographic temporality should be framed in the overall tempo of modernity—see Peter Osborne, 
The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London and New York: Verso, 1995). About intensification 
of the modern temporality in the late capitalist phase, see Frederic Jameson, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review, no.146 (September/October 1984), 53-92. 
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politics will make in the future.45 Today, I heard the euphoric reference to the “historic moment” 
(rekishi-teki shunkan) again and again throughout Yasukuni. When academia and journalism 
faced similar remarks upon the death of the emperor Shōwa in 1989, scholars and journalists 
then tended to dismiss the mainly young Japanese who made the remarks as “apolitical.”46 Nev-
ertheless, to me, the college student and other youths, to whom I have talked in the shrine today, 
are unambiguously expressing their political consciousness—the consciousness of conservatism, 
whose main feature is to remain apolitical in order to conserve the status quo. It is the Internet- 
and other new-technologies-generated consciousness, which marks contemporary rightist events 
as historic, looking back from the future. Looked back on from the future, the shock and violence 
that rightist events might likely inflict on the contemporary people will turn out to be changing 
nothing about the present. It is these rightist events’ system-preserving eventfulness without po-
litico-ethical progress that the Internet masses are celebrating today. These masses are sum-
moned by their sense of spatialized historicity, in joining not the peace families rally but the Ya-
sukuni “prayers.” 
 The path to the Hall of Prayers is now completely jammed. As soon as we passed the Di-
vine Gate and started to stop and step, step and stop, over the about 50 feet distance between the 
Gate and the Prayer Hall, the crowds pull their cells out of their pockets likely to check e-mails 
and send the rare photos of the uniformed and marching rightwingers that they took before the 
Gate. The visitors eventually encounter about a 20-feet wide, tatami-matted entrance area to the 
Hall of Prayer, though only from outside—entry is not permitted, unless one is willing to pay the 
                                                                  
45 In Murayama’s word, Japan “inflicted enormous damages and suffering to many countries, particularly people in 
[other] Asian countries, by means of [Japan’s] colonial domination and invasions.” See “Sengo 50-nen ni atatte 
no Shushō Danwa” in Asahi Shinbun, 8/15/1995. 
46 See Asahi Journal ed. Shōwa no Shū’en: 1988.9-1989.2: Tennō to Nihon-jin (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha, 1989); 




2,000 yen (20 dollars) suggested admission. As far as I can see, nobody is entering the hall today. 
The area that is exposed to the average visitor is anti-climactically plain, without any particularly 
important-looking objects of religion, such as statues or reliquaries. The “divine body” (shintai) 
of the shrine, the list of the fallen and consecrated soldiers (reijibo), is actually laid out in the 
Repository of the Spirits’ Registry (Reijibo Hōan Den) further down to the west and unlikely 
available to even paying visitors. The average visitor is expected to toss token coins into the coin 
box (saisen bako) outside the Prayer Hall and offer prayers there to the invisible collectivity of 
“gods” (saishin), the fallen soldiers. 
 Still, I see signs of efforts to individuate the abstracted and collectivized “spirits” (rei) of 
families. On the side of the coin box are laid cups of sake and cans of beer. Similarly laid on the 
ground are lit cigarettes. I also see the approximately five dollar bouquets made up of white and 
colorful flowers, which are sold at the Divine Gate. The middle-aged male vender raised his 
thumb, as I asked if his business was good today. Facing the entrance to the Hall of Prayer, a 
gray-haired man in a white shirt and blue-gray pants closes his eyes and silently prays. There is 
another, similarly elder female, accompanied by what appears to be her daughter, also praying 
with her palms joined together. A middle-aged male in a black suit and tie deeply bows and ad-
miringly looks into the Hall’s interior. 
 The clamor and confusion of the crowds continue, enveloping even these genuine prayers 
and solemn nationalists. People are taking pictures, standing on their toes to see better, throwing 
coins, and waiting for their turns before they leave. The air is pungent with tobacco. The metallic 
noises of the tossed coins against the wooden coin box and clicked shutters of cameras add to the 
booming whirl of the chattering crowds.  
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Though the entrance to the hall is hardly spectacular, the vision is certainly opened up all 
of a sudden after the long, tortured procession behind and next to the claustrophobia-inflicting 
backs and arms of fellow visitors. To describe the atmosphere in front of the Prayer Hall as fes-
tive emphasizes a certain excitement only at the cost of the sense of tension that is created by the 
over-presence of the police. Consciousness of the tensed “here and now” seems to underline 
people’s constant references to “Koizumi” or “China” or other buzz words of international and 
domestic politics. But perhaps I am wrong and the air is excited exactly due to the state’s visible 
existence that the police, or rather the concept of Yasukuni Shrine itself, inevitably embodies. If 
that is the case, then the celebratory excitement that I feel among the crowds now at the anti-
climactic end of their journeys must be the showcase of how agilely these conservative minds 
find the magnetic field of an era, in which the state’s force concentrates. The conservatives are 
finally showing their radicality, the radicality of being excessively attracted to the idea of the 
state—some of them come even all the way from the northernmost Hokkaido to demonstrate 
their obedience. 
 Technologically, the Yasukuni masses’ nature of radical obedience might be reflected by 
their supplementary usage of cell phones, in addition to the Internet. For instance, now, two boys 
of high-school age are taking pictures of the shadowy inside of the hall with their cell cameras. 
They ask to each other, 
 “Isn’t this it? Here?” 
 “I bet. This must be the place, from which Koizumi got in [the Prayer Hall] in this morn-
ing.” 
 According to them, they are going to mail the pictures to their friends right there then. 
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 Although cell cameras are part and parcel of the Internet culture, I think there is a differ-
ence between sending images via cell-phones and uploading them onto web-pages. It is true that 
both technologies boast their mobility and interactive possibilities, which TV can only envy. 
However, cell-phones carry what McKenzie Wark calls the TV “vector” or “any trajectory along 
which bodies, information, or warheads can potentially pass.”47 Although Wark says that the 
vector is about “fixed length” and not about “fixed position,” in the Iraq War that he writes about, 
televised information always came from Iraqi “locations” and warheads from the Allied Forc-
es—positions and directions were always fixed.48 
Similar fixity has characterized postwar Japanese TV, which has more or less been asso-
ciated with the idea of the public, due to the half-state-owned station, NHK’s existence. At the 
end of a given day around midnight, NHK (Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai or Japan Broadcast Association) 
has never failed to broadcast the image of the supposed flag of Japan (nisshō ki) waving in the 
wind to the accompaniment of the supposedly national anthem “Our Lord’s Reign.” Through this 
televised ritual, the order between the TV Subject (the state/emperor) and the (imperially) sub-
jectified viewers has been created and re-created as the matter of the everyday.49 Even in other, 
less nationalist stations, which the postwar Japanese with their leftover statist minds would de-
rogatorily call “the private” (minkan), that is, private companies as opposed to NHK, the massive 
                                                                  
47 See Wark, Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); 
p.11. 
48 See Wark, Ibid.; p.11. 
49  In her analysis of the historical sagas that NHK has broadcasted in Sunday evenings for decades, Soomi 
Lee does not particularly discuss what I would regard as the imperial element of the station. Yet she similarly 
maintains that the sagas (taiga drama) “simultaneously summon their viewers as the historical subjects of the 
‘Japanese’ and arrange them into the national space-time of ‘Japan.’ In these processes,” she continues, “there is an 
ideology present, working to encourage the viewers to memorize and memorialize past Japan. Then, past Japan is 
expected to function to [help the viewers] praise and [imaginatively] integrate current Japan.” See her “Taiga Drama 
no Bunka Seiji Gaku: Televi Media Kenkyū ni taisuru Hitotsu no Teian” in Shun’ya Yoshimi and Reiko Tsuchiya 
eds., Taishū Bunka to Media (Sōsho: Gendai no Media to Journalism 4) (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 2010), pp.197-220; 
p.215. Shunya Yoshimi similarly argues that one of the most important functions of postwar Japanese TV in general 
is that it has “inserted into the household the everyday schedule that has national significance.” See his “Televi wo 
Dakishimeru Sengo” in Yoshimi and Tsuchiya, Ibid., pp.166-196; p.188. 
  
294 
difference is clearly visible between the capital that can afford gorgeous commercial films and 
the ordinary viewers, who merely admire capital’s power in front of the screen. The economic 
difference immediately converts to the political distance between those who could interpellate 
others into certain identity formations and those who are interpellated. It is true that TV’s differ-
ence from prior technologies, such as cinema, is its intimacy, with which the interpellating voice 
reverberates literally in one’s living room or even bedroom. However, the distance, which the 
power-difference between the interpellater and interpellated makes, have never been and will 
never be collapsed by the technology-enabled intimacy. It is that insurmountable distance, which 
makes the glamor of TV technology.50 
 Cell phones, in their play with intimacy and separation, work to maintain the media vec-
tors and accompanying orders of things that TV has created. The more or less personalized mes-
sages fed in the cell-phone machine are meant to go across long distances and different times, 
which are assumed to separate the sender and receiver. It is the drama of distance and simultanei-
ty that supplies the technology’s romanticism, as is perhaps perceived by the users. At least in 
Japan, the cell-phone figures that companies promote are typically two lovers geographically 
separated (enkyori renai) or grown-up sons and daughters working in cities away from their “real 
home” (jikka), that is, home where their parents are. Even though many uses of the cell phone are 
textually made, the point of its primary difference from other contemporary media technologies 
is its transmission of voices. Corporate interests do not know any better sales-points of cell-
phones besides the romanticism of the origin and its displacement, which the technology plays 
                                                                  
50 About the interplay between the public and private that TV enacts, see Martin Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (Columbia 
Pictures, 1976). Michael Haneke’s Funny Games (Wega Film, 1997) focuses on the meaning of TV violence in-
troduced directly into the private sphere.  
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out with the transmitted voices.51 In the present case of the boy senders of Yasukuni images, the 
images’ authorship will be easily attributed to them, probably due to the desires of their personal-
ized circle of receivers (their friends). These are the desires, which also accompany ordinary in-
stances of cell-phone usage, i.e. the desires to keep the romantically imagined distance from the 
receiver of one’s voice, which are always traversed by other kinds of desire to attain technologi-
cally enabled proximity to the same receiver. The boys’ “live” transportation of the pictures is 
meant to establish this miracle of the simultaneous far and here. 
 Like cell phones, some moments on the Internet continue the distancing and hierarchizing 
techniques of TV. Those moments are when the Internet operates in the modes of blogging, 
tweeting, and mailing. These modes thrive on the users’ desires for the origin, for clearly distin-
guished authorship and unique time and place, which the author is supposed to mark. At the 
same time, claims for originality on the Internet are stretched thin by its culture of sharing, inter-
acting, and participating. These other moments of the Internet, in which it downplays the idea of 
the origin, also characterizes cell-phones. Especially in their texting mode, which enables bulk 
and carbon-copied mails, as well as in their conference function, cell phones join the Internet, 
marking their technological abilities for reproduction, anonymity, and co-respondence. Neverthe-
less, what fundamentally differentiates the cell phone from the Internet is, again, voice and its 
technology of aura, to which the cell phone always comes back in the last instance. When cell 
phones create the illusion of simultaneity in order to dramatize distance, the Internet creates the 
same illusion in order to delete the sense of distance at all—in the Internet fantasy, everyone in 
the world is just “one-click away.” This last analysis might allow me to conclude that cell phones 
                                                                  
51 About the relation between conventional phones and distance, see Avital Ronell, “The Worst Neighborhoods of 
the Real: Philosophy-Telephone-Contamination” in Differences 1:1 (1989); 125-45. Phones in their relation with 
the economy of proximity/distance are of course based on the postal model—see Jacques Derrida, The Post 




are ultimately the same as TV in their reliance on the media vector, while the Internet is charac-
terized by its movement to depart from that reliance. What distinguishes the Internet among the-
se other technologies might be its stronger tendency toward displacement, interchange, and dis-
semination than the other technologies’ tendencies toward them. 
 Now, let us look at the three technologies’ relation within the larger history of mass-
media in modern Japan concerning the fascist moments that such history seems to contain. My 
sense is that this history is not likely a teleological path to liberation, liberation of the fascist 
moments from corporatist binding. When the death-communal aspirations might accompany 
temporally and spatially “equalizing” technologies such as the Internet, these technologies have 
always coexisted with the TV-type of corporatist media of distance and hierarchy—they have 
dialectically evolved together. In 1920-40s Japan, for instance, the equalizing (“massifying”) 
technologies of cinema and newspapers asserted their technological advantages and disad-
vantages vis-à-vis the hierarchizing technology of radio. As I have analyzed in the second chap-
ter, cinema and tabloids were petty bourgeois tools to express their grotesque desires for equality. 
In contrast, the centralized device to distribute official voices, the radio, was used by the state for 
such mythically authoritarian purposes as to announce its false “victories” in losing battles or to 
“de-consecrate” the emperor in 1945.52 In the current moment of history, the aspect of the Inter-
net that underscores simultaneity and confluence seems to refer the technology back to the earlier 
moments in Japanese media-history, viz. the filmic and tabloid moments, than the moments of 
                                                                  
52 The radio-broadcast in which the emperor Hirohito declared that he was a human was called the “broadcast of 
the jade sound” (gyokuon hōsō). This was the first time that the ordinary Japanese heard the emperor. About the 
place of the emperor’s embodied voice in the historic moment of democratizing Japan, see Yoshikuni Igarashi, 
Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton and Oxford: Prince-
ton University Press, 2000).  
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TV and cell phones. TV and cell phones, in turn, might belong to another corporatist genealogy 
within media history, which seems to tie these technologies with radio.53 
 In the death-communal line of media history, the line that threads together cinema, news-
papers and the Internet, the shocking force of photography has been carried over. Such force flat-
tens time into space, while the interpreter of the “shot” objects of photography cannot help but be 
affected by the photographical violence. Or rather, the interpreter has to be already affected by 
modernity’s photography-like shocks of lights, in order to be able to understand how to interpret 
a photo.54 Benjamin suggests film’s advancement of the photographic shock in both its subjec-
tive and objective aspects. In terms of the object, film introduces the ultimate speed with which it 
shoots the object—that of speech as in the sound film.55 The filmic subject, the mass audience of 
film, is the advanced version of the shocked interpreter of photography, since it is an assemblage 
of the distracted and isolated interpreters of photos.56 The audience of film is always collective—
even after home videos, DVDs, and bluerays, the film-producers always assume and try to ap-
peal to people’s common-sense and -sentiment. Reflecting their mechanically reproduced identi-
cality as masses, the movie-audience even outside the theater exists as the invisible audience of 
movies, always ready to be assembled into a totality of the movie-audience. This is why the aes-
                                                                  
53  According to Yoshiaki Hashimoto’s suggestion, Japanese TV’s rootedness in radio dates back to 1926, 
when NHK was established originally as a radio-broadcaster of the state, integrating three private radio-stations. 
After NHK the radio station stopped broadcasting the state voices upon Japan’s defeat in 1945, the station tried to 
transform itself into a national broadcaster; along with two postwar, private broadcasters, NHK the radio station 
started to work to “encourage the nation” with “Ringo no Uta” (1945) and other pop songs and “Kimi no Na wa” 
(1952) and other audio dramas, according to Hashimoto. In his and many other scholars’ implications, postwar 
Japanese radio’s nationalism was inherited and advanced by TV, which started its broadcast in 1953. It is popularly 
said that many Japanese became motivated to purchase black and white TV sets in 1958, in order to watch Akihito, 
the then prince’s wedding parade in 4/10/1959. Different from his father, Hirohito, Akihito is known for his 
ambition to represent the Japanese nation and its mass culture. See Hashimoto, Media to Nihon-jin: Kawari-yuku 
Nichijō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2011); pp.13-39; the quote is from p.18. About the relation between Akihito and 
the mass-cultural formation of the postwar Japanese, see Keiichi Matsushita, “Taishū Tennō Ron” in Chūō Kōroni, 
April, 1959, 30-47. 
54 See Cadava, Ibid. 
55 See Benjamin, Ibid.; p.219. 
56 See Benjamin, Ibid.; p.239-40. 
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thetic totalitarianism of spatialized temporality, which photography-film promotes, is politically 
realized as fascist totalitarianism. Aesthetics of the organized-looking masses in photography and 
film is acted out in reality only when it has the subject of acting-out, the already totalitarian 
masses of capitalism. Film actualizes the invisible massness of photography’s interpreter. 
 Attaining new levels of displacement and simultaneity, the Internet seems to retrieve and 
develop the condition in which the filmic masses were placed. This inheritance is despite the de-
cline of the cinema industry⎯the industry has long been said to be declining because of the 
shadow of TV. It is true that the Internet seems to inherit the commoditized field of celebrities 
and authoritative sources of journalism from conventional TV stations, as I have argued.57 But 
Internet users also seem to undermine the TV technology of distancing, in order to inherit the 
cinematic emphasis on participation and interaction. The Internet advancement of cinematic 
technology is such that even the speed of the sound film becomes slow—Twitter can keep up 
with the flow of thoughts even before they are formed as speech. While film commodified peo-
ple’s unconsciousness, the web-camera makes sure that there is no realm in the everyday uncon-
scious that is not covered by the web-cam’s abstracting power.58 As for the media subject as well, 
Internet users can be more easily assembled than in the case of the movie audience either inside 
or outside the theater. The homogeneous breadth of the Internet masses, though, is dotted with 
points of fascist integration, just like the movie audience. Similarly to the movie audience, which 
prefers to be assembled by the actors’ aura, the Internet masses seem to be tempted by the idea of 
being totalized as not just masses, but as, say, the emperor’s (or the “thoroughbred” Ko’izumis’) 
masses. It is this nostalgic moment built into the Internet masses’ modern sensibility, which pro-
                                                                  
57 About the relation between the state authority and the country’s journalism, see Helen Hardacre, “Aum Shin-
rikyo and the Japanese Media: The Pied Piper Meets the Lamb of God” (an unpublished paper presented at East 
Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1995). 




vides fascists with the point of integration. TV or cell-phone lovers might have some affinity 
with this point of the nostalgic origin (e.g. the emperor), but will be appalled by the distance-
closing image of simultaneity and atomized interaction presented by the Internet grassroots. 
 In the Yasukuni Shrine in 2006, fascism-minded crowds seem to allude to the Internet in 
its dialectic with TV- and cell phone-technologies. In the middle of the commodifying process 
that the Internet accelerates, TV and cell phones insert the idea of the origin and author. At the 
same time, TV and the cell phone have those moments in which these technologies refer to the 
proliferating power of anonymity and displacement, just like the Internet. The Internet’s newness 
in this dynamic is its renewed possibility for death-communal equality, that is, the possibility to 
realize the mutually equal mass-grassroots. However, this possibility is fundamentally compro-
mised by TV’s authoritativeness or the cell-phone technology of aura, since the imagined grass-
root-mass is mutually equal only under the emperor, at least ideologically speaking. The hybridi-
ty of the Yasukuni crowds’ mass-consciousness that I have observed likely shows a transitory 
state in which 2006 Japan is moving from one technological regime to another. At the same time, 
the transitory hybridity could be fundamentally fascism’s, showing its deeply split duality be-
tween its mechanical reproductive materiality and its desires for the auratic. 
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Chapter 5. Disruptions: Other Voices and Mournful Responses 
  
“After the company commander admitted [his crimes], I confessed I had robbed deserted 
villages of potatoes, wheat, and ilk, when I was a rookie. 
 “Then in one village, I accompanied our sergeant interrogating a [Chinese] communist 
combatant [who was taken hostage]. Though we [the imperial Japanese army] had an interpreter, 
the sergeant had got so irritated that he repeatedly (zuka zuka) stabbed the [hostage’s] knees with 
his bayonet. The hostage said he had no doubt that Japan would lose the war. He told the 
sergeant if he was going to kill him anyway, then he should do so as soon as possible. The 
sergeant said kono yarō (this bastard) and beheaded him. I was right there and supported him. 
 “I also joined ‘rabbit hunts’ [the ‘hunting’ of able-bodied Chinese males as forced 
laborers for Japan]. Even though it was a state policy, I apologize and sincerely reflect. [During 
one of these hunts] the squad leader Nakajō found a mother and a son. ‘Private Kubodera, shoot 
the man,’ he ordered me; I shot the boy who was about fourteen years old. It was about twenty 
meters in distance. Felt as if I had shot my own younger brother. 
 “I had thought the war was something that was to be fought between soldiers and never 
thought I would end up killing innocent people (jinmin).” 
The approximately fifty young and old men and women gathered on a hazy May 
afternoon today (2007) are hushed. They are just gazing at the witness, unable to even blink. In 
this tense instance, apparently nobody can truly understand what s/he has just heard. Then, some 
sigh; others start to look at the handouts again, desperate for clues. The eighty-seven year-old 
former private, Hisao Kubodera, does not even pause. He continues to mechanically read the 
prepared draft and impassively point at an about one square-yard hand-drawn map of East to 
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Northeast China. On its side also standing on a wooden tripod is a chronology of the battles he 
fought there more than sixty years ago. There is a certain robotic quality to this extremely good-
postured witness. Wrapped in a grayish blue suit and a bolo tie with a big cold stone ornament, 
this pencil-thin, quiet farmer from Hatano, northern Kanagawa, never even sets his eyes on the 
audience during his thirty-minute testimony. His eyes are either intensely following the script or 
fixed in midair, as if he was talking to something else there. It is true that he says he is “sincere” 
when he apologizes. Yet, its clichéd wording⎯“I apologize and sincerely reflect” or 
“mōshiwakenaku, kokoro kara hansei shimasu”⎯merely emphasizes his ritualism. The hardened 
way in which he says the phrase might indicate he has repeated it many times. Given the kinds of 
war-crimes that he says he committed (assistance in hostage-execution, murder and capture of 
civilians, and robbery of foodstuffs), the first question that his ritualism raises might be that of 
ethics.  
Apology is usually expected to accompany sincerity, truthfulness, and other 
meanings⎯like words of love or condolence, apologies are not supposed to be mechanically said 
without meaning. In a case like Kubodera’s, which attempts to redo ethically grave acts, one 
might wonder if the apologizer is even more obliged to this general rule of meaningful apologies 
than other cases. At the same time, like any other kinds of words, it is hard to know the meaning 
of apologies. The apologizer can be sincere and make sincere-sounding apologies; or, s/he can be 
insincere and still make sincere-sounding apologies. How can one judge Kubodera’s insincere-
sounding apologies? Of course apologies do not have to be semantically meant in order to 
produce pragmatic meanings. Like postwar Japanese politicians’ apologies to the rest of Asia and 
the Pacific, which accompanied aid monies, scholarship, and others, apologies could be 
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meaningful in their effects.1 Could individuals like Kubodera meaningfully apologize in this 
pragmatic sense? Finally, when one considers the pragmatic of apology, the 
moral⎯“legal”⎯aspect of apologism is highlighted. If one regards Kubodera’s apology or the 
politicians’ monies as expressions of their respective senses of indebtedness, how will one 
reconsider Kubodera’s ritualism and the politicians’ formalism? Would mere gestures of apology, 
even without either semantic or pragmatic meanings, suffice as gestures of return in the 
exchanging relation with the victims? Ultimately though, I surmise that either moral or ethical 
implications of these apologies have to miss truths seen from the victims’ perspective, since the 
victims’ losses would never be completely recovered⎯no matter how sincere the apologizer is, 
no matter how generous compensations are, and no matter how good the gestures of return are. 
Within this limitation, I wonder, is there still a more meaningful apology than others, which 
Japanese war-criminals and their descendants can make to other Asian and Pacific victims?  
The last chapter of this dissertation concerns itself with the questions of ethics and 
morality. To ask moral-ethical questions is to consider the consequences of fascism. Fascism in 
previous chapters has been analyzed in terms of its commodity structure and mass-technologies. 
These analyses were meant to provide insights into the factor in fascism⎯desires for 
mechanical-aesthetic organization of those mass-situations and events that could be regarded as 
chaotic in certain minds. In spite of these desires and corresponding projects, fascism was far 
from organizing the chaotic; it ended up generating causally haphazard and historically specific 
effects, as Kubodera’s execution of a hostage might show. These effects cannot be discussed 
without referring to the categories of morality and ethics, the latter in particular, since in their 
                                                                  
1  About the relationship between these politicians’ apologies and the monies that they offered to Japanese 
fascism’s victims, see Norma Field, “War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After.” Positions 5:1 (Spring 
1997): 1-49. Ultimately, she considers this relationship in terms of J. L. Austin’s theory on speech acts⎯see his 
How to Do Things with Words, 2nd Edition, eds. by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1997(1962)). 
  
303 
attempts, fascist projects were those of formalization, i.e. reduction of singular lives and 
historical events into mechanically static forms.  
Investigating Japanese fascism’s effects and their ethics, the current chapter tries to 
explore the possibility of a future between Japan and the rest of Asia and the Pacific. Those 
nationalist projects that similarly address fascism’s effects without an ethical view of other 
victims could ideologically construct a moral future within Japan, but not beyond Japan⎯recall 
the victimological narcissism that I have analyzed in Chapter 1. In the subsequent chapters, I 
have suggested that the possibility of an ethically minded future seems to be presently prevented 
by the contemporary Japanese psychological structure of melancholia, the socio-political 
institution of corporatism, and the economic mode of mechanical reproduction. I have argued 
that these structures and institutions in Japan have given birth to the problem of “second fascism,” 
i.e. fascism of reducing the victims’ voices (Chapter 2). Nonetheless, this chapter attempts to 
provide ethnographic evidence of future-oriented movements initiated by the Japanese for other 
victims. This chapter will focus on these Japanese efforts to apologize and compensate for their 
fascism’s effects on other Asians and Pacific Islanders. Against the fascist grain of the larger 
Japanese society, and despite the seeming impossibility of reparation (e.g. how could Kubodera 
revive the life of the boy that he shot and killed?), these progressive Japanese have tried to forge 
and maintain just relations with other Asian and Pacific victims. This chapter will 
ethnographically explore these efforts.  
The moral-ethical movements by the contemporary Japanese are generationally organized. 
What separates the first generation from others is the question the younger activists tend to ask, 
“Should the second or third generations’ apologies be the same as the perpetrators’?” The 
younger generations seem to attempt to apologize, while reflecting on the differences between 
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apologies and compensations, between accountability and responsibility, between the individual 
crimes and social structure⎯what is at stake here seems to be the issue of the subject. 
Subsequently, my ethnography in this chapter is composed of two parts. First, I will go back to 
Kubodera’s testimony to analyze the moral-ethical judgments that the actual perpetrators of 
fascist crimes are facing today. I focus my attention especially on the language that Kubodera 
uses to address other victims. Within the pragmatic confine of address, Kubodera’s vocabulary is 
limited and expressions are stylized. I would like to think about his pragmatically impoverished 
words in terms of the commodity, especially the commodity’s power of circulation. Due to its 
generality, the commodity is equipped with not only the power to go across national borderlines, 
but also the power to transmit apologism from generation to generation. After Kubodera, I will 
move on to his children’s and grandchildren’s generations in order to see how the linguistic 
currency of apologism that Kubodera’s generation abstracted from their particular experiences is 
bequeathed and developed over time. I will introduce the Kanagawa Prefectural Affiliate of the 
Peace Families Association (Kanagawa Heiwa Izoku Kai), to investigate such concepts as 
Japan’s “ongoing imperialism” and the “postwar [Japanese] responsibility” to resolve 
imperialism. These activists say they hope that the postwar Japanese taking their responsibility 
make them qualified to “cohabitate with [other] Asians.” Through these ethically commoditized 
languages and exchange of moral gestures, these families and remorseful perpetrators have 
formed a loose network of mourners in the melancholically forgetful nation. This network has 
constituted another death space in postwar Japan, the death space in which other victims instead 
of the Japanese victims, ethical ideals instead of fascist ideals, are remembered. I will elucidate 
how this space has been maintained throughout the postwar period, as actors exchange moral 




The Ethics and Morality of the Contemporary Japanese Apologism 
 According to Hisao Kubodera, he was born in 1920 on the Hatano farm, Kanagawa 
Prefecture, where he lives now with his wife. As soon as he was conscripted in 1942 at the age of 
22, this tobacco and peanut-grower was dispatched to Jinan, Shandong Province in China. The 
army’s Division 59 (otherwise called Robe or Koromo), to which Kubodera belonged, was newly 
formed in 1942 for the purpose of Jinan’s “public security.” The 12,000 lightly-armed soldiers in 
Division 59 were placed in a position to easily commit war-crimes against Chinese civilians, 
whom they were told were “communists.” In addition to murders, abductions, and robberies, as 
Kubodera testifies, Division 59 is proved to have been accountable for rapes, enslavement, arson, 
and other kinds of horrendous crimes.2 According to Japanese journalists, Katsuichi Honda and 
Setsuo Naganuma, it was said among the Jinan Chinese that “let the Japanese military rest in 
your house for fifteen minutes, and you’ll take three years to restore the household; let them stay 
overnight, and it will take forever.”3 A Japanese historian, Yutaka Yoshida, argues that these 
crimes that had initially accompanied Division 59’s campaigns in “accidental” ways later 
became the main purpose of the division. The change reflected the degree to which ordinary 
Chinese had started to join or support the Red Army, according to the historian.4  
 In such a criminally oriented division, Kubodera had been steadily promoted. By 1945, 
when the division was disarmed by the Soviet army in Hamhung, North Korea, he had become a 
corporal in charge of recruit training. After the war, the Soviet Union kept him and 968 other 
Japanese war criminals from Division 59 and other divisions and forced them to work in 
                                                                  
2  See Fujiwara, “Shiryō no Igi ni tsuite: ‘Sankō Seisaku’ no Jittai,” Sekai, May 1998, 79-87; Masayuki 
Toyoda, “Senpan Kyōjutsu-sho no Zentai-zō: Kōkai-sareta 1177-mai no Keitai kara, Shiryō no Igi wo Yomi-toku,” 
Sekai, August 1998, 262-270. 
3  Katsuichi Honda and Setsuo Naganuma, Tennō no Guntai (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1991); pp.22 and 
374. 
4  See Yoshida in Honda and Naganuma, 436-7. 
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Vladivostok labor camps for five years. Upon the new People’s Republic of China’s request, the 
SSRC agreed to hand these Japanese to the PRC in July 1950. The PRC transported them to its 
Fushun Detention Center in Liaoning Province and detained them there until August 1957. 
Additionally, 140 more Japanese war criminals were similarly detained in Taiyuan, the capital of 
Shanxi Province, and released in 1957. During the six years in detention, apparently none of 
these war criminals experienced vengeful violence from guards or any other Chinese personnel. 
Humanitarian treatment was the norm in these centers; the detainees’ moral growth was their 
goal.5 In their trials held in 1957, the heaviest sentence passed was eighteen years of 
imprisonment, from which five years in Vladivostok and six in Fushun were subtracted.6 
Kubodera and other rank- and file-soldiers were immediately shipped back to Japan. Upon 
repatriation, about 60% of these former detainees gathered together and established the Liaison 
Office of the Repatriates from China (Chūgoku Kikansha Renrakukai or Chūkiren). “Admission 
of crimes,” “remembrance of the past for the future,” or “inheritance of Fushun’s miracle” 
became their slogans, in the logic of gift-exchange with Chinese humanitarianism. For decades, 
they have published several collective memoirs and held thousands of testimonial gatherings like 
Kubodera’s.7  
 Kubodera did not join the Liaison Office immediately. In 1957, he became 36 years old. 
As the eldest son of a farmer, he had to start a family and together run the farm. In the social 
environment of the Cold War, in which the repatriates were called “red” (aka) or worse, 
                                                                  
5  See one of the former superintendents of the Fushun Center, Meisai Sun’s memoir, “Fushun Senpan Kanri 
Shochō wo Tsutomete” in Kikan Chūkiren 2 and 3 (http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/index.htm). 
According to a historian, Zhiyong Song, Chinese humanitarianism was caused by their communist will to observe 
international laws and by their political calculations to seek a future “development of friendship between Chinese 
and Japanese.” See his “Sengo Chūgoku ni okeru Nihon-jin Senpan Saiban” in Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū, No.30 
(Winter 2000), 62-68; p.67.    
6  That was the sentence that the last commander of Division 59, Shigeru Fujita, received.  
7  See these repatriates’ memoirs⎯e.g. Chūgoku Kikan-sha Renraku-kai, Shin Dokusho Sha eds., Shin’ryaku: 




“brainwashed” (sennō sareru) to be red, Kubodera’s family-orientation dictated him not to 
involve himself in the progressive activism by the Liaison repatriates. Indeed, according to a 
Liaison member, Tsuyoshi Ebato, local police visited the repatriates about once a week; nobody 
hired them except for those construction companies which paid only 240 yen a day on a daily 
contract.8 Kubodera says he did not wish to isolate his family from the farming neighborhood 
more than necessary.  
But now in 2007, his children are fully grown up and he and his wife are semi-retired. In 
today’s meeting, which is the second one for him, Kubodera mentions the notoriously 
neonationalist former prime minister, Junichirō Koizumi, as the launcher of the new activist 
phase in his life. Advocating that Japan should become a “normal country” (futsū no kuni) with 
military capabilities, Koizumi and other neonationalists have struggled to abrogate the Article 9 
of the country’s 1946 Constitution (renunciation of war).9 Kubodera is applauded stating, “It is 
citizens who actually go to the battlefield. I feel I have no other choice than fighting for the 
current Constitution in order not to let the Japanese citizens kill other citizens, just as I did.” The 
vivid testimony of atrocities is then meant to bring home to the contemporary Japanese the 
importance to stop their support of the popular politician, Koizumi, and other neonationalists. I 
surmise that it is supposed to be a type of educational process. For this purpose, the testimony 
cannot be timelier; the supposedly “self-defense” forces (SDF) of Japan have started to be 
dispatched abroad under the excuse of joining the United Nations’ peace-keeping operations 
                                                                  
8 According to Ebato, the job was called “niko yon” after its 240-yen wage. See “Kanagawa Shibu Dayori” 
(an unpublished pamphlet by Bujun no Kiseki wo Uketsugu Kai); p.6. In the pamphlet, Ebato is transcribed as he is 
interviewed on 1/24/2007. 
9  Kubodera has similarly published his interview by David McNeil in 1/26/2007⎯see McNeil’s “A Foot 
Soldier in the War Against Forgetting Japanese Wartime Atrocities” in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 
(http://japanfocus.org/). Relevant to this current chapter will be the level of the testimony’s repetitiveness observable 
throughout these three occasions, two testimonial events and one interview.   
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among others. Many in the country see these dispatches as the state’s preliminary steps toward 
remilitarizing the country.  
At the same time, there is a sense of anachronism and idiosyncrasy in Kubodera’s 
testimony, which does not quite fit the timely goal of pacifism and public cause of education. His 
eyes are not an educator’s eyes, which would look into those of students to make sure they learn 
the right lessons. His speech is not a public orator’s speech, which would modify its speed, 
emotionality, and gestures according to the audience’s responses. It is true that in his entire life 
Kubodera was never a public figure; one should probably expect this level of social oddity from 
an eighty-seven year-old farmer from Hatano. At the same time, the level of his oddity is such 
that at least I wonder if he even requires us, the audience. It is as if he was addressing somebody 
else, likely his slain and robbed victims; we were placed there as a token of the audience so that 
his address could take the form of a testimony. I said anachronism, since he seems to be fixated 
on the more than sixty-year-old scenes of murders and robberies.10 Across time and space, he 
seems to try to address those original scenes that are impossible to recover, and as part of the 
token audience, I feel I am excluded from the dialogic relation that he seems to intend to forge 
with his victims. If exclusion is not the right word, then we might be included merely as 
privileged eavesdroppers of his personal address.  
If this is the case, then the next question is his ritualism, especially when he actually 
apologizes. He says, “I apologize and sincerely reflect’ (mōshiwakenaku, kokoro kara hansei 
shimasu) on what he did. In this probable climax of his speech, in which he actually looks to be 
                                                                  
10  According to Jacques Derrida, justice-demanding others of a given regime always come back to the regime 
as an opening to other times, “anachrony”:“This spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked 
at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority 
(which may be on the order of generation, of more than one generation) and asymmetry, according to an absolutely 
unmasterable disproportion. Here anachrony makes the law.” See his Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the 
Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf, with an intro by Bernd Magnus and Stephen 
Cullenberg (New York and London: Routledge, 1994); pp.6-7; italics and parentheses original.  
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directly talking to the victims, what might strike one would be the apology’s banality. 
Particularly in the 1990s, Japan and the rest of the world experienced what Norma Field called 
politicians’ “apology movement” that was meant to redress those half a century-old wrongs done 
during World War II.11 In the finely calibrated world of diplomatic protocols and political 
calculations, such words as “I apologize” or “sincerely reflect” became standardized and made to 
correspond to similarly standardized meanings and monetized compensations. Why would 
Kubodera, who has personal and embodied relations with his victims, use these public and 
emptied words? Would not he have more specific things to say to his particular victims than the 
obsolete words of politicians and diplomats, which are so obsolete that they hardly mean 
anything (except for the material meaning of compensations)? Is it even ethical for a perpetrator 
to present standardized words to his/her victims, thus standardizing the pains and sufferings that 
s/he inflicted on the victims? 
Let us consider the unethical appearance of Kubodera’s ritualism some more⎯what is so 
unethical-looking about his apology? It seems that there is a problem of standardization, of 
grading singular cases into a corresponding hierarchy of appropriate apologies. If fascism can be 
minimally defined as a reduction of singularities, the mechanical standardization of victims’ 
plights is connected to the problem of fascism (see Chapter 2). The possibly fascist 
standardization here should be discussed together with the overall mechanism of 
commoditization, of which fascism is born and over which fascism tries to rise. I think one needs 
something like the mechanism of commoditization in order to be able to treat particular losses 
and personal agonies as if they could be converted into abstract numbers, into monetary values. 
By selecting the widely circulated words of politicians’ apologies, Kubodera seems to 
intentionally or unintentionally make his victims exchangeable with those other victims who can 
                                                                  
11  Field, Ibid.; p.3.  
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be estimated to have suffered from similar grades of pain to his. The initial impression of 
unethicality that one might have toward Kubodera’s apologies must be generated from this 
mechanism of abstraction, of commodification. 
Even though instances of commodified apologies are imbricated with the problem of 
fascist reduction, commodification in itself does not have to be unethical. Ethics is related to but 
separate from morality, since morality, as I refer to in this dissertation, is the Kantian sense of 
law. Recall my relevant discussion in the first chapter, in which I have stated that Kantian 
morality is based on causality through freedom⎯this sense of morality assumes the 
groundlessness of moral codes and human freedom to observe groundless codes.12 “Free” 
humans in Kant, in other words, are the subjects with the subjected will to belief versus 
knowledge. In Chapter 1, I have discussed that this freedom to belief is comparable with Marx’s 
concept of commodity fetishism. Without the misconception of the commodity’s agency, 
humans can produce neither the commodity nor themselves as commodities (subjects), according 
to Marx. In contrast to these ideas of morality and the inseparable issue of subjectification, ethics 
is the concept that was rearticulated by Jacques Derrida among others, focusing on the ground of 
the groundlessness of moral laws, that is, on the instituted traces of the others that moral conduct 
blindly signifies. No matter how automatically moral law reigns, no matter how unconsciously 
the subject obeys, the others to whom moral conducts are supposed to direct themselves remain 
as “necessity” and as “event[s]” in the whole subjectifying and commodifying system of moral 
                                                                  
12  Therefore, moral persons are exercising their freedom to act morally, in the environment where there is no 
ground or authority to dictate them to do so. In the enlightened world, where knowledge and belief are discrepant, 
morality is human’s freedom, will power, to ascend from the phenomenal world, over which knowledge rules. It is 
true that in another respect morality is blind obedience to a system of everyday imperatives. But these “practical 
laws refer only to the will, irrespective of what is attained by its causality, and one can disregard this causality (as 
belonging to the sensuous world) in order to have the laws in their purity.” In Critique of Practical Reason, Third 
Edition. ed., trans., intro. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1993(1956)); p.19; parentheses original. 
See also Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  
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law, according to Derrida.13 That others constitute necessity means that the kind of mental 
activity that addresses them is decision, although it would “not be a free decision; it would be the 
programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a calculable process.”14 To say others’ 
place in moral codes is decided is also to say that questions regarding others are solved in 
heteronomous ways⎯a “decision comes to him [the decision-maker] from the other” like an 
event, whether the decision-maker likes it or not.15 Ethics to Derrida is therefore the necessary 
and necessitated consideration of others. This consideration tries the limits of law, reason, and 
the self, yet remain within the limits as something programmable and calculable. Although the 
ethical considerations of others are imperative and inerasable, such considerations should 
differentiate itself from substantiation of others. Otherwise, philosophical endeavors of ethics 
would fall in the “nonphilosophy” of empiricism, like Emmanuel Levinas’.16 Or, those projects 
that attempt to philosophically reclaim others might mention such an “audacious” and “perilous” 
idea as “divine violence,” as Walter Benjamin does.17 In both hermeneutical and political senses, 
these ethical attempts to immediately recognize others fail, as Derrida depicts. Despite their 
ethical intentions, these attempts end up revealing that empirical encounters with others require 
language and that just treatments of others require law. Derrida’s studies prove that ethics does 
not transcend but delimits, and in that sense, inhabits law and language.18  
                                                                  
13  Derrida, “Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in ed. and with an introduction by Gil 
Anidjar, Acts of Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), pp.230-298; p.244 and 253 respectively.  
14  Derrida, Ibid.; p.252. 
15  Derrida, Ibid.; p.255. 
16  Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” Writing and 
Difference, trans., with an intro. and additional notes by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1978), pp.79-153; p.152. 
17  The first two of the three quotes in the sentence are both from Derrida, “Force of Law,” Ibid.; p.286; the 
last quote is from Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” ed. and with an intro. by Peter Demetz, trans. by 
Edmund Jephcott, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 
1978(1921)), pp.277-300; p.296-7.  
18  Responding to the Derridian understanding of the relation between ethics and morality, Annika Thiem asks, 
how can one make those recent ethical issues such as cohabitation, poverty, and environmentalism incorporated in 
the normative? and vice versa, how are these and other ethical questions already involved in moral philosophy? See 
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If one goes back to the issue of commodification and reexamine the issue in terms of 
Derridian ethics, the ethicality of commodification will be unambiguous. According to Marx, 
commodities will not even be produced, where there is no ethicality involved in their exchanges.  
 
It is only by being exchanged that the products of labour acquire a socially 
uniform objectivity as values, which is distinct from their sensuously varied 
objectivity as articles of utility. This division of the product of labour into a 
useful thing and a thing possessing value appears in practice only when 
exchange has already acquired a sufficient extension and importance to allow 
useful things to be produced for the purpose of being exchanged, so that their 
character as values has already to be taken into consideration during 
production.19 
 
People produce “useful things…for the purpose of [these things] being exchanged,” that is, 
people produce commodities, apparently bearing in their minds the existence of others, with 
whom they are going to trade their commodities. This ethicality as the consideration of others in 
the middle of the production process is intimately related to morality, to the degree that it is not 
required that these others take any particular figures in the producer’s mind. The irreducible 
others in the production process is rather an idea of the general subject with the same moral 
sense with that which the producer possesses. Even though there is no authoritative guarantor 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
her Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008).  
Apart from this Derridian line of discussion, Michel Foucault’s theory of ethics underscores the subject. 
See his “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose eds., The 
Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York and London: The New 
Press, 2003), pp.102-125. Ethics, according to him, is “the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, 
rapport à soi” (p.111; italics original). Ethics is said by him to be that “which determines how the individual is 
supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions” (p.111). To him, ethics is made of “part of 
ourselves, or of our behavior, which is relevant for ethical judgment” (which he calls the “ethical substance”), “the 
mode of subjection [mode d’assujettissement], that is, the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize 
their moral obligations,” “the self-forming activity [pratique de soi] or l’ascétisme⎯asceticism in a very broad 
sense,” and “the telos [téléologie]” (p.111-2; square brackets and italics are original). There is no room for others in 
Foucaultian ethics. Saba Mahmood challenges the Foucaultian limits by studying an Islamic Revivalist females’ 
mosque movement in Cairo, Egypt, with the Foucaultian concepts of ethics and the subject. See her ethnographic 
thesis, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2005). 
19  See Marx, “The Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret,” in his Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy, Vol. 1. intro. Ernest Mandel, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp.163-77; p.166. 
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(e.g. God) who assures that others are not treacherous, one embarks on production for others 
anyway, since this embarkation constitutes the habitually determined freedom of the modern 
capitalist subject. Commodity fetishism is another name for this habituated freedom, i.e. the 
producer’s unguaranteed assumption of others’ morality or others’ commodified appearance 
under the same moral law with that to which the producer subjects him/herself. The fetishistic 
misconception of others here is supplemented by the affect of sympathy⎯as I have discussed in 
Chapter 3, the sympathetic faculty allows one to imagine oneself in others’ positions. Even as the 
economy develops and capitalism deepens, the affect of sympathy and the object of such an 
affect, i.e. the idea of moral other, persist. In a credit economy, in which payments are delayed 
and credited, commodities’ exchanges have to depend on the buyer’s pledge for payment⎯the 
nexus rerum or the “obligation of the debtor to the creditor”⎯and the seller’s trust in the buyer’s 
pledge.20  
According to Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno’s observation, though, this 
fundamental sense of capitalist ethics looked already outmoded in the 1930s monopoly economy 
in Germany. It was true that the “independent economic subject,” who had previously existed in 
the country, had been characterized by the “true interests of others” and “penetration of 
receptivity and imagination”⎯the “economic basis for moral decision.”21 But with 
monopolization of the economy, the face-to-face types of ethicality between independent 
businesspersons and other petty-bourgeois actors had been taken over by “contribution to the 
                                                                  
20  Marx, “Money, or the Circulation of Commodities,” in his Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 
Volume One. intro. by Ernest Mandel, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London, New York, Victoria, Toronto, Auckland: 
Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1976(1867)), pp.188-244; p.228; the nexus rerum is in Marx’s 
text, while its translation (“the obligation...”) is Ben Fowkes the translator’s.  
21  See their “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,” Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. by John Cumming 
(New York: Continuum, 1998(1944)), pp.81-119; p.198. 
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apparatus.”22 The ethicality of the moral subject was instrumentalized and totalized for the 
purpose of the monopolizing totality of the state and industries. Now, the state and industries 
functioned as people’s externalized super-ego, Horkheimer and Adorno observed⎯if pragmatic 
ethicality is the “devotion of the ego to the substantial outside world,” the monopoly economy 
abuses ethics’ pragmatism, they suggest.23 The monopoly state and industries’ totalization and 
instrumentalization of capitalist ethics were closely related to fascism, especially in terms of 
fascism’s actuality, such as the Holocaust. “In Fascism,” they say,  
 
the conscience is taken care of; the responsibility for wife and children so 
carefully nurtured by bourgeois civilization is replaced by the constant 
necessity for the individual to obey the rules. Unlike the assumptions of 
Dostoyevsky and the German apostles of inwardness, the conscience consisted 
in the devotion of the ego to the substantial outside world, in the ability to take 
into account the true interests of others. This ability is the capacity for 
reflection as the penetration of receptivity and imagination. When the big 
industrial interests incessantly eliminate the economic basis for moral decision, 
partly by eliminating the independent economic subject, partly by taking over 
the self-employed tradesmen, and partly by transforming the works into objects 
in trade unions, reflective thought must also die out. The soul, as the possibility 
of self-comprehending guilt, is destroyed. There is no object left for the 
conscience because the responsibility of the individual for himself and his 
family is replaced by his contribution to the apparatus, even if the old moral 
assumptions are retained.24 
 
As one’s “responsibility for wife and children” was replaced by mechanical subjection to the 
system, Jews were robbed and massacred without ethical reflection or conscience. Ultimately, 
Horkheimer and Adorno think, this is an extension of the tendency that is inherent in the 
Enlightenment⎯reason just systematizes; it does not know moral sentiments, which 
encompasses or otherwise connects to the ethical consideration of others. According to their 
reading of Kant, these sentiments and considerations are a sort of accidental “fact” that have 
somehow been born out of the systematizing Enlightenment. By representing the monopoly state 
                                                                  
22  Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.; p.198. 
23  Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.l p.198. 
24  Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.; p.198. 
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and industries and by being supported by them, fascism concretely showed what would happen 
when even the last bit of freedom left for the enlightened subjects, viz. morality and its 
fundamental ethics, was systematized.25  
 By staring at midair, where the murdered Chinese ghosts might hover, Hisao Kubodera is 
perhaps trying to remember the pre-monopolized mode of capitalist morality. That Kubodera the 
farmer operates to the accompaniment of natural rhythms might allow him for such a quixotic 
remembrance in the middle of the monopolized economy of contemporary Japan. “Even now [at 
the age of eighty seven], he and his wife still go out to the farm when it is sunny and they feel 
better,” one of the middle-aged staff members at the Kanagawa affiliate of the Liaison Office of 
the Repatriates from China, Eiji Matsuyama, says. The maxim of the nexus rerum might have 
survived in Kubodera, in the environment in which the amount of labor that he inputs is 
immediately reflected by the amount of harvest that he reaps. As for Marx, he does not say that 
the nexus rerum would disappear as capitalism develops. Certainly, obligatory relations between 
business partners become more complicated everyday, while the moral sense that usually 
accompanies individualized transactions might be subsequently dispersed among an extended set 
of transactions; the moral sense would also be attenuated in each case of transaction. Money in 
an advanced stage of capitalism will no longer be used for its use-value, i.e. for its function to 
measure and symbolize other commodities’ values. For, more transactions will occur than those 
to which a given amount of money in an economy can accurately correspond. However, in a 
crisis, the nexus rerum will brutally come back to the market as the creditor’s confirmation of the 
                                                                  
25  “Reason contributes only the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of fixed conceptual coherence. 
Every substantial goal which men might adduce as an alleged rational insight is, in the strict Enlightenment sense, 
delusion, lies or ‘rationalization,’ even though individual philosophers try to advance from this conclusion toward 
the postulate of philanthropic emotion”⎯Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.; p.85. In Kant’s expression, they say, 
morality happens as a “fact” (Horkheimer and Adorno, Ibid.; p.82).  
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debtor’s pledge to return the sold commodities in the bodily form of money.26 This might mean 
that even if the debtor in a credit economy omits her/his pledge, the creditor remembers the 
absent pledge. Even Horkheimer and Adorno have above said that in the monopoly economy 
“There is no object left for the conscience…even if the old moral assumptions are retained,” the 
ghostly assumptions without objects.  
 Nevertheless, as a possible holder of the fundamental ethicality of capitalism, Kubodera, 
is doomed⎯he will not be able to completely return his moral debts to his Chinese victims. No 
matter how much reflection and imagination of the victims his pragmatic morality allows him, he 
is a mere sentient being without the capacity to resurrect the victims. Even to approximate wish 
fulfillment, fulfillment of his wish for repayment, he has to use one sort of indirect measure or 
another⎯he has to use a substitute for resurrection. His choice, words of apology, is already 
proliferated to the degree that they have lost meaning. The linguistic inflation of course reflects 
the economic condition in which it is placed. Kubodera is the linguistic counterpart to the debtor 
in a credit economy, who would not be able to return the debt in the form of actual money. At 
this point in history, discrepancy between the physical bodies of money and their proliferated 
specters of credits has become too widened for any moral debtor to completely repay in money. 
Likewise, the actuality (sincerity) of an apology has already become too distanced from the 
wording of the apology for Kubodera to use the apologetic words meaningfully.  
 Did Kubodera make a wrong choice here⎯should he have chosen money instead of 
words as a means of his apology? Even if both money and words suffer from mechanical 
reproductive proliferation, would there still be difference between these two value systems? 
What if Kubodera made the moral gesture of remembrance and repayment in the form of money 
                                                                  
26  Marx, Ibid.; p.235-6.  
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and not language? “If apology is a verbal performance centered on the penitent recognition of 
absolute inadequacy,” Norma Field observes, “its paradoxical character is highlighted when 
accompanied by material restitution.”27 She continues, “In contrast to the verbal apology, 
material restitution seems to undercut the acknowledgement of the stark impossibility of repair 
by being explicitly subject to calculations of value.”28 In the particular culture in which the 
current apologizer (Kubodera) is situated, money and other materials’ “[explicit] subject[ion] to 
calculations of value” usually results in these material’s taboo-charm, which people usually try to 
avoid as much as possible. A series of moral codes sets the taboo of money apart from the field 
of people’s everyday activities⎯money is literally wrapped up, disguised, and put aside, since it 
is supposed to be too blunt, too corrupt, too “dirty” for people to casually touch and see.29 
However, as Field discusses, words of apology that are regarded as politer, purer, and cleaner 
than money and other materials cannot materially help the aging victims’ lives, which tend to 
have been impoverished due to the colonial and other Japanese deprivation.30 In turn, words 
could be material in a negative way⎯they are supposed to “earn” the apologizer dignity, trust, 
and legitimacy, the symbolic capital that can be the apologizer’s “selfish” purpose to begin 
with.31 
 With these differences between apologetic words and monetary compensations in mind, I 
would like to return to their overall framework of commodification. It seems to be commoditized 
apologies in general, either in monetary or linguistic forms, which raise moral and ethical 
questions. Earlier, I have compared Kubodera’s commodified apology with the fascist reduction 
                                                                  
27  Field, Ibid.; p.8. 
28  Field, Ibid.; p.8. 
29  See Mikiharu Itō, Zōyo Kōkan no Jinrui-gaku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1995); Katherine Rupp, Gift-
Giving in Japan: Cash, Connections, Cosmologies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).  
30  See Field, Ibid.; p.8.  
31  Field, Ibid.; p.8. 
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of the victims. The question whether his apology is ethical or moral seems to hinge on his act of 
commodification in general. What Marx, Horkheimer and Adorno have contributed is the insight 
that the production of the exchange value does not have to be unethical when it is considered in 
the context in which the producer of the commodity is embedded, i.e. in the producer’s 
relationality to other producers. In this dialogic view of commodification, Kubodera’s apology 
differs from fascist reduction⎯fascism reduces for aesthetic purposes of organization, whereas 
Kubodera reduces for pragmatic purposes of communication. The key is probably the existence 
of others in the act of reduction. When one looks at the pragmatic aspect of the commodity, the 
ethical consideration of others is already incorporated even in the commodity’s production as the 
producer’s imagination of the scenes of exchange. Likewise, Kubodera seems to reduce whatever 
emotions or truthfulness he might or might not hold for the intended circulation of his apology. 
Kubodera might be neither specific nor expressive enough in his apology, but in his case, 
specificity and expressivity are sacrificed or rather sublimated into dialogism. He surely reduces 
the specificity of his case into a generic form of apology⎯yet without this reduction and 
generalization, a moral exchange between him and his victims would not even start. Too much 
specificity and/or too much expressivity would result in idiosyncrasy; non-formalized 
idiosyncrasy would not be understood by the victims. In this fundamental orientation toward his 
victims, Kubodera’s intention for moral exchanges seems to contain the seed of ethics.  
 In this analysis, fascism turns out to be a project that tries to defy the ethical definition of 
commodification⎯the fascist reduction of others. Fascists emphasize the idealized orderliness 
among the equalized commodities and ask if such orderliness can be maintained completely 
statically without any exchange between commodities, without any dialogue between reified 
producers. When there is no exchange or dialogue assumed, there will be no room for others in 
  
319 
the entire economy, the entire society. Similar to what Rosalind Morris calls structuralists’ 
“fantasized universalism under the rubric of representation,” fascists’ idealized order without 
others might be “beautiful” to look at but impossible to carry out.32 Just as fantasized perfection 
and permanence of representation (perfect and permanent coincidence between the signifier and 
signified) has to always fight “time’s intrusions into the relations of difference between signs,” 
fascism’s idealized stasis among constellated commodities has to always exclude others, because 
differences lead to movements, exchanges.33 Both endeavors, the endeavor of fighting time and 
that of excluding others, are utterly unrealistic. To make their unrealistic project real, fascism 
cannot help but bear violence⎯fascism’s projects of commodification without consideration of 
others are deeply unethical. To me, the seeming contradiction between Kubodera’s apology and 
his commodification of the victims reveals the real contradiction between fascism’s 
commodification and its will to delete any dialogism. Fascism’s is a real contradiction, since 
those goods and services that are not produced for exchange cannot be called commodities.34 
Pushing this contradiction, fascism necessarily fails in the self-consuming community of death 
                                                                  
32  Morris, In the Place of Origins: Modernity and Its Mediums in Northern Thailand (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2000); pp.46-7; Italics original. Here, she is reading Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things. 
According to her, “Because representation remains committed in some sense to what is perceived to be the true 
order of things, and because it secures itself with reference to something outside of itself, it is the point from which 
the consciousness of loss emerges. Only from within representation can the plenum of experience become an object 
of knowledge and thus a point of departure. Only from within representation can one become aware of the 
disarticulation of language from the world. That is to say, only in loss can a sense of origin be perceived” (p.47). 
The Foucaultian type of representation, though, should be strictly distinguished from fascists’ actualization of their 
ideals. As a reader of the Japanese novelist Yukio Mishima might notice, an aspect of fascism could be defined for 
its confusion between representation and reality⎯“action” (kōdō) is the name that Mishima gives to this confusion. 
See his “Bunka Bōei Ron,” Chūou Kōron, July 1968: 95-117. In previous chapters, I have explained the confusion 
in terms of the inverted temporality in fascism, referring to Susan Sontag, “Fascinating Fascism,” New York Review 
of Books, February 6, 1975. In the last analysis, fascist actions that try to subjugate reality to its representation are of 
course totally different from Kubodera and others’ pragmatism that tries to introduce others into reality. 
33  Morris, Ibid.; p.47.  
34  That is why air or the ocean cannot be called commodities⎯neither is a dinner cooked for oneself. “In 
order to produce [the commodity],” according to Marx, he [the producer] must not only produce use-values, but use-
values for others, social use-values…In order to become a commodity, the product must be transferred to the other 
person, for whom it serves as a use-value, through the medium of exchange.” See “The Commodity,” in Capital, 
Ibid., pp.125-177; p.131. 
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sans exchange, sans others. The irony is that it is in such an impossible community of death that 
the ultimate exchangeability between mutually identical members can become even fathomable.  
 According to this understanding of fascism, the postwar Japanese state’s treatment of 
other Asian and Pacific victims to me seems to deserve the name of second fascism. Together 
with Kubodera and other Japanese perpetrators, the nation-state of Japan as the legal 
representative of the Japanese perpetrators is in a position to be the pragmatic agent of apologies 
to and compensations for other victims. For various reasons, the Japanese state has yet to 
perform these pragmatic obligations to the victims. First, the state interprets that the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East has resolved all the relevant war-crimes. Postwar Japanese 
domestic laws are subsequently not equipped with the ability to criminally pursue individual 
Japanese regarding any crimes that they might or might not have committed during the war.35 
Second, according to the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, in which Japan regained its sovereignty, 
its forty eight signatories renounced their respective citizens’ civil right to the Japanese state-
compensations for their individual losses in the war. With those invaded countries that did not 
participate in the treaty, viz. China, South Korea, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
USSR, Japan forged bilateral treaties, stipulating that Japan provides aid-monies for each 
country’s economic development instead of compensation for the country’s losses that Japan 
caused.36 In exchange, each donee’s citizens are legally interpreted to be bound to the San 
                                                                  
35  This legal system makes a stark contrast to that of West Germany, whereby Nazi crimes do not even have 
the statute of limitations. See Linda Hoaglund, “Stubborn Legacies of War: Japanese Devils in Sarajevo” in The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (http://japanfocus.org/, 1/26/2007). The irony is that Kubodera and other 
Japanese witnesses take advantage of the loopholes in the Japanese system⎯ the Japanese domestic laws “protect” 
them from the chance that they will be indicted in Japan for what they testify.  
36  Excluded even from this international diplomatic scheme of “aid” are Taiwanese and North 
Koreans⎯Japan has yet to forge peace treaties with their countries. Similarly, North and South Korean residents in 
Japan are never given a chance to take advantage of even the aid-monies from the Japanese state due to their 
ambiguous nationality and citizenship. See Michael Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910-
1923 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989); Sonia Ryang, “The North Korean Homeland of Koreans in 
Japan” in her ed. Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 
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Francisco Treaty, i.e. that they have forsaken their individual right to pursue reparations from the 
Japanese state concerning their war-related losses. Third, there are cases that have to risk 
stigmatizing the plaintiffs in their home countries⎯those that involve rapes and sex-slavery 
being prime examples. These socio-cultural reasons aside, individual victims of Japan’s fascism 
in the rest of Asia and the Pacific could not receive compensations due to the postwar Japanese 
state’s fascism that has summarily reduced these individuals’ unique losses to their respective 
countries’ general interests. Other states have apparently cooperated with the state of Japan⎯the 
Allied Forces, and the signatories of the San Francisco Treaty and other bilateral peace treaties 
with Japan have lent deaf ears to individual victims’ demands for justice in order to save the 
invader Japan’s primitively accumulated capital, accumulated through its invasion into and 
colonialism of the rest of Asia and the Pacific. No wonder, when the capital could be used to 
finance the invaded and colonized countries’ military dictatorship and other forms of 
totalitarianism developed in postwar days.37 “A [possible] swarm of individual suits,” as a judge 
of Japan’s Fukuoka District Court is reported to have said to his colleagues, which would 
otherwise have been brought by the other Asian and Pacific victims against Japan, are then 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
pp.32-54; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Exodus to North Korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007). 
37  According to Namhee Lee, The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South 
Korea (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), South Korean Park Chung Hee, who seized the country’s presidency 
in 1961 through a military coup, received Japanese monies in exchange for his dictatorial ambitions. Before the 
1965 “Normalization Treaty” between South Korea and Japan that Park forged despite the “oppos[ition] by an 
overwhelming majority of Koreans” (p.31), “[t]he ruling Minju Konghwadang (Democratic Republic Party: DRP) 
[of Park] was rumored to have received a $130 million advance from Japan, from the property claims settlement 
fund, and it was said that the government and the ruling party had used the money to organize the party. These 
rumors heightened suspicions that the ruling party was hurrying the settlement in order to maintain its power. 
Distrust increased further when the Japanese government revealed that it had already arranged several commercial 
loans of more than $100 million with South Korea” (p.30; note 37). South Koreans also suspected the anti-
communist American encouragement behind Park’s decision (p.31). “Once Koreans became aware of the 
negotiations in March 1964, many expressed the thought that normalization with Japan should be preceded by 
Japan’s sincere apology for its past colonial rule of Korea. They said the treaty was against Korea’s national 
interests, that it was another humiliating episode for Korea because it made Japan’s ’40 years of crimes against 
Korea justified,’ and that it provided a way for Japan to rule over Korea once more” (p.30).   
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neatly represented by the international diplomatic bodies of the nation-states and their interests.38 
Visceral details of the individual losses are laundered into the clean form of aid-monies. The 
victims’ voices are thus commoditized, but unlike Kubodera’s case, the purpose of 
commoditization is anti-apologism⎯compensations as such have never been paid by the 
Japanese state to either the invaded countries or their citizens. The possibility of dialogic and 
other exchanges between the actual victims of fascism and the postwar state of Japan are 
completely precluded from this international scheme of second fascism.  
 Just as fascism cannot sustain its ideal of monologism, the second fascism of the 
Japanese state and the supporting community of other states has to disclose its internal 
discrepancy. The internal discrepancy manifests itself as different positions in the international 
scheme that the Japanese state has constructed and joined. For example, although it was drawn 
into Japan’s diplomatic scheme of fascism and receives Japan’s official development-assistance 
(ODA), the Chinese state effectively allows its citizens to sue the Japanese state for their 
individual losses. Since the mid-1970s, approximately eighty lawsuits were brought by various 
Chinese plaintiffs against the state and corporations of Japan, albeit with their results always 
being the plaintiffs’ losses.39 According to the Chinese state, “the 1972 Chinese renunciation of 
the [Chinese state’s] right to Japan’s reparation [which China declared upon its forging a peace 
                                                                  
38  The remark is reported by Keiichi Sasaki in his “Kurai Kako wo Seisan-suru Hōzu: Sengo Hoshō Saiban 
wo Ou” in Nikkan Berita (www.nikkanberita.com, 2/14/03). The occasion of the remark, according to Sasaki, was 
that on 4/26/2002 the court ordered the Mitsui Miike Mine and the Tagawa Mining Corporation to monetarily 
compensate for the forced labor that these corporations used during the war. The plaintiffs were those fifteen 
Chinese males who were forced to work in these corporations’ mines in Kyushu Islands, where the court is located. 
Replying to the above quoted remark, the presiding judge, Motoaki Kimura, is reported to have said that “the 
number of the Chinese who were forcefully brought to Japan for labor [during the war] is about 40,000. Even though 
we [the Japanese state] pay 10 million yen [about 100,000 U.S. dollars] to each of them, it’ll be only 40 billion 
altogether. It’s not going to hurt us [the Japanese state and its budget].” 
39  See Daisuke Ōshima and Keisuke Nishikawa, “Sengo Hoshō Saiban: Ta no 4-ken mo Haiso” in Asahi 
Shinbun, 4/28/2007. More strictly, according to the article, most of these cases were dismissed, first, according to 
the statute of limitations of twenty years. Second, the Japanese courts have interpreted that before Japan’s 1947 State 
Reparation Law, the Japanese state in its exercising its public rights (such as the right to war) was immune to civil 
litigations. Additionally, on 4/27/2007, Japan’s Supreme Court newly presented its judgment that the Chinese 
individual right to the Japanese state-compensation had been renounced in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Statement.  
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treaty with Japan] was politically decided by China for the sake of the two peoples’ friendship. It 
is unlawful and invalid [for the Japanese state] to interpret [China’s renunciation] as 
encompassing the Chinese citizens’ equivalent right.”40 The Japanese Association of Scholars of 
International Law upholds the Chinese state’s claim and comments that “jurisprudently, a state 
cannot renounce its citizens’ civil right to seek other states’ compensations.”41 In addition to, or 
rather, as something that is intrinsic to this legal reason, one would like to consider the ethical 
principle of justice that the Chinese state may or may not mention here. Any project of fascism 
will not be able to annul the principle of justice, no matter how many others it kills, no matter 
how many voices it suppresses. Or rather, the more murderous and suppressive fascism becomes, 
the more pressing the question of the victims’ justice becomes. This fundamental sense of justice 
as an inerasable principle of fairness between one and others is recovered even from the 
internationally legitimized scheme of Japan’s anti-compensation, probably since the recoverer, 
the Chinese state, is positioned to represent others (the individual Chinese victims). The state of 
China, like other modern states, is recorded to have violated its citizens’ human rights, but vis-à-
vis the Japanese state, I think it has largely spoken for the victimized Chinese people.42 Derrida 
says that deconstruction is “[n]ot to change things in the no doubt rather naïve sense of 
calculated, deliberate and strategically controlled intervention, but in the sense of maximum 
intensification of a transformation in progress, in the name of neither a simple symptom nor a 
                                                                  
40  Ōshima and Nishikawa, Ibid. 
41  “Ichiren no Chūgoku Sengo Hoshō Saiban no Saikōsai Hanketsu ni tsuite no Seimei” issued on 5/7/2007. 
See http://homepage3.nifty.com/jalisa/kikanshi/k_157/157_011.html. 
42  See Human Rights Watch’s 2012 report on China, for example⎯http://www.hrw.org/world-report-
2012/world-report-2012-china. Nonetheless, against certain, conservative, North American public opinions that 
single out China’s human right-violations and culturalize such violations, I would emphasize, a la Horkheimer and 
Adorno, that these violations are derived from instrumentalized reason of the Enlightenment. The Chinese state is 
just one example of the modern bureaucratic state in general, the most systematic user of such reason. I hope I do 
not have to point to the U.S. state’s reduction of Muslim Americans and others to homo sacer in Guantanamo and 
beyond, in order to prove my point.  
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simple cause; other categories are required here.”43 This is perhaps the attitude that allows us to 
find the way in which the Chinese citizens struggle to make their state represent their demands 
for justice. Another victimized state of Republic of Korea has followed China’s footsteps by 
overlooking South Korean victims’ legally pursuing justice in Japanese courts, though the 
ROK’s support of justice had to wait for the end of its military regimes in 1979. During the Roh 
Moohyun administration (2003-2008), the South Korean state set up an investigatory and 
compensatory apparatus concerning individual citizens’ losses during Japan’s colonialism (1911-
1945). Tens of thousands of South Koreans responded to their state’s offer of investigation of 
and compensation for the losses that they sustained under Japanese colonialism.44 The Japanese 
state promised to cooperate with the investigation, if not with compensation. Even within the 
Japanese state, justice-oriented reassessment of its second fascism has generated dialogic 
attempts with other victims. In August 1993, the then chief cabinet secretary, Yōhei Kōno, 
admitted that the wartime Japanese institution of sex-slavery was constructed and managed by 
the Japanese military. He remarked that he “felt apologetic and remorseful” about the state’s 
accountability. In the same year, the then prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa (1993-1994) 
similarly described the Asia-Pacific War as an “invasive” and “wrong” war on the Japanese part. 
The social-democrat PM, Tomiichi Murayama (1994-1996), inherited the state-apologism and 
uttered that Japan had “inflicted enormous damages and pains on people in many countries, 
particularly [other] Asian countries, with [Japan’s] colonial dominations and invasions.” 
These apologies made by these Japanese politicians are surely commodified. But they are 
ethically minded and in that sense comparable with conservative Japanese politicians’ apologies. 
                                                                  
43  See his “Force of Law,” Ibid.; p.236. 
44  More precisely, the number amounts to 20,000 as of 6/20/2005, according to a supporting Japanese activist, 
Kazuyuki Kawamura. Earlier in 2005, Kawamura joined other leftist Japanese and resident Korean activists in Japan 
to establish the Network to Investigate the Truth of Forced Mobilization (Kyōsei Dō’in Shinsō Kyūmei Network). 
The network intends to help the ROK’s new investigatory/compensatory apparatus, particularly when the ROK 
officials and civilians make research trips to Japan.  
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According to a historian, Yutaka Yoshida, the apology movement in Japan dates back to the 
1980s, when the then PM, Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), and others started to think that “the 
issue of Japan’s accountability for the war-related losses would politically stymie Japan, as it 
was going to assume leadership in [the rest of] Asia.”45 Nakasone and others then dreamt about 
Japan’s political “leadership” in Asia and the Pacific at the peak of the country’s economic boom. 
Unless Japan apologizes, peoples in these regions would not find Japan as a holder of those 
moral qualities that are usually thought of as necessary for political leadership, according to 
these politicians. Yoshida comments that in this type of thinking, “there is only exceedingly little 
[room for] problematization of and interest in how to change [Japanese] policies to admit the 
war’s invasiveness and offensiveness and how to change the Japanese consciousness to support 
these [potential] new policies.”46 So, according to the historian, Nakasone and other hawks of the 
1980s tried to apologize without meaning either the war’s (or rather the warring Japanese) 
invasiveness and offensiveness. Their apologies were not sincere, the historian suggests, since 
they did not mean to change related policies or consciousness. Could Kōno and other doves in 
the 1990s be described as sincere in their apologies? How can we distinguish Nakasone’s 
nominal apologies from Kōno’s? Are not these two sets of apologies similarly arbitrary in their 
discrepancy from sincerity? The answer to these questions, though, lies not in the meaning but 
wording of the apologies. Kōno’s apology is the admission of the Japanese state’s accountability 
for the sex slavery. Murayama’s apology similarly defines the war as Japan’s invasion and 
colonialism. These admissions and definitions are not “sincere” in the sense that it does not 
matter whether they accompany the apologizers’ emotional or personal convictions. These 
apologies rather show the apologizers’ political positions in the spectrum of the finely calibrated 
                                                                  
45  Yoshida, Nihon-jin no Sensō-kan: Sengo-shi no naka no Hen’yō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); p.8.  
46  Yoshida, Ibid.; p.8. 
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words of diplomatic apologies. It is in their calibrated words that Murayama and other politicians 
point to a certain set of calculated positions, which differ from those which are pointed to by 
Nakasoné and others⎯the latter never made public statements on Japan’s invasion or 
accountability.    
In current, neonationalist Japan, even Nakasone-types of ultra-formal apologies should 
make a difference⎯the idea of conversations with others in general seems to have completely 
ceased to exist in this country. Neonationalists started their non-apologism with toning down of 
Murayama’s ethical wordings⎯during his administration, due to the demands made by many 
conservative alliances formed in the Diet, the social democrat draft for the Resolution for No 
War (submitted in June 1994) was reduced to the Resolution to Renew the Determination for 
Peace Based on the Lessons Learned from History (June 1995).47 In January 1997, the 
Association to Write New History Textbooks (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukuru Kai) was 
established among neonationalist politicians, intellectuals, and lobbyists, to revise the history of 
Japan’s fascism, especially that of sex-slavery.48 As the country plunged into a deep recession in 
                                                                  
47  See McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London and New York: Verso, 2007); 
p.10. 
48  That Japan’s second fascism attempts to reduce the memories and testimonies of the country’s sex slavery 
in particular might underscore the deep, gendered structure of fascism in general. According to Klaus Theweleit, 
Male Fantasies, trans. by Stephan Conway in collaboration with Erica Carter and Chris Turner, forward by Barbara 
Ehrenreich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987-1989), in Nazi Germany, fascism’s stasis without 
exchange, without others, was fantasized through the figure of the “hard,” “seamless,” armor-like body of a 
“masculine” soldier. Homosociality is the interpersonal mode through which the figurative soldiers are expected to 
relate to each other. Jews, women, and others, who were assigned the “feminine” signs of fluidity, porousness, and 
intermixture, were destined to be tamed and/or exterminated in this symbolic imagination. The Japanese sex-slavery 
with the ideology of the female sex-slaves’ “comforting” (ian-suru) of the male soldiers should therefore be the 
secret of the secret of Japan’s fascism. It represents one of the most acute contradictions to the fascist fantasy of the 
masculine soldiers⎯their hard autonomy and self-sufficiency. One of the discourses to try to solve this 
contradiction will be that of the “release of (male) sexual instinct” (seiyoku shori) by means of the “comfort women” 
(ianfu)’s bodies⎯sex without other. Apparently many neonationalists, e.g. Hiroki Azuma, prefer to employ this 
discourse. See the entries of 5/12-13, 2013, on this literary critic’s twitter. He was practically endorsing the then 
Osakan Mayor, Tōru Hashimoto’s similar remark⎯see “’Ianfu wa Hitsuyō datta’ ‘Shinryaku, Hansei to Owabi wo’ 
Hashimoto-shi” Asahi Shinbun, 5/13/13. Literature on Japan’s wartime sex slavery is vast⎯Yūko Suzuki’s “Jūgun 
Ianfu” Mondai to Sei Bōryoku (Tokyo: Mirai Sha, 1993) and Yoshiaki Yoshimi’s Jūgun Ianfu (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1995) provide classical studies from the Japanese leftist and feminist perspectives respectively. Shinichi 
Arai, Akira Maeda, and Rumiko Nishino, Jūgun Ianfu (Tokyo: Shinkō Sha, 1997) adds journalistic will to truths 
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1990, a certain philanthropic-ethical mood that might have accompanied what Field above called 
the apology movement among Murayama, Hosokawa, and other politicians has apparently given 
way to the narcissistic-monological logic that the neonationalists would call “self-existent pride” 
(rin to shita hokori).  
Let me analyze these neonationalist languages of non-apology more closely. Unlike 
Kubodera’s or Murayama’s commoditized apologies, the neonationalists’ non-apologies seem to 
be characterized by these actors’ excessive will to meaning at the cost of the forms in which the 
meaning should be enveloped. This characteristic is comparable also with the other extreme in 
the non-apology movement⎯the extreme of pure formalism without any meaning (the sense of 
obligation, justice, or sincerity), which was exercised by Nakasone and others in the 1980s. 
According to one of the representatives of the meaning-oriented neonationalists, Norihiro Katō, 
who is a literary critic, Japan does not have to, or rather cannot, apologize to the rest of Asia and 
the Pacific until the country reasserts its national subject. In his logic, any apology needs the 
subject of apology, whereas the nation of Japan has lost its subjectivity due to the nation’s 
“deprived” pride and “twisted” legitimacy after its defeat in the war.49 Katō argues that his 
project of national reconstruction is intended to be the step toward reconciliation with Japan’s 
victims. But the hypocrisy of this argument is obvious in his language of (neo)nationalism, 
which contains his ambition to transcend even his own language as the means of communication. 
Another literary critic, Kōjin Karatani, points out Katō’s impossible ambition for non-semiotic 
language by calling it “private language” (shi-teki gengo).50 With an over-usage of the phonetic 
hiragana letters, Katō seems to want to enact a poetic union with his readers, the necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
against the revisionist context in contemporary Japan. One of the most recent investigations into the historical and 
historiographical problem of this problem is done by an anthropologist, C. Sarah Soh, with her The Comfort Women: 
Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).   
49  See his Haisen-go Ron (Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 1997); p.261 and p.13 respectively.  




national readers.51 He would describe this union as “literary,” with literature being a means 
through which the national readers share “deep” national emotions such as those that might 
accompany defeats of the country. Ironically, the depth of the shared emotions in these instances 
will eventually erase the necessity of literature as a linguistic art, since in Katō’s logic, these 
instances should be felt instead of discussed through the texts.52 That which is unambiguously 
excluded from Katō’s emotional nationalist language and literature is political consideration of 
others, other Asians and Pacific Islanders, who will not understand his idiosyncratic words at all. 
Neither will they understand his logic of the two-step process for Japan to be able to 
apologize⎯first, construction of the Japanese national subject and then, apology by the 
constructed subject. The non-ethical and -moral language here is at once the cause and effect of 
the non-apologism.  
These (neo)nationalist languages of the contemporary Japanese non-apologism clearly 
differ from the ethical apology made by Kubodera. Robotically apologizing, looking at midair, 
he seems to be driven by the idea of the moral obligation to his slain victims, whereas this 
obligation would not even exist if he did not think about the victims. Moral calculations and 
ethical considerations here are inseparably entangled, generating and generated by each other. 
Balancing between the monetary value of the victims’ deprivations, the incalculable losses of 
these victims’ human dignity and lives, and the always insufficient medium of apologetic words, 
                                                                  
51  There is another phonetic system of writing in Japan⎯katakana, which is usually used to represent 
“foreign” sounds among others. Perhaps due to this usage of katakana, hiragana seems to be preferred by 
nationalists as the device to express their logo-centric desires against yet another writing system, kanji, the 
ideogramatic system borrowed from China. Takaaki Yoshimoto, for instance, seems to me to be involved in this 
problematic of hiragana logo-centrism⎯see his Kyōdō Gensō Ron (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1982). Nobukuni 
Koyasu discusses the logo-centrism of the early 19th century nativist scholar Norinaga Motoori in his Motoori 
Norinaga (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992). About the historical process of kanji-importation and its socio-cultural 
repercussions, see H. Mack Horton, “Japanese Spirit and Chinese Learning: Scribes and Storytellers in Pre-modern 
Japan” in Jonathan Boyarin ed., The Ethnography of Reading (Oxford, England: University of California Press, 
1993), pp.156-179.  
52  Katō, Ibid.; p.218 and p.213-4, respectively. See also pp.107-9. 
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Kubodera keeps the vacant seats for the victims, the victims as the unnamed yet concretely 
pictured addressees of his apology. These places of the addressees are the minimal evidence that 
Kubodera is the holder of the profane ethics that Derrida talks about. Such ethics are irreducible 
to either monetary or linguistic values, yet instituted by and instituting these values. It is these 
ethics as supplementary considerations of others, supplementary to the logic of the commodity, 
which fascism lacks. The latter’s difference from the commoditized apology by Kubodera might 
look slight, but I would like to keep focusing on it in order to see how the possibilities of other 
futures than fascism’s have been inherited and expanded in postwar Japan.  
 
Mourning Beyond Melancholia 
 Psychoanalytically, Hisao Kubodera’s moral-ethical attempts can be better analyzed in 
the framework of the Freudian theory of mourning and melancholia.53 Briefly, the theory 
addresses the questions of how one deals with losses in one’s life and what relations one should 
and can forge with the lost objects as well as with the new objects to love. The lost objects that 
inflict psychological pains on Kubodera are not only the murdered boy, executed hostages, and 
robbed villages, but also Kubodera’s own innocence and integrity. At more collective levels, he 
suggests he used to believe in the popularity of Japan’s fascism among other Asians and 
fantasize victories of the country over the “western” nations. None of these beliefs and fantasies 
remained after August 15, 1945. In today’s testimony (2007), asked how he felt upon Japan’s 
defeat on that day, Kubodera’s answer is straightforward⎯“I thought it was a great pity.” He 
says, “Even before [the 15th], I’d heard the U.S. and the Soviet militaries talking [about Japan’s 
defeat] through the ‘Radio No. 6 [roku-gō musen],’” he continues. “But I’d never even dreamt 
                                                                  
53  Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Philip Rieff ed. General Psychological Theory: Papers on 
Metapsychology (New York: Touchstone, 1997(1963)), pp.164-179. 
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that we’d lose.” Having joined the war, “believing it [the war] to be righteous,” he “lost [himself]” 
on the 15th. On the next day, the battalion commander committed suicide. Other officers were 
“like insane, saying ‘we’ll never forget this [the loss]. We’ll seek revenge.’” Kubodera had to 
feel another “great pity” in northern Korea, where his Division 59 (Robe) was captured by the 
Soviet army. As the division lined up and marched to Vladivostok, those who were near the end 
of the line were robbed and stoned by their former colonial subjects, Koreans. “I think this [the 
episode of the Japanese soldiers’ symbolic ostracism by Koreans] is totally understandable, seen 
from the historical perspective,” Kubodera says, “yet from the personal perspective [of his], it is 
a pity.” That is, even now, he regrets that the colonial empire of Japan collapsed and the 
Japanese were ostracized. According to him, it is the same sense of pity and regret that occupied 
his mind during the first years in the Fushun Detention Center, China. It was “after [and perhaps 
only because his] company commander admitted [his crimes],” that Kubodera “confessed [he] 
had robbed deserted villages,” according to him.  
However, his seeming remorselessness is complicated by such remarks as “I’ve had no 
interest in the Yasukuni [Shinto Shrine, where fallen Japanese soldiers are consecrated as 
national heroes] then or now… I don’t believe in things like ‘Vive His Majesty,’” which the 
soldiers are ideologically supposed to shout as they fall⎯the nation is said to be embodied by the 
emperor. “Facing the matter of life or death, most of us, foot-soldiers, were remembering our 
moms” and not the ideological existences of Yasukuni or the emperor, he informs the audience. 
Similarly, he mentions his brother, who fell in the “South” (Nampō) (Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific), and three cousins who were similarly killed in battle, and states, “I don’t want any more 
war. Each individual soldier doesn’t have any grudge or hatred toward the enemy soldier whom 
he has to kill; he kills only for the sake of his state.” These anti-ideological and pacifist remarks 
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are backed by his holding testimonial events about his crimes, atrocities, and defeat, in the newly 
fascist and nationalist country of contemporary Japan.  
In the seemingly still ongoing process through which Kubodera might dialectically work 
through his emotions of chagrin, undead fantasies, and thoughts of others, language seems to 
perform an important role. At least to me, it is not hard to notice that he seems to be switched on 
and off between formal, apologetic words and informal, emotional expressions. The expressions 
of chagrin and pity are limited to the time of questions and answers, when he spontaneously 
speaks without drafts, actually looking at the audience. Even then, as soon as questions touch 
certain ideological kernels, he is quick to return to the reciting mode of a robot, starting to look 
away and stating such stiff, formal things as “why war? I heard that the purpose of the last war 
[the Asia-Pacific War] had been economic interests” or “as a son of a farmer, I learnt how to 
listen to the powerful so that I could survive the poverty in which I’d been conditioned” or “the 
class difference between me and my superiors in the military was so enormous that I had to listen 
to what they said as absolute orders.” Through the conversations between postwar Chinese 
communists and leftist Japanese intellectuals, the ideological consensus seems to have been 
established that the Japanese soldiers had invaded China, but they had done so to effectively 
benefit Japan’s “imperial” interests. Without sufficient education, these soldiers were of the 
farmers’ class; the intellectual consortium would say that they were easy targets of imperialist 
indoctrination and enforcement.54 Of course, there are a lot of problems in this theory⎯ 
historical materialism that sees imperialism as a necessary “phase” in the teleologically 
conceived path to communism, the related elitism that sees the farmers as manual laborers 
                                                                  
54  For example, see Saburō Ienaga, Taiheiyō Sensō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968). 
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without either intellectual abilities or practical agency.55 Nevertheless, the theory, as long as 
embodied by Kubodera, seems to provide the possibility of a conversation between the Japanese 
perpetrators and the Chinese victims. According to the theory, since these two groups of people 
belong to the same international class of farmers similarly oppressed by international 
imperialism, they, as part of the collectivity of the victims of imperialism, could unite together to 
advance certain historical consciousness.56 In the process of unification that is by definition self-
awakening according to the historical materialists, the wrongs will be admitted and apologies 
will be made. Though highly ideological, the theory has obviously caused at least Kubodera’s 
apologism. The theory seems to have lent him the intellectual mold and formal language in and 
with which he could temporarily sublimate his attachment to prewar Japan’s ideals. The mold 
and language have allowed him to disguise the fact that he has a new leftist consciousness and 
apologetic humanism; only in this disguise, the possibility of a new history emerges as a new 
chain of dialogic exchanges between him and his victims. No matter how awkward he looks, he 
has to say “I apologize and sincerely reflect” to begin the conversation.57  
                                                                  
55  See Marx, “The German Ideology, Part I.” in Robert C. Tucker ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Edition 
(New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp.146-200; Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: 
Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999). 
About the idea of the Chinese communist party as the ideological and moral vanguard, see Benjamin I. Schwartz 
“The Philosopher” in Dick Wilson ed., Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History (Cambridge, London, New York, 
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp.9-34; Stuart R. Schram, “The Marxist,” in Wilson, Ibid., pp.35-
69.   
56  See Sun, Ibid.  
57  My reading of historical materialism regarding the East Asian historiography of imperial Japan’s invasion 
and colonialism is inspired by Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, Ibid. According to Derrida, the humanist Marx in 
the German Ideology does not have to be seen as “false, unnecessary, or illusory” (p.214). Since, what matters is “a 
relatively stabilized knowledge [as is presented in the GI] that calls for questions more radical than the critique itself 
and than the ontology that grounds the critique. These questions are not destabilizing as the effect of some 
theoretico-speculative subversion. They are not even, in the final analysis, questions but seismic events. Practical 
events, where thought becomes act [se fait agir], and body and manual experience (thought as Handeln, says 
Heidegger somewhere), labor but always divisible labor⎯and shareable, beyond the old schemas of the division of 
labor… These seismic events come from the future, they are given from out of the unstable, chaotic, and dis-located 
ground of the times. A disjointed or dis-adjusted time without which there would be neither history, nor event, nor 
promise of justice” (p.214; italics, parentheses, and square brackets original).  
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In the Freudian framework, this formalist genesis of an apology and its historical 
development into a conversation are parts of the process of mourning. Upon theorizing mourning, 
Freud asks,  
 
Now in what consists the work which mourning performs? I do not think there is 
anything far-fetched in the following representation of it. The testing of reality, 
having shown that the loved object no longer exists, requires forthwith that all the 
libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to this object… The task is…carried 
through bit by bit, under great expense of time and cathectic energy, while all the 
time the existence of the lost object is continued in the mind. Each single one of the 
memories and hopes which bound the libido to the object is brought up and hyper-
cathected, and the detachment of the libido from it accomplished… [W]hen the work 
of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.58    
 
The labor of mourning here is said to be the libido’s “withdraw[al] from its attachments to this 
[loved] object.” This withdrawal is supposedly accomplished by “[bringing] up and 
hypercathect[ing],” that is, by thematizing and investing much libido into “each single one of the 
memories and hopes” regarding the object. Much libido is mobilized in this process, probably 
because, after loss, touching these memories and hopes requires a lot of courage and energy. 
Consciousness and thoughts of the objects may be hurtful yet absolutely necessary here; only 
through them can one “detach” one’s libido from the object, that is, can one regard the object as 
lost, as other than oneself, the survivor of the loss. This process of conscious thinking of the 
object as other necessarily involves a certain semiotic means, as Eric Santner says. When the 
subject thinks about the object, s/he should surely work through his/her libido pertaining to the 
object; according to Santner’s suggestion, the mournful subject in the Freudian theory does so by 
distancing him/herself from libido, by working on the object’s memories and related hopes 
instead of the libido itself. This is strictly a semiotic process, in which meaning (the libido) is not 
and cannot be directly addressed by the subject, but its signs (memories and hopes) are and can. 
                                                                  
58  Freud, Ibid.; pp.165-6. 
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Linguistic abstraction of the object here approximates what Freud calls psychological 
“detachment” from the object. Santner suggests that mourning is complete when abstraction is so 
advanced that the object becomes a generic sign to be exchanged with other signs in the 
everyday semiotic field.59 At this point, the object’s raison d’être to the subject, viz. the lovable 
quality and other unique traits that the subject used to desire the object to possess, has been 
completely dissolved into the generic idea of that particular object (although certain, 
unresolvable ghosts of the subject’s attachment to the particular object will remain).60 The whole 
process of mourning resembles that of commoditization in that it is summarized as abstraction, 
through which the use-value of the object (its specific raison d’être to the subject) is turned into 
its exchange-value (its generic qualities common among other objects as signs).  
 Freud’s argument is effectively that the processes of abstraction and exchange heal the 
subject in mourning. In Kubodera’s case, we have earlier learnt that he remembers the Chinese 
                                                                  
59  See Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). His reading of Freud’s article, “Mourning and Melancholia,” will be found in pp.2-
3. Santner elaborates on the symbolic aspect of mourning in his discussion of the fort/da game, which Freud 
observes his toddler grandson playing. Meaning “gone”/“here” in English, the fort/da game seems to Freud to be the 
ritualized taming of the child’s sense of loss regarding his mother’s occasional absence and, more generally, 
regarding the foreseen end of the imaginary unity with his mother. Santner remarks, “Bereft by the mother’s absence, 
and more generally by the dawning awareness that the interval between himself and his mother opens up a whole 
range of unpredictable and potentially treacherous possibilities, he [the child] reenacts the opening of that abysmal 
interval within the controlled space of a primitive ritual. The child is translating, as it were, his fragmented 
narcissism into the formalized rhythms of symbolic behavior; thanks to this procedure, he is able to administer in 
controlled doses the absence he is mourning. The capacity to dose out and to represent absence by means of 
substitutive figures at a remove from what one might call their ‘transcendental signified,’ is what allows the child to 
transform his lost omnipotence into a form of empowerment. This empowerment is called creativity; it is the 
capacity for play, for symbolic behavior in accordance with rules and forms” (p.20). James Siegel, “Language and 
Hierarchy in an Indonesian City,” Solo in the New Order (Princeton N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1986), pp.257-276, 
similarly discusses the work of translation that Javanese employs during their funerary ritual⎯the raw emotions 
upon death is meant to be displaced into the cultural imagery of death through the attitude of the iklas (detached) or 
the help of photography.  
60  Using another example of a Greek myth, Apollo and Daphne, Santner says that, after the symbolization of 
the lost object, the next phase of mourning involves the question, how can the mourner “[weave]” the symbolized 
object into the society in which s/he is embedded? As Apollo makes a wreath out of the laurel tree, into which 
Daphne is metamorphosed, the mourner has to go through an “ambivalent troping or turning from the organic matrix 
into a transitional space organized by the unnatural codes of the Symbolic. The partial ‘demotivation’ of the figure 
of consolation⎯its capacity to be exchanged and grafted⎯is what allows it to become a sign or title of power and 
vocation: the floating signifier of a legacy” (22). This phase of symbolic weaving of the lost object is of course 
parallel to psychoanalytic sessions, in which the patient has to verbalize his/her loss in the language that is shared 
with the analyst (25).  
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boy that he shot and killed as an image. We also know that this image has been substituted by 
that of Kubodera’s own brother. Perhaps through this chain of substitution, his remorse is 
deepened and articulated better. After more than 60 years, this ethico-symbolical process of 
mourning seems to have developed into his political activism against the possible constitutional 
revision proposed in Japan today and against war in general. Apparently this is not an easy 
process, as long as bits of evidence of his continuous attachment to prewar Japan’s ideals⎯the 
country’s military victories and colonial glories⎯seem to be still betrayed. Kubodera’s efforts 
for symbolization and ethicalization of his losses will be appreciated, once they are recognized as 
processes and also when they are juxtaposed with the larger society’s attempts at incorporation 
of the losses.  
As opposed to the symbolic process of mourning, Freud says melancholia is featured by 
desires for and acts of (re)incorporation. In the Freudian scheme of socio-sexual evolution of an 
individual and civilization, melancholic patients belong to the “narcissistic” stage.61 Similar to 
the world of Bataillean sovereignty (see Chapter 2), the world of melancholia is that of a solipsist, 
made of the enlarged ego and objectified others readied for the ego’s devouring 
consumption⎯“cannibalism,” Freud says.62 Note that Freud thinks melancholic narcissism is a 
problem of not so much immaturity as “regression.”63 Melancholics are fixated on the 
narcissistic world of expendable objects retroactively, that is, after they have already acquired 
the social skill to respect the objects as others. Similarly, even though melancholics are said to 
pursue the oral aspect of the linguistic process (voice, breath, mouth), they do so not because 
                                                                  
61  Freud, Ibid; p.171. His social-sexual teleology here is ethical, in which a person’s or culture’s complete 
maturation is supposedly marked by their acquisition of sociality. In the case of a child’s development, the child 
starts with auto-eroticism of “organ pleasure” and then proceeds to narcissism then to oral incorporation of others. 
Their “sadistic-anal” mastery follows this stage. Genital love of others comes in the end as the figure of the child’s 
full sociality. See his “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” in Philip Rieff ed., General Psychological Theory: Papers 
on Metapsychology (New York: Touchstone, 1997(1963)), pp.83-103; p.102.  
62  “Mourning and Melancholia,” Ibid.; p.171. 
63  See “Mourning…,” Ibid.; p.171. 
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they do not know how to signify meanings with sounds, but because they refuse what the sounds 
should mean⎯their linguistic symptom is staged as de-metaphorization.64 In Jacques Derrida’s 
words, “[T]his [that melancholics can speak anasemically] is only because the forbidden moment 
of the oral function had first been a ‘substitute’ for or a ‘figure’ of a wordless presence,” such as 
mother.65 In my previous analysis of Nakasone and others’ purely formalist languages, they 
could talk about other Asians and Pacific Islanders as if they had not carried any historically 
specific meaning to the contemporary Japanese, not because these formalists do not know the 
meaning but because they symptomatically omit the meaning, with unconsciously knowing about 
the meaning. The symptomatic amnesia of meanings and focus on appearances here should be 
contextualized in the overall mode of mechanical reproduction, in which “the very memory of 
use-value is effaced.”66 The possibility to forge linguistically and otherwise mediated relations 
with the objects as others is attenuated in this mode. Such a possibility seems to be rather 
replaced by the pleasure of consuming the objects as pure appearances and desires to 
aesthetically totalize such appearances.  
Kubodera’s apology is surely formalist, but it is different from melancholics’ formalism 
due to his assumption of the specific addressees. Formalism seems to be his instrument to reach 
his victims as well as to calibrate his positionality in the society⎯the purpose here seems to be 
reconciliation with his victims as others and recovery of his own humanity that is lost. The third 
aspect of his mourning that I have not discussed fully would be its temporal transmission. I have 
briefly mentioned that his testimony is supposed to provide a historical lesson to younger 
                                                                  
64  See Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, Volume I, ed., trans., and with an intro. 
by Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); pp.114-5 and 126-7. 
65  See his “Forward: Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok” in Abraham and Torok, 
The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, trans. by Nicholas Rand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986); xxxviii; italics are original. 
66  See Frederic Jameson, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review, 
no.146 (September/October 1984), 53-92; 66.  
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Japanese. As a tool of an intergenerational communication of the spirit of mourning as well, the 
formalist language seems to be pragmatically effective.  
 
The Mournful Rhizome: Generations, Transmission, Futures 
 The difficult process of mourning through which Hisao Kubodera has tried to address his 
victims qua victims is a pattern that is similarly observable among the first generation members 
of the Kanagawa Prefectural Affiliate of the Peace Families Association (Kanagawa Heiwa 
Izoku Kai). These several men and women have come a long way to forsake their identities as the 
victims themselves and recognize other Asians and Pacific Islanders as their families’ victims. Its 
representative, the 89-year-old Kiku Ishizaki is a bereaved wife, who lost her husband in the 
Pacific. He was twenty-eight years old. As a geology scholar at Taipei University in colonial 
Taiwan, he was drafted to survey occupied Borneo for its oil reserves. When he was killed 
aboard the Awa Maru, he was on the way back to Taipei, where the couple had gotten married 
and lived together. Immediately, Ishizaki noticed that she had to give up the luxury of the 
colonial life as the wife of an elite “imperial university” (teidai) professor⎯all she used to do 
was to play Chopin or Beethoven piano pieces. After her “withdrawal to the inland” (naichi e no 
hikiage), that is, repatriation to Japan, she spent the first several years in a “dead or alive kind of 
condition” in a small room in Nagasaki, Kyūshū Island, which she shared with her parents-in-law. 
Her secretarial job in a “special” school for the blind supported herself and the in-laws, a former 
judge in Taiwan and his wife. After she left the in-laws, she moved to Kyoto and back to 
Nagasaki and then to Yokohama. In the middle of her jobs as different types of assistants, she 
studied to become a middle school teacher. She never married again. In the capitalist economy, 
in which women tend to be hired for worse-paying jobs at lower wages than those that are 
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available for men, Ishizaki seems to have struggled throughout the postwar days. Her sister-in-
law, for example, who similarly married a Taipei Imperial University professor, does not have to 
retire to a publicly funded home, as Ishizaki does in the Miura Peninsula, Kanagawa 
Prefecture⎯just because this in-law’s husband survived the war and has provided for the family, 
teaching at Kōbe University. Economic hardship as an unmarried woman might help Ishizaki 
raise her pacifist consciousness (ishiki), but the consciousness-raising took a long time, 
according to her.  
 “For a long while, I’d known that the Shiba Zōjō Temple [in Tokyo] held an annual 
memorial in April for those who died aboard the Awa Maru, just like my husband. I’d always 
wanted to attend. I’d wanted to meet other families. I’d wanted to know what had happened [on 
the boat]. But simply, I was too busy to attend⎯I was barely surviving. 
 “Even now in this Health Care [Center, her home now], I’ve noticed that female residents 
tend to be like me⎯they don’t seem to have had enough time to learn anything about the society.” 
Elegantly clad in a finely flower-patterned summer dress, Ishizaki in this high-end café in 
Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture, where we meet over cakes and parfaits, hardly looks like she 
has struggled. At the same time, I can imagine many of the female residents at the Health Care 
Center might have ended up in the Center, having had similarly hard lives to hers, alone or with 
their families, bereaved by the war or not.  
 “Recognition of one’s own family member as an invader” (shinryaku-sha toshite no 
nikushin to iu ninshiki) is tough and slow to come, even if one has enough time to learn anything 
about the society, she says. “Look, my late husband is consecrated in Yasukuni as one of the 
war-heroes. It’s not that I’ve ever believed in the consecration⎯even when I had yet to develop 
my consciousness [as a peace family], I knew I didn’t like the idea of war [which Yasukuni 
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glorifies]. But I guess many families of Yasukuni have hard times changing their consciousness, 
once they develop a sense of pride [as families of consecrated soldiers of the nation-state].”  
So, why could she make a difference? She points out the existence of a certain network of 
peace activists, to which she was introduced through her Christian belief. Particularly influential 
was “Pastor Deguchi,” as Ishizaki and several other peace families in Kanagawa call him. I have 
briefly seen this legendary pastor, now in a wheelchair, in his Rokkaku-bashi Church, Yokohama, 
of whom these families are members. “Guided by Pastor Deguchi,” Ishizaki says, she read 
“many books that criticized the emperor [Hirohito] and emperorship; those books started to be 
published in the 1960s.” The pastor then was also interested in learning how Christians had 
cooperated with the warring state (see Chapter 4). Gradually, Ishizaki started to notice that there 
were many anti-war meetings held in Yokohama. Going back and forth between the church’s 
study group, civil meetings, and her grinding jobs, “it became my habit (shūkan) to turn my 
consciousness into that [pacifist] direction. Every time I met new people, every time I read a new 
book, I was let notice, ‘Wow, it [the socio-political situation during the war] was like that.’ I’d 
go back to my own consciousness and say, ‘Wait a minute. I’ve thought about it this way, but I 
was wrong.’ And then I had to start making an effort to change my consciousness.” 
According to this habitual thinking, the current (2007) national movement to revise the 
Article 9 (renunciation of war) of the 1946 Constitution of Japan is to “trample on the victims’ 
sacrifices.” The victims, according to her, are “those who were invaded [by the Japanese], those 
who were injured [by the Japanese] all over their bodies.” She bores suppositional holes in her 
forehead, cheeks, breasts, and stomach, with both of her index fingers. The current Constitution 
is, she says, “a congealment of those victims’ tears and blood” (gisei-sha no omoi ga komotte-
iru). Since “such a wonderful thing as the Constitution is grounded on the victims’ voices,” these 
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victims could be thought of as having been “sacrificed” (gisei ni sareru), she wants to think 
(somewhat problematically).   
Shigenori Nishikawa, one of the leaders of the National Liaison among Peace Families 
Associations (Heiwa Izoku Kai Zenkoku Renraku Kai), which represents the Kanagawa and other 
prefectural associations of peace families, suggests that he has pursued his activist career in the 
opposite way of Ishizaki’s. As opposed to her, who discovered others’ voices as a result of her 
recognition of her husband as an invader, Nishikawa says his similar recognition of his fallen 
brother was “necessitated by the purpose to unite with the bereaved in the world.” Now, in the 
same summer of 2007 when I interview Ishizaki, Nishikawa and I are sitting at the wooden table 
near the window as usual, in the Yotsuya Church, Tokyo, where he leads a study group for peace 
on Sunday afternoons after service. Across the table, Nishikawa, a retired employee at a small, 
Christian publisher in Tokyo, is looking for a paper through his lawyer’s briefcase. Surviving the 
immediately postwar days as a milk deliverer in Osaka and a print-shop boy in Tokyo, he never 
lost his ambition to study more. Nowadays, he brings his heavy briefcase with him in his 
everyday trip to the Diet, which he attends as a citizen. He writes a weekly report on the Diet and 
presents it at the Yasukuni Committee of the Nihon Christian Conference (NCC: see Chapter 4). 
He finally finds the paper that he was looking for and starts eating his small lunch box⎯“I can’t 
eat so much any more⎯I’m already 78,” says he. As for me, I am working on the instant ramen 
that I bought in the church’s basement for 150 yen (about 1.50 U.S. dollars). Mrs. Nishikawa, a 
friendly woman from Marugame, Shikoku Island, serves green tea to the several participants. 
Many of them are young. “Manami Hasegawa,” a middle-aged woman with “digital-permed” 
hair comes belatedly with her trademark smiles. Today, specifically for me, Nishikawa is going 
to talk about how he and his fellow activists established the Christian Families Association 
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(Christ Kyō Izoku no Kai) in 1969. The Christians’ association is now a member organization of 
the National Liaison among Peace Families Association, which was established in 1986, uniting 
Christian and other preceding movements.  
Nishikawa starts with the background information. Back in 1969, he states, the 
conservative Japan Families Association (Nihon Izoku Kai) and the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP or Jimin Tō) had been struggling for several years to “nationalize” the Yasukuni 
Shrine (see Chapter 2). According to Nishikawa, the nationalizing movement was an apparent 
reaction to the students and citizens’ peace movements of the period against the Vietnam War 
(1955-75) and the U.S. military usage of Japan for its warring efforts. Kōji Misono’o of the 
Association to Support the [South Korean] Veterans’ and Former Military Personnel’s Lawsuits 
[against the Japanese state] (Gunjin Gunzoku Saiban wo Shien-suru Kai) is the living witness of 
the peace movements in the 1960s. As a college student in Tokyo, Misono’o participated in the 
Citizens’ League for Peace in Vietnam (Vietnam ni Heiwa wo: Shimin Rengō), demonstrating in 
the street and assisting American deserters. “The air among us [the Japanese anti-war students] 
was like, ‘Koreans, yes! Zainichi [resident Koreans in Japan], yes! Chinese, yes!” he informs me. 
According to him, this air was made of a certain “pan-Asian” logic against the U.S. and the 
transnational citizens’ solidarity movement against the “American imperialism” (bei tei). These 
students were similarly acting as the second-generation Japanese after Japan’s invasions and 
atrocities in the rest of Asia and the Pacific during the Asia-Pacific War, according to Misono’o. 
He says that the students tried to unite with other Asians and Pacific Islanders “to undo the 
wrongs” done by their parents’ and grandparents’ generations.67 Propelled by the overall liberal-
activist atmosphere of the period and opposing the Yasukuni activists’ reactions, one of the first-
                                                                  
67  A similar complex of trans-generational, political, and psycho-analytical factors seems to have been 
observable among the leftist West-German students during the same period and beyond⎯see Uli Edel dir., The 
Baader Meinhof Complex (Munich: Constantin Film Verleih, 2008). 
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generation activists, Nishikawa, wrote up his draft of the peace families’ manifesto overnight. “I 
was crying though,” he confesses.  
His brother was 24 years old when he was officially recorded to have incurred some 
disease and died somewhere in Burma. Nishikawa the survivor was sixteen. “Since I’m a man, 
Brother left his will and library to me,” Nishikawa tells me, implying his belief in a certain 
patrilineal inheritance pattern. Between the brothers, there is a sister. In their home in Marugame, 
Shikoku, Nishikawa says his brother’s library was filled with almost all the literary and 
philosophical books that had been published in Japan during the war⎯Kiyoshi Miki, Kitarō 
Nishida, Martin Heidegger, so on and so forth. Following the underlines and notes that his 
brother left in the books, Nishikawa was assured that his brother had “had doubts about Japan’s 
fascism.” He also found that his brother had marked all the descriptions concerning death that 
there were in the books. This made him think, “he knew he had to die for something that he 
didn’t believe.” Later in 1969, upon writing the peace families’ manifesto, Nishikawa says he 
thought, “Should my non-fascist brother be called an ‘invader’ as well?” 
“Yasukuni was almost being nationalized [in the 1960s], as I’ve told you,” Nishikawa 
says to us, the several listeners in the Yotsuya Church, “while I wanted to say no to that. And I 
wanted to say no with my hands in the hands of the [other] Asian victims. And then, as I looked 
at [the imagined victims of other] Asians, I couldn’t say ‘at least my brother was irrelevant [to 
Japan’s fascism].’ Just because he [must have] held a gun [toward the Burmese and other Asians], 
I couldn’t. Then, I looked at myself. Would I be irrelevant? No, I said. I had the accountability 
for having seen him [his brother] off [to the battlefield]. I could not say only the [then] prime 
minister [Hideki Tōjō] had been accountable [for the invasion].” Compare this “I” that 
Nishikawa says emerged then as an invader’s brother to that which I have mentioned is 
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advocated by the neonationalist Norihiro Katō. Nishikawa’s “I” seems to be a temporarily 
established agent of apology, as the apology becomes necessary for the pragmatic political 
purposes of anti-Yasukuni Shrine and anti-Vietnam War. Katō’s “I” is supposed to be 
emotionally extending itself over the whole nation and by implication over the whole period of 
national times. This “I” of Katō could be easily surmised to be ideationally set up against others 
as similarly logo-centric nations. The pragmatic subject of Nishikawa seems to have carnally 
emerged, when he “looked” at other Asians and was looked at from their perspective. Like in 
Hisao Kubodera’s case, the first generation of the perpetrator Japan seems to have possibly 
started the long and yet-to-be achieved reconciliatory process with other victims only in this type 
of embodied imagination⎯changing of perspectives and feeling of finger-bullets. Apparently, 
the majority of the Japanese have lived the postwar period without these ethical gestures⎯what 
started these gestures in these activists? 
To Hatsue Ishida, a Kanagawa peace family, the question “all comes down to my poverty, 
and ultimately, to my being a woman, which is related to my poverty.” In the same summer of 
2007, I am sitting in one of the empty conference-rooms in the Kanagawa Prefectural Residents’ 
Center near the Yokohama Station over the handmade daifuku snack that I bought for 150 yen 
apiece. “I thought it could be impolite [since daifuku is supposed to be casual], but I couldn’t 
resist⎯these pieces are made from scratch!” I apologetically explain. “Oh gosh, how did you 
know I had a sweet tooth!” The seventy-five year old is rather glad. In exchange, she treats me to 
a vending machine tea. A light yellow, cotton shirt and a hat; under the hat, her grayish hair is 
naturally thick and wavy, tamed by several tiny hair-clips. Her small leather bag and several 
plastic bags are filled with books and documents, which she brought with her for me from her 
home in remote Atsugi City, Kanagawa. Earlier in this summer, in the annual meeting among the 
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prefectural peace-families, I saw her losing her temper over a one-time participant. Criticizing 
how the families managed their movement in the past, the middle-aged male said, “Your 
movement is tapering off⎯you should think more seriously about involving younger 
generations.” “But you don’t know us; you haven’t joined even a single demonstration by us!” 
Ishida immediately stood up and shouted. The woman who looked tall and strong then turns out 
to be petite and frail today. I have also found that she usually whispers. An independent thinker 
with strong will, nonetheless.  
“What came to determine the way of my life?” she asks herself, eruditely looking at the 
table. “I was born in a family of six⎯four older brothers, me, and my mother. My father passed 
away as soon as I was born.” According to her, the eldest brother worked for the Ministry of 
Finance and provided for the family. “My mother kept saying she felt bad [that he had to take 
care of the family]. She was totally diminished, while my brother was the boss of the family. I 
grew up thinking that women were like this [that they had to exchange their power for their 
financial needs due to the social condition of the society].” By the end of the war in 1945, the 
family had added one more member⎯although the family’s second eldest son was drafted and 
killed in Imphal, India, his newlywed wife and newborn son remained in the Íshida household. 
Eventually, the then 21-year-old wife was “sent back [to her natal] home” by the Ishidas; the 
Ishidas instead adopted her son as the family’s youngest son. “War is hurting not just the fallen 
soldiers but also their families,” says Ishida. This boy, her fallen brother’s son, later uncovered 
the family secret and became alcoholic, according to her. As for his biological mother, Ishida’s 
late brother’s former wife, “apparently she didn’t feel comfortable back in her ‘real [natal]’ 
home⎯she rented an apartment and eventually got remarried,” she sighs and continues, “The 
war affected our lives this much. I bet we were not alone⎯but I bet we were affected this much, 
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because we weren’t so rich.” And I think her point is that in the less-privileged lives, it is the 
women who tend to be affected by war more than men. Later, as a student in an all-women’s 
high-school (jogakkō), which was the only kind of school available to girls of that age, Ishida 
says she read Tolstoy’s “Resurrection.” She states, “I realized that the system that oppressed 
poor women was everywhere, of which my family was just an example.”  
At the age of 17, she graduated and became a clerk at a department store. It was 1949. 
“They were kinds of days in which you could sell anything⎯you put, say, picture frames with 
little flower ornaments or something at the Christmas time and then people would come 
avalanching at you. You’d be pushed so far that you wouldn’t be able to give change to your 
customer. And then I realized,” she continues, “that my hard work in this period had never been 
reflected in my wage. Timecards, vacations, dress codes⎯we female clerks (uriko) were so 
controlled. Controlled in a gendered way. Our boss was male, who’d want to control even our 
romantic relations in our private lives.” In her implication, this type of gendered control, which 
she describes as “feudal,” legitimized these female clerks’ fixed (and likely low) wages. After a 
year, she joined the one-year-old labor union established in the store. She met her ex-husband 
there. Together, they led a strike and were fired. This “stigmatized” (shirushi wo tsukeru) them, 
according to her, in the job market. Ever since, he has had no other choice than working as an 
independent furniture maker and she as a part-time worker in various workplaces. “He was great 
theoretically. Raichō Hiratsuka, Kukue Yamakawa, de Beauvoir⎯he educated me to be a 
feminist thinker. But when it comes to our everyday life, he had never done any chores at all. His 
idea was that they were lowly; women should do them. According to the feminist thoughts that 
he taught me, we were both wageworkers, equally contributing to the household.”  
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If they had lived a little more comfortable life, she could not have had to face his 
contradiction, Ishida says. “The economical issue was connected with the gender issue. They are 
always connected, if we notice it or not. So, if we want to resolve either of them, we have to 
resolve them together, simultaneously.” It is war that most acutely represents the dual issues of 
economy and gender, according to her. “Capitalists wage war as they pursue their interests. In 
the corporations that they run, women are exploited. The corporate exploitation of women is 
based on the male domination of females in their everyday lives. These are the relations that 
cause war. War isn’t naturally caused. I’ve just learnt this fact by living my kind of life.” 
Branded with the 1950s or 60s vulgar Marxism perhaps, Ishida’s thoughts, though, seem to me to 
be strong in their visceral origin. She suggests that it is in her forced background of the 
proletariat and due to her lived identity as a feminist that she has discovered her fallen brother as 
an invader in the rest of Asia and the Pacific. The classed and gendered exploitation that she says 
she has abstracted from her life-experiences diffused throughout those regions along the 
expansion of Japan’s “imperialism” (teikoku shugi), i.e. an economic and military expansion 
overseas driven by its monopoly industries and state. The imperial Japanese soldiers, including 
her brother, were the forerunners of Japan’s sexist imperialism, according to this logic.  
This discovery then seems to let her listen to other Asian females’ voices, the 
economically impoverished and physically violated voices, as the voices of female victims of 
Japan’s imperialism. “I went aboard one of the Peace Boats to see Young-soo Lee [one of the 
victims of Japan’s sex slavery during the war] in Seoul. I don’t have so much money or time to 
do anything grand, but I always think about [other] Asian women. Remember the remark ‘child-
bearing machine [which the then Health, Welfare and Labor minister, Hakuo Yanagisawa, made 
in 1/27/2007 regarding his idea of the relation between the low birth rate in Japan and the 
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country’s thinning pension-fund⎯see Chapter 3]’? I thought it [the remark] was totally capital-
driven. As long as that type of remark keeps being made, the possibility of war continues [since 
the remark suggests the existence of the driving force of capital in Japan, which may or may not 
be imperialist in its foreign relations]. As long as the possibility of war continues, the necessity 
[for Japanese women] to unite with [other] Asian women continues.” In other words, as a 
Japanese woman she is placed in the same oppressed position as other Asian females, which 
separates them from the imperial state and monopoly corporations of Japan⎯by implication, 
these corporations and the state are gendered as male. I am not sure if other Asian females might 
agree with her. At the same time, I recognize that this thinking of hers has allowed her to declare 
her brother an invader⎯the minimal point from which she can start a conversation with these 
other women.  
Class-caused, gender-entangled, the first generation Japanese’s visceral thoughts of 
others were abstracted in the following manifesto. Based on Shigenori Nishikawa’s 1969 
declaration, the manifesto of the National Liaison among Peace Families Associations was 
issued on July 7th, 1986⎯the date commemorates the so-called Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 
1937, which led to the Fifteen-Year War between China and Japan. “We lost our beloved 
families in Asian and Pacific battlefields,” the manifesto starts.  
 
Our postwar days have been sad ones, because of the losses; our beloved 
families have never returned to us, to our hometowns…  
However, as we have recognized the war’s criminal nature [on the 
Japanese part], our feeling [toward their families] has become complicated. Our 
recognition is that the war that took our families away was an invasive war [on 
the Japanese part], which threatened peace in [other] Asian countries, destroyed 
people’s lives [in these countries], and deprived more than 20 million lives [of 
these people]. [After this recognition,] we have never been able to console 
ourselves with such an idea that the death of [their] sons, husbands, brothers, 
and fathers were “purposeful.”  
We seek peace more than anybody else, just because we are bereaved. 
We think we should never antagonize [other] Asian people and kill these 
innocent people without any sense of remorse… 
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We…will reflect [on the past] again, to newly create a real peace, 
holding hands with [other] Asian and global victims of wars… 
 
Who are the “we” (watashi-tachi) that they mention here? To whom do they represent 
themselves as “we”? Perhaps to Japan Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izoku Kai), the 
conservative and biggest association among bereaved Japanese, with whom the peace families 
have tried to communicate for years to no avail. At the same time, the addressees here might be 
other Asians, to whom the peace families seem to be trying to be cooperative as well as 
apologetic (they “will reflect again” [jikaku wo aratani-shite]). In that case, the manifesto’s plain 
language is comparable with the language of Hisao Kubodera’s apology, which I have surmised 
shows his will to transnational communication. The difference between these two instances of 
languages is that the manifesto’s language is more distanced from the original events of war 
crimes than the language of Kubodera’s staged apologies. The manifesto, after all, is authored  
by the soldiers’ families. Their apologies are and should be discrepant from those by Kubodera 
and other war-criminals.  
 These soldiers’ children and grandchildren pursue this discrepancy, as they try to inherit 
and deepen the ethical projects started by the first generation. The bereaved children (iji) of the 
Kanagawa Peace Families Association seem to have taken advantage of their temporal, spatial, 
epistemological, and structural distances from the original crimes to talk about such abstract, 
ethical themes as “a future-oriented new peace in Asia-Pacific” or “cohabitation with [the rest of] 
Asia.” Several of these children are the association’s committee members, who hold monthly 
meetings in the Kanagawa Prefectural Residents’ Center. They also organize bi-annual teach-ins, 
attracting more than 100 participants each time. In addition to them, fewer than twenty families 
are the association’s members in Kanagawa; 54 more are also “friends” (kaiyū), that is, non-
bereaved members. According to the committee’s secretary general, Yasuhiko Uchida, the peace 
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families nowadays try to generalize the first generation’s thoughts and emotions, “since the 
bereaved as such will die out soon; the movement should evolve into something else besides the 
families’ movement.”  
It is in February 2007 in his home. As we warm ourselves at his kotatsu table with an 
electric heater underneath and a comforter draping around the table, hamsters are running in a 
wheel by the sunny window⎯“ham-chan,” he calls the favorite pets of his grandchildren, with 
whom and whose parents he lives in this mammoth complex in Kōnan-dai, Yokohama. On the 
wall near the ceiling, I see an A-4 sized picture of his late wife. Next to it is hung a picture of his 
fallen cousin, forever young in his navy uniform. Uchida says he used to call this former medical 
student at the Hokkaidō University “big bro.” In 1945, “big bro” was drafted as a medic and 
killed in a sinking battleship. Uchida was a freshman in a middle school in Ashikaga, Gunma 
Prefecture. “Boy, how many times did he help me with my homework,” he sighs. All of a sudden, 
the kettle in the kitchen begins to howl. I customarily try to refuse the coffee that he is going to 
make for us. I place my notebooks and pens on the table, on which he is serving two oddly sized 
mug-cups of aromatic coffee. For a moment, he stares at my hand as I try to transcribe 
everything that he says.  
“So, the peace families’ movement is coming to a cul-de-sac at this moment.” He stops 
and sees if I have written it down correctly. “One way out of it would be to develop the 
movement into a peace movement in general. Another way would be to stress our kind of 
historical consciousness (rekishiki ninshiki) even more than before, the consciousness as the 
families of the invaders. If you’ve had a chance to go to Gunma Prefecture and see the 
monument that they built to commemorate those Chinese forced laborers who had been abducted 
to and used in the prefecture…” He pauses to see if I have. I say no. “OK,” he continues, 
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“anyway, the monument reads ‘Remembrance, Reflection, and Friendship.’ If they [other Asians] 
would ever forgive and befriend us, they’d forgive and befriend us only after we remember the 
truths [of Japan’s invasions and atrocities] and reflect on their being wrong. As the second 
generation of the peace families, we’ve been working for remembrance and reflection. We’ve 
held many teach-ins; we’ve supported relevant lawsuits [against the Japanese state and 
corporations]. Especially the matter of compensation (hoshō no mondai)⎯we’ve struggled to 
make sure that [other] Asian victims get compensations [from the Japanese state and 
corporations].” Would remembrance or reflection imply or lead to a certain sense of redress? 
“Perhaps”⎯a little moment of epoché, as this quiet, thoughtful man always has. “The most 
serious problem that we have to solve is,” he continues, “that [other] Asian victims have been 
left without being apologized to or compensated. It [the problem] is not about money only. 
There’re those who were enslaved for labor, enslaved for sex. I think it [the problem] is about 
justice,” Uchida says. So, the second generation remembers and reflects so that justice (seigi) is 
established between the Japanese state/corporations and their victims. “Yes, I guess this is a big 
problem,” he says, implying that it has yet to be solved. Since according to his syllogism, 
friendship would not be forged before remembrance and reflection are conducted, i.e. justice is 
restored, he seems to be hesitant about resolving his particular position as family into something 
more general. Either way, perhaps reflecting his position as the secretary general, strategy-
making seems to be one of the predominant concerns of his. Such a hard thing to say for 
Kubodera or Ishida, justice, which could be said only with the help of the molding or enabling 
language of historical materialism, is mentioned by Uchida as if it were a matter of fact. He 
seems to take it for granted that the problem that the second generation has to solve is that of 
justice. This generation can afford to take advantage of the result of the embodied labor of 
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mourning that Kubodera’s generation made in thinking of and apologizing to others. The purpose 
is thus inherited; and the issue that the younger generations face now is that of strategies, how to 
establish and practice justice and just friendship, he suggests. 
When one takes the second strategy that Uchida mentions, viz. the strategy to resolve the 
peace family’s position into peace movements in general, obviously the inherited ethical 
thoughts of the first generation are further generalized, as is seen in the example of Junko 
Nishikiori, a bereaved child in her early sixties. With a neatly cut bob that is dyed red, the social 
woman Nishikiori has given me an impression that she is always hopping from one activist event 
after another. To her, her volunteer job at the Kanagawa peace families’ committee might be just 
another activity. She says she was so young when her father fell that she does not even remember 
him at all. I am sure that she participates in the peace families’ association with a certain type of 
identity as a family, but I have a feeling that that identity does not define her as deeply as it does 
the first generation.  
In these days (2007), she could even skip the peace families’ monthly committee, when 
something pressing happens in a peace movement in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa, where she lives 
with her family. George Washington, a nuclear-generated aircraft carrier of the U.S. Navy, is 
about to make the Yokosuka Port her home. The U.S.S. will be officially stationed in Yokosuka 
on 9/25/2008 after this fieldwork, even though on 1/5/2008 they found some problems in its 
generators. As of 2007, Nishikiori lets me know that 70% of Yokosuka citizens are against the 
carrier’s planned stationing. According to her, vigorous demonstrations are everywhere in 
Yokosuka, everyday. Another Yokosuka activist and a city assembly member, Akihiro Harada, 
conjectures that the vigorousness of these demonstrations is proportionate to the “stubbornness” 
of the mayor, Ryōichi Kabaya. According to Harada’s observation, the Liberal Democratic Party 
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mayor started to preach that the U.S.S. was “not dangerous” newly after his trip to the Pentagon 
in 1995. Harada tells me that there was a rumor among the assembly members that the then 
prime minister, Junichirō Koizumi (2001-6) of the LDP “scolded” the mayor that even the LDP 
members in the assembly were publicly against the U.S.S. Under the double pressures from the 
Pentagon and the Japanese PM, the mayor became “fortified as a reactionary bulwark” against 
the citizens’ movements, Harada says. Leading activists like Harada or Nishikiori witness that 
they have never seen so many citizens participating in their kind of leftist demonstrations. 
“Yokosuka citizens are otherwise pretty conservative,” Harada states, “which I think is 
demonstrated by the fact that most of the assembly members are elected with neighborhood 
associations’ official supports.” As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the neighborhood association 
is a corporatist institution that is intimately connected with the conservative LDP’s interests. In 
Nishikiori’s feeling, “the Yokosukans are united this time as mothers and fathers” against 
George Washington beyond their partisan interests. As for her, she says she “can’t hand such a 
future to [her] children, the future that is contaminated by George Washington’s possible 
nuclear-accidents.” Anti-George Washington activists estimate that in case of an accident, “those 
who live in the 165 kilometer radius of Yokosuka would risk their lives, bodies, and 
properties”⎯the radius will cover not only the whole Kanagawa Prefecture but also Tokyo, 
Chiba, Shizuoka, Yamanashi, Saitama, Gunma, Nagano, Tochigi and Ibaraki Prefectures.68 
Nishikiori’s environmentalist concern as a mother seems to be related to her pacifist 
position as a daughter. The U.S.S. has a history of indiscriminate (“anti-terrorist”) bombings of 
Iraqis and Afghans; Nishikiori says “it is totally unacceptable that Yokosuka ends up 
contributing to the war, to killing of innocent citizens, even indirectly.” In addition to lending 
                                                                  




ports, airports, and other facilities, Japan’s host-nation support to the U.S. military, as stipulated 
in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan of 1960, 
includes Japan’s payment to the Japanese employees working in the U.S. bases in Japan.69 Many 
Yokosuka citizens live on the jobs provided by the U.S. base, while the city’s budget is 
supported by the Japanese state’s relevant payment. When I visit the vicinity of the base with 
Harada in June 2007, some Yokosukans’ economic reliance on the base is obvious even outside 
its properties⎯around the base, which is only about a five minute walk from a Keihin Kyūkō 
railroad station, Shioiri, I see a dozen or more high-rises for related Americans, small hotels and 
inns with English signs, ads for “home-staying,” and embroidery shops for insignia selling their 
works for 300 yen (3 dollars) apiece. Late in the night, Harada says one of the backstreets, Dobu 
Ita Dōri Street, will be filled with neon lights, American sailors, and prostitutes and other 
Japanese girls.70 During the Asia-Pacific War, the Yokosukans similarly worked for the Japanese 
naval base, whose facilities the U.S. occupied intact and uses even today. From March 1940 on, 
thousands of abducted Koreans were introduced to Yokosuka in order to construct the Japanese 
navy’s underground headquarters, airplane sheds, and other structures. Some of these Korean 
forced laborers were then dispatched to the “South,” that is, Palau, Iwo Jima, the Ogasawara 
Islands, and others, to construct naval facilities there.  As of August 15th 1945, there were 1,700 
                                                                  
69  Facing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Japan introduced the Iraq Special Measures Law in July 2003. 
The law enabled Japan to contribute to the U.S. military in broader dimensions than before. For instance, following 
the law, Japan dispatched its Self Defense Forces’ advance team to Iraq in December 2003. In the same month, 
some army personnel were similarly dispatched for the “humanitarian supports” of the Samawah residents. In June 
2007, Air Force units were also sent to transport some clandestine matters from Kuwait to Baghdad. Arguing that 
these acts violated the Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, about 5,600 citizens and 100 attorneys brought the issue to 
the court and gained a favorable ruling in the Nagoya District Court on 4/17/2008. The state did not appeal and 
withdrew the forces in December of the same year. See the plaintiff’s homepage, Jieitai Iraq Hahei Sashi-tome 
Shoshō no Kai at http://www.haheisashidome.jp/. 
70  Many have studied gender-related dynamics and sexually-motivated crimes around the U.S. bases 
throughout the world⎯see, for instance, Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics (London: Pandora, 1989). The oeuvre of a Japanese novelist, Ryū Murakami, shows the 
process through which the violently masculine consciousness emerges among the host country males, starting from 
their sense of being penetrated by the U.S. soldiers⎯see Murakami’s first novel, Kagiri-naku Tōmei ni Chikai Blue 
(Tokyo: Kōdan Sha, 1976).  
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Korean forced laborers left in Yokosuka. For various reasons, many of them decided to stay in 
postwar Yokosuka; constructing their own primary school (Chōsen shokyū gakkō in Japanese), 
these Korean survivors worked for a Toyota’s affiliate, Kantō automobile factory, until it shut 
down “recently” due to the recession, according to Harada. Now, Harada estimates there are 
1,000 resident Koreans in the city, extremely antagonized and impoverished after the anti-North 
Korean policies of the former prime ministers, Junichirō Koizumi (2001-6) and Shinzō Abe 
(2006-7 and 2012-).71 So, Yokosuka has a long history of economic reliance on the base, whether 
American or Japanese⎯they literally live with the reminders of their violent past and prospects 
of more violence to be exercised. Nishikiori insists, “nobody, especially no Japanese, should be 
blinded by their economic interests to kill other citizens in a war.” According to her, it is because 
“we [the Japanese] were invaders ourselves. When we are in the position to pay back [the moral 
debt that the Japanese incurred during the war], why would you even accumulate the debt even 
more [by indirectly contributing to another war]? It doesn’t sound right to me.” Although she 
generally seems to take more emotional distance from the Asia-Pacific War as compared to the 
previous generations, the introduction of the moral logic of exchange seems to enable her to 
engage herself. Perhaps it is because the logic turns her into an agent, the agent of repayment. 
Even though she is distanced from the actual event of the Asia-Pacific War by a generation, she 
becomes interested as soon as she thinks herself as a descendant of what she calls the “Japanese” 
                                                                  
71  The statistics are taken from my interview of Harada as well as Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō Shinsō Chōsa 
Dan, Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō Chōsa no Kiroku, Kantō Hen 1: Kanagawa, Chiba, Yamanashi (Tokyo: Kashiwa 
Shobō, 2002). Harada, a high school teacher by occupation, is the secretary general of Kanagawa Prefectural Team 
to Investigate into the Truths of Forced Mobilization of Koreans (Kanagawa Ken Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō Shinsō 
Chōsa Dan, since 1991). Ko’izumi and Abé politically thematized North Korean abduction (rachi) of Japanese 
civilians, causing the formation of an emotionally-charged, nation-wide movement not only against the criminality 
of the North Korean state but also against the North Koreans in general and their residents in Japan. The counter-
strategies taken by Japanese leftists were to point out the similar criminality of the prewar state of Japan, which had 
forcefully mobilized more than 10,000 Koreans for variously back-breaking kinds of labor in the Japanese Islands 
and elsewhere. Many Korean individual experiences of their departures from their natal villages can indeed be 
described as the Japanese state’s abduction of these innocent lives. See Kyungsik Pak, Chōsen-jin Kyōsei Renkō no 
Kiroku (Tokyo: Mirai Sha, 1990(1965)). Some of those Koreans who were sent to the south from Yokosuka were 
killed in battles⎯as I will mention later, their remains are still missing. 
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(nihonjin), the temporally stretched collectivity that she thus sets up at least for the purpose of 
moral exchange with Japan’s victims. 
Note here that the moral strategies that Nishikiori takes differ from those that the earlier 
generations have taken. In contrast to Kubodera, for instance, who seems to struggle to repay the 
actual victims that he murdered and damaged, Nishikiori suggests that she intends to repay the 
Iraqis and Afghans in the current wars. The debt was made in older Japanese’s relation to other 
Asians and Pacific Islanders; yet her suggestion is that her current civil activism to save the 
Iraqis’ or Afghans’ innocent lives will make a repayment to the long-killed victims in the rest of 
Asia and the Pacific. At least, the Japanese would not have to accumulate more debts by 
desisting from their contribution to the Iraq and Afghan Wars, according to her. A more or less 
similar logic has to be taken by anybody in the second generation, as it seems, even when they 
engage in civil movements for the Asian and Pacific victims of the WWII Japanese invasions. 
Even though Harada, who is in Nishikiori’s cohort, did not personally contribute to the 
institution of the forced Korean labor, he says he has to “correct the [past] wrongs” that were not 
corrected by the actual perpetrators, the prewar Japanese state and their agents, viz. older 
Japanese. A similar thing must be true to Uchida in his activism for other Asians’ justice. Their 
activism is moral-ethical acts, whose motivations were created even before they came of age. In 
these imagined moral exchanges, they are media, vessels that convey unfulfilled pasts into 
reconciliatory futures. These conveyances might need the media, to the degree that the past and 
future never coincide⎯humans are not meant for resurrection or restoration.72 The younger 
peace-families’ activism grows to be general and far-reaching, due to this type of displacement 
                                                                  
72  According to Marshall Sahlin, in the moral exchange of gifts among Maoris, “a direct return on the initial 
gift is excluded. In each instance [of gift-transmission], reciprocation passes by way of a third party. This mediation 
in every case brings issue to the original gift: by the transfer from the second party to the third, some value or effect 
is added to the thing given by the first party to the second. And one way or another, the first recipient (middle term) 
is menaced by destruction (mate) if the cycle is not completed.” See “The Spirit of the Gift,” Stone Age Economics 
(New York: Aldine Publishing Company), pp.149-183; pp.164-5; parentheses original. 
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between the past and future, between the motivation and acts, and between the agent of an event 
and the subject of the event’s responsibility. The younger families act as the conduit not only 
between these discrepancies; as the third party between these parties, the younger families 
introduce other events and other thoughts into these families’ movement. These other events and 
thoughts are not directly related to the perpetrators’ testimonies or the perpetrators’ families’ 
movements, yet associatively pertinent, like Nishikiori’s peace activism. Imaginative association 
seems to be the younger generations’ intellectual and pragmatic tool. The tool allows them to 
exchange the apologetic attitude and language that they inherited from the older generations with 
those similarly conscientious attitudes and languages developed in other civil movements. 
Through this process, the initial dialogism of Kubodera, Nishikawa, and others become tri-
logism and eventually multi-partied conversation. The language of more or less personal apology 
will subsequently become that of translation. The general language and multi-partied 
conversation seem to be the outcomes that the younger families seek, when some of their slogans 
are “cohabitation with [the rest of] Asia” (Asia to no kyōsei) and “future-oriented relationships” 
(mirai shikō no kankei) with others.73 Indeed, Nishikiori’s language is meant to be transmitted 
beyond Asia to the Middle East⎯to the warless future.  
These general goals and slogans can become fathomable only among the second or third 
generations, who think they are and should be distanced from the first generation’s immediate 
                                                                  
73  Here, the source of my inspiration is Walter Benjamin, who says “Although translation, unlike art, cannot 
claim permanence for its products, its goal is undeniably a final, conclusive, decisive stage of all linguistic creation. 
In translation the original rises into a higher and purer linguistic air, as it were. It cannot live there permanently, to 
be sure, and it certainly does not reach it in its entirety. Yet, in a singularly impressive manner, at least it points the 
way to this region: the predestined, hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages.” See 
his “The Task of the Translator: An Introduction to the Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux” in ed. and with an 
intro. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken Books, 
1968(1923)), pp.69-82; p.75. The “predestined, hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of 
languages” refers to memories of the future utopia to come, in which the pre-Babylonian unity of languages will be 
embodied in what he calls “pure language.” The idea of the ultimate language of translation, the pure language, is 
comparable with Marx’s concept of the “universal commodity,” according to Rosalind Morris, in that both guarantee 
the fundamental exchangeability of languages or commodities, thus enabling everyday exchanges of these things. 
See Morris, Ibid.; p.46. 
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needs for specific apologies. In the country’s discursive field, this thinking is known under the 
rubric of “postwar responsibility” (sengo sekinin), which is supposed to be contrasted with the 
actual perpetrators’ accountability (zaiseki). According to Hiroshi Taguchi, the postwar 
responsibility of the Japanese is the concept that focuses on the postwar Japanese “consciousness 
of [their] responsibility for the present and future, which should be based on [their] reflection [on 
the past].”74 He argues that the concept of postwar responsibility consists of three relevant 
ideas⎯first, that the war and the wrongs committed in the war were “done by others,” that is, by 
the past Japanese, who Taguchi thinks differ from the present Japanese.75 Second, the current 
Japanese still cannot help but “earnestly look at each individual victim’s ‘tiny’ existence, whose 
precious life and welfare were irreparably deprived” by the past Japanese.76 Third, those “various 
conditions (jōken) that enabled the [Japanese] invasions” still condition the contemporary 
Japanese society.”77 He says, “it is possible for the postwar generations to ‘reflect’ (hansei-suru), 
if [they] think that those individual atrocities or discriminations that were committed and 
exhibited in the ‘past’ war of invasions were unjust and if [they] judge that they and their society 
contain the potentiality of doing⎯or have been repeating⎯similar conducts [to those taken by 
the past Japanese]. Under these circumstances, reflections are possible, even though these 
mistakes [in the past] were done by others.”78 In this understanding, the subject of the atrocities 
is not inherited; the atrocities’ conditions are inherited, albeit unintentionally. Taguchi suggests 
that the postwar Japanese responsibility concerns itself with the future, with the creation of a 
                                                                  
74  See Taguchi, “Sengo Sedai no Sensō Sekinin wo megutte” in Kikan Sensō Sekinin Kenkyū, Vol.13 (Fall 
1996), 40-47; 44.  
75  Taguchi, Ibid.; 43. 
76  Taguchi, Ibid.; 47. 
77  Taguchi, Ibid.; 40. 
78  Taguchi, Ibid.; 43. 
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society that does not contain the potentiality for another example of atrocity, another instance of 
discrimination.   
One of the earlier thinkers about postwar responsibility, Yasuaki Ōnuma, says more 
specifically that what he calls the trans-war “foundation” (kiban) of Japanese society, based on 
which the atrocities were committed, has been maintained and still incessantly renewed in the 
postwar Japanese everyday unconsciousness of ethno-centrism. According to him, “when 
[people] try to form a thought on [the postwar Japanese] responsibility for the war and on the 
war’s position in Japanese history, the war tends to be treated as an independent phenomenon, as 
an abnormal event that is separated from the history of everyday human lives. Perhaps one of the 
important tasks for the theories of postwar responsibility is how to think through the war’s 
abnormality… and turn it into general thoughts on everyday lives.”79 Concretely, the “everyday 
lives” (nichijō-sei) under discussion refer to the trans-war structure of the Japanese society, in 
which “each individual Japanese in his/her everyday life stands in the discriminator’s or 
oppressor’s position toward the Koreans or Chinese and violates these people’s humanity.”80 
This structure of everyday discrimination (sabetsu) and oppression (yokuatsu) is deep-rooted in 
Japan’s modernization, in which Ōnuma suggests modernity has been misconstrued as Euro-
American cultures.81 It is this misconception that allowed the prewar Japanese to slaughter other 
Asians and Pacific Islanders remorselessly, since these people were supposed to be someone else 
than modern humans, according to his suggestion. Insofar as this misconception is still held 
among contemporary Japanese, they are responsible for resolving it; and this constitutes their 
                                                                  
79  See, Ōnuma Tokyo Saiban kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisō é (Tokyo: Yūshin-dō, 1985); p.116-7. 
80  Ōnuma, Ibid.; p.118. 
81  Ōnuma, Ibid.; p.183. 
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responsibility for other Asian and Pacific victims of the war.82 Postwar Japanese responsibility 
for the war, he states,  
 
would not be truly fulfilled by [the Japanese] apologies for the irrevocable past 
or by [their] monetary compensations as substitutes [for apologies]. The 
responsibility would be fulfilled only after the foundation on which the war was 
started is dissolved. [I] have to say that it is the responsibility of the whole 
postwar Japanese that this foundation still exists even to this date… To the 
extent that the Japanese society still keeps the foundation on which the Fifteen 
Year War was started, the Japanese today in their everyday lives share the 
experiences of the Fifteen Year War [as discriminators and oppressors of other 
Asian and Pacific people].83 
 
The postwar responsibility of the Japanese is the accumulated “non-actions of each individual 
[Japanese],” i.e. the absence of the accumulated efforts to correct their ethno-centrism and the 
ethno-centric society, Ōnuma similarly says.84 Note that responsibility, foundation, or everyday 
life, as he discusses, are at once historical and ahistorical concepts. They are historical in the 
sense that he problematizes the historically specific consciousness of modernity among the 
Japanese, which he suggests has been intimately connected with the categories of the “west,” 
“Asia,” “race,” “culture,” etc.85 The historicity of this view will be clear, when compared with 
the argument that attributes the Japanese atrocities to the supposedly cultural existence of the 
emperor (see previous chapters). At the same time, Ōnuma’s idea of the postwar Japanese 
responsibility looks ahistorical from the perspective that tries to look at the commodity structure 
of Japan’s fascism. Ōnuma’s problematization of Japan’s ethno-racial conflation between 
modernity and the west or between non-modernity and the rest of Asia will surely help him 
theoretically extract the structures of what he calls discrimination and oppression. But fascism, 
                                                                  
82  Ōnuma, Ibid.; p.183. 
83  Ōnuma, Ibid.; p.186.  
84  Ōnuma, Ibid.; p.188. 
85  He refers to Yoshimi Takeuchi and says that he agrees with Takeuchi in that “in [Takeuchi’s] Kindai no 
Chōkoku, [Takeuchi] shows his view that the war should be divided into two dimensions⎯the war that Japan fought 
with the U.S., Britain, and other imperial forces and the war in which Japan invaded [other] Asian countries⎯and 
that [Japan] is responsible for the latter only” (Ibid., p.167).  
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which I would think is responsible for Japan’s violence against the rest of Asia and the Pacific, 
would be out of his theoretical reach, unless he thematizes the commodity logic behind the 
violence. The argument that I have made throughout this dissertation is that Japan’s violence is 
historically specific to the mechanical reproductive mode of production that was achieved in 
Japan and the rest of the world during the 1920s and continued ever since. Without this 
historicist view, Ōnuma’s criticism of racial-ethnic discrimination looks to replicate the 
essentialist problem that is attached to the categories of race and ethnicity.  
 In spite of these points, Ōnuma or Taguchi’s idea of the postwar Japanese responsibility 
seems to prevail among progressive thinkers on prewar Japanese violence and its aftermath. A 
variation could be found in Kōjin Karatani and others, who argue that the trans-war foundation 
that caused the Japanese invasions is statist systematization of the society, most vividly 
represented and promoted by the “all-out” war policies among others.86 Tetsuya Takahashi 
presents a slightly different thought from others, stressing postwar Japanese accountability 
versus responsibility. According to him, postwar Japanese responsibility should fundamentally 
be “response-bility” (ōtō kanōsei), that is, the ethical ability and potentiality to respond to the 
other victims’ voices⎯a position that is similar to Yasuhiko Uchida’s or Akihiro Harada’s 
activisms.87 This focus on the ethical aspect of postwar Japanese response-bility seem to enable 
these leftists to reflect on the issue of the Japanese’s still on-going accountability. Even though 
the individual bodies of the postwar Japanese may not be those that actually committed the war-
crimes, “politically, the Japanese ‘qua Japanese’ should be [still] accountable” for these crimes, 
Takahashi argues.88 According to him, the “Japanese” (nihonjin) here are the concept that is 
                                                                  
86  See Karatani et. al., Ibid.; p.33. Similar position is presented by Yasushi Yamano’uchi, Victor Koschmann, 
and Ryūichi Narita eds. Sōryoku-sen to Gendai-ka (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1995).  
87  See his Sengo Sekinin-ron (Tokyo: Kōdan-sha, 2005(1999)); p.32. 
88  Takahashi, Ibid.; p.52.  
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close to Japanese citizens (shimin), who hold the “political right to pressure the Japanese 
government to formally admit its accountability [and compensate for the victims’ losses].”89 The 
postwar Japanese accountability to Takahashi is this right, which emerges in their represented 
relation with the Japanese state. The argument is meaningful in the historical context in which 
the Japanese state has never admitted its involvement in the Japanese war-crimes, except for the 
admission by Yōhei Kōno and a few other ethical representatives. I have also discussed that the 
Japanese state has never paid compensations to other victims.  
 As for the Kanagawa peace families association, Yasuhiko Uchida emphasizes the 
association’s moral “expansion of its agenda should not allow us to lose sight of our roots,” the 
ethical roots in their self-consciousness as the invaders’ families. In their “Agenda 2007,” they 
declare that they will “cooperate with support-organizations of those [other Asian] victims’ 
lawsuits [against the Japanese state and corporations], which demand the [Japanese] state’s 
sincere apologies and compensations for the losses and damages that [the Japanese state and 
corporations] inflicted [on these victims].” To take an example, the above-mentioned support-
group for South Korean draftees, represented by a former anti-Vietnam War activist, Kōji 
Misono’o, is one of those organizations with which the Kanagawa families has cooperated. On 
June 29th 2001, 252 South Koreans, including former draftees, forced laborers, and their families, 
started a suit against the Japanese state to take back the fallen South Koreans’ remains and their 
salaries. According to Misono’o, “there’re double, triple firewalls for the [Japanese] state not to 
return [either the remains or salaries].” During the war, the state effectively abducted some of 
these draftees and laborers; most of them were listed, if they were, in their forcefully assigned 
“Japanese” names (sōshi kaimei). War-time confusions similarly seem to contribute to the 
difficulty, which the Japanese state says it has in recovering lost records⎯for instance, some of 
                                                                  
89  Takahashi, Ibid.; p.56. 
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the forced Korean laborers taken to Yokosuka were then shipped to the South, as I have 
mentioned, making it hard to trace each individual laborer’s fate. “In the court room,” Misono’o 
lets me know, “they [the Japanese state] say they can’t return those things that they can’t locate. 
They say non-locatable things don’t exist legally; they have no legal obligation to return legally 
non-existent things, according to them.” To beat this logic, the South Koreans have “only 
humanitarian principles, the principle of justice,” Misono’o says. Out of the 252 plaintiffs, the 
first generation is dying; even over the year of 2005, he witnessed about 10 elder plaintiffs 
became unable to travel to Japan any longer. I do not recall how many times he says “time is 
getting short” during the two-hour interview in a chain coffeehouse, Renoir, near the Japan 
Railroad Nippori station, a walking distance from his employer, Arakawa Ward Office. Since 
local-level state-offices tend to strictly follow the legal principle of equal employment 
opportunity, many leftist activists are employed by them if not by private corporations, which try 
to avoid their activist experiences and critical thoughts. Sipping a characteristically small cup of 
Renoir coffee, I start wondering if time is getting short for the plaintiffs to achieve their justice in 
their lifetime or for the supporting Japanese to repay their moral debts directly to the actual 
victims.   
 As Yasuaki Ōnuma points out, the original injustice that the Japanese caused during the 
war, though, is probably not a one-time event but part of a sedimented structure, sedimented in 
the trans-national temporality of mechanical reproduction. Injustice seems to be constantly done 
to the most vulnerable kinds of labor force in any given time, placed in the clefts between 
domestic laws and international desires. In 1985, when Ōnuma wrote his book, the Japanese 
economy was expanding overseas, outsourcing factories and importing a labor force. Memories 
of Japan’s having continuously profited from the Korean War (1950-3) and Vietnam War are 
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still fresh, with the bitter after-tastes of having exploited Japan’s former colonies and occupied 
territories once again. After Japan’s “bubble” economy blew up in 1990, it might be somewhat 
nonsensical to entertain such an idea as Japanese discrimination or oppression of other Asians, as 
Ōnuma does. As Japan has steadily sunk into a deep quagmire of recessions, other Asian and 
Pacific countries, particularly South Korea and China, seem to be asserting their economic and 
political prowess. However, even in 2007, the wake of postwar Japan’s economic exploitation of 
the rest of Asia is still observable, at least in my eyes⎯rather, the wake manifests itself as odors 
in places like Kotobuki Town, Yokohama, a known town among day-contractors.  
 Today, Kubodera’s testimony is held in Kotobuki’s Kanagawa Labor Plaza. In one of the 
vinyl sofas in the hallway after the testimony, Nishikiori starts nibbling on the boiled eggs that 
she cooked with a kitchen timer so that they are perfectly coddled. Tetsushirō Yoshida, a 
bereaved son, finds and joins us, unsuccessfully convincing Nishikiori to trade one of her eggs 
with the convenience-store bought rice-balls that he brought with him. Having comfortably 
retired from one of the major trading companies, Yoshida spends days participating in various 
peace meetings. The classy Katsuko Tsuhako, an Okinawan who lost her father in the war, 
smilingly listens to their teases. Before she developed a heart problem, Tsuhako used to be one 
of the most eager representatives of the Kanagawa association of all. Yasuhiko Uchida 
approaches us with his usual, quiet smiles, asking how we liked Kubodera’s testimony today. 
Yoshida, the always-articulate leader of the families’ discussions, of course responds first⎯“I 
thought it was great. More than anything, I admire his courage.” Everybody guesses how much 
effort he had to make in order to “come out” from the more than sixty years of public silence. 
“Particularly in this kind of period,” Uchida points out, mentioning current neonationalism, in 
which the pop-culturally represented soldiers of Japan are always righteous⎯war-crimes like 
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Kubodera’s might look to be “lies” forged by the “brain-washing” Chinese.90 As we criticize 
such recent buzzwords as “pride,” “public-mindedness” (kōkyō shin), or “patriotism” (aikoku 
shin), unemployed laborers wander around outside the windows. We also discuss the violent 
slogan of one of the media-created “representatives” of neoliberal poverty, Karin Amamiya, “let 
us live!” (ikisasero). According to her, in these days the poor say they “hope something like war 
could happen” so that “they could be honored and paid [as soldiers] or they could restart [their 
lives in the social chaos created by a war].”91 A former singer in a rightwing punk-band, 
Amamiya, and the hitherto liberal Asahi Shinbun newspaper, which seems to be oddly willing to 
give her self-representational spaces, might seem to encourage an aesthetic simplicity of the 
logic that poverty leads to a war⎯as if these actors were expressing their hopes for a war in the 
stifling air of neoliberal distress. But of course the Kotobuki laborers’ unemployment and war 
should be connected through international mazes of injustice and inter-generational complication 
of memories.   
In muddy tank tops and paint-stained cargo pants, those middle-aged to elder males who 
pass outside the windows look characteristically spacy⎯perhaps they are already (or still) drunk. 
Yoshida casually proposes we go out to look, saying “C’mon, it’ll be educating.” Neither Uchida, 
Tsuhako, nor I have ever had a chance to explore the supposedly off-limit Kotobuki Chō. “Ah⎯, 
well, I guess I’ll go then,” I say. “Did I tell you I loved your being so curious and active 
(footwork ga karui)?” Nishikiori almost embraces me. As it turns out, there is a convenience 
                                                                  
90  See Yoshinori Kobayashi, Shin Gōmanism Sengen SPECIAL: Sensō Ron (Tokyo: Gentō Sha, 1998). In 
1997, Sankei Shinbun’s periodical for popular rightist readers, Seiron, and Bungei Shunjū’s equivalent, Shokun!, 
carried out a year-long campaign on the “lie of the Nanjing Massacre” and “brainwashed” repatriates from China, 
presumably including Hisao Kubodera. See, for instance, Ikuhiko Hata, “‘Sekai’ ga Mochi-ageru ‘Bujun Senpan 
Saiban’ Ninzai-sho no Yomi-kata” in Shokun! (August 1998): 158-169. See the leftists’ counter-arguments in 
Mitsuyoshi Himéda, “‘Sankō Sakusen’ wa Nakatta-noka: ‘Jōshiki wo Utagawa-reta’ Daigaku Kyōju ga Tanabe 
Toshi’o Shi ni Hanron-suru” in Seiron (April 1997): 284-9; Shōzō Tominaga, “Tanabe Toshi’o Shi no Hanron ni 
Kotaéru” in Chūkiren, 3 (December 1997), http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/index.htm. 
91  See her “2007 San’in-sen Ima-koso To’u: Hataraku Hinkon-sō, Dō Hoshō” in Asahi Shinbun, 7/19/2007. 
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store near the Labor Plaza, where these day-laborers (hi yatoi) buy 200 milliliter cups of sake 
(cup zake) and variously sized beers⎯sake for 200 yen and the smallest Sapporo or Asahi (200 
ml) for 350 yen. On the ground next to the convenience store, a stocky guy is in the middle of his 
nap, casually stretching his limbs in all directions and faintly smiling as if he were sleeping the 
king’s sleep. Hidetoshi Watanabe, a pastor and activist for these laborers, had once told me that 
the aging Japanese male laborers who gathered here struggled in the post-bubble economy. 
According to him, these laborers are unable to pay even the 2,200 yen (about 20 dollars) a day 
for a bed⎯outside Kotobuki, a room in a functional business-hotel would cost more than five 
times. The so-called “casual inns” (kan’i shukuhaku-jo) around here, which are a sort of 
dormitory equipped with bunk beds, seem to feature unusually low ceilings, as long as I can see 
from outside⎯perhaps to save the space. These inns emit strong odors of human flesh 
throughout the street; the inns apparently use chlorine, but the chemical seems to accentuate 
instead of erase the odors. According to Watanabe, during the boom, approximately 1,200 South 
Korean men came and supplemented the Japanese laborers here. These were former construction 
workers for the 1989 Seoul Olympics, who were unemployed after the Olympics were over. 
Philippines came after these South Koreans⎯then Japanese Brazilians, Pakistanis, and 
Bangladeshis. As of 2006, all but just more than 100 of them left, due to the recession and the 
post 9/11 “anti-terrorist” state of Japan, which has been willing to round up different-looking 
laborers on the street. Providing physical labor to Japan’s manufacturing industries now are 
mainly Chinese “interns,” whose ambiguous status is exploited so much so that their wages are 
reported to be only a few dollars per hour in one of the most notorious cases of all.92 
                                                                  
92  Some of the worst examples of these “interns” of all will be those six female Vietnamese, who worked for 
an apparel factory in Ibaraki Prefecture. According to their witness, the factory never let them have an access to the 
portion of their earning, which was supposedly “saved for them.” Subtracted this portion, the actual wage of these 
  
366 
  As the peace families and I come back to the entrance to the Labor Plaza, women who 
might be “hostesses” pass us. Hostesses, as they are so called, are female workers in night clubs 
and bars, who charge their male clients expensive “service charges” for their company.93 In the 
broad daylight, apparently in their off-time, the young females look rather vulnerable. Donning 
colorful, revealing T-shirts and black leggings, they swing the plastic bags from their shopping at 
the convenience store. Their Korean conversation momentarily stops as they get busy observing 
us, apparent intruders from uptown. We are also seen as Japanese intruders, I gather, who are 
regarded to belong to the community that has sexualized and capitalized on them—as war-time 
sex-slaves, “kisaeng” prostitutes for the postwar Japanese sex-tourism, and hostesses, as we see 
them in Kotobuki now.94 In the back-road of nearby Hinode Chō, I have seen a lot of small 
hostess clubs and brothels, which I hear hire Philippine, Taiwanese, in addition to Korean 
females. Those who feature them are known among not-so-well-off Japanese males as 
“Philippine pubs” or “Taiwan pubs.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
seamstresses was only about three hundred yen (three U.S. dollars) an hour. See “Gaikoku-jin Ukeire Minaoshi-ron 
Kōsaku” in Asahi Shinbun, 5/16/2007. 
93  See an ethnography by Anne Allison, Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a 
Tokyo Hostess Club (University of Chicago Press, 1994). Although she argues that hostess clubs concern themselves 
with sexuality and not sex, this argument might depend on the ethnicity and class of the hostesses and clients that 
one is talking about. In a movie, Tsuki wa Docchi ni Dete-iru, dir. by Yōichi Sai, (Tokyo: Ciné Canon, 1993), for 
instance, it is implied that in a tacky Kabukichō club, the heroine, Connie, and her colleagues from the Philippines 
might engage in prostitution upon the request from the not-so-affluent Japanese or resident Korean clients and from 
the resident Korean mistress of the club.  
94  The post-1960s South Korean prostitutes were sold in the nostalgic image of kisaeng, courtly entertainers. 
According to Namhee Lee (Ibid.; p.36; note 67), the number of these prostitutes amounted to 200,000 in 27 brothels 
in South Korea as of 1973. The customers were mainly Japanese males, who accounted for 80% of the country’s 
tourism in 1973, revenue-wise. Upon the above-mentioned statement that the imperial Japanese military “needed” 
sex slaves, made by the then Osakan mayor, Tōru Hashimoto, Hashimoto’s colleague in the same Japan Restoration 
Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) and a congressman, Shingo Nishimura, blogged, “it’s as if Korea was exporting comfort 
women (ianfu). You’ll know what I’m talking about once you walk down the street of Tokyo or Osaka downtown 
during the night. Even the Korea that became rich is exporting comfort women. I wonder how many they exported 
when it was poor.” It is in political insensitivity and historical anachronism that Nishimura calls the Korean 
prostitutes on the contemporary “street of Tokyo or Osaka downtown” “comfort women.” Despite many criticisms, 
he remains in his office as of June 2013. See Fumihiko Hori and Yukiko Hayashi, “Nishimura Shūin Giin: Netto ni 
‘Kankoku, Ianfu Yushutsu’: Hashimoto-shi Hatsugen ‘Tōzen’ to Yōgo,” Mainichi Shinbun, 5/18/2013. 
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 Of course, these men and women are not just victims of Japanese ethno-centrism and 
sexism. One can say that they came to Japan to agentically take advantage of the ecumenical 
flow of capital and labor-force. At the same time, the “racial” and gender discriminations that 
they are facing in Japan are real. Ōnuma and other thinkers of postwar Japanese responsibility 
would say that these are the kinds of discrimination that keep conditioning the Japanese for 
another instances of invasions and atrocities. I ask, “If racism and sexism are resolved, then 
would the condition of fascism be resolved? Is fascism the same thing with racism or sexism? 
What caused the Japanese invasions and atrocities?” According to my position, racism or sexism 
is relevant to corporatist, versus fascist, desires, which try to create a hierarchical order in the 
middle of the massive flows of labor force or commodities (see Chapter 3). Philippine or Korean 
females are assigned to some of the most exploited jobs in Japan today due to the socio-
economic structures that are created by corporatist interests, which profit from differences and 
distances. Fascism, according to my previous analyses, is a product of another line of desires, 
desires for equivalence without differences. Fascist desires might have motivated the 
Japanization of Korean names, to take an example⎯the Korean alignment to the form of the 
Japanese subject. Certain ethno-centrism must surely have existed in this motivation, which 
distinguished Koreans from Japanese. At the same time, I am not sure if ethno-centrism or 
racism alone could explain the more prominent feature of this instance⎯the momentum of 
alignment itself, standardization, commoditization. This view and not the view of racism will 
have easier time, explaining the massness of the war-crimes committed. In just one campaign by 
Kubodera’s Division 59, more than 140 Shanxi villagers were slaughtered and more than 100 
houses were burnt.95 In another campaign by the same division, over 3,000 date trees in a village 
                                                                  
95  See the division’s last commander, Shigeru Fujita’s testimony, “Chūgoku Jinmin no Kandai Seisaku ni 
tsuite” in Chūkiren, 2 (September 1997), http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/index.htm. 
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were sawed down⎯an act of cruelty in the village whose main source of income was the dates.96 
The question is whether the Japanese soldiers committed these atrocities because their victims 
were Chinese. Would the Japanese have committed similar mass-crimes against, say, the 
Russians, whom they tend to regard as “westerners”? A Japanese historian, Akira Fujiwara, 
points out that in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) the Japanese humanely treated Russian 
hostages according to the Geneva Convention.97 But could one compare these two different wars 
in different historical contexts⎯one before the mode of mechanical reproduction and the other 
after the mode’s saturation of the world? A view on racism, sexism, and other corporatist desires 
for difference is important, which this dissertation has not ignored (see Chapter 3). But, a more 
important view to understand the war’s atrocities are desires for sameness, proliferation, and the 
massive scale, in which the atrocities and crimes were carried out. It is a view of this aspect of 
the war that seems to be lacking in the contemporary Japanese leftist discourses.98  
This chapter has attempted to salvage these discourses, though, by focusing on their 
morality and ethics. The kind of morality in which the leftists seem to have engaged concerns 
itself with the process of apologetic and compensatory exchange with Japan’s victims. The kind 
of ethics that the leftists seem to exhibit manifests itself as their orientation toward the ideas of 
                                                                  
96  See Chūgoku Kyōsan Tō Fun Ro Yo Hen Ku Tō Iin Kai, “Kōnichi Konkyo Chi no ‘Sankō’” in Chūkiren, 4 
(March 1998), http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/index.htm. 
97  See his “Nichū Sensō wa Nani de atta ka” in Chūkiren, 4 (March 1998), 
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/tyuukiren/web-site/index.htm. 
98  While he does not thematically focus on the mode of mechanical reproduction, Takashi Fujitani 
acknowledges a watershed in the Japanese state policies concerning race and ethnicity. According to him, after 1937, 
the state developed biopolitical ideologies of equality and assimilation, which bore tense dialectics between ethno-
centric ideologies and its ideological denial. See his “Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and 
Japanese as Americans during WWII,” Representations, 99 (Summer 2007): 13-39. He argues that the “anti-racial” 
ideologies in Japan should be framed in their intertextual relation with those similar policies that were 
simultaneously developed in the United States. Prasenjit Duara presents another view that the assimilationist policies 
in Japan were developed after the First World War, together with similar policies pursued by other “postcolonial” 
nations such as Germany, Italy, the U.S., and Kuomintang China. According to his terminology, these countries’ 
anti-racist ideologies were parts of what he calls imperial nationalism, versus civic nationalism of Britain or France. 
Duara maintains that imperial nationalism’s assimilationism opposed the racist exclusionism previously exhibited by 
civic nationalism. See his Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). 
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justice and responsibility for theses victims. The leftist Japanese may not be able to completely 
dissolve, or even consciously notice, the condition and possibility of fascism. Yet these leftists’ 
everyday efforts for new moral habits and ethical thoughts should be appreciated as such, i.e. in 
their everydayness without completion, orientation without destination. The younger activists in 
contemporary Japan have inherited moral and ethical thoughts and language from the remorseful 
Japanese perpetrators and their families, but these inherited thoughts and language are always 
incomplete⎯and thus becoming. And it is in this transitional, dynamic state that these projects 
seem to have secured a concrete space for mourning other losses in the midst of the otherwise 
forgetful times of postwar Japan. This chapter has ethnographically analyzed the generational 
stretch of such a space, which constitutes another death-space for futures.  
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Conclusion: Anthropology of Fascism, Fascism of Anthropology 
  
 Back in New York City, I am sitting in a café that is chilled to the temperature of a meat 
locker. The café is crowded with college students. During the summer break though, apparently 
some students remain in this quarter of the city near a college⎯or perhaps the young customers 
in the café are incoming summer students. In tank tops, shorts, and “Longchamp” nylon bags, 
girls are well sun-tanned, as if they never heard of the danger of UV rays. Turning the brims of 
their “N.Y. Yankees” caps backward, boys similarly seem to care about carefree appearances⎯if 
they try to emulate anything, they emulate the classical body of blithe athletes. A few years after 
my fieldwork, the impression of Japanese boys and girls still linger in me, their bodies that show 
off the traces of their efforts to be as thin as humanly possible. Bihaku, or “beauty/whiteness,” is 
the mantra among the Japanese girls nowadays, somewhat off the “racist” context of the global 
fashion industry and more in tune with the neonationalist discourse of the domestic environmen-
tal industry. In this discourse, to be conscious about the UV rays and other environmental factors 
is to contribute to the industry, the industry that the Japanese state promotes as one of the saviors 
of the country’s recessionary economy. The recessionary economy might indeed be the ultimate 
signified that these thin and pale girls and boys are pointing at⎯the thinning wealth of the nation 
and fading spirits of its people. These girls and boys seem to be surely oppressed⎯under the pre-
text of the ecologism of downsizing, restaurants nowadays serve half-sized dishes for the same 
prices as before. The morality of thankfulness for the given context feeds these underfed boys 
and girls. But are they more oppressed than their protein- or steroid-injected American counter-
parts, their new focus on the muscular body in the midst of the variously imagined “terrorist” 
attacks? This middle-aged American male, who is sitting with me over my chapters, thinks so.  
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 “Lord, it’s terrible,” he exclaims with big sighs, as he stops reading them. “‘Women are 
child-bearing machines’⎯I mean… Is it true? What do people say in Japan⎯do they even com-
plain about it? If anybody in his position said anything even remotely close to that in this country, 
he’d have to quit his job.” He is talking about my description of the controversial remark made 
by the then head of the Health, Welfare, and Labor Ministry of Japan, Hakuo Yanagisawa. De-
spite the feminist and leftist objections, Yanagisawa did not take any kind of responsibility for 
his remark, which imaginatively mechanized female bodies as the sources of the labor force. I 
say I agree with him that the remark is terrible. Now, his eyes are mellow, even sympathetic in a 
somewhat condescending way, as he asks, “Is it because of the Japanese tradition that people sort 
of accepted it [Yanagisawa’s remark]?” That is, I suppose, the Japanese are conditioned by their 
“tradition” to meekly “accept” even the most controversial remark made by officials. Traditional 
Japan, democratic U.S.⎯here you go, I think in my mind, now seeing where our talk is headed. 
Living in the U.S. society, the destination is pretty familiar to me, the destination that I usually 
feel too weak or lethargic to reset. Travellers to this destination are often times as earnest and 
(condescendingly) sympathetic as this man in the café. Sympathetic, since I am a woman from 
Japan, I guess, the supposed victim of the country’s tradition. Condescending, since the U.S. so-
ciety is supposed to have already overcome tradition-based oppressions, I also surmise. This man, 
who is sipping a certain kind of latté to compensate for my brief silence, is not even uneducat-
ed⎯supposedly, he has a social science master’s degree or two. Being at a loss, again, about 
what to say in front of the power of belief, I entertain in my mind the fresh memory of the then 
Republican Senate nominee from Missouri, Todd Akin, who has kept campaigning, despite his 
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pro-life statement on “legitimate rape.”1 “Let me see my chapter again⎯didn’t I say there were 
some opposition movements against him [Yanagisawa]?” I say anyway.  
 Receiving the hardcopy from him, I ask in my mind if the point is Japanese tradition or 
its modernity. According to the minister’s trope, Japanese female bodies are machines⎯their 
function to digest inputs of energy, programs, and environments and to produce precisely appro-
priate quantities and qualities of outputs. Why is the kind of oppression that uses the trope of 
machines considered traditional? In the minister’s ideal, the country should consist of the stand-
ardized (“healthy,” according to him) unit of a man, woman, and their two children. This nucleus 
should then be repeated everywhere in the country to completely populate its territory with the 
proliferated standard of the nuclear family. The national space will infinitely extend with a calcu-
lated supply of the self-reproducing labor force; the national time will also stretch into eternity 
with the steady provision of the pension-premium-paying offspring. Presenting the futuristic pic-
ture of the machine-precise bodies and their quality-controlled multiplication, the minister’s re-
mark should rather be criticized in terms of the specifically fascist, instead of generally modern, 
problematic. Avarice, envy, obsession, and other excessive factors of capitalist human interac-
tions are carefully excluded from the picture. People who inhabit this picture are formed into the 
molds of the father, mother, and child, and as such, mechanically functioning for the moralized 
nation-state. Would this picture be shared by those outside Japan, who would similarly try to de-
limit females’ sexuality into the form of heterosexual marriage and females’ reproductive rights 
                                                                  
1  According to John Eligon and Michael Schwirtz, “Senate Candidate Provokes Ire with ‘Legitimate Rape’ 
Comments,” The New York Times, 8/19/2012, the Tea Party-backed Akin remarked in a local TV interview that “If 
it’s a legitimate rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down,” that is, to prevent pregnancy. 
The idea represented by Akin is supposedly well known among anti-abortion activists as the “forcible rape” theory, 
advocated most prominently by a medical doctor, John C. Willke⎯see Pam Belluck, “Health Experts Dismiss 
Assertions on Rape,” The New York Times, 8/20/2012. In the midst of wide-ranged criticisms against the remark, 
the National Republican Senatorial Committee withdrew its support of Akin⎯see Jonathan Weisman and John 
Eligon, “G.O.P. Trying to Oust Akin from Race for Rape Remarks,” The New York Times, 8/20/2012. The 
democrat candidate, Claire McCaskill, won the senate seat in Missouri.    
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into the form of nuclear family? Are not these forms ultimately good for capitalist 
(re)production? This dissertation has argued that fascism is a general problem.  
 My dissertation has started its endeavor by asking, should one refer to the theoretical cat-
egory of fascism in discussing the physical violence and political oppressions that were exercised 
by the prewar Japanese state and its subjects? Is fascism a specifically European phenomenon 
appearing only during the two World Wars? How could a historicist position that focuses on ma-
terial conditions of phenomena re-define fascism without resorting to such questionable concepts 
as “tradition” or “culture”? In an attempt to answer these questions, I have problematized the de-
sires and anxieties of differences that seem to underline the ordinary association of fascism with 
Nazism or Fascismo only. These desires and anxieties feature the supposedly “different” parties 
as well, resulting in culturalist self-explanations of those phenomena that otherwise replicate the 
core features of either Nazism or Fascismo. In Japan, the oppressions and violence of the 1920-
40s have been analyzed in terms of the supposed origin and embodiment of the country’s differ-
ence, viz. the emperor; the violence has been variously called “imperial absolutism,” “imperial 
fascism,” or “ultra-statism.” According to these theories, due to its cultural difference and histor-
ical delay, Japan has yet to be conditioned for fascism, for its bureaucratic systematicity and ret-
rogressive savagery. Nazism (if not Fascismo) is a retrogressive rupture inserted into the midst 
of high modernity attained, these theories suppose; Japan’s “imperialism” is the manifestation of 
the highest possible stage of the country’s historical development. According to these theories, 
there is no retrogression or detour in the Japanese case. If one follows these theories, the Japa-
nese and European kinds of violence met each other at the intersection where European fascism 
retrogressively caught up with Japan in the past of Europe, while Japan was trying to catch up 
with Europe in the future of Japan. In this culturalist imagination, what is truly prominent is nei-
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ther the European civilization’s momentum to regress nor the Japanese culture’s specificity to 
remain different and delayed; the outstanding feature of the imagination is rather the degree of 
those desires and fears that have constructed the imagination to begin with. Focusing its attention 
on such desires for and fears of delays and differences, this dissertation has been fundamentally 
anthropological in its inquiries. My dissertation has attempted to locate the genesis of these de-
sires and fears, which are responsible for the theories of Japan as non-fascist. The genesis that I 
have presented is modernity⎯I have argued that modernity generates both the theories and phe-
nomena of fascism.   
 As for the phenomena of fascism, to argue their modernity is to attempt to see the con-
temporaneity of the kinds of violence that Europe and Japan experienced in the 1920-40s⎯cold 
mechanicity, mechanical repetitiveness, and intense massivity, with which persecution, depriva-
tion, and extermination of different lives were planned and conducted. Both in Europe and Japan, 
these plans and conducts accompanied the perpetrators’ disinterests in their acts’ political and 
ethical consequences. The perpetrators were instead interested in their acts’ aesthetic conse-
quences⎯how their acts could project an image of homogenized, unified, and aligned lives. In-
verted temporality characterized both the European and Japanese kinds of violence, in which rep-
resentation of acts was the end. The actors were embraced by a perverted sense of aristocra-
cy⎯the sense of their omnipotence, license, and transcendence, with which the actors thought 
they could realize whatever they planned and represented. The aesthetic replacement of reality 
and the narcissistic inversion of temporality, both in the European and Japanese instances repli-
cated and accentuated the modern primacy of appearances over their contents. Fascism as a per-
verted accentuation of modernity was and is a potentiality generally shared by any country or 
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region⎯as long as the temporality of these countries or regions has been determined by the 
modern issue of displacement.  
Particularly in the phase of mechanical reproduction, the issues of abstraction and repeti-
tion deepened, so that these issues were discussed as the crises to be immediately and completely 
solved. What seemed to be particularly urgent was the phenomenon of the mass, the reified 
products of mass-reproductive technologies as well as the producers and consumers of mass-
reproduced products. The masses appeared to replicate a given form, heedless of any organic dis-
tinctions; their replication seemed to contain a power, the power of dispersion over any border-
lines. To the extent that the contemporary world is still conditioned in the mass-reproductive 
mode of production, fascist promises of an immediate and complete solution of the mass phe-
nomenon are dangerously seductive⎯even if these promises are not real solutions but appear-
ances of solutions. Perhaps it is we the modern capitalist subjects, who would rather see the cin-
ematic and otherwise represented organization of the mass, as fascists represent it. Fascists are 
not equipped with the real power to materially change the condition of mechanical reproduction, 
but this inability might be what the middle-classed subjects of modern capitalism would like.  
In an attempt to organize the phenomenon of the mass, fascists project an idealized image 
of commoditized equality among the mass. This projection effectively spotlights commodity log-
ic, which is ordinarily buried in people’s everyday unconsciousness. Fascism is tautology, rhe-
torically speaking; its aesthetic quality is uncanniness. Look at how fascists geometrically pat-
terned a monumental space in Nuremberg with the mass-reproduced Nazi Party members.2 Look 
at how they populate the equally monumental “shrine” of Yasukuni with standardized “spirits” 
of Japanese soldiers. These German and Japanese fascists then and now are the literal and sym-
                                                                  
2  See Leni Riefenstahl, Triumph of the Will (Bloomington, Il: Synapse Film, 2001(1935)). 
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bolic movie-directors who project the deepest secret of the modern capitalist life, the mechani-
cally reproduced self and world. A surrealistic arrest of the Real, fascist representations and fas-
cism as representation command a strange allure, attracting both desires and anxieties of the 
mass-reproduced and -reproductive subjects.  
This dissertation applied the thesis of fascism’s modernity and generality to contempo-
rary Japanese society. The historical specificity of the instance of contemporary Japanese fas-
cism is that it builds on the unsolved legacies of the country’s prewar fascism. The first chapter 
of the dissertation, entitled “The Emperor’s Infants Now,” has studied the way in which such 
legacies are inherited and advanced by unconsciously fascist actors. The particular legacies un-
der discussion are the literal remains of the Japanese soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-
1945), which are still widely strewn throughout the former battlefields. The petty bourgeois ideo-
logues that I discussed in this chapter demanded these remains be recovered, according to the 
principles of democratic equality and equality among the state subjects. By not criticizing the 
war or modern wars in general, these ideologues unconsciously reveal the way in which prewar 
fascism and postwar democracy of Japan are continuous in the subjected minds. This chapter has 
analyzed this continuum by clarifying the structure of the subject, which underlies both the re-
gimes of democracy and fascism. The subject structure in turn is predicated on the structure of 
the commodity. It is true that the ideologues are consciously making the moral claim of demo-
cratic or statist equality between the fallen soldiers and living Japanese. But unconsciously, they 
are presenting the aesthetic picture of formal equation between the fascist and democratic sub-
jects. Not unlike the above-mentioned picture of Japan filled with childbearing machines, the 
picture presented by these ideologues represents the idea of equivalence by commodity logic. 
Theoretically, the uncanny appeal of this picture to the modern capitalist subject lies in the sub-
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ject’s unconscious understanding of this equivalence⎯the unconsciousness that the subject 
needs in leading the everyday life.  
 The second chapter, “Theories of Delay: The Petty Bourgeois Formation of Postwar Fas-
cism,” has thematized the category of class, which features the pre- and post-war ideologies and 
practices of fascism in Japan. Materially delayed in the country’s modern economy due to its 
strategically impoverished state, the petty bourgeois Japanese have been positioned to find their 
elective affinities with the fascist ideal of equality. This class of Japanese has also been ideologi-
cally “delayed,” made into the nationalized “folk”⎯the imagined delay that corresponds to the 
ideology of the delay of the supposedly ancient emperor. This chapter was an ethnographical 
study of how the petty bourgeois veterans of the Asia-Pacific War were materially and ideologi-
cally situated to maintain the ideal of equality among the Japanese emperor’s “infants” (sekishi). 
Introducing the Freudian theory of melancholia, I have argued that these veterans’ ideological 
maintenance is closely related to the veterans’ inability to mourn the other losses that Japan’s 
fascism caused. During the war, it was the ideology of the emperor’s infants which killed Japa-
nese and other communists, feminists, and dissidents who were regarded as not fitting the idea. 
What is more, the lives of 20 million other Asians and Pacific Islanders were claimed under the 
same rubric of equality, equality among the infants, equality in death. To the petty bourgeois 
Japanese after the war, the memories of other victims have presented another chance of fascism. 
I have used the term, “second fascism,” to explain this new chance, the chance for aesthetically 
organizing these memories of others into a fantasy of the self.  
 The Yasukuni Shinto Shrine in Tokyo, where these veterans gather together, constitutes 
what I have called the “death space” in contemporary Japan. This is a catacomb underneath cor-
porate Japan, where the fascist past of the country and fascism’s underlying logic of the com-
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modity have grotesquely been exhibited throughout the postwar days. The dark space of death 
should be contrasted with the rest of the country, where peace and prosperity have been earned in 
exchange for the memories of these pasts and past ideals. Chapter 3, “Incorporating the Every-
day: Or, the Corporatist Representation of War Machines,” has focused on the way in which the 
ordinary, bourgeois Japanese traded their wartime libido toward fascist ideologies with their 
postwar enthusiasm for economic activities. Ethnographically studying the suburban everyday, 
my third chapter has showed that the intensified division of gendered labor in postwar Japan has 
fueled the economic mania, motivating the conservative minds in the suburbs to problematize 
such a mania. It is not that the suburban conservatives are against the gendered difference per se. 
These bourgeois conservatives problematize the way in which the gendered division of labor is 
accomplished through unconscious acts of the everyday in mechanically compelled ways. The 
conservatives try to tame this compulsion by moralizing the gendered division. For this purpose, 
the conservatives rehabilitate the prewar ideology of the “emperor’s body” or kokutai. Mobiliz-
ing the ideology’s language of the bodily, the organic, and the sacred, the conservatives attempt 
to discursively hierarchize the newly gendered masses of postwar Japan. Corporatist in its orien-
tation toward the idea of an organic hierarchy, the recycled ideology of the emperor’s body dif-
ferentiates itself from the remnant ideology of the emperor’s infants. In contrast to the petty 
bourgeois ideology of the emperor’s infants, which aims at equality under the emperor, bour-
geois corporatism aims at hierarchy under the same emperor. This chapter has demonstrated that 
Japan’s postwar fascism has developed in its dialectic with neo-corporatism. Together, these two 
projects’ agents, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, have struggled to resolve the renewed 
issue of the mass and also to repress the voices of other victims of Japan’s fascism.  
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 The fourth chapter of this dissertation, “Internet Fascism and Resurgence of the Grass-
roots,” shed light on fascism’s media. One of the contradictions of fascism is its accentuation of 
commodity logic in an effort to solve the manifestation of the intensified logic of the commodity, 
i.e. the mass phenomenon. In order to bind the distracted and dispersing mass, fascists project an 
idealized image of commoditized equivalence. Translated as equality, the image of equivalence 
intrigues the mass, yet the image merely reiterates the condition of the mutually identical and 
atomized mass. Media among the mass become an important issue to fascists, in order for them 
to solve the problem of the mass dispersion. The emperor, führer, and other figures of the leader 
are examples of such media. In 2006, visitors of the Yasukuni Shrine emphasize the mass media 
of the Internet and cell phones, in addition to the emperor. Earlier than the currently observable 
Internet movement of participatory democracy, which has been promoted since the Fukushima 
earthquake of 2011, those Internet users who gathered in the shrine in 2006 represented them-
selves as the “grassroots” (sōmō). The loaded term, the grassroots, showed these masses’ desires 
for equality under the symbol of the emperor. At the same time, the interactive technology of the 
Internet allowed the masses to imagine their mutual connectivity without any leader. In the im-
poverishing context of neoliberalism, the masses’ desires for participation and equality made a 
sharp contrast to the previously dominant tendencies toward centralization and hierarchy, exem-
plified through TV. This chapter has provided a certain history of mass media, in which I have 
argued that TV was a corporatist tool among the bourgeoisie. The temporality of simultaneity 
that the Internet promises is currently replacing the spatiality of stillness that TV has constructed. 
I have analyzed this transformation in terms of these medias’ affinity with fascism.  
 Chapter 5 is entitled “Disruptions: Other Voices and Mournful Responses.” This chapter 
has introduced critical movements staged by those Japanese activists who struggle to mourn oth-
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er losses in other Asian and Pacific countries, those losses that Japan’s fascism caused and has 
left uncompensated. To these peace activists, to mourn other losses means to look at the effects 
of the fascist ideal of equality; and to look at these horrendous effects is to cut the loop of fascist 
formation in trans-war Japan. More than sixty years since the end of the war, the labor of mourn-
ing is a project transmitted over several generations. The first generation’s efforts are those of the 
perpetrator, starting from the attempts just to address their victims. Situating these former war 
criminals’ apologies in the modern capitalist everyday, I have abstracted two significant momen-
tums in their apologies, viz. the ethical and moral ones. Pragmatically defined as consideration of 
others and considered exchanges with others respectively, the ethical and moral momentums of 
these apologies are then inherited by the second and third generation Japanese. Although these 
younger Japanese insist that they are not accountable for the actual violence of Japan’s fascism, 
they try to continue to consider other victims ethically and morally anyway. For, according to the 
younger Japanese, they are responsible for resolving the everyday contexts of fascist potentiali-
ties in contemporary Japan. According to my diagnosis, fascist potentialities and their roots in 
commodity logic are not something that could be resolved; these activists believe otherwise, 
since their historical materialism decides that wartime Japanese violence was caused by modern 
“racist discrimination.” Perhaps this decision of theirs exhibits the degree to which they are satu-
rated with the logic of the commodity, which belongs to the realm of the everyday unconscious. 
No one (including myself) can step outside to see, which is what I have meant by the generality 
of fascism. However, this chapter has called these younger participants’ partial and incomplete 




 This dissertation therefore submits the anthropological thesis that fascism is a general 
phenomenon among the modern capitalist nations, particularly in the mode of mechanical repro-
duction. The question that is to be asked next will be, “how can we conceive of the fascism of 
anthropology?” There are two prospective avenues toward the answer to this question, which 
have been partially explored. One problematizes the way in which the disciplines of anthropolo-
gy and ethnology in Japan (both minzokugaku in Japanese) cooperated with the fascist state prior 
to and during the war. 3 According to these studies, these disciplines were instrumental, particu-
larly in ideologically defining the “race” (jinshu), “people” (minzoku), or “culture” (bunka) of 
Japan and other Asian and Pacific countries. After these categorizations, the disciplines are 
known to have worked for the “all-out” war state in the latter’s endeavor to “equalize” other 
Asians and Pacific Islanders as the same labor force as the Japanese.4  
Another avenue that future studies regarding the fascism of anthropology could explore is 
to reconsider “Japan” as it is anthropologically represented for the “western” audience. In classi-
cal anthropological texts, the country has been the champion of mimesis, a garbled, fun house 
caricature of western practices.5 According to these texts, Japan embodies either “alternative” 
modernity with a “cultured” inflection or a modern culture that lacks the western type’s rationali-
ty. Japan has adopted modern technologies, yet the Japanese minds are not fully modern, they 
say. The narrated contrast between Japan’s modern appearance and its non-modern spirit is sup-
posed to feature other “non-western” countries as well, according to these texts. Japan merely 
                                                                  
3  See Eiji Oguma, ‘Nihon-jin’ no Kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen Shokumin-chi Shihai kara Fukki 
Undō made (Tokyo: Shin’yō Sha, 1998); Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East 
Asian Modern (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Tōru Sakano, Teikoku Nihon to Jinrui Gakusha: 
1884-1952-nen (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2005).  
4  See Ichirō Tomiyama, “Nettai Kagaku to Shokumin-chi Shugi: ‘Tōmin’ wo meguru Sa’i no Bunseki-gaku” 
in Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary, and Toshio Iyotani eds., Nationality no Datsu Kōchiku (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 
1996), 57-80.  
5  See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Cleveland and New 
York: Meridian Books, 1967(1946)); Robert J. Smith, Japanese Society: Tradition, Self, and the Social Order 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).  
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represents the contrast in the sharpest possible way, they maintain. The question that future re-
search on the fascism of anthropology should ask is, what is the essence or content of modernity, 
which Japan and the rest of the ‘non-west’ are said to have failed to adopt? Can one think that 
Japan in these texts is made to mimic the true being of modernity, which is technologies and ap-
pearances themselves and nothing more or deeper? Is not Japan textually made to uncannily ex-
hibit modernity’s secret existence as appearances? Are the authors of these texts trapped by the 
allure of uncanny Japan that they have (probably) unconsciously generated? Of course the un-
canny structure of the inside-outside reversal and entrapment in the allure of such a structure 
alone would not deserve the label of fascism. What I would like to suggest is differ-
ent⎯fascism’s ubiquity, or rather the ubiquity of the condition on which fascism is predicated. 
Fascism and anthropology share the same condition of commodity logic, the everyday uncon-
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